SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
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• Case Number: F-2017-00351
• Publication Date: February 1, 1988

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Soviet-Israeli Relations:
Trends and Prospects
A Research Paper
"*eatt
..Sheete4
NESA 88-10006
February 1988
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Directorate ot
Intelligence
Soviet-Israeli Relations:
Trends and Prospects
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
contributions from NESA, and
Office of Soviet Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Issues and Applications
Division, NESA,
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--tece.t.
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NESA 88-10006
February 1988
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Summary
Information available
as of 5 February 1988
was used in this report.
Soviet-Israeli Relations:
Trends and Prospects
Under Gorbachev's leadership, the USSR has expanded its dialogue with
Israel in an effort to increase its relevance to the Arab-Israeli peace process
and appeal to public opinion in the West. The Soviets are pursuing their in-
terests by gradually upgrading bilateral contacts, expanding East Europe-
an ties to Israel, and allowing increased Jewish emigration. This approach
has enabled Moscow to avoid the hostile Arab reaction and domestic
complications that more dramatic policies, such as the restoration of full
diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, might produce.
Moscow seeks admission to the Arab-Israeli peace process on an equal
basis with the United States, and the lack of relations with Israel has been
an impediment to that objective. Its increased contacts with Tel Aviv,
particularly the presence in Israel of a Soviet consular delegation and
Moscow's agreement to accept an Israeli delegation, lend credibility to its
claims to a legitimate role in the negotiating process.
The Soviets have tried to appeal to both Israel and the West by allowing in-
creased emigration of Soviet Jews and indicating their intention to improve
the lives of those remaining. But Gorbachev has allowed emigration to
increase more gradually than Brezhnev did in the 1970s. This may reflect,
at least in part, a Soviet perception that the sharp increase in emigration in
the 1970s failed to elicit from the United States the economic concessions
the Soviets were seeking, while the subsequent cutback in emigration
created a backlash of anti-Soviet sentiment. It probably also reflects a
Soviet desire to use this card as an incentive for Israeli concessions.
The Soviet position with respect to restoring full diplomatic relations with
Israel has been modified in the past several years. Soviet spokesmen,
including Gorbachev, have indicated that the lack of relations is not
"normal," and Moscow has made clear to its Arab friends that Soviet�not
Arab�interests will dictate the Soviet Union's Middle Eastern policy.
Moscow previously had insisted that restoration of relations with Tel Aviv
depended on Israel's withdrawal from all the territories taken in 1967, but
it now suggests that a restoration can come in the context of movement to-
ward an international Middle East peace conference. The Soviets also have
softened their position with respect to the timing of recognition. They
previously indicated that relations could only be restored after successful
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completion of the peace process, but they now suggest that it can occur
during the process.
Tel Aviv has been consistent in stating that relations with Moscow must be
restored to full diplomatic status�nothing less. In January 1988, Israel
renewed the visas of the Soviet consular delegation for only one month, in-
dicating its reluctance to allow this Soviet presence to become more
permanent (at least without some reciprocity from Moscow). Moscow's
subsequent agreement to accept an Israeli "consular-technical" group
revealed its concern that its consular presence in Israel might be in
jeopardy. Moreover, disagreement between Israel's Labor and Likud
parties over Soviet participation in an international peace conference
continues to slow the pace of rapprochement.
There is little incentive for the Soviets to reestablish full diplomatic
relations with Israel. A peace conference is not imminent, and such a move
probably would not give Moscow increased leverage with Israel. In
addition, the Arab-Israeli dispute is competing with the Iran-Iraq war as
the primary regional concern, so the Soviets probably feel little pressure to
seize the initiative. Finally, the USSR is making gains in relations with the
West without making further gestures toward Israel.
Moscow, however, has laid the groundwork for a restoration of diplomatic
ties. Should the Soviets believe Israel was committed to attending the
international peace conference they have proposed (a more likely possibility
if Labor wins the Israeli election in November 1988), they almost certainly
would be prepared to reestablish relations. It is conceivable, but far less
likely, that Moscow would restore diplomatic relations without any such
Israeli shift. Gorbachev would have to decide that formal ties would
demonstrate that his "new thinking" has substance and would add
momentum to the USSR's regional policies and/or credibility to its
initiatives in the West.
Short of restoring full diplomatic relations, Moscow probably will try to
maintain movement in relations with Israel as it continues to cultivate the
image of a responsible superpower seeking constructive political solutions
to regional problems. It may try to upgrade the relationship by proposing
the opening of a consulate or an interests section. Similarly, to improve
relations with the West and appear responsive to human rights challenges,
it may allow even greater increases in Soviet Jewish emigration.
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Should Moscow restore relations with Israel, there would be increased
pressure on Washington from both its West European allies and moderate
Arab states as well as from the Soviet Union to include Moscow in the
Arab-Israeli peace process. Moscow's claim to a central role in the process
would have greater credibility and the US ability to keep the Soviets on the
sidelines would be undermined if Moscow took the step that Washington
has long demanded. Allowing increased Jewish emigration and improving
the quality of life for the remaining Soviet Jews would further enhance the
Soviet image in the United States. On the other hand, a reversal or
stagnation of Soviet efforts with respect to Israel and Soviet Jewish issues
would have negative repercussions in the United States and might
adversely affect Moscow's efforts to move relations with Washington
forward.
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
The Status of Bilateral Relations
1
Soviet Incentives To Improve Relations
1
Soviet Disincentives
2
Israeli Incentives
2
Israeli Disincentives
2
The Impasse on Diplomatic Relations
2
Expanding Dialogue: The Process
3
The First Steps
3
New Soviet Initiatives
4
Soviet Consular Delegation in Israel
6
Jewish Emigration
6
Israeli Reaction to Soviet Moves
7
New Strains in Relations
8
Continued Momentum
9
Soviet Concern About Arab Reaction
9
Prospects
10
Implications for the United States
11
Appendixes
A. Jewish Emigration From the USSR
13
B. Soviet and Israeli Views of a Middle East Peace Conference
15
C. Major Events in Soviet-Israeli Relations
17
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Soviet-Israeli Relations:
Trends and Prospects
The Status of Bilateral Relations
Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Israel in
1967, largely to regain the credibility it had lost with
its Arab clients during the Arab-Israeli war. All of
the USSR's East European allies except Romania
followed suit. Over the years, numerous Soviet spokes-
men have indicated that
the decision was a mistake, as it put the USSR at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States in terms of
mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. The USSR's in-
ability to improve its position in the Middle East
during the 1970s and early 1980s can be attributed, at
least in part, to the fact that it had become irrelevant
to the peace process.
