PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01211135
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2017
• Case Number: F-2009-00358
• Publication Date: August 23, 1974

wxsit,ay.,-mr
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SNIE 4-1-74
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security
Agency.
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant General Manager for National Security representing the Atomic
Energy Commission
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury representing the Department
of the Treasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
ALSO PARTICIPATING:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
-1757
SeeR:Ezt
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ire3
CONTENTS
NOTE
Page
1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 2
DISCUSSION 7
I. THE BARRIERS TO PROLIFERATION 8
A. Technological Requirements 8
B. International Restrictions 13
Safeguards 13
Protection of Existing Weapons 15
II. CANDIDATES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 16
A. India 16
Capabilities 16
Intentions 19
B. Israel 20
Facilities and Programs 20
Israeli Options 25
The Political and Military Parameters 25
C. Republic of China ( Taiwan) 26
Capabilities 26
Intentions 28
�.17Ggl'1=9
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Page
D. Japan 29
Capabilities 29
Intentions 30
E. Argentina 32
Capabilities 32
Intentions 34
F. South Africa 34
Capabilities 34
Intentions 36
G. Other Countries 36
III. PROLIFERATION BY PROXY 39
IV. PROSPECTS FOR DETECTION OF A COVERT PROGRAM . . 41
V. THEFT OF MATERIALS OR WEAPONS 42
--Tcyr�sEcRET1
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1
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NOTE
This paper deals with a number of aspects of the potential spread
of nuclear weapons outside the five major nuclear powers. It includes
discussions of Indian nuclear intentions, the weapons development
capabilities and policies of a number of other countries, and the
potential for acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-governmental
entities. Most specific judgments on capabilities and intentions are
intended to cover the next five years or so, but longer term judgments
also are included in some cases.
707�SENCRE
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TO
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. In the 1980s, the production of nuclear weapons will be within
the technological and economic capabilities of many countries. The
once formidable barriers to development of nuclear weapons by na-
tions of middling size and resources have steadily diminished over
time. They will continue to shrink in the years ahead as plutonium,
enriched uranium, and technology become more widely spread. Some
countries will consider nuclear weapons largely in terms of military
utility. The principal determinant of the extent of nuclear weapons
proliferation in coming years will, however, be political considera-
tions�including the policies of the superpowers with regard to pro-
liferation, the policies of suppliers of nuclear materials and technology,
and regional ambitions and tensions.
B. As things now stand, it is likely that India will proceed to fabri-
cate weapons covertly. But the US or the USSR still might be able to
dissuade them. The Indians probably would begin a weapons program
with the intent of keeping it small, but once launched on that course
pressures for an overt, substantial program�including nuclear-capable
aircraft, missiles or both�are likely to prove irresistible. An Indian
decision to proceed with an overt weapons program on any scale will
be one factor inclining some other countries to follow suit.
C. We believe that Israel already has produced nuclear weapons.
Our judgment is based on Israeli acquisition of large quantities of
uranium, partly by clandestine means; the ambiguous nature of
Israeli efforts in the field of uranium enrichment; and Israel's
large investment in a costly missile system designed to accommodate
nuclear warheads. We do not expect the Israelis to provide confirma-
tion of widespread suspicions of their capability, either by nuclear test-
ing or by threats of use, short of a grave threat to the nation's existence.
Future emphasis is likely to be on improving weapon designs, manufac-
turing missiles more capable in terms of distance and accuracy than the
existing 260-mile Jericho, and acquiring or perfecting weapons for air-
craft delivery.
D. Several other countries�including West Germany, Sweden,
Canada and Italy�could have fabricated nuclear devices more easily,
from a technological and financial point of view, than India and Israel.
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They have refrained, and they are unlikely to be much influenced by
weapons acquisition in countries like India. The inhibitions facing
each of them are strong. In all, popular opinion is strongly opposed
to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, both on emotional grounds and
because such weapons would entail substantial risks�of provoking
attack, of offending vital allies and of destroying existing mutual se-
curity arrangements. It would require very fundamental changes, such
as the breakup of major defense alliances accompanied by a substantial
increase in strife and tension throughout the world, to induce countries
like West Germany, Sweden, Canada and Italy to exercise their near-
term capability.
E. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of
State, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army believe that
Japan's situation is very similar to that of the other advanced Western
nations just mentioned. They believe Japan would not embark on a pro-
gram of nuclear weapons development in the absence of a major ad-
verse shift in great power relationships which presented Japan with a
-clearcut threat to its security. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force and the Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy, however, see a strong chance that Japan's
leaders will conclude that they must have nuclear weapons if they are to
achieve their national objectives in the developing Asian power balance.
Such a decision could come in the early 1980s. It would likely be made
even sooner if there is any further proliferation of nuclear weapons, or
global permissiveness regarding such activity. These developments
would hasten erosion of traditional Japanese opposition to a nuclear
weapons course and permit Tokyo to cross that threshold earlier in the
interests of national security. Any concurrent deterioration of Japanese
relations with the Communist powers or a further decline in the credi-
bility of US defense guarantees would, in their view, further accelerate
the pace of nuclear weapons development by Japan.
F. Less sweeping changes could induce one or another of the less
advanced nations to mount the . sort of nuclear effort India and Israel
have made. Some states, such as the Republic of China, Argentina and
South Africa, will be much influenced in their decisions not only by the
TO �
3
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general course of proliferation but by such factors as growing feelings
of isolation and helplessness, perceptions of major military threat and
desires for regional prestige. In each of these cases, any weapons ca-
pability probably would be small and delivery probably would depend
on aircraft, though there is some possibility that one or another might
be able to purchase a nuclear-capable missile system from a foreign
supplier.
G. Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a weapon option
clearly in mind, and it will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear device
after five years or so. Taipei's role in the world is changing radically,
and concern over the possibility of complete isolation is mounting. Its
decisions will be much influenced by US policies in two key areas�
support for the island's security and attitudes about the possibility of a
nuclear-armed Taiwan. Taipei's present course probably is leading it
toward development of nuclear weapons. �
H. Argentina's small nuclear program is being pursued vigorously
with an eye toward independence of foreign suppliers. It probably will
provide the basis for a nuclear weapons capability in the early 1980s.
Argentina has no apparent military need for nuclear weapons, but
there is strong desire for them in some quarters as a way to augment
Argentina's power vis-a-vis Brazil. Over time, in the absence of strong
international pressures that stop nuclear weapons acquisition else-
where, there is an even chance that Argentina will choose to join the
nuclear club in a small way.
I. In the short run, South Africa is of more concern in the prolifera-
tion context as a potential supplier of nuclear materials and technology
than as a potential nuclear weapons power. It controls large uranium
deposits, and it apparently has developed a technology for enriching
uranium that could be used for producing weapons-grade material.
South Africa probably would go forward with a nuclear weapons pro-
gram if it saw a serious threat from African neighbors beginning to
emerge. So serious a threat is highly unlikely in the 1970s.
J. Other candidate countries�Spain, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil
and South Korea�would need at least a decade to carry out a nuclear
weapons development program. One or another might detonate a de-
monstrative device earlier�perhaps considerably earlier by using pur-
chased materials or by obtaining extensive foreign assistance. Each of
�0-P�sEc-Rfa
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RteR:U.
these countries is subject to a different set of motivations and pressures.
Some have enemies already making efforts in the nuclear weapons
field; all will be concerned with such efforts on the part of neighbors
or potential antagonists. Some will be interested in nuclear weapons
for their presumed prestige value. Unless countries opposed to prolifer-
ation�particularly the US and the USSR�find ways to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons programs before these candidate countries are in a
position to go forward, at least some of them will be motivated to join
the nuclear race. The strongest impulses will probably be felt by Paki-
stan and Iran; Egypt and Brazil now appear to fall into a second cate-
gory of likelihood.
K. France, India and Israel, while unlikely to foster proliferation
as a matter of national policy, probably will prove susceptible to the
lure of the economic and political advantages to be gained from ex-
porting materials, technology and equipment relevant to nuclear
weapons programs. And most potential proliferators are on good terms
with one or all of them.
L. It is theoretically possible for a country capable of developing
a nuclear weapon to do so covertly, up to the test of a first device. And
a test is not absolutely necessary. In practice, indications of such a pro-
gram are virtually certain to reach the outside world. But most coun-
tries will seek to maintain the tightest possible security with regard to
any military nuclear activities, and information is likely to be inter-
mittent and inconclusive. Indigenous ballistic missile delivery systems,
on the other hand, would be readily identifiable early in the develop-
ment cycle, and missile systems obtained abroad would not remain
undetected for any significant period.
M. Governments backward in the nuclear field and anxious to ac-
quire a token capability quickly are more likely to try to steal weapons
than fissionable materials, despite the fact that the latter are less well
protected. A country capable of developing and producing its own nu-
clear device is highly unlikely to try to steal weapons, but one might
seek fissionable materials by theft or diversion. Competently done, di-
version might go undetected.
N. Terrorists might attempt theft of either weapons or fissionable
materials. They could see the latter as useful for terror or blackmail
purposes even if they had no intention of going on to fabricate weapons.
-7013�frECFl.ET
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Nuclear Activities of Selected Countries
Sign'ficant
Uranium Enrichment Number of Reactor-Associated
,-,.- Treaty
Facil'ties Plutonium Producing Reactors* i Facilities_ Commitments
[ z
i 0 L
. N
2 E
i n
I'l i E
. re f^ m re ^ ci U Pu",,i-
II D _iw n tu
..
in un. w
.1 n
A Ce u.
