CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06629857
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01084
• Publication Date: February 21, 1957

Approved for Release: 2017/09/22 C06629857
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IDENT1AL
CURRENT
� INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 17
OCI NO. 0059/57
21 February 1957
DOCUMENT NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Approved for Release: 2017/09/22 C06629857
Approved for Release: 2017/09/22 C06629857
"3764.E',
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 1957
The USSR is
reportedly withholding promised
economic credits and threaten-.
ing even greater sanctions,
such as suspension of Soviet
shipments of iron ore, oil, and
grain, which, however, are
still arriving. It is also
hampering the repatriation of
Poles now in the USSR. There
are indications, too, of stronger
Soviet opposition to Gomulka's
efforts to improve relations
with the West and to seek credits
and assistance from that dirpr-
tion.
SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
Recent Kremlin moves ap-
� pear calculated to bring the
dispute with Tito to a head.
The Russian leaders appear
willing to read Tito completely
out of the Communist world un-
less he is willing to make suf-
ficient compromises in his
position to allow some new form
of modus vivendi. The Kremlin
presumably has no intention of
returning to such Stalin-era
types of pressure on Yugoslavia
as border incidents, name call-
ing, and complete economic
blockade. In its present for-
eign policy orientation of
"coexistence," it will presum-
ably find a way of coexisting
with Tito, but not as a com-
radely Communist.
The Kremlin leaders' in-
creasing fears over Gomulka's
course in Poland may be the
cause of the stepped-up pace of
their anti-Tito moves, even
though they probably had con-
cluded by November that Yugo-
slavia, with its present atti-
tude, could no longer be toler-
ated even in a "fringe" position
in the Communist world. Soviet
bloc propaganda has often con-
nected Yu oslav and Polish
ideas
PART II
The strongest official
Soviet statement thus far was
made by Dmitry Shepilov in his
final report as Soviet foreign
minister on 12 February when he
made future development of all
Yugoslav-Soviet relations con-
tingent on a change in the
Yugoslav ideological attitude.
Belgrade has reacted sharply
to this, stating that since
Yugoslavia bore no responsibil-
ity for the past abnormal re-
lations, further development of
relations would depend on the
Soviet attitude, and that the
Yugoslav position remains un-
changed.
Moscow is also reported to
have proposed a meeting of all
Communist leaders to take place
this spring in Prague to settle
ideological differences and
establish Communist unity. The
Yugoslays refused an invitation,
however, believing they would
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 3 of 17
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 1957
be placed in the position of a
defendant before hostile judges.
The Yugoslays report that
their recent economic negotia-
tions with Moscow have taken
place in an "icy" climate. They
say they have found the USSR
recalcitrant on reaching rea-
sonable prices for such items
as coking coal, as well as on
determining quotas for numerous
other goods. They also report
that Moscow is now unwilling to
start implementing the joint
Soviet-East German 700,000,000
ruble ($175,000,000) credit for
the development of a large alu-
minum complex in Yugoslavia
until the present Soviet Five-
Year Plan is completed in 1961.
The Yugoslays view the Soviet
retreat on this project and on
the agreement to assist in
developing the Yugoslav nuclear
energy program as an explicit
pressure tactic.
During all these moves,
commmunications have passed
back and forth between Tito and
Khrushchev. The Yugoslays pub-
licly have shown �a strong de-
sire to avoid a deterioration
in relations, even though they
are not retreating on their
basic views. In a New Year's
interview, Tito strongly empha-
sized the need to separate state
relations from the ideological
discussions, and in the latter,
he called for dignified, com-
radely discussion, not "polem-
ics." From that date until the
Borba blast on 14 February, the
leading Yugoslav newspapers
largely refrained from answering
the numerous Soviet bloc attacks
on Yugoslavia, "national Com-
munism," "revisionism," and on
other sins with which the Yugo-
slays have been charted.
MOLLET'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
French premier Mollet, who
arrives in Washington on 26
February, is hoping to use the
visit to buttress his domestic
political position. Despite
has government's success in the
UN debate on Algeria, there are
signs that the right-center is
ready to launch an all-out at-
tack on the government's eco-
nomic European integration, and
Algerian policies.
Mollet is expected to dis-
cuss a wide range of topics
with American officials which
he probably hopes will give him
new ammunition with which to
fend off critics at home.
France's growing inflation and
budgetary problems are confront-
ing Mollet with increasing par-
liamentary difficulties which
may come to a head shortly after
his return, and reports are
again current that the right-
center is planning to use an
economic issue to bring down the
government before it makes too
many concessians in Algeria or on
EURATOM and the Common Market.
Although Paris insists
requests for financial aid as
such are not on the premier's
agenda, discussion of France's
economic difficulties is implic-
it in such proposed topics as
European defense, the Middle
East, and underdeveloped areas.
The prestige of Mollet's
government, particularly that
of Foreign Minister Pineau, has
soared with France's successful
defense of its Algerian policy
in the UN. At the same time,
however, there is a growing
awareness in both the government
and its opposition that Monet
now is morally committed to
the formula of a cease-fire,
elections and negotiations con-
tained in his declaration of
"ThrsREL,
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 4 of 17
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