As it has moved to restructure the Soviet economic
and political system, the Gorbachev regime has tried
to invigorate its foreign policy and alter its interna-
tional image. To ease the pressures of military expen-
ditures and gain access to Western credit and technol-
ogy, it has pushed movement in arms control and tried
to improve its relations with the West. As part of its
policy, it has portrayed itself as a responsible super-
power interested in pursuing constructive solutions to
international tension. Expanding its ties to Israel
offers Moscow the prospect of enhanced regional
flexibility and international credibility.
Soviet Incentives To Improve Relations
The Soviets want to improve relations with Israel
because:
� They want to end the US monopoly on mediation in
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their claim to a central
role in the peace negotiations has been undermined
by their inability to deal with all parties to the
dispute.
� They want to enhance their position as a world
power with status equal to that of the United States.
1
Mikhail Gorbachev
� They want to be seen as capable of advancing the
political, as well as military, goals of their Arab
clients and do not want the latter to regard the
United States as the only power capable of serving
as an honest broker in the area.
� They hope to demonstrate the "new thinking" in
Soviet foreign policy.
� They want to improve relations with the United
States. Their estimation of strong Jewish and Israeli
influence in the United States suggests to them that
improved relations with Israel would bolster their
case in the United States.
� Formal ties might enable them to lobby the Israelis
more effectively on issues such as Israeli participa-
tion in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
� A Soviet presence in Israel would improve Soviet
espionage capabilities there and might give Moscow
increased access to advanced Western technology.
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Soviet Disincentives
There are several factors, however, that inhibit the
Soviets from moving quickly to restore full relations
with Israel:
� They have repeatedly asserted that relations will not
be restored until certain conditions have been met,
and they would lose credibility and future leverage
if a satisfactory quid pro quo were not obtained.
� Israel has linked the restoration of relations to the
issue of Soviet Jewish emigration, and Moscow has
consistently asserted that this is an internal matter.
More favorable Soviet treatment of its Jewish mi-
nority could increase demands on Moscow by other
Soviet minorities.
� The Soviets seek to avoid damaging relations with
Arab allies who do not want Israel's status enhanced
and who do not want Israel's Jewish population
bolstered by a large influx of Soviet Jews.
� Reestablishing relations might not sufficiently in-
crease the USSR's leverage with Israel or its rele-
vance to the peace process.
� Moscow has been improving relations with the
United States and Western Europe without reestab-
lishing diplomatic relations with Israel and thus can
afford to wait.
� An Israeli Embassy in Moscow would serve as a
rallying point for Jewish dissidents. Soviet leaders
are well aware of the large spontaneous demonstra-
tions that occurred in 1948, when the new Israeli
Ambassador to Moscow, GoIda Meir, visited a
Moscow synagogue and attracted a crowd of 40,000
Soviet Jews.
Israeli Incentives
Israel wants to restore full diplomatic relations with
the Soviet Union because:
� Such a restoration would diminish Israel's isolation
in the United Nations and the Third World, weaken
the position of hardline Arab states that oppose
Israel's right to exist, and lead to closer ties to other
East European states.
Shimon Peres
� Tel Aviv seeks increased emigration of Soviet Jews,
one of the largest remaining sources of Jewish
population for Israel.
� Normal relations with the Soviets may, over time,
lead Moscow to provide less military support to
Israeli foes such as Syria and the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO).
� A presence in Moscow would enhance Israel's abili-
ty to collect intelligence.
Israeli Disincentives
There are several factors that inhibit Israel from
improving relations with Moscow:
� Tel Aviv's leadership, although not of one mind,
generally rejects Moscow's condition that Israel
agree to attend (and agree to Moscow's attending)
an international Middle East peace conference.
� Soviet espionage and possible acquisition of military
information could undermine Israel's military domi-
nance in the region.
� The growing community of Soviet Jews in Israel is
hostile to the USSR.
The Impasse on Diplomatic Relations
Moscow's minimum price for restoration of relations
is its inclusion in an international Middle East peace
conference. Israeli leaders are divided on this require-
ment. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres favors an inter-
national conference and has indicated that he could
2
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�gerret.
Yitzhak Shamir
accept Soviet participation, but Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir opposes a conference and considers
Moscow's demand for inclusion both irrelevant and
impossible to meet. He has often stated, however, that
he would be willing to allow Soviet involvement in
Arab-Israeli negotiations if Moscow first met his
preconditions on formal relations and Soviet Jewish
emigration
The Soviets have given numerous indications that
they are flexible on the question of emigration, and,
although Prime Minister Shamir frequently demands
complete freedom for all Soviet Jews to migrate to
Israel, Tel Aviv has never set a specific requirement in
this regard. Although the obstacles to a solution of
this problem are serious, it seems likely that a com-
promise could be reached if other factors affecting the
restoration of relations were settled.
Expanding Dialogue: The Process
The First Steps
Shortly after Gorbachev became General Secretary in
March 1985, the Soviets began to indicate interest in
upgrading relations with Israel.' This interest was
given impetus by the agreement in February 1985
between PLO Chairman Arafat and Jordanian King
' In May 1985, lzvestiya published a message from Israeli Presi-
dent Chaim Herzog to the USSR on the 40th anniversary of the
victory over Germany. This was the first time such a message had
been published and was particularly significant in that it contained
a denunciation of the Nazis. Soviet propaganda has long equated
Nazi and Israeli activities.
3
Labor Versus Likud�Differing Attitudes
Toward Moscow
Virtually all Israelis favor reestablishing full diplo-
matic relations with Moscow, according to Israeli
polls. Both major parties see formal ties as increasing
Israel's international status. Both parties are pre-
pared to participate with the Soviets in the peace
process if Moscow agrees to restore diplomatic rela-
tions and allows significantly increased Jewish emi-
gration.
The main difference between Labor and Likud atti-
tudes toward Moscow is the latter's greater suspicion
regarding Soviet intentions and tactics in the region.
Most Likud officials believe that the Soviets seek to
advance their position in the region through the
perpetuation of Middle Eastern tensions. They be-
lieve this gives Moscow opportunities to gain influ-
ence by providing arms and assistance. Even if Mos-
cow met Israel's conditions for participation in peace
talks, many Israeli officials have suggested they
would try to limit Moscow's role
Hussein to coordinate their efforts with respect to
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. This agreement cre-
ated concern in Moscow that a US-backed process
that excluded the Soviets was again on track
Active Soviet exploration of expanded bilateral ties
began in the summer, with contacts in Paris between
Soviet Ambassador to France Yuliy Vorontsov, now
First Deputy Foreign Minister, and his Israeli coun-
terpart.