D 1/1
x
,
4 i�c Yi
z z
� - -
!JARGENTINA
AUSTRALIA
[ AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
; BRAZIL 1 � �
1BULGARIA �
CANADA
AO
CHINA,REPof
ICZECHOSLOVAKIA
; DENMARK
EGYPT a.
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY LEAST
GERMANYLNEST j �
! GREECE �
:HUNGARY .1b �
r INDIA
ISRAEL
ITALY
JAPAN
MEXICO
NETHERLANDS
PAKISTAN
PORTUGAL
ROMANIA
SOUTH AFRICA
LSOUTH KOREA
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
' YUGOSLAV!AJH.EJ Ea,
Small research reactors and others tha produce insignificant amounts of plutonium are excluded
" Significant in association with natu al uranium fueled reactors
�91417?1,1
563614 7-74 CIA
OMajor
0 Significant
� Minor
OProduction R Ratified
In operation
as of 15 Aug. 74
Pilot plant S Signed but not ratified
I Under construction
CIResearch _I and/or planned for
operation by 1980
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DISCUSSION
1. 1. Five nations�the US, the USSR, the UK,
France and China�have overt, substantial
nuclear weapons programs. India exploded a
device, labeling the event a "peaceful nu-
clear explosion," in May 1974 and is in a
position to produce a small stockpile of rela-
tively crude weapons by 1976 if it chooses. We
believe Israel already has nuclear weapons,
though the Israelis have been quite successful
in concealing their program and denying out-
siders absolute proof of their weapons capa-
bility. A number of other countries are tech-
nologically capable of producing a weapon in
the foreseeable future, although none now ap-
pears committed to such a course. They range
from countries like Canada, West Germany
and Sweden�with near-term capabilities but
minimal incentives�to those like South Africa
and Taiwan�where the nuclear weapons op-
tion is more distant in time but potentially
more attractive from the politico-military view-
point.
2. The once formidable technological and
economic barriers to development of nuclear
weapons capabilities by nations of middling
7
size and resources have steadily diminished
over time; they will continue to shrink in the
years ahead. Fissionable material�the first
essential of a nuclear weapon�is becoming
more readily available throughout the world.
The knowledge necessary for making a weap-
on is spreading. Many of the facilities for proc-
essing nuclear materials are becoming com-
monplace, leading�among other things�to
a decrease in the incremental costs of a weap-
ons program. More and more countries are
entering into or expanding domestic programs
in fields such as metallurgy and conventional
weapons that provide a basis for nuclear weap-
ons fabrication capabilities.
3. Thus, military utility and political conse-
quences as perceived by national leaders will
increasingly dominate the future nuclear
weapons decisions of those states now having
little or no nuclear weapons capability. Mili-
tary utility will probably be the overriding
consideration in any case where a nation per-
ceives an urgent military requirement; in most
instances, however, domestic and international
political considerations are likely to be the key
determinants.
SC.
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I. THE BARRIERS TO PROLIFERATION
A. Technological Requirements
4. Natural uranium, the source material for
the two most commonly used fissionable ma-
terials�Uranium-235 ( U-235 ) and Plutonium-
239 ( Pu-239) is abundant enough so that
many nations have domestic reserves that are
exploitable at present market prices. ( See
Table.) Others ( e.g., India and Israel) are
exploiting domestic uranium that is not eco-
nomic in world market terms.
5. Of the two primary weapons materials,
plutonium is the one that most aspirants to nu-
clear weapons could obtain most readily. It is
produced by bombarding U-238 with neutrons
in nuclear reactors ( the irradiation process ).
The uranium that serves as fuel for the reactor
contains both U-238 and U-235. After the fuel
has been irradiated, it contains a mixture of
uranium, plutonium and many fission prod-
ucts. Plutonium can be separated from the ir-
radiated fuel by a chemical process in a chemi-
cal separation plant. As of mid-1974, there are
.16 countries aside from the five nuclear powers
with a total of 53 operational electric power or
research reactors capable of producing up to a
total of some 9 metric tons per year ( mt/y )
of plutonium. By 1980, we anticipate that 24
such countries will have about 157 such re-
actors capable of producing up to 50 mt/y.
Maximizing the Pu-239 content for weapons
use involves frequent fuel reloadings, requiring
significantly larger uranium supplies than nor-
mal operation and greatly increasing the cost
of the electric power produced. This can most
rap St GR-E-1
readily be done in a natural uranium reactor
designed to permit fuel rod replacement with-
out interrupting power-generating operations.
6. Alternatively, a state seeking a nuclear
capability could opt for a weapon based on
U-235, rather than plutonium. Natural uranium
contains only some 0.71 percent of U-235, the
isotope essential for nuclear weapons utilizing
uranium as the source of an explosive chain
reaction. It must be highly enriched for weap-
ons use; enrichment to over 90 percent offers
the best combination of explosive potential
and weapon size. The method of enrichment
commonly used to date is gaseous diffusion.3
This method has not been practical on a small
scale and facilities have been built only by the
five nuclear powers, although a French-led
consortium ( Eurodif ) including financial par-
ticipation by Italy, Belgium and Spain�and
possibly Libya�will soon begin construction
of a $2 billion plant in southern France that is
due for operation in 1980 or shortly thereafter
and intended to provide enriched uranium for
reactor fue1.3
7. The first enrichment method suitable for
small-scale operation to be proved feasible for
In this process, natural uranium in the form of
gaseous uranium hexafluoride is pumped or diffused
through a barrier containing a very large number of
pores of very small diameter. Because U-235 is
lighter and therefore diffuses more rapidly than
U-238, a larger fraction of the original amount of
U-235 succeeds in doing so. Through many repeti-
tions, the gas is enriched in U-235, until the desired
enrichment is achieved. Since the gas must be pumped
by a compressor run by an electric motor at each
stage, an enormous amount of electric power is con-
sumed.
The subject of worldwide commercial demand
for enriched uranium for peaceful purposes will be
treated in a forthcoming NIAM, The Nuclear Fuel
Market Through 1990, scheduled for publication in
October 1974.
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TOP
EST1M ATES OF WORLD URANIUM RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION
(Thousand short tons of U30,)
RESERVES
PRODUCTION
Recoverable below
$10/1b.**
Additional
Recoverable at
810�$15/1b.**
1980
Known &
Known &
1972
Attain-
Known
Probable
Known
Probable
Actual
able
Argentina
12
30
10
40
*
1
Australia
207
255
38
76
0
8
Bulgaria
12
12
na
na
*
Canada
241
488
158
442
5
14
Central African Republic
10
21
na
na
0
0
China, People's Republic
100
100
na
na
2
3
Czechoslovakia
150
570
na
na
3'
3
Denmark
7
20
no
na
0
0
France
48
79
13
39
2
3
Gabon
26
32
no
7
1
2
Germany, East
50
100
na
no
71
6
lIungary
12
12
na
na
1 1
1
India
0
0
32
4
*
Italy
12
12
na
no
0
*
Japan
4
8
5
no
*
Mexico
1
1
1
na
0
*
Niger
52
78
13
26
1
2
Portugal
9
17
na
30
*
Romania
10
20
no
na
*
*
South Africa
163
173
81
115
4
6
South-West Africa (Namibia)
100
100
na
no
0
5
Spain
11
11
10
na
*
Sweden
0
0
350
402
*
USA
340
1,040
183
483
13
34
USSR
95
155
na
na
7
7
Yugoslavia.
8
21
na
na
0
*
Other
5
7
4
4
*
TOtalS 3
1,685
3,360
870
1,665
45
95
*Less than 500 tons.
**These are measures of ore quality commonly used as benchmarks. Actual prices in inter-
national contracts concluded in the several years prior to 1974 tended to be in the $8-12/pound
range. Thus, fairly intensive work has been done on locating and delineating deposits recoverable
at $10/pound or less. Prices in contracts recently concluded for future delivery are substantially
higher, but the price rise has not yet inspired much new information on the availability of lower-
grade or less accessible ore.
no Data not available.
1 Processing into metal done in USSR.
2 India currently is expoliting these reserves.
3 Totals may not add, due to rounding.
�or-sccarzt
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ge71"-SteR:E=T
Plutonium Weapon Production Cycle
Uranium Mine
Concentration
Plant
Jr
Fuel Rod
Fabrication
563613 7.74 CIA
4'Natural Uranium
Reactor*
Spent Fuel Chemical
Separation
Plant
Reactors fueled with enriched uranium also are usable
commercial use for reactor fuel was the gas
centrifuge.' The UK, West Germany and the
Netherlands, in a consortium called Urenco,
are pioneering the commercial use of gas Cen-
trifuges to enrich uranium for power reactor
fuel. Urenco has begun construction of two
plants scheduled to be operational in 1976 that
will be large enough, in combination, to pro-
vide about enough fuel for one large reactor. It
is negotiating ten-year contracts for enrich-
ment services, and it plans to have enough ca-
pacity to satisfy the fuel needs of 25 major
reactors by 1985. Intensive research on gas
centrifuge enrichment is also going forward
in Japan, which plans a pilot plant by 1980 and
a production facility by 1985, and considerable
effort is being devoted to the process by a
number of other countries.
