INTELLIGENCE MONITORING OF NORTH KOREA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE US-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK (21 OCTOBER-21NOVEMBER 1996)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01017920
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01488
• Publication Date: December 12, 1996

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Secret
Intelligence Report
Directorate of Intelligence
12 December 1996
Intelligence Monitoring of North Korea's Implementation of the US-
DPRK Agreed Framework (21 October-21 November 1996)
Status of the Facilities at Yongbyon
In a climate of-worsening North-South tensions, Chief Engineer Li announced the
shutdown of spent fuel canning for the 4-10 November "winter preparation" period.
North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu�in a letter to US officials
on 11 November accusing Washington of supporting Kim Yong-sam's efforts to use
the Agreed Framework to pressure the North�linked the resumption of spent fuel
canning to construction work on the LWR project. He stopped short, however, of
officially threatening to end the nuclear freeze.
Canning operations have not yet resumed, nor has the North committed to doing so at
any set time.
This report was prepared by analysts throughout the Directorate of Intelligence and was coordinated within the
Intelligence Community. This is a monthly report that updates policymakers on developments related to
North Korea's implementation of the US-North Korean nuclear agreement. Information available as of
6 December 1996 was used in this report. Comments and queues are welcome and may be directed to
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Implementation of Light-Water Reactor (LWR) Agreement
In the absence of an apology by North Korea for the submarine intrusion incident,
Seoul continued to oppose formally initialing the draft protocols on site and services
concluded in late September. Alleging concern for the safety of South Korean
workers, Seoul also temporarily suspended direct support for the LWR project and
indefinitely grounded South Korean teams scheduled to travel to North Korea to begin
site preparation work.
� In response, Piyongyang on 15 November threatened, through its
official wire service, to end the freeze on its nuclear facilities unless the
US ended its alleged delay in implementing the US-DPRK Agreed
Framework, including the light-water reactor project.
The warning, although undoubtedly approved by the leadership, was
not issued as an official policvdeclaraion by the Foreign Ministry or
other national authority.
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US-North Korean Liaison Offices
No developments to report.
North-South Dialogue: The Gap Widens
The North Korean submarine incursion of 18 September has continued to dominate
North-South relations. A massive manhunt to track down the infiltrators ended on
5 November when two of the three remaining infiltrators were shot and killed by the
South Korean military.
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� In total, 24 North Koreans were killed, one captured and one remains
unaccounted for. Seoul presumes the final infiltrator died of exposure.
� The manhunt also resulted in the deaths of 14 South Koreans and the
injury of 16 others. Among the dead were four South Korean civilians.
that it would not be
possible to resolve the submarine incident directly with the South for two reasons:
� The precedent that security-related issues be resolved through military
channels at P'anmunjom.
� Kim Yong-sam's alleged "maldeeds" (sic) of two years ago�an
apparent reference to Kim Yon -sam's refusal to issue condolences on
Kim ll-song's death.
In the aftermath of the submarine incident P'yongyang initially signaled greater
� flexibility to US diplomats over conditions for accepting a joint briefing on the
four-party talks proposal, but reversed course when told that without a resolution of
the submarine incident, the joint briefing would not be possible unless the North agrees
to participate in the four-party talks themselves.
� The North Korean Foreign Ministry's spokesman on 11 November
publicly noted that Washington was now refusing to provide a joint
briefing, and that P'yongyang was interpreting this "change in (the US)
� position" is "revocation" of the four-party talks proposal.
� First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-chu in an 11 November letter to
US officials charged that South Korean President Kim Yong-sam
"remains opposed to the dialogue for reunification...as long as he stays
in power, there cannot be a remotest possibility about North-South
dialogue."
South Korea, for its part, continued to demand an apology for the submarine incursion
as a precondition for further contacts with the North. Kim Yong-sam, in a
9 November interview with The Washington Post, stated that the South will not
conduct any dialogue or exchanges with the North until P'yongyang apologizes
directly to Seoul and promises no further incidents.
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� Suspended contacts include investment plans by South Korean
businesses and discussions related to both food and financial assistance.
Seoul also canceled participation in multilateral negotiations over
opening a corridor through North Korea's air space.
P'yongyang on 18 November announced in an official wire service report that it would
"tentatively" close its North-South Liaison Office at Panmunjom. Subsequent
attempts by South Korea to test the phone links between the liaison offices have not
been answered by the North. In a-19 NoVoinber "authorized" communiqu�the North
cited as justification for the move Seoul's "policy of closing the door on North-South
relations" and asserts that the liaison office had "lost its reason for being."
Implementation of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration (NSDD)
No new developments to report.
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