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East European Relations With Israel
All of Moscow's East European allies except Roma-
nia severed relations with Israel in 1967 as a gesture
of solidarity with both Moscow and their Arab
clients. As Moscow has moved to upgrade contacts
with Israel, several East European countries have
moved ahead of the Soviets�almost certainly with
Soviet approval. A Soviet academic told the Jerusa-
lem Post in December 1987 that the step-by-step
rapprochement between Israel and the various East
European countries was being coordinated by the
Kremlin.
Poland initiated talks to upgrade relations with
Israel in late 1985, and in October 1986 the two
countries established interests sections in each other's
capitals. On 14 September 1987, Israel and Hungary
announced that they would establish interests sec-
tions in each other's capitals. With some 80,000 Jews,
Hungary has the largest Jewish community in East-
ern Europe.
and Poland's exploration of the possibility of estab-
lishing an interests section in Israel�a move that
clearly had Soviet approval
Subsequent developments suggested the prospect of
real movement in the Soviet-Israeli dialogue. In his
speech to the United Nations in October, Israeli
Prime Minister Peres indicated new flexibility in the
Israeli position toward the peace process, for the first
time publicly endorsing the concept of an internation-
al framework for negotiations. During his visit to
Paris later that month, Gorbachev hinted at flexibility
with respect to relations with Israel. He stated that
the faster the situation in the Middle East was
normalized, the faster Moscow could consider the
question of resuming relations with Tel Aviv
In the wake of these developments,
indicated that Moscow was going to
upgrade relations with Israel before the Soviet Corn-
munist Party congress in February 1986.
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the activity (b)(1)
of late 1985 was followed by a hiatus in Soviet-Israeli (b)(3)
relations. This probably reflected both the changing
regional environment and Moscow's preoccupation
with domestic issues on the eve of the 27th Soviet
Communist Party congress. In the Middle East, the
Hussein-Arafat initiative was foundering in the wake
of the Palestinian hijacking of the Achille Lauro and
Israel's attack on PLO headquarters in Tunisia. The
demise of this initiative eased pressure on Moscow to
press its demand for a role in the Arab-Israeli peace
process and gave it time to address other issues and
reassess its policies. The Third World in general and
the Middle East specifically were given little attention
at the party congress, suggesting that, if major adjust-
ments in policy had been under consideration, they
had been postponed
New Soviet Initiatives
The Soviets resumed their activity on the Arab-Israeli
peace front in mid-1986. In April they proposed that
the USSR send a consular team to Tel Aviv to inspect
their former embassy and Russian Orthodox Church
property owned by the Moscow Patriarchate.' Al-
though they withdrew the request following the US
bombing of Libya later that month, they renewed it in
The Soviets made a similar proposal to Israel in 1974, but the
Israelis refused to consider it.
4
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Moscow's Conditions for Restoring Diplomatic
Relations With Israel
Moscow's position with respect to the restoration of
full diplomatic relations with Israel has always been
ambiguous. The Soviets recognize Israel's right to
exist and frequently have asserted their willingness to
reestablish diplomatic relations when the necessary
conditions have been met. The definition of those
conditions, however, has fluctuated. In 1973, at the
Geneva Conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromy-
ko indicated to Israeli Foreign Minister Eban that
relations might be restored if there were "significant
progress" in the peace process. Subsequently the
Soviets emphasized that Israel must withdraw from
the territories taken in 1967 (and thus remove the
original cause of the break). In the early 1980s they
seemed to add a demand that Israel abrogate its
strategic understanding with Washington. During the
US-Soviet summit meeting in late 1985, to reassure
the Arabs and counter a feared move toward the
United States by Yasir Arafat, the Soviets implied
that PLO participation in Middle East peace talks
was a condition for renewed relations.
Under Gorbachev, the formula has shifted back
toward the Gromyko formulation of 1973. Relations
can be restored in the context of movement in the
peace process�specifically movement toward the
convening of an international conference with Soviet
participation. The Soviets also have introduced flexi-
bility into their position with respect to the timing of
the restoration, hinting but not guaranteeing that a
conference does not have to take place before rela-
tions are resumed.
Occasionally, however, authoritative Soviet spokes-
men return to the old formula�particularly when
speaking to Arab audiences. In August 1987, for
example, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov
stated in an interview with an Egyptian newspaper
that removing the conditions that provoked Moscow's
break in relations with Tel Aviv would have to be
accomplished before relations can be restored. More
recently, in December 1987, Soviet Ambassador to
Egypt Zhuravlev told another Egyptian newspaper
that the USSR could only reestablish relations when
Israel withdrew from the occupied territories. Thus,
the Soviets retain their ambiguity�and their flexi-
bility�both as leverage in their talks with Israel and
as a counter to Arab criticism.
July, when they revived their calls for an international
peace conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict.'
A public meeting between Israeli and Soviet officials
was held in Helsinki in August 1986�the first such
meeting outside occasional talks at the United Na-
tions since 1967. The much-heralded but substantive-
ly unsuccessful session lasted 90 minutes, breaking up
over differences on the agenda. The Soviets had come
prepared to discuss only those topics relating to
'Moscow added a new proposal to its old plans for a conference,
suggesting that the permanent members of the UN Security
Council meet first to coordinate the conference. Moscow actively
pursued its plan and gained endorsements from the United Nations,
the European Community, and the Islamic Conference Organiza-
tion.
5
consular matters and had sent a low-level consular
delegation. The Israeli delegation, which was headed
by a senior Foreign Ministry official, was determined
to discuss all relevant bilateral issues, including Soviet
Jewish emigration. Despite the breakdown, the fact
that the talks were convened reflected the strong
interest of both sides in continuing the dialogue.
Israeli Prime Minister Peres and Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Shevardnadze met at the United Nations in
September 1986, the highest level meeting of Soviet
and Israeli officials since 1967. Once again little
substantive progress was made. The talks served to
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(b)(3) Russian Orthodox church in Jerusalea
energize relations, however, and were followed by
increased contacts�between the Soviet and Israeli
Ambassadors in the United States, between Soviet
and Israeli officials at the United Nations, and be-
tween representatives of Foreign Minister Peres and
Soviet Foreign Ministry and Communist Party offi-
(b)(3) cials.