' The centrifuge process involves high speed spin-
ning of uranium in gaseous form in cylindrical con-
tainers through many iterations, with the lighter iso-
tope ( U-235 ) gathering towards the center of the
tube.
Implosion Weapon
Detonators 0
Plutonium 4
Weapon k 0 0
239 Fabrication
Plant
High Explosive
0/ 0
0
8. Several other enrichment methods are
under development�notably the Becker jet
nozzle technique, laser isotope separation and
an unknown South African process.' Most of
the work on the Becker process has been done
in West Germany, supported both by the gov-
ernment and by a private firm. The several
possible laser techniques and processes are in
their infancy�they are being pursued prin-
cipally in the US, the USSR, Europe and Is-
rael.
9. South Africa is building a pilot enrich-
ment plant that probably involves an aerody-
namic process�perhaps similar to the Becker
One of several aerodynamic methods, the Becker
technique involves forcing a jet stream of a gaseous
uranium mixture along a curved wall, with the
heavier isotope remaining close to the wall, the lighter
one collecting away from it, and the fractions being
separated by a knife edge. Laser techniques are based
on the use of laser beams to ionize or otherwise iso-
late a selected isotope�whether of Uranium, sulphur
or some other element�which can then be removed
by electrical or magnetic attraction or by changes in
chemical activity.
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Tor�steRET
Uranium Weapon Production Cycle
Uranium Mine
4
Concentration
Plant
4
Conversion
to
Gas
563612 7-74 CIA
Enrichment Facility
Gas Diffusion Plant
Gas Centrifuge
or
New Experimental
Technologies
11
High sive u
Detonator Ex loU 235 + 2
3
5
Gun-barrel Weapon
Highly Enriched Weapon
Uranium 235 Fabrication
Plant
jet nozzle. Construction began on this plant
in early 1971, following the Prime Minister's
July 1970 announcement of the development of
a new technology for enrichment that would
be economically competitive with other estab-
lished methods. It has been announced that
the pilot plant is to begin partial operation in
1974. After feasibility studies, a full-scale pro-
duction facility is anticipated, which is to be
financed partly by foreign sources and will
involve some sharing of technology. The one
known possible future partner is the German
firm that has been backing development of the
Becker jet nozzle and is participating in the
South African feasibility studies; Japanese par-
ticipation at the study stage also is rumored.
.. 10. Interest in enriched uranium does not
necessarily indicate a desire for weapons. Most
power reactors utilize slightly enriched ura-
nium as fuel, and dependence on the US�
which until recently was the only commercial
source of enriched uranium�or on the other
major powers as suppliers of a commodity
vital to national energy output strikes many
or
Implosion Weapon
Detonators 0
0
High Explosive
users as undesirable on both economic and
political grounds. The intensive work being
done in many places on enrichment technology
leads us to believe that technical knowledge
necessary to produce weapons-grade uranium
is likely to become increasingly available. As
new reactors using enriched uranium are built
throughout the world, supplies of low enrich-
ment uranium will become common. Enrich-
ment plants to serve the reactors will become
more widely spread. Low enrichment material
can be upgraded rapidly by relatively small
enrichment plants. Conversion of a gaseous
diffusion or Becker nozzle facility from a low
enrichment end product to a high enrichment
one requires extensive modification. But a gas
centrifuge plant which can produce slightly
enriched uranium can be used to produce
weapons-grade material without substantial
modification.
11. A country seeking a demonstrative nu-
clear explosive device or a weapons capability
can choose to develop a simple gun-assembled
device employing U-235 or a more complex
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TOP
spherical implosion device employing either
U-235 or Pu-239. A gun-assembled device, in
which two subcritical masses of uranium are
rapidly brought together in a gun barrel type
arrangement, has the advantages of being sim-
ple in concept, inherently rugged and easy to
design.
Implosion devices, in which spheres and/or
shells of uranium or plutonium are rapidly
compressed by detonation of the high explo-
sive charge surrounding them, are more com-
plex, require considerably more developmental
research and a more sophisticated technologi-
cal base for their manufacture.
12. If access to kilogram quantities of fis-
sionable material is available, the technological
resources required for the development and
testing of a simple nuclear explosive device are
not very great. Much information on the func-
tioning of a simple gun or implosion assembly
with a fission yield in the nominal range has
been published in open literature. It is gen-
erally known that plutonium is unsuitable
for use in gun-assembled devices. Critical
masses have been published for spheres of
plutonium and enriched uranium of various
isotopic contents and with different configura-
tions of neutron reflectors. With these basic
data, a combination can be selected that will
be appropriately sulvritical until the high ex-
plosive is detonated.
-rar-sEC-PET
Moreover, experimental techniques for study-
ing high speed detonations and hydrodynamic
material behavior that are needed for the more
sophisticated designs are widely used in the
field of conventional ordnance. Once a country
had detonated a first device, it could move on
to reduce size and weight and to increase the
efficiency of use of fissionable material.
13. The cost of a program for producing a
few low-yield fission weapons per year is not
prohibitive for any country with a modest in-
dustrial and technological base. Beginning
from scratch, a program to produce one or two
weapons per year probably would cost at least
$200 million before testing an initial device
would be possible. This figure would include
capital investment on the order of $50 million
for necessary facilities for research, produc-
tion and testing, and some $150 million to
cover operating expenses for research facilities
for at. least five years and production facilities
for two years. For a program to produce 15-30
fission weapons per year, the costs prior to a
first test or device probably would be $500
million to 8600 million, of which at least half
would be capital investment in facilities.
14. No potential producer of weapons is to-
day in quite the state of innocence assumed
by the foregoing cost estimates., As a result of
widespread publication in the nuclear field,
competent personnel could reduce the time
and expense required for research and devel-
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Sg,C,BST
opment. All facilities essential to weapons pro-
duction except a weapons fabrication plant
can be justified as necessary for a power pro-
gram. Many nations already have all or most
of the requisite facilities. By deferring a de-
cision to manufacture weapons until comple-
tion of all facilities required for production of
fissionable materials, the cost of weapons pro-
duction can be limited to the additional ex-
incurred for research, development,
fabrication and testing of actual weapons. A
fabricating facility need cost no more than a
few million dollars. If it is assumed that all
other necessary facilities are developed within
the framework of a peaceful uses program, a
country today probably could operate a pro-
gram for production of one or two weapons per
year, plus on-going research and limited test-
ing to improve the weapon design, for about
$10-15 million per year. A larger program to
produce 15-30 weapons per year, including on-
going research and testing, might cost some
$20-30 million per year.
15. A number of countries have already
spent considerably more on their nuclear pro-
grams than the amount estimated as the mini-
mum necessary to acquire a capability for
weapons production, without actually acquir-
ing such a capability. Funds have been spent
for research and facilities not directly related
to capability for weapons production.. The ad-
ditional amount that each would have to spend
if it wished to produce weapons depends on
the nature and status of its present program,
and of course on the size of the weapons pro-
gram desired.
B. International Restrictions
16. In an effort to prevent or limit the
spread of nuclear weapons, much of the inter-
national community has joined to construct
13
barriers to further proliferation. These include
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons ( NPT ), test-ban treaties, and
international inspection agreements. Elaborate
controls on the use of nuclear materials, called
safeguards, have been devised.
Safeguards
17. Under the provisions of the NPT, new
safeguards arrangements under the auspices of
the International Atomic Energy Association
( IAEA ) have replaced or will replace most
bilateral and trilateral safeguards arrange-
ments. The objectives of applying IAEA safe-
guards to nuclear materials are: ( a ) the timely
detection of any diversion of significant quan-
tities of material from peaceful nuclear activi-
ties, and ( b ) the deterrence of such diversion
by the risk of early detection. To detect diver-
sion, the IAEA must verify the quantities and
location of safeguarded nuclear material. Ap-
plication of uniform safeguards on a broad
basis, covering entire national nuclear pro-
grams, probably will be more effective than
the multiplicity of systems and methods that
have been used to date. For those countries
who have signed the NPT, the possibility of
being detected in a violation will be a strong
deterrent to diversion of safeguarded nuclear
materials into weapons production.