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Soviet Consular Delegation in Israel. In July 1987 a
Soviet consular delegation arrived in Tel Aviv, the
first official Soviet delegation to visit Israel since
1967. The arrival marked a formal upgrading of
relations and enhanced the credibility of Moscow's
claims that it could sustain a dialogue with both sides
in the Arab-Israeli dispute (including the PLO) with-
out having to meet Israel's preconditions. The delega-
tion was welcomed by Israel as the most tangible sign
to date of improved Israeli-Soviet ties. The delegation
has twice extended its stay in Israel, and Soviet
Middle East specialist Primakov indicated to US
officials in December 1987 that the Soviets view it as
a permanent presence.
Moscow has insisted that the delegation's primary
functions are to provide services to Soviet citizens and
to look into the status of Soviet properties in Israel. At
the same time, it has left open the possibility that the
In October 1986, Peres and Shamir exchanged jobs, with Peres
becoming Foreign Minister and Shamir Prime Minister in the
National Unity government. Peres's focus on the peace process
continued, however, as he tried to use the issue to promote his
political position.
Peres and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
meeting at United Nations, 1986
delegation could perform other functions, including
meeting with Israeli officials, should the occasion
arise. Primakov asserted in December that the delega-
tion maintained regular political contacts with Israeli
officials. The Soviets consistently have denied that
Israel would be given reciprocal rights, stating that an
Israeli delegation would have no comparable func-
tions to perform in Moscow. In January 1988, howev-
er, in response to Tel Aviv's threats to stop renewing
the Soviet delegation's visas, the Soviets agreed to
accept an Israeli "consular-technical" group in Mos-
cow to inspect the Israeli interests desk at the Dutch
Embassy
Jewish Emigration. The issue of Jewish emigration
from the Soviet Union is at the heart of Soviet-Israeli
relations and also plays a major part in shaping
Western perceptions of the USSR. In early 1987 the
Gorbachev regime allowed an increased flow of Soviet
Jewish emigrants and offered assurances that Jewish
life in the Soviet Union would improve. This shift in
policy probably was directed primarily at Moscow's
efforts to improve relations with the United States.
Indeed, Soviet officials have asked on various occa-
sions if the new Soviet policy toward Israel and the
Jews is having a positive impact on US public opinion.
Gorbachev has moved more slowly in allowing in-
creased emigration than Brezhnev did in the 1970s,
6
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Figure 1
Jewish Emigration From
the USSR, 1971-87
Thousands of emigrants
55
01971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
315943 2-88
and the 1987 figures do not approach those of the
1970s.6 Gorbachev may be moving cautiously because
of a Soviet perception that Soviet concessions in the
1970s failed to produce the expected return in US
trade and credit, while the subsequent cutback in
emigration caused a substantial backlash. He may
believe that Soviet interests are best served by holding
out the prospect for increases until tangible benefits
are obtained
Israeli Reaction to Soviet Moves
Although the Soviet shift with respect to Jewish
emigration may have been directed primarily at the
'The figures rose in early 1987 and appear to have stabilized at a
rate of about 800 emigres per month. Soviet Jewish arrivals in
Vienna totaled 871 in May, 796 in June, 819 in July, 782 in
August, 725 in September, 871 in October, 906 in November, and
899 in Decemberj
7
West, it has had resonance in Israel.' From Peres's
point of view, the Soviets were responding to his direct
appeal to Shevardnadze in September on Jewish
emigration and were beginning to demonstrate a
willingness to pay the price for admission to a Middle
East peace conference. From Shamir's point of view,
the Soviet policy was threatening because it seemed to
provide impetus to Soviet-Israeli relations, to move-
ment toward an international conference, and to
Peres's position. Since mid-1987, therefore, Shamir
has shifted his position and asserted that there is no
linkage between emigration and improved Soviet-
Israeli relations.
Peres consistently has tried to capitalize on expanding
relations with the Soviets to gain support in Israel for
his concept of an international framework for Arab-
Israeli peace negotiations and to lend credibility to his
claims to be the "peace" advocate in the Israeli
Cabinet. In April 1987 he met in Rome with the
senior Soviet Communist Party officials responsible
for the Middle East, Karen Brutents and Aleksandr
Zotov. He subsequently described these talks as the
first "serious political dialogue between the two na-
tions."
Apparently believing that his position was relatively
strong and that there was impetus for movement in
the peace process, Peres tried to bring the issue of an
international conference to a vote in the Israeli Cabi-
net.' We believe he was hoping for a vote of confi-
dence and possibly also hoping to force an election.
He did not have enough votes to accomplish this
objective, however, and in mid-May he backed down.
'Peres and Shamir put greater emphasis on the emigration issue
than on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, demonstrating
the importance of this issue to Israeli domestic politics. There are
differences among Israeli leaders over how many Soviet Jews would
actually seek to emigrate from the USSR if the gates were open.
Peres maintains that tens of thousands would leave while Shamir
asserts that there would be hundreds of thousands.
In the spring of 1987, there was active diplomacy in the region as
US, Israeli, and Jordanian officials met to discuss possible move-
ment in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations
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New Strains in Relations
Strains in bilateral relations were evident during the
summer and fall of 1987 despite continuing contacts.'
The Soviets almost certainly were disappointed by the
failure of Peres to move his agenda forward and were
more aware of Shamir's strength and Peres's weak-
ness. Several critical themes emerged in Soviet propa-
ganda that reflected concern about Israeli policies and
suggested pessimism about the short-term prospects
for improved relations. The first was a new differenti-
ation in Soviet treatment of the Israeli leadership.
Where Moscow previously had lumped all Israeli
leaders together, it now referred favorably to Peres
and focused sharp personal criticism on Shamir for
his "rightwing policies" and "lack of political rea-
lism." Articles charged that Shamir's position pre-
cluded any chance that Soviet-Israeli relations would
be restored. The second theme involved Israel's in-
creasing military capability, specifically its develop-
ment of the Jericho II missile with its capability to
deliver a nuclear weapon. Criticism of the Jericho II
was given extensive treatment in Soviet radiobroad-
(b)(3) casts to Israel in the fall
(b)(3)
The more realistic and pessimistic Soviet attitude was
reflected in the subdued reports that followed both the
August meeting in Bonn between Peres's aide, Nim-
rod Novik, and several members of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry and the September meeting at the United
Nations between Peres and Shevardnadze. Soviet
reporting stressed that the August meeting was simply
part of the Soviet effort to convene a peace conference
and that Moscow's position with respect to relations
with Israel still depended on a settlement in the
Middle East. Peres, as usual, was upbeat about his
meeting with Shevardnadze and reported that the
latter had requested permission to establish an inter-
ests section in Tel Aviv. The Soviets denied, both
Cultural exchanges are being arranged to include performances by
the Bolshoi Ballet, the Red Army Chorus, and the Mo se ev
Dancers in Israel and by Israeli groups in the USSR.