18. The IAEA's safeguards under NPT
agreements are applied to processed uranium
in all peaceful nuclear activities carried on
by all parties to the Treaty other than the
nuclear-armed signatories�the US, the USSR
and the UK�with a view to preventing diver-
sion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Thirty-three countries were covered
by such agreements at the end of July 1974,
although only 19 of the countries had nuclear
&EGRET
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NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
INITIATION
� Imposed by NPT or by suppliers of nuclear materials and/or equipment or
assumed unilaterally by recipients
PURPOSES
� Detect diversion of materials to unauthorized uses
� Deter such diversion by providing high likelihood of detection and Of ad-
verse political and economic consequences
SCOPE
� Recordkeeping and record audit�to maintain fullest possible accountability
� Influence over facilities design�to facilitate accurate checking
� Equipment such as tamper-indicating seals and surveillance devices
� Inspection for independent verification
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES
� IAEA ( International Atomic Energy Agency)
� in connection with all transfers of relevant materials and equipment
from any party to the NPT to any other country
� on most arrangements predating the NPT and involving a party to it
� on some arrangements entered into by non-parties who have neverthe-
less given jurisdiction to the IAEA
� EURATOM ( same membership as European Economic Community)
� administers own independent safeguards in all member countries
� under agreement recently negotiated and approved by IAEA Board of
Governors but not yet ratified by member countries, will fulfill IAEA's
safeguarding functions in Germany, Italy, Benelux countries, Denmark
and Ireland
� Supplier Governments
� sometimes impose conditions that supplement or substitute for safe-
guards of multinational bodies
RELIABILITY
� IAEA system cannot provide absolute assurances that nuclear material has
not been diverted
� Supplier governments impose conditions that range from extremely strict to
extremely lax
LIMITATIONS
� Major power signatories of NPT�no means for assuring compliance
� Other signatories of NPT�only declared facilities are covered; areas subject
to inspection are narrowly defined; surprise inspections are not practiced;
materials used for non-explosive military purposes are exempt
� Important non-signatories of NPT ( France, China, Israel, India, Spain, South
Africa, Argentina, Brazil)�safeguards voluntary or non-existent
� IAEA safeguards under non-NPT agreements are interpreted by some coun-
tries as permitting peaceful nuclear explosives
TCYP-SK REI
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programs significant enough to be safe-
guarded. IAEA safeguards also are applied to
selected nuclear activities in non-NPT parties
with a view toward ensuring that the special
fissionable or other materials, services, equip-
ment, facilities, and information under Agency
controls are not used in such a way as to fur-
ther any military purpose. Forty-one such
agreements are in force dealing with specific
facilities in 23 non-NPT countries, plus the
US and the UK. Examples are the two US-
supplied power reactors at Tarapur, India;
the two Canadian-supplied power reactors in
Rajasthan, India; the research reactor at
Nahal Soreq, Israel; the major fraction of the
Japanese and Swiss nuclear power programs;
and research reactors in Argentina, South
Africa and Brazil.
19. However, no safeguard system can pro-
vide absolute assurance that no fissionable
material is diverted to weapons uses. Small
undetected diversions are possible even with
thorough inspection. Nuclear processing in-
volves lost material in amounts that cannot
be so precisely accounted for as to make di-
version impossible. In practice, accountability
is even less precise than it technically could
be�because the IAEA lacks funds to buy the
best possible equipment and because the most
effective inspection methods would interfere
with economically optimal operating methods.
Moreover, some authorities ( e.g., France) set
relatively lax standards in their bilateral agree-
ments. Inspectors do not have free run of nu-
clear facilities; because of deep concern in
some countries about the possibility of in-
dustrial espionage, areas subject to inspection
are narrowly defined. More importantly, safe-
guards detect diversion only after it has oc-
curred; a country with a large stockpile of
fissionable material can violate the treaty and
face the consequences�at a minimum, the
701.�"SECR41
15
suspension of nuclear cooperation and supply
by most other signatories�afterward.
20. The largest shortcoming, of course, is
the number of countries where materials are
not subject to inspection under the NPT. Main-
land China, France, India, Israel, Brazil,
Argentina, South Africa and Spain have not
signed; most are unlikely to do so. Each is im-
portant as a potential source of technology or
nuclear materials. Moreover, the major power
signatories�the US, the UK and the USSR�
are on their honor to refrain from providing
assistance in nuclear weapons development to
non-nuclear states, but no means exist for
assuring compliance. While each appears sin-
cerely opposed to proliferation, none can
guarantee that all their citizens and govern-
ment officials will abide by the treaty. Com-
petition among the major nations supplying
nuclear materials and equipment is likely to
erode the effectiveness of safeguards in the
future. Continuing growth of nuclear power
programs, with increasing numbers of facili-
ties to be controlled and ever growing amounts
of fissionable materials moving in world mar-
kets, will add to the problem.
Protection of Existing Weapons
21. Numerical abundance and geographical
dispersion also magnify long-standing prob-
lems in assuring the security of existing nu-
clear weapons from theft. As of mid-1974,
there are well over 50,000 nuclear weapons in
existence, scattered at many hundreds of loca-
tions around the world. The US has elaborate
programs, involving physical security meas-
ures for stored weapons, procedures designed
to minimize risks inherent in shipment, and
selectivity applied to personnel given access
to weapons. As a further barrier to detonation
by an unauthorized party, some US nuclear
weapons are fitted with devices requiring spe-
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cial coded instruction prior to activation. The
UK and France use similar approaches to the
security of their weapons. It is reasonable to
believe that the USSR and China are also
very careful, and the vulnerability of weap-
ons within their borders probably is reduced
by the restrictions on personal freedom and
travel characteristic of Communist societies.
There is no reason to believe that any nuclear
weapon has been misappropriated anywhere
in the world. As with safeguards on materials,
however, absolute assurance about future se-
curity is impossible. And prudence would re-
quire any observer to credit the thieves of a
weapon with the potential capability to deto-
nate it or release its toxic material content.
II. CANDIDATES FOR THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
22. For those countries technically capable
of producing weapons, the governing factors
in their decisions up to this point have been
political and military�safeguards and inter-
national pressures have retarded the pace of
proliferation but not prevented it. The US
and the USSR have devoted very substantial
attention and resources to discouraging their
separate sets of allies and friends from de-
veloping independent capabilities, but France
and mainland China have proceeded to ac-
quire significant inventories of weapons. In-
dia has detonated a device; we believe Israel
has weapons in being. Other countries which
could more easily have produced a weapon
from a technological point of view�e.g.,
West Germany, Japan, Canada and Sweden�
have refrained. In the following section, there-
fore, we discuss the future of nuclear weap-
ons programs in a number of countries in
terms of the political and military parameters
that will influence governmental decisions as
well as in terms of technological capabilities.
A. India'
Capabilities
23. India has had all of the essential mate-
rials and facilities for production of plutonium
weapons for about a decade. Uranium is
mined and concentrated in Bihar, then shipped
to the Bhabha Atomic Research Center at
Trombay, northeast of Bombay, where a ura-
nium metal plant and a small plant which
fabricates fuel elements are situated. Two of
the three Trombay reactors are insignificant
plutonium producers, but one supplied by
Canada ( CIRUS ) can produce about 10 kg
of plutonium annually. A plant for chemical
separation of plutonium from irradiated ura-
nium has been in operation at Trombay since
1964, and the Indians could have stockpiled
enough plutonium for some 10-15 weapons.
24. Indian plutonium production capability
already is substantial, and it will be greatly
expanded during the rest of the 1970s. A nu-
clear power station at Tarapur, with two re-
actors supplied by the US, became opera-
tional in 1969. A power station at Rajasthan
includes one reactor that began operating in
1973 and a second scheduled for operation in
late 1976. Both Tarapur and Rajasthan are
subject to safeguards, including inspection,
but Tarapur is dependent on imported fuel,
which is also safeguarded, while Rajasthan
operates on fuel produced in India. A station
being built at Kalpakkam, near Madras, does
not involve foreign assistance and will be free
of safeguards; each of its reactors ( one sched-
uled for operation in 1977 and one in 1978)
could produce about 150 kg of plutonium
annually.
Greater detail on Indian capabilities and inten-
tions are available in Interagency Intelligence Memo-
randum, "Prospects for an Indian Nuclear Force,"
dated 19 June 1974.
3r%12=SigG&E:E
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ECRU
India: Facilities Suitable for a Plutonium Weapon
Uranium
4
Concentration
Fuel Rod
Fabrication
1$. Reactor
4
Spent Fuel 4 Plutonium
Separation
25.
Implosion
Device
Weapon
Fabrication Implosion
Weapon
�T-1,NrsL-GRE-4
17
26. The Indians have spent heavily for
their overall nuclear program. Budget figures
indicate a total of 8.2 billion rupees�equiva-
lent to $1.2 billion converted at exchange
rates prevailing at the time of bugeting�
since 1954. Of this total, about $725 million
was for building nuclear installations�re-
search facilities, nuclear materials plants and
power stations�and $475 million was for re-
search and development. According to a press
report citing "a senior Indian authority" the
underground test of a nuclear device on May
18 was the culmination of a five-year pro-
gram that cost $216 million. This report seems
reasonable, both as to the magnitude of the
figure�which is equal to 75 percent of the
Indian budget for nuclear research and de-
velopment during the five-year period�and
as to scheduling. In 1969-1970 the annual
nuclear research budget jumped by 50 percent
to $33 million. It has grown steadily since then,
reaching $75 million in FY 1974.
27.
An unweaponized device
would be more consistent with India's public
posture of developing nuclear explosives for
peaceful purposes only. And test data are a
key element in shaping weapons designs. If the
Indians do not have a weapon but seek one
rapidly, they probably could begin accumulat-
ing a stockpile by 1976. But a more effective
approach would be several more tests, spread
over a two to three year period, in order to
develop a lighter, more efficient weapon.
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Tor-scural
28. The principal constraint on the size and
shape of any Indian nuclear weapon force
would be delivery capability. To deter a nu-
clear threat from China, India would need a
retaliatory capability against valuable targets
in China�urban industrial centers. This
would require bombers or missiles capable of
carrying a nuclear payload at least 1,400
nautical miles ( nm ). The only bombers now
in the Indian inventory are slow Canberras,
which have a combat radius of only about
1,000 nm with a 5,000-pound payload. Com-
mercial Boeing 707s and 747s have longer
range and are theoretically transformable into
bombers, but they are even less suitable than
the Canberras for penetrating heavy air de-
fenses. India's most ambitious indigenous air-
craft development effort to date�a jet
fighter�has been beset with difficulties
throughout its long history. Licensed produc-
tion of a foreign aircraft is no answer; even if
India could get a license, which is improbable,
it would face problems in the manufacturing
process that would greatly delay such a pro-
gram.
29. Thus, purchase from the USSR, the
only non-US source of bombers with sufficient
range, appears to be New Delhi's only possible
means of acquiring a reasonably effective
long-range bomber capability by 1980. In the
late 1960s, the Indians asked the Soviets for
one or two squadrons of medium bombers as
replacements for the aging Canberras. New
Delhi spurned a Soviet offer of subsonic TU-16
Badgers, on the grounds that they were little
better than Canberras. And they lost interest
in the TU-22 Blinder when told that only a
stripped-down version, lacking sophisticated
avionics, would he available. There is no doubt
that the Indian military will remain desirous
of a multipurpose, long-range bomber, whether
or not they intend to equip it with nuclear
weapons. But there are reasons to doubt that
Indian political authorities would reopen the
question with Moscow, as well as considerable
uncertainty about how the USSR would re-
spond if faced with a request. There does not
now appear to be any sound basis for judging
how all the factors involved might net out;
an Indian request and a Soviet agreement re-
main a possibility to be taken into account.
30. If India were sufficently desirous of an
intermediate-range ballistic missile ( IRBM ),
it might be able to develop one�but not be-
fore the early 1980s. An initial missile almost
certainly would be based on a satellite launch
vehicle that has been under development since
the 1960s. The focus of the space booster
development effort at present is a four-stage,
solid-propellant vehicle about 64 feet long,
with a maximum diameter of 39 inches. It is
now scheduled to orbit its first satellite in
1978 ( postponed from 1974), but so far not
even the fourth and smallest stage has been
flight-tested. An Indian-developed IRBM
made up of the first three stages of the satellite
launch vehicle could be expected to carry a
2,000-pound payload to a range of about 1,500
nm, though its accuracy ( CEP) probably
would be no better than five to ten miles with
an indigenously developed inertial guidance
system.
31. The principal space research facility is
the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching
Station ( TERLS ) on India's southwest tip.
Facilities for making solid propellants and
fabricating rocket motors are being upgraded
to produce prototype motors for the satellite
launcher. A test range near Madras, the Sri
Harikota Island Rocket Launch Station
( SHIRLS ), will serve as the rangehead for
Indian satellite launches. It is not yet corn-
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plete, but some of India's larger sounding
rockets have already been tested there. Ma-
jor additions under way include a plant for
making solid-propellant boosters and facili-
ties for static testing and rocket sled testing.
32. Given a strong desire and the capabil-
ity to purchase or develop the necessary hard-
ware, India could have both nuclear-armed
Soviet bombers and its own IRBMs for a total
expenditure on the order of a billion dollars.
Of the total amount, $300 to $500 million
would be for a. squadron of 16 aircraft, some-
what more would be for 10 to 15 IRBMs, and
about $200 million would be for some 65
nuclear devices. If these costs are spread over
the next decade, the amount required each
year would represent about 4 percent of the
present defense budget ( $2.7 billion at the
current exchange rate).
11e96--sEirigaa
19
Intentions
33. There appear to be three broad options
open to the Indians that are viable in tech-
nological and economic terms:
� nuclear development solely for peaceful
purposes
� emphasis on peaceful nuclear explosive
( PNE ) programs, with covert buldup of
a small inventory of fission weapons
� deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft
and/or missiles.
Each option embraces a large range of specific
program possibilities; each could be adopted
temporarily and merged gradually into an-
other.
34. India may not yet have decided whether
to proceed with deliberate development of a
weapons capability. The demonstrated ca-
pability to explode nuclear devices has prob-
ably already given India one benefit it was
seeking�a feeling of enhanced national pres-
tige and a stronger position in its area. India
has long been interested in uses of PNEs, par-
ticularly for mineral recovery, and the device
tested in May would be suitable for such use.
There is no military requirement for a nuclear
weapon to deal militarily with Pakistan or
even with the contingency of a suddenly hos-
tile Iran. And China's nuclear force, which
includes IRBMs deployed within range of
northern India, gives China nuclear superior-
ity over any force the Indians could hope to
mount within the foreseeable future.
35. An Indian nuclear weapons program
would have potentially adverse effects on vari-
ous international aims. A declared decision at
this time to produce weapons and develop a
medium-range delivery capability would cre-
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20
ate enormous complications. It would hurt
its relations with Pakistan and Iran and seri-
ously impair its relationship with the US and
other major sources of assistance. In terms of
China, though the Indians might view a small
capability as a useful deterrent, a well-funded
Indian nuclear weapon development program
would encourage arms competition and fur-
ther increases in military budgets. We believe
India will recognize these drawbacks and
eschew a full nuclear weapons program at this
time.
36. For the immediate future, the Indian
decision on nuclear policy thus appears to
come down to one of whether to conduct a
nuclear program for peaceful uses alone or to
design, fabricate and stockpile a few nuclear
weapons covertly. US and Soviet policies could
have considerable influence on the eventual
decision. As things now stand�given India's
aspirations, its possession of fissionable mate-
rials, its potential to develop strategic strike
forces and the presence of a nuclear power
directly to its north�it is likely that India
will go forward with a covert weapons pro-
gram if it has not chosen already to do so. It
might begin such a program with the intention
of keeping it small. But it is likely that, over
time, there would be increasing demands for
an effective operational force, particularly as
the inventory of weapons accumulated. In
time, such demands probably would prove
irresistible�especially if the perceived threat
from China were to intensify.
B. Israel
37. We believe that Israel already has pro-
duced and stockpiled a small number of fis-
sion weapons.
it cannot be proven
beyond a shadow of a doubt. But several
bodies of information point strongly in the
direction of a program stretching back over
a number of years:
( a ) Israel has gone to great effort to ob-
tain uranium concentrate. It has sought this
material clandestinely,
(b) For over ten years, the Israelis have
been doing research and development work
on the gas centrifuge method of uranium
enrichment; Israel has no nuclear power re-
actor and hence no known domestic non-
weapons use for enriched uranium.
( c) It also is likely that the Israelis ac-
quired a quantity of weapons grade uranium
some years ago, in which case they would
only have had to fabricate the weapons in
order to have a small stockpile.8
( d) Israel has invested heavily in a
costly missile system that is ineffective for
precision delivery of conventional weapons.
Facilities and Programs
f18. Israel's efforts to develop facilities to
produce fissionable materials began in 1957,
with an Israeli-French agreement for nuclear
cooperation which resulted in construction of
'The Assistant General Manager for National Se-
curity, Atomic Energy Commission has no information
that would support this statement. He notes, however,
that his reservation on this statement does not con-
stitute disagreement with the overall judgment of the
status of Israel's nuclear weapons program.
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the Nuclear Research Center, Negev, near
Dimona. This site has most of the facilities
necessary for the production of plutonium for
a small weapons program, with the possible
exception of a chemical separation plant.
These include a reactor, a uranium metal
plant, a fuel fabrication facility, laboratory
buildings for handling radioactive and non-
radioactive materials, waste disposal facilities
and the usual administrative and support fa-
cilities. There is no conclusive evidence on the
presence or absence of a chemical separation
plant. Small scale facilities for reprocessing
irradiated fuel could have been installed�e.g.,
in the laboratory for handling radioactive ma-
terial�with little chance of detection.
39. From the time the unsafeguarded re-
actor at Dimona went critical in 1963 to at
least mid-1969, it apparently was used for re-
search, isotope production, training and test-
ing.
TOP- SECRET
Israel: Facilities Suitable for a Plutonium Weapon
Uranium
Concentration
4
Fuel Rod
Fabrication
14 Reactor
Spent Fuel 4 Plutonium �Fabrication
Separation
I mptosion
Wenpon
21
40. Uranium availability has been a diffi-
culty for the Israelis, but they have obtained
enough to support operation of the reactor at
Dimona for many years.
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-73TT-PterICT
43. The fact that Israel has made such a
large investment in the Jericho missile sys-
tem�which is only marginally useful if armed
with high explosive warheads�is compelling
substantiation for the judgment that Israel has
nuclear weapons. Development began in
France in 1963, was transferred to Israel in
1968, and was probably completed about 1970.
The missile itself is essentially unchanged
from the original French design. However,
the Israelis replaced the original inertial guid-
ance system developed by the French with
one of their own design which is based on
components produced in Israel under licenses
from US companies.
44. The Jericho is a mobile, two-stage, solid-
propellant, short-range ballistic missile system
with both tactical and strategic importance in
the Middle East context. ( See graphic.) It is
about 43 feet long, weighs almost 15,000
pounds and has a reentry vehicle that prob-
ably weighs about 2,200 pounds. Its maximum
range is about 260 nm and the circular error
probable (CEP) at that distance is estimated
to be about 0.5 nm.