416Fe
The Jericho II Missile
In mid-July 1987, Radio Moscow in Hebrew charged
that Israel's development of the Jericho II missile
constituted a threat to the Soviet Union. It referred to
Western press descriptions of the missile as capable
of carrying a nuclear warhead and having a range of
1,500 km. Following this criticism, Foreign Minister
Peres issued an unusual statement, claiming that
Israel does not consider the Soviet Union an enemy
and rejecting Soviet threats. The statement went on
to support US and Soviet efforts to moderate the
arms race and to welcome Moscow's announced
intention to avoid introducing short- and medium-
range missiles into the Middle East�a reference to
Moscow's announced decision not to deliver the SS-
23 to Syria. The Israeli press subsequently reported
that, even if rumors of the missile's range were
accurate, Israeli targets would be Arab capitals, not
the Soviet Union.
Radio Moscow subsequently responded that, al-
though the Soviet Union did not believe the Jericho
missile was designed to jeopardize the southern part
of the Soviet Union, Israel's "big uncle" (the United
States) might believe differently and so might mem-
bers of the "institutionalized right" (which, it said,
includes Prime Minister Shamir). It argued that
intermediate missiles are designed to deliver a first
strike and that the USSR might have to take suitable
measures to help those countries that have "already
been victims of Israeli adventures." Both this broad-
cast and a Radio Peace and Progress Broadcast in
Hebrew on 31 July linked the Jericho II to Soviet
and US efforts to negotiate an agreement on the
removal of medium- and short-range missiles�a
gambit Moscow did not repeat in talks with Washing-
ton.
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publicly and privately to US officials, that Shevard-
nadze had made such a request)
Soviet spokesmen have indicated their frustration
with Israeli politics and suggested a more pessimistic
attitude toward improved relations. At a news brief-
ing in early October, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokes-
man Pyadyshev emphasized that Moscow's position
was that a genuine Arab-Israeli peace process could
stem only from an international conference and that
no improvement in Soviet-Israeli relations would be
possible without Israeli flexibility on this issue.
in November,
Soviet Communist Party official Zotov expressed
frustration with Israeli politics and indicated that
Israeli policy would have to change if progress were to
be made in bilateral relations. In early December a
Soviet academic told the Jerusalem Post that there
could be no diplomatic relations between the USSR
and Israel because Israel (meaning Shamir) was "not
ready."
The Soviets made their unhappiness clear to Israel by
supporting the annual UN vote to rescind Israel's
credentials in October. This act was used by Shamir's
office to discount the Peres line that progress was
being made in bilateral relations, and Peres himself
stated in late December that the Soviet attitude had
become less flexible
Tel Aviv, in turn, became more willing to push its own
agenda. In January 1988 the Soviets requested anoth-
er extension of visas for their consular delegation in
Israel. The Israelis granted a one-month, rather than
a three-month, extension, indicating that this would
give Moscow time to consider their own pending
request for visas for a "consular-technical" group.
Peres may have misunderstood Shevardnadze when the latter
either held out the prospect of establishing interests sections within
the "context of movement in the peace process" or referred to
Moscow's request for an extension of the stay of the Soviet consular
delegation in Israel. It is possible that Peres chose deliberately to
exaggerate Shevardnadze's comments to promote his pursuit of the
peace process. On the other hand, Shevardnadze may have pro-
posed creating an interests section to entice Israel to make further
concessions with respect to Soviet participation in the Arab-Israeli
peace process
9
Continued Momentum
Moscow's announcement in mid-January that it had
accepted Israel's request and would grant such a
delegation two-month visas revealed its concern that
its consular presence in Israel might be in jeopardy.
The Soviet agreement was particularly striking given
its timing. Moscow had been critical of Tel Aviv's
response to disturbances in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip during December and January and certainly
would have preferred to postpone making any gesture
toward Israel in the middle of international debate
over Israeli policy.
Moscow's commitment to sustaining its dialogue with
Israel also has been demonstrated by its continuation
of bilateral meetings (Soviet and Israeli officials met
in Helsinki in mid-January) and by its new willingness
to allow exit visas for temporary visits to Israel to
increase dramatically in late 1987 and early 1988.
Soviet Concern About Arab Reaction
Soviet concern about the reaction of the Arabs,
particularly key clients such as Syria and the PLO,
has long been a constraint on Soviet policy toward
Israel, but, during the visit of Syrian President Assad
to Moscow in April 1987, Gorbachev indicated that
this consideration was no longer as important as it had
been. In his dinner speech, Gorbachev stated that the
absence of relations with Israel was not normal and
suggested that Soviet-Israeli relations could be re-
newed "in the mainstream of the peace process," a
major step forward in Moscow's ambiguous refer-
ences to the conditions and timing for restoring
relations. Gorbachev emphasized that war was no
longer an option in the Middle East and that the
Arab-Israeli conflict could be resolved only through
political means�an implicit rejection of Assad's ef-
forts to achieve strategic parity with Israel and to
pursue a military solution.
Moscow has attempted to make its approach to Israel
acceptable to its Arab allies by suggesting that any
cret
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new leverage it gains with Tel Aviv will be used for
the benefit of its friends. It has accompanied its
efforts to improve ties to Israel with efforts to project
itself as the main supporter of the Arab cause and the
chief advocate for Arab unity. The Soviets were
deeply involved in the reunification of the PLO that
occurred in Algiers in April 1987 and have consistent-
ly argued that a united Arab position is essential to a
successful peace process�just as they have argued
that they should have ties to Israel if they are to
protect Arab interests in peace negotiations.
Thus far, Arab reaction to Moscow's improving con-
tacts with Israel has been relatively muted, and
moderates such as Jordan and Egypt support the
development. The Syrians and Palestinians have been
less accepting of Soviet policy
Prospects
Moscow almost certainly will sustain its gradual
upgrading of contacts with Israel in 1988, hoping for
a Peres victory in the Israeli election. The policy has
lent legitimacy to its claims to a mediating role in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and has given it some credibility
in the West on the issue of human rights. The costs to
Moscow in terms of relations with its Arab clients
have been minimal.