TOIThrefiET
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=.pn
�D
Gree.q9, a
b.
b1.---/ BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHOFO1A1:IVE,
Mediterranean
Warhead Section
2nd Stage
Egypt
ISRAELI
JERICHO MISSILE
Liftoff weight: 15,000 pounds
Length: 43 feet
Staging: Two stage, solid propellant
Re-entry weight: 2,200 pounds
Maximum range: 260 nautical miles
CEP: 0.5 nautical miles
1st Stage
1113P-5teitif
563941 8-74 CIA
Aswan
High Darn
Sudan
23
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0 50 Igo. 110- 200 MILES
0 50 .100 ida 260 -KiLOMETERI �
Tot-5E61ZZ
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45. Development of the missile is the re-
sponsibility of Israeli Aircraft Industries ( IAI ),
which has constructed a number of facilities
for both production and testing. These include
solid-propellant production facilities north of
Tel Aviv, motor research and development
facilities near Haifa, motor production and test
facilities at Ramla ( about ten miles southeast
of Tel Aviv), and a missile assembly and
checkout plant at nearby Hoter. A test range
is in the Yavne sands�an area on the coast
south of Tel Aviv.
46.
48.
49.
47. The Jericho missile was designed by the
French to carry nuclear as well as conventional
warheads.
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TOr-SEC-Ria.
25
Israeli Options
50. We believe that the Israelis will de-
sign and produce a bomb specifically for
aerial delivery, if they have not already done
so. Their earliest studies in the nuclear field
apparently envisaged bombs rather than mis-
siles; the missile� option took precedence
when the missile contract with Dassault was
concluded and when Israel was having dif-
ficulty obtaining nuclear-capable aircraft.
Now, however, they have about 120 US F-4
Phantoms and 205 US A-4 Skyhawks, as well
as 30 French Mirage Ills that could be
modified to carry nuclear weapons. They prob-
ably have arranged some means for using
aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons, if neces-
sary.
51. It seems unlikely that Israel would sus-
pend its missile program after production
and deployment of a small force of limited-
range, nuclear-tipped missiles. Several other
lines of endeavor are logical and probably
will be pursued to some extent. Tel Aviv may
decide to place Jericho missiles in hardened
silos, as an alternative to bunkers and mobile
transporter/erectors. There are, as yet, no in-
dications of silo construction, which would
take about two years. Thus, a hardened sys-
tem is unlikely before 1976 or 1977 at the
earliest.
52. An improved missile with a capability
to reach much greater distances from central
Israel is another likely follow-on; it may al-
ready be under development.
The Political and Military Parameters
53. We cannot tie Israel's decision to pro-
ceed- with fabrication of nuclear weapons to
any precise date or event. But it is a choice
clearly justifiable on military grounds from
Tel Aviv's viewpoint and consistent with its
long-standing desire for military self-reliance.
Israel's View of itself as a beleaguered, iso-
lated nation�potentially friendless in a hos-
tile world�has persisted since independence.
It has been heightened by actual or threat-
ened wars, by such events as the 1968 French
embargo on major arms shipments, by the
network of close relationships between the
USSR and a number of Arab states that has
grown up over the past two decades, and
by adverse rulings against Israel in major
world bodies such as the United Nations.
Israel could hope that threats to use a nuclear
weapon would dissuade Arab governments
from pressing any military, operation too close
to Israeli population centers; it could be sure
that actual use of a nuclear weapon would
greatly enhance Israel's capability in a war
that seemed to threaten the existence of the
state itself.
54. The most serious disadvantage was the
knowledge that the US would strongly dis-
approve of an Israeli weapons program and
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26
might react by refusing Israeli arms requests
or by taking steps to restrict Israeli access to
financial assistance from US sources. Appar-
ently the Israelis concluded either that the
risk of severe US reaction was not too great
or that the potential security gains were
worth the risk. In any event, they have tried
to minimize the prospect of strong US re-
action both by maintaining tight security on
all information on the nuclear weapons pro-
gram and by repeatedly assuring US officials
that they "would not be the first to introduce
nuclear weapons into the Middle East." At
the same time, they undoubtedly are anxious
to minimize the impact of any US action that
might follow public revelation of Israel's nu-
clear capability. That concern, as well as
likely worry over Soviet reactions to a con-
firmed nuclear weapons capability, are the
basis for Israel's policy of keeping its nuclear
capabilities and intentions undefined at-
tempting to feed Arab fears while allaying
concern elsewhere in the world.
C. Republic of China (Taiwan)
Capabilities
55. In connection with an ambitious pro-
gram for procurement and operation of nu-
clear power facilities on Taiwan, the Re-
public of China (HOC) is gradually develop-
ing a potential for the production of nuclear
weapons. There is strong military association
with nuclear programs on the island, and we
believe facilities are being developed with
conscious intent to keep a nuclear weapon
option open. But it will be at least five years or
so before the ROC is in a position to fabri-
cate a nuclear device.
56. Most military-related nuclear programs
are centered at Lungtan. Prior to 1973, the
military-controlled portion of the nuclear pro-
-7517�StekEi
gram was conducted at the Chung Shan
Science Institute, established after Peking's
first nuclear test under orders to provide a
nuclear weapons research facility. It conducts
nuclear research, missile development and
related electronics research. A 1973 spin-off,
named the Institute of Nuclear Energy Re-
search (INER) remains collocated; it was
publicly placed under the civilian Atomic
Energy Council but we believe it is still
subject to strong military influence and is
conducting military-related research. The
physical security of the Lungtan facilities is
excellent, and our information on activities
there is far from complete, but known pro-
jects are applicable to weapons development.
57. The centerpiece of the Lungtan facili-
ties is the Taiwan Research Reactor, a 40
MWt heavy-water reactor built by Canada
which has been in operation since mid-1973.
This reactor, similar to the CIRUS reactor
in India which produced the nuclear materials
used in the Indian test, is capable of produc-
ing enough plutonium for one or two weapons
annually. Other facilities include an almost
completed pilot laboratory for reprocessing
fuel plates from small testing and teaching
reactors, a fuel fabrication plant with a capac-
ity of 25 tons of fuel per year, a hot labora-
tory for handling spent fuel and various
other laboratories. Scientists at INER are
designing a unique sort of 135 MW natural
uranium-fueled power reactor for domestic
production. This reactor would be suitable
for plutonium production, but actual con-
struction of such a facility would be a long
and difficult endeavor and may not be
achievable.
58. At present, the nuclear plans of the
Taiwan Power Company ( Taipower ) are
based entirely on imported reactors. Two 636
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MW plants plants are under construction and due to
come on line in 1975 and 1976. Contracts have
been let on two 985 MW plants; bids are
currently under review for two more of
similar size. Future plans call for two more,
of 1,300 MW each. Taipower once con-
sidered purchasing Canadian natural uranium
reactors, but all contracts signed to date have
been with the US for reactors requiring en-
riched uranium fuel,
59. Taiwan has no chemical separation
plant; it has been seeking one for �several
years. After an unsuccessful attempt in 1972
to buy one in West Germany, it turned to the
US. A strongly negative .US response led to
Taiwanese assurances that attempts to obtain
a reprocessing capability would be dropped.
Subsequently, however, reports were received
of continuing attempts to obtain a separation
plant from France. With separation tech-
nology widely available and a number of
manufacturers selling the equipment, the
Taiwanese should encounter no great diffi-
culty in obtaining a production-size plant if
they are determined to have one.
60. Taiwan is dependent on foreign sources
both for uranium and for the heavy water
moderator required by the CIRUS-type re-
actor. Canada has provided enough fuel,
under safeguards, to operate the reactor for
research purposes for about four years. And
the ROC has bought some 112 tons of safe-
guarded uranium from South Africa via the
UK�enough fuel for another 14 years. If the
reactor were operated for the production of
weapons-grade plutonium, fuel presently
available would last for about five or six years
and produce enough material for about ten
weapons. Dependence on imports could not
be eliminated in the foreseeable future, how-
ever, as Taiwan has no known uranium de-
TOrteeFit&T
Taiwan: Facilities Suitable for a Plutonium Weapon
Uranium
Concentration
1
Fuel Rod
Fabrication
Reactor
Spent Fuel
4 PI
ium
At�n
27
posits. But construction of a domestic plant
for processing uranium concentrates into metal
and a domestic heavy water facility are pos-
sible. These would leave Taiwan dependent
on outsiders only for uranium concentrates,
which are much more readily available on the
world market.
61. At this stage, there is no evidence of
ROC progress toward development of a nu-
clear delivery system which would pose a
credible threat to Mainland China targets.
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--efro-steR:rd.
62. Taipei was an original signatory of the
NPT and moved rapidly to ratify it; all known
nuclear facilities on the island use safeguarded
materials. However, it was expelled from the
IAEA in December 1971, in response to Pe-
king's demands. IAEA has continued to make
inspections on Taiwan, but the ROC could re-
fuse it access at any time. Under these cir-
cumstances, the CIRUS-type reactor would
be free of safeguards. US-supplied reactors
are less vulnerable, in practical terms, to such
action; they are subject to bilateral US safe-
guards and require slightly enriched uranium
which TFaipei must import.
63. Even assuming that ROC authorities
were willing to abrogate safeguards and to
invest heavily in nuclear processing facilities
they now lack, they would be some years
from attainment of a weapons capability. A
chemical separation plant would take several
years to build. Testing and weaponization
would require two or three years, once wcap-
ons-grade plutonium was available. All things
considered, we think it would take a decision
in the immediate future and considerable
foreign assistance from sources such as Israel
or France for the ROC to be able to construct
a device by 1980.