By keeping their consular delegation in Israel and
allowing the Israeli "technical" delegation to remain,
the Soviets would have de facto interests sections
operating. They might propose the opening of a
consulate or the establishment of more formal inter-
ests sections�moves short of a full restoration of
diplomatic relations. They might also allow a gradual
increase in Jewish emigration. This would enable the
Soviets to demonstrate continuing dynamism in their
policy, help prevent a backlash of anti-Soviet senti-
ment that might develop if they seemed to halt their
efforts, and hold out the lure of further concessions if
their conditions were met. They would be more likely
to move in this direction if they believed Israel would
respond favorably for example, if Peres gained power
in the election).
''Se<
There seems little incentive for Moscow to move
ahead much faster with Tel Aviv. Relations with the
United States are improving without significant ges-
tures toward Israel. In addition, Moscow probably
believes that moving quickly at this point would not
give it sufficiently increased leverage with Israel or
access to the peace process.
Still, the Soviets have indicated flexibility on almost
all relevant issues, including the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations. Ambiguity with respect to pro-
cess and timing suits Moscow's interests, allowing it
to pursue various options simultaneously without hav-
ing to make commitments or reconcile incompatible
positions.
Although movement toward an international peace
conference or some other forum that included the
Soviets in a prominent role would provide the most
likely incentive for restoring relations with Israel, it is
conceivable�but unlikely�that Moscow will go to
full relations with Israel without being formally ad-
mitted to the peace process. Restoration could come,
for example, as part of an effort to demonstrate that
the "new Soviet thinking" has substance and to lend
credibility to Moscow's efforts to show that it is
taking a constructive approach to international prob-
lems. It would be intended as a significant gesture
toward the West as well as toward Israel.
It is similarly conceivable, but almost as unlikely, that
the Soviets would allow a dramatic increase in Jewish
emigration. Such a breakthrough, particularly if Isra-
el were governed by a Labor-led government, might
lead to greater flexibility in Israel's conditions for
Soviet participation in the peace process.
As there are factors that encourage Moscow to accel-
erate its policy toward Israel, so there are factors that
suggest a slowdown. Soviet preoccupation with inter-
nal matters, as in the period before the 27th Commu-
nist Party congress in 1985-86, could lead to a loss of
momentum in foreign policy. Similarly, as there is
resistance to Gorbachev's internal policies of peres-
troyka and glasnost, there almost certainly is resis-
tance to change in foreign policy. A Soviet Foreign
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Ministry official stated in February 1988 that there
were differences within the Soviet Union over how to
manage contacts with the Israelis
Regional and global developments also could interfere
with Soviet-Israeli rapprochement. The resumption of
a separate approach to peace negotiations (as, between
Jordan and Israel) could again prompt Moscow, with
its rejectionist clients (Syria and the PLO), to adopt
an obstructionist role in the peace process. This would
entail a harder line toward Israel. Similarly, a deterio-
ration in Moscow's relations with the West, particu-
larly with the United States, would reduce its incen-
tives to improve relations with Israel.
Implications for the United States
Soviet relations with Israel will have an impact on
Moscow's relations with Washington. The Soviets
know that improvement in US-Soviet relations has
been hampered by regional conflicts including the
Arab-Israeli dispute. Soviet First Deputy Foreign
Minister Vorontsov linked the two directly in a recent
interview with the Egyptian press, stating that a true
and lasting detente with the United States will be
possible only if the hottest regional conflicts, such as
the Middle East, are settled.
Washington has long insisted that the Soviet Union
should restore diplomatic relations with Israel if it
expects to return to the peace process. We believe
Moscow's claim to an active, central role in the
process would have greater credibility and the US
ability to keep the Soviets on the sidelines of negotia-
tions would be undermined if Moscow follows Wash-
ington's prescription. Even a gradual improvement in
relations increases the Soviet claim to a role, as it can
speak to both sides in the dispute. The presence of a
Reverse Blank
11
Soviet consular delegation in Tel Aviv and the delega-
tion's dealings with the Israelis clearly point to some
meaningful communication
Moscow will continue to use its efforts to improve
relations with Israel and to move the peace process
forward on its terms to demonstrate that it is the
United States and Israel that are the "braking factor"
with respect to progress toward peace. The Soviets
will try to focus attention on what they describe as a
"lack of leadership" in Israel and "indifference" in
the United States.
The establishment of full Soviet-Israeli diplomatic
ties probably would be accompanied by Soviet pres-
sure on its allies (Syria and the PLO) to take the steps
necessary to get to an international conference, in-
cluding urging the PLO to recognize Israel's right to
exist. A successful Soviet policy would put pressure on
Israel and the United States to respond.
The Arab Gulf states probably would react negatively
to a restoration of Soviet-Israeli ties, and those states
that have been exploring ties to the Soviets might slow
the progress of expanding bilateral ties. On balance,
however, we believe that, except in the immediate
aftermath of a restoration of Soviet-Israeli relations,
the Gulf states would work out their ties to Washing-
ton and Moscow on the basis of a much broader range
of regional issues.
'*F�ek
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Appendix A
Jewish Emigration From
the USSR
The issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union
is complex, involving Soviet internal policies with
respect to minorities and dissidents, the Israeli desire
to increase its Jewish population and help Soviet Jews,
and questions of human rights that have an impact on
Soviet relations with the West, particularly the Unit-
ed States
In the 1970s the Brezhnev regime allowed a dramatic
increase in Soviet Jewish emigration to improve the
climate of relations with the United States. With the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974, however, emi-
gration was formally linked to Soviet efforts to gain
most-favored-nation status. The Stevenson Amend-
ment to the Export-Import Bank Bill subsequently
restricted credit allocations to the Soviets to a four-
year total of $300 million, a pittance compared to
Soviet expectations. Immediately thereafter, the Sovi-
ets repudiated their commitments with respect to
Jewish emigration, and the number of emigrants
dropped. Emigration increased again in the late
1970s, peaking at over 51,000 in 1979. During the
early 1980s the numbers decreased, and from 1982 to
1986 they were negligible.
During Gorbachev's first two years in power, there
was only a modest change in Moscow's position
toward Soviet Jews. Well-known refuseniks, such as
Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Grigoriy and Isai Goldshtein,
and Ilya Essas were allowed to leave. But the total
number of Jews allowed to emigrate did not rise.
Soviet pressure on Jews seeking to emigrate intensi-
fied, with nine Jewish activists being arrested and
imprisoned.
In 1987 the Soviets allowed the number of Jewish
emigrants to rise, permitted prominent refuseniks to
leave, allowed Soviet emigres to return on visits, and
somewhat clarified emigration procedures. Soviet as-
surances that they would allow improved conditions
for those Jews who chose to remain in the Soviet
Union were reinforced by Moscow's release of the so-
called prisoners of Zion (mostly Hebrew teachers) and
13
Figure 2
Jewish Emigration From the USSR,
January-December 1987
Hundreds of emigrants
1,000
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
315944 2.88 (b)(3)
by indications that Hebrew classes would be offered
publicly. In addition, an unofficial group established
to defend Jewish culture has been allowed to function,
while there have been hints that the USSR's Anti-
Zionist Committee would be disbanded. These mea-
sures have been slow and halting, however, and broad-
based discrimination against Soviet Jews continues.
Israeli leaders call for free emigration and are careful
not to hint at a minimally acceptable number. We
believe that Tel Aviv would be satisfied by a Soviet
Secr
(b)(3)
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commitment to allow tens of thousands of Jews to
leave each year for an indefinite period. Israeli offi-
cials often refer to the pace of the 1970s, when over
30,000 Soviet Jews emigrated annually for several
years. Although most of these emigrants probably
would not go to Israel, the influx of a large number of
immigrants in a short period would strain Israel's
absorption system, and Israeli officials might prefer a
(b)(3) more orderly influx
In addition to pressing for increased emigration and
improved conditions for Soviet Jews, Tel Aviv consis-
tently has sought direct flights from the Soviet Union
to Israel to ensure that emigrants who have declared
Israel as their destination do not go to Western
Europe or North America. The Soviet Union has
refused to permit direct flights, arguing that it is up to
the individual to decide on his destination and denying
that Soviet Jews are citizens of Israel with a "right to
(b)(3) return.'
In the spring and early summer of 1987 there were
several reports that the Soviets
were considering allowing direct flights to satisfy Tel
Aviv's interests. In mid-July, however, a Soviet
spokesman indicated in an interview with Corriere
Della Sera that the emigration issue was "very
touchy" and that direct flights "would go against the
real intentions of the emigrants.'
The current Soviet position on direct flights is less
responsive to Israeli interests than it is to those of the
Arabs, who want to keep the Jewish population of
Israel down; to the United States and its Jewish
community, which argue for the emigrants' freedom
to choose their destination; and to its own domestic
position, which is to treat minorities as Soviet citizens,
not citizens of other states. An Israeli interpretation
of the Soviet position as of the summer of 1987 was
that the Soviets were more interested in appealing to
the United States and its Jewish community than in
meeting Israeli demands.
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Appendix B
Soviet and Israeli Views of a
Middle East Peace Conference
To reassert its role in the Middle East, play to the
interests of moderate Arab states, prevent US-backed
peace negotiations, and demonstrate that it can cre-
atively and constructively participate in the resolution
of regional crises, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev
has actively campaigned for an old idea�the conven-
ing of an international conference on the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Soviet spokesmen, led by Gorbachev, have
tried to demonstrate their seriousness about this ap-
proach by enunciating a new rationale:
� It is impossible to resolve the Middle East problem
through armed confrontation because of the dangers
involved.
� Given low oil prices, it is impossible for the Arab
states to bear the burden of armaments.
� It is, therefore, time to concentrate on resolving the
conflict through political means.
The Israelis are divided on the subject of an interna-
tional approach to a settlement. Foreign Minister
Peres has endorsed an international framework for
talks, seeing this as the only means to bring the Arabs
to the negotiating table. Prime Minister Shamir re-
jects the concept, arguing that the extreme Arab
position would prevail at such a conference and that
Israel would be under intense pressure to make
territorial concessions in the occupied West Bank,
Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights.
There are basic differences between the Soviet con-
cept of a conference and Peres's concept, primarily
concerning the structure and authority of such a
gathering. The Soviets insist that all participants
(including themselves) must have the opportunity to
play an effective role and that the conference must
not become merely an umbrella for direct talks
between the parties to the dispute. This reflects their
consistent rejection of separate accords; their demand
for a comprehensive settlement that excludes none of
the main parties, particularly their clients, Syria and
the PLO; their desire to demonstrate their political
value to their Arab clients; and their concern that
they not again become irrelevant to the process.
15
Those Israelis who support a conference insist that it
only provide a general framework in which direct
talks can be held. They also insist that decisionmaking
authority rest with the working groups, and they
reject the authority of the overall conference to
approve or veto those decisions.
Another basic difference concerns the role of the
PLO. Virtually all Israelis reject the participation of
the PLO in any phase of negotiations. Moscow's
position has been that the PLO is the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people and that it is
up to the PLO to determine who will represent the
Palestinians.
Over the years the Soviets have indicated flexibility
on virtually every issue having to do with a settle-
ment�save their own participation. Although they
have called for Israeli withdrawal from the territories
taken in 1967, self-determination for the Palestinians,
including the establishment of their own state, and
mutual recognition of the sovereignty of all states in
the region, they have frequently indicated that they
would accept any position that the Arabs themselves
were willing to accept.
Under Gorbachev's leadership, the Soviets have indi-
cated an increased willingness to meet Israeli (as well
as US and Jordanian) concerns about the structure of
a conference. They have not, however, abandoned
their insistence that a conference have authority to
sanction any agreements reached. The Israeli newspa-
per Ha'aretz reported on 6 September 1987, for
example, that a senior Soviet diplomat had said that
an international conference need not have a veto or
the power to force a solution. He said, however, the
USSR insists on the signing of one comprehensive
accord and will not accept separate agreements be-
tween Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians without
agreements with Syria and Lebanon. He did not rule
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(b)(3)
out the possibility of further flexibility on the part of
the Soviet Union. Soviet officials privately substanti-
ated this account in subsequent talks with US Embas-
sy officials in Moscow
Soviet proposals for a peace conference have con-
tained the following points:
� A conference should have parallel frameworks, in-
cluding a full meeting with the participation of the
permanent members of the UN Security Council
and regional committees of the countries directly
involved.
� There should be discussions by the full conference of
the international aspects of the process�such as
guarantees of peace, the nature of a Palestinian
entity, and the status of Jerusalem.
� The regional committees should convey all agree-
ments reached to the full conference to give them
international legitimacy.