Intentions
64. We have no reliable information on just
what has .inspired the ROC to continue
its nuclear weapons efforts. Most likely,
the initial stimulus of Peking's nuclear pro-
gram was reinforced by concern for the dura-
bility of all-out US support, the program
gathered momentum as the military-scientific
bureaucracy expanded to staff the effort,- and
feasibility became an independent justifica-
tion of sorts. Taipei's growing sense of isola-
tion is adding impetus to its drive for military
self-sufficiency. And the recent Indian test
no doubt has buttressed the case for those on
Taiwan who favor developing a nuclear weap-
ons capability.
65. But the Taipei leadership must also be
aware of the many risks that abrogation of
safeguards and actual fabrication of weapons
would entail. Taipei clearly cannot hope to
compete with Peking in the area of nuclear
weapons. Existence of a small number of
nuclear weapons on Taiwan might serve to
provoke Peking, rather than deter it. Disclosure
of a nuclear weapons capability on Taiwan
would lead to world-wide pressure to cut off
nuclear fuel supplies and technical support
for nuclear power programs. And exercise of
a nuclear weapons option would endanger
further support from the US. Taiwan's se-
curity is so heavily dependent on continued
adherence of the US to the Mutual Defense
Treaty that any move on Taipei's part which
might imperil that relationship would not be
taken without agonizing study.
66. All things considered, Taipei probably
sees a capability to design and produce a nu-
clear weapon as a potentially useful hedge
against the unknown exigencies of the fu-
ture, when it may be alone and facing great
risks. We think that an early ROC decision
to proceed with testing or with the fabrica-
tion and stockpiling of untested devices is
unlikely, so long as the US remains committed
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mough to the ROC to give it some sense of
security, But in the longer run Taipei is one
place where US policies toward nuclear pro-
liferation would have a major impact. If there
are to be several more nuclear weapons states
by the mid-1980s, the ROC will want to be
among them, and its present course probably
is leading it that way.
D. Japan
Capabilities
67. Japan has an extensive and technologi-
cally advanced nuclear energy program; with-
in the next few years it will have the second
largest nuclear power generating capacity in
the world. Technologically speaking, it is
in a position to produce and test a nuclear
device within two or three years by violating
safeguards and before 1980 with full ad-
herence to safeguards, but it could not develop
a credible independent deterrent force for a
decade or more.
68. Japan has seven nuclear power reactors
now in operation and another three scheduled
for operation later in 1974. These 10 represent
power generating capacity of 5,200 MW; the
planned goal is 70,000 MW by 1985. The first
operational reactor was built by the UK and
the next six by the US; all are under IAEA
safeguards. The Japanese are now building
an advanced thermal reactor at Tsuruga,
which will be operational in 1976. If fueled
with indigenous ,uranium the Tsuruga reactor
would not be under safeguards and thus would
represent a significant potential source of nn-
safeguarded plutonium�some 50 kg annually
in normal operation.
69. The Japanese plan to recover the plu-
tonium produced in these reactors in their
own 210 mt/y fuel reprocessing plant, which
--1177p-5c-eRET
Japan: Facilities Suitable for a Plutonium Weapon
Uranium
Concentration
Fuel Rod
Fabrication
Lo. Reactor
Spent Fuel
*PijitSnidni
SOnaration
Fabrication
Inpjs ion
,Wea:Vion
29
is scheduled for operation in 1975. More ca-
pacity will be needed by 1978, and plans are
currently being studied for a second plant
of about 1,500 mt/y. The plutonium recovered
will be under safeguards and is to be used in
an experimental fast breeder reactor and the
advanced thermal reactor. Later it will be used
in Japan's fast breeder program.
70. Japan will be dependent upon imported,
safeguarded enriched uranium fuel for its
nuclear power plants, at least through 1985.
To meet the enriched fuel needs of its power
reactors later on, Japan is conducting active
research on both gas centrifuge enrichment
and gaseous diffusion. In 1972 a decision was
made to construct a pilot centrifuge plant
which, if successful, would be followed by a
full size plant, tentatively slated for operation
by 1985. Studies are being conducted into
possible joint ventures with other countries
in enrichment projects.
71. Although Japan has carried out extensive
exploration for uranium, it has not located
any substantial deposits. It does have limited
reserves amounting to about 8,500 tons of
U308 in widely scattered deposits impractical
to exploit at present for use in the large power
program. However, these reserves would pro-
vide a source of unsafeguarded material for
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30
TO
a weapons program. The Japanese are operat-
ing an experimental uranium processing fa-
cility with a production capacity of about 30
tons per year. Japan has made uranium pur-
chasing agreements with the US, Canada and
France and is participating in uranium explor-
ation in Niger, Gabon, Canada and Indo-
nesia.
72. If Japan decided to develop a nuclear
weapon as rapidly as possible, in violation of
safeguards, it probably could have an initial
device within two or three years, and a weap-
on some time later. It now has on hand�from
fuel reprocessed abroad and returned�sepa-
rated plutonium sufficient for several tens of
weapons. Costs would be minute in Japanese
terms. And Japan has suitable weapons fabri-
cating facilities and the technical knowledge
necessary to proceed at any time. A Japanese
weapon developed without abrogating safe-
guards would take somewhat longer, prin-
cipally because implementation of such a
decision would have to await significant
production of plutonium from the Tsuruga
reactor.
73. Japan already has a significant aircraft
delivery capability. It began manufacturing
F-4E Phantoms under license in 1972 and
plans to have about 100 by the end of 1977 and
125-150 by 1980. The .500-600 nin combat
radius of the Phantom is enough to put some
Chinese coastal targets, Eastern Manchuria
and the Soviet Maritime Province within
striking range.
74. Japan has no strategic ballistic missile
program, but it probably could develop and
deploy a missile within three to five years of
initiation of a serious effort. The Japanese
could present a reasonably credible threat to
the Soviet Far East and most areas of stra-
tegic value in China with a force of about 50
c;sc=c-44.F.-
to 75 intermediate-range ( 1,500 nm ) missiles.
Experience gained during the past decade in
development, testing and production of satel-
lite vehicles and hardware for the Japanese
space effort would be directly applicable. Us-
ing the largest satellite launch vehicle devel-
oped to date, the solid-propellant Mu-3C, as
the basis for a design, it could develop a mis-
sile capable of delivering a 2,500-pound pay-
load to a range of 1,375 nm. The principal
problems in conversion would be development
of guidance and control systems�a matter of
a year or two before testing could begin. Im-
proved and more powerful versions of the
satellite vehicle, the Mu-4SH and the Mu-4SS,
are scheduled for testing in the next few years;
they would provide a basis for increasing
payload and/or range capability of any mili-
tary version. The Japanese probably could
convert any of these vehicles into ballistic
missiles without a major input of foreign
technology.
75. Japan already has the basic test facili-
ties required for missile development, and
these are scheduled to be upgraded. The Ka-
goshima Space Center on the southern tip of
Kyushu is a relatively modern facility well
suited, with appropriate modifications, for
missile development. A larger satellite launch
complex is under construction 50 nm south,
on the island of Tanegashima. Either site
would provide adequate firing ranges to the
east or southeast. The cost of developing and
deploying a military missile would be little
burden for Japan.
Intentions
76. At a minimum, Japan will keep open
the possibility of developing nuclear weap-
ons�whether or not it ratifies the NPT. It
will continue to develop its plutonium pro-
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TOP�SE4R
duction capability. It will pursue its space
program with an eye to enlarging its com-
mercial position in the aerospace industry and
to future military applications. It will keep a
wary eye on China and the USSR, and study
evidence of US intentions with regard to Jap-
anese security. In short, in the course of its
nuclear power program, Japan will probably
reach a point in about two years at which ( a )
a decision to manufacture nuclear weapons
could be followed by the production of a first
weapon in a program within two years or so;
and ( b ) an initial device could be detonated
in a shorter period. Opinions within the intelli-
gence community differ on the decision that
the Japanese are likely to make.
The Position of the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence representing the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Di-
rector of Intelligence and Research
representing the Department of State,
the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army
77. We believe that the Japanese are un-
likely to make a decision to produce nuclear
weapons unless there is a major adverse shift
in relationships among the major powers. We
do not believe that Japan's leaders view nu-
clear weapons as a prerequisite to achieve-
ment of the nation's basic political and eco-
nomic goals. We do not believe that events
such as India's explosion of a nuclear device
will have significant influence on Japan's
course.
78. Official Japanese nuclear policy is set
forth in the "three non-nuclear principles"�
no possession, no manufacture, no introduction
�46
31
of nuclear weapons into Japan. Despite a Jap-
anese government interpretation that the
peace constitution" does not preclude pos-
session of defensive nuclear weapons, Japan
is likely to continue to hold to these well-
publicized principles. The Japanese position
is a product of continuing strong domestic
opposition to nuclear weapons and general
awareness of the hostile reaction that a nu-
clearized Japan would engender among its
East Asian neighbors. There is also the risk,
virtually unacceptable until Japan achieves
independent means of producing massive
quantities of plutonium or enriched uranium,
of being cut off from imported materials,
equipment and technology for its ambitious
nuclear power program.
79. From the Japanese point of view, there
is the problem of scale. It is hard for Tokyo
to see how development of a modest nuclear
arms capability�much less the token of a
nuclear explosion on the Indian pattern�
could enhance the nation's security or improve
its economic standing. Indeed it would almost
certainly be viewed as counterproductive,
arousing China and the USSR without intimi-
dating them and leading almost inevitably�
in light of Japan's strategic vulnerability�to
a requirement for development of a credible
deterrent force. The latter would entail mas-
sive reordering of national economic priorities.