� There should be reciprocal recognition by the PLO
and Israel and acceptance of the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
According to the Kuwaiti news agency KUNA, the
Israelis rejected a Soviet proposal to this effect in
(b)(3) mid-September 1987
(b)(3)
In September, at the United Nations, Peres presented
his program for the peace process, and it differed
significantly from that of the Soviet Union. It called
for direct talks; no imposed settlement and no veto;
acceptance of UN Security Council resolutions pro-
viding for the withdrawal from occupied territories
and recognition of Israel's right to exist; negotiations
to resolve the Palestinian problem with a joint delega-
tion of Palestinians and Jordanians; negotiations to be
conducted by three regional committees; and a
committee of regional states and the permanent UN
Security Council members to chart the future and to
legitimize the process.
Thus, the basic impasse remained in early 1988. The
Soviets continue to insist on a conference with "au-
thority," while the Israelis continue to insist on the
primacy of direct talks. At the US-Soviet summit
meeting in December, the Soviets repeated their
argument against bilateral agreements concluded out-
side the context of an international conference. Soviet
spokesman Polyakov indicated that such agreements
would be "blown up" like the 1983 Lebanese-Israeli
agreement.
The Palestinian Issue
With respect to Palestinian representation at a confer-
ence, the Soviet position under Gorbachev has become
more flexible. Moscow's basic position has been that
the PLO is the "sole legitimate representative" of the
Palestinian people. While consistently stating that it
will abide by any representation that the Palestinians
accept, Moscow has insisted that it is the PLO that
must make this decision
In recent months the Soviets have tried to convey an
impression of increased ambiguity in their approach
to the issue. In a late September discussion with US
Embassy officers, Foreign Ministry Middle East De-
partment Deputy Director Robert Turdiyev indicated
that there was no single answer to the problem but
that the Soviets remained convinced that the PLO
constituted the only credible and accredited represen-
tative of the Palestinian people. He stated that the
PLO was not a monolith, there were large differences
within the organization, and the task was to encour-
age the most suitable views
The Soviets avoided describing the PLO as the "sole
legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people
during the fall of 1987, while continuing to assert that
the PLO must be involved in the peace process.
During the visit of King Hussein to Moscow in
December 1987, for example, Gorbachev stated that
all sides, including the PLO, should participate in
working out a settlement. This type of formulation
leaves room for a variety of approaches, such as the
creation of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.
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Se�et
May 1948
February 1952
February 1953
July 1953
June 1967
December 1968
December 1969
Spring 1970
Appendix C
Major Events in Soviet-
Israeli Relations
USSR recognizes Israel (second country to do so)
Prime Minister Ben Gurion reads Knesset note to the USSR giving assurances
that Israel will not join any aggressive pact against the USSR. Calls on USSR to
permit emigration of Jews to Israel.
USSR breaks diplomatic relations with Israel following bomb explosion in Soviet
Legation in Tel Aviv
USSR-Israeli diplomatic relations resume.
USSR breaks diplomatic relations with Israel after the Arab-Israeli war
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Simonev and Israeli Ambassador Tekoah hold
direct talks in New York on bilateral relations and the Middle Eastern crisis.
Soviet-Israeli talks conducted through Romania.
Soviet approaches made to Israelis in Argentina, New York, and Geneva
June 1971
December 1973
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
1
b)(1)
(b)(3)
Soviet journalist Viktor
Louis visits Israel, meets with Prime Minister Meir.
Soviet and Israeli Foreign Ministers Grom ko and Eban meet at the 1973 Geneva
Peace Conference on the Middle East.
17
..sg.'ecr.et......
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Late 1974
24 September 1975
6 May 1976
24 September 1981
30 November 1981
Moscow requests Israeli permission to assign several Soviet consular officials to
the Finnish Embassy in Tel Aviv to handle consular services for Soviet passport
holders. Israel eventually agrees on condition that Soviet officers serve on a
temporary basis and that Moscow accept a reciprocal Israeli group to study
procedures for handling Soviet Jewish emigration. Nothing further occurs on this
subject until 1986.
Foreign Ministers Gromyko and AlIon meet for three hours in New York at
Israel's initiative to discuss the Middle Eastern situation.
Soviet and Israeli Ambassadors to the United Nations meet to discuss Soviet
policy statements on Middle East.
Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Shamir meet at the United Nations in New York.
First public meeting in six years
US and Israel sign Joint Political Military Agreement, labeled a strategic
cooperation agreement aimed against the USSR
14 December 1981 Israel annexes Golan Heights
6 June 1982 Israel invades Lebanon.
19 September 1982
21 April 1983
June 1984
September 1984
sgetvet,,
TASS statement condemns Israel for the massacre of Palestinians at Sabra and
Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon.
The Anti-Zionist Committee is established in Moscow
Israeli press reports Romanian President Ceausescu conveyed a Soviet message to
the Israeli Minister of Communications expressing a willingness to consider
renewing relations if Israel agrees to attend an international peace conference.
Similar signals are made in Scandinavia and the Netherlands.
Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Shamir meet during the UN General Assembly.
It is their first meeting in three years.
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St
December 1984
July 1985
September 1985
May 1986
August 1986
September 1986
October 1986
April 1987
July 1987
September 1987
January 1988
Reverse Blank
Ambassadors Dobrynin and Rosenne meet in Washington to discuss relations, but
no progress is achieved, according to the Israeli press
Ambassadors Vorontsov and Sofer meet in Paris and discuss renewing relations.
No agreements are reached.
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze refuses to meet privately with Foreign Minister
Shamir at the United Nations.
USSR issues a statement criticizing Israel's decision to participate in the Strategic
Defense Initative.
Soviet and Israeli consular officials meet for 90 minutes in Helsinki. No
agreements are reached
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Prime Minister Peres meet at the United
Nations. First public meeting with an Israeli Prime Minister.
Poland establishes an interests section in Tel Aviv.
Foreign Minister Peres meets with senior Soviet Communist Party officials
responsible for the Middle East
Soviet consular delegation arrives in Israel
Foreign Ministers Shevardnadze and Peres meet at the United Nations
Hungary and Israel agree to exchange interests sections.
Moscow receives three-month extension for consular delegation.
Moscow receives one-month extension for its consular delegation and grants
Tel Aviv's request to send delegation to Moscow to inspect interests desk at
Netherlands Embassy.
19
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646405
S& et
Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646405
N.
Approved for Release: 2017/11/20 C06646405