80. It is fair to assume, nonetheless, that the
Japanese leadership would give serious con-
sideration to the development of nuclear
weapons if they felt the country threatened.
The actual decision would depend on the do-
mestic political context, the state of relations
with the US, particularly the credibility of its
nuclear umbrella, and�most important�the
dimension of the threat perceived from the
USSR and/or China. For the next several
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32
years, it is difficult to foresee circumstances
developing which would cause the Japanese
government to decide to go nuclear. And it
is even more difficult to imagine the Japanese
electorate overcoming the nuclear allergy suf-
ficiently to support such a decision.
The Position of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the
Air Force and the Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy
81. We believe the nuclear question poses
a difficult choice for Japan between the un-
certainties of continued and obvious reliance
on the United States and the economic and
probable political costs of an independent nu-
clear force. Acquiring nuclear weapons would
subject the Japanese Government to political
criticism, domestically and from abroad. It
would also risk an embargo on foreign sup-
plies of uranium, which are vital to the nuclear
power program in which Japan has invested
some $5 billion. Japan's assessment of the poli-
cies of other nations will weigh heavily in
the ultimate decision. Japan's security policies
have been predicated on containment of nu-
clear proliferation and general movement to-
ward disarmament, two premises which now
appear threatened. The Japanese have been
disturbed by the lack of a strong stand by
the US and other Western powers against
India's explosion of a nuclear device and by
US offers of reactors and atomic fuel to Israel
an-1 Egypt. These events follow other develop-
ments of the past few years which have cre-
ated a sense of insecurity among the Japanese:
growing doubts about the reliability of the US
nuclear umbrella in defense of Japan; eco-
nomic vulnerability, painfully brought home
by the Arab use of oil as a weapon in time
of crisis; and the discovery that economic
power alone offers insufficient leverage in
international politics to a nation that aspires
to great power status.
82. Some Japanese see a military nuclear
capability as a natural component of Japan's
big power status; a greater number still op-
pose the idea. Recent Japanese polls, however,
have revealed a public trend toward wider
acceptance of at least the possibility that Ja-
pan might eventually acquire nuclear weapons,
an indication that a growing number of Jap-
anese, while not approving a nuclear capabil-
ity, are becoming passive in their opposition,
in the belief that such a development is in-
evitable.
83. On balance, we believe there is a strong
chance that Japan's leaders will conclude that
they must have nuclear weapons if they are to
achieve their national objectives in the de-
veloping Asian power balance, Such a decision
could come in the early 1980s. It would likely
be made even sooner if there 'is any further
proliferation of nuclear weapons, or global
permissiveness regarding such activity. These
developments would hasten erosion of tra-
ditional Japanese opposition to a nuclear
weapons course and permit Tokyo to cross
that threshold earlier in the interests of na-
tional security.
84. Deterioration of Japanese relations with
China or the Soviet Union, and the Japanese
perception of a military threat from either
power, would accelerate the pace of weapons
development. So would a further decline in the
credibility of US defense guarantees.
E. Argentina
Capabilities
85. Argentina's nuclear program is fairly
new, but it is being pursued vigorously with
'EP15=ijE.C=1;K=T-
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--13:1116.E.GEEEI
an eye toward independence of foreign sup-
pliers and controls. If Buenos Aires dedicated
itself to the earliest possible achievement of
a nuclear weapon and received continuing
foreign assistance in building the necessary
facilities, Argentina could have an initial de-
vice in the early 1980s.
86. Argentina's first nuclear power reactor,
a 340 MW heavy water reactor at Atucha
built by a German firm, is operational. Safe-
guard arrangements on it include a provision
for renewal in October 1977; if the Argentines
choose to refuse renewal and procure or pro-
duce unsafeguarded heavy water, they could
have a reactor free of safeguards with an
annual plutonium capability of about 150 kg
in normal operation. Construction has begun
on a Canadian-supplied and IAEA safe-
guarded natural uranium reactor, scheduled
for operation in 1979. Work on a third power
reactor of the same type supposedly will begin
before the end of 1974 although the supplier
is not yet certain. All three reactors are of a
type easily adaptable to production of weap-
ons-grade plutonium, and military pressures
favoring them over reactors requiring enriched
fuel played a significant part in the,' final
decision.
87. The desirability of natural uranium
fueled reactors also rests OD the fact that Ar-
gentina has abundant supplies of natural uran-
ium. Refining capacity is being expanded from
60 mt/y to about 400 mt/y of concentrate,
based on anticipated daily processing of some
1,200 tons of ore. To date, fuel rod fabrication
has been done abroad, but proposals are being
solicited from Argentine firms for construction
by late 1977 of a 300 mt/y fabrication facility.
Other Argentine plans include a 400 mt/y
heavy water plant to become operational in
'MP�SECRET
Argentina: Facilities Suitable for a Plutonium Weapon
Uranium
Concentration
Nei Pod
Fabiloation
Lip. Reactor
Spent Fuel .40 Plutonium Fabrication
Separation
Imploalon
Device
33
1979 and reactivation of a currently inactive
British-built, pilot-scale chemical separation
plant.
88: Although Argentina is highly indus-
trialized by Latin American standards, attain-
ment of a nuclear weapons capability in the
near term would be severely hampered by
technological shortcomings. A plant suitable
for reprocessing reactor fuel in quantity would
take several years to build and require a con-
siderable advance in technology and skills.
Thus the extent of foreign assistance available
would be a key element in determining the
time frame of Argentine progress. A five-year
agreement with India, signed in mid-1974,
might provide some help in this regard.
89. For the foreseeable future Argentina
would probably have to rely on aircraft�
notably the Mirage Ills and Canberras now in
inventory and anything more they might
buy�as delivery vehicles. It has only a rudi-
mentary aircraft industry and no capability
to produce a ballistic missile. It might be able
to purchase a short-range, nuclear-capable
missile such as the French Pluton, but it prob-
ably would not have the skills to fit them with
suitable warheads for years to come. And
such missiles would be of doubtful utility in
any event.
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Intentions
90. Argentina has not signed the NPT;
rather, it is an outspoken critic of the Treaty
as a barrier to full development of peaceful
uses by parties to it. It has signed but not
ratified the Latin American Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty. It would not appear to have any
military need for nuclear weapons, but it has
long been apprehensive and envious of Brazil,
and this is being exacerbated by Brazil's note-
worthy economic performance. An Argentine
nuclear capability, perhaps described on the
Indian model as possession of a "peaceful de-
vice," has considerable appeal in some quar-
ters as a means of redressing the power bal-
ance. Argentine nationalism, pride and pre-
tensions to a major role in Latin America and
the world would be enhanced at least tem-
porarily by possession of weapons or devices.
But, Argentina must also consider the possi-
bility that Brazil would follow suit and soon
negate any advantage. Over time, and in the
absence of strong international pressures that
succeed in stopping weapons acquisition by
other countries, there appears to be an even
chance that Argentina will choose to join
the nuclear club in a small way.
F. South Africa
Capabilities
91. In the short run, South Africa is of more
concern in the proliferation context as a po-
tential supplier of nuclear materials and tech-
nology than as a potential nuclear weapons
power. It controls large uranium deposits,
both in South Africa proper and in Namibia
( South-West Africa). It apparently has de-
veloped a technology which will enable it to
produce and market enriched uranium. If this
technology proves successful, South Africa
�1e13-4FrsekEt
would be capable of producing a nuclear de-
vice within this decade if it chooses.
92. South Africa has the world's third largest
uranium reserves. It has been a major ex-
porter, principally to the US and the UK,
since 1950. Sales to those markets have
dwindled, and exports to new customers such
as Japan and Germany have not fully re-
placed them. Recent production of some
4,000 mt/y of uranium concentrates, prin-
cipally as a byproduct of gold mining opera-
tions, has largely gone into stockpiling for fu-
ture export and domestic needs. Some 20,000
tons of uranium concentrates now are on hand.
Current plans are to bring the Namibian fields
into operation at an output level of 3,000
tons by 1975 and increase their production
to 10,000 tons by 1981.
93. Revived interest in uranium mining
stems from increased world demand for
uranium and apparent success in developing
a method of enriching uranium into fuel suit-
able for the type of power reactors that will
dominate world markets for nuclear generat-
ing plants in the decade ahead. As explained
above ( paragraph 9), the. South Africans are
building a facility�described as a pilot plant
but substantial in size ( see photo)�which
will use some new and as yet undefined en-
richment technology. The South Africans have
announced that it will be operational before
the end of 1974, but this date may slip some-
what. They intend to follow on with a com-
mercial-scale enrichment facility but con-
struction has not yet begun and operation
probably will not occur in this decade.
94. Although the South Africans contend
that their facilities will be used fOr production
of slightly enriched uranium, all known en-
richment processes are adaptable to produc-
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�Trap-6 ECREL
tion of weapons grade U-235. The potential
output of the pilot plant is unknown, but
it certainly Would be adequate to provide
enough material for at least a few weapons
annually. There is no reason to doubt that
South Africa could acquire all the technology
and fabrication facilities necessary for de-
signing and producing such weapons within
a few years. For delivery, South Africa would
have to rely on aircraft. It has 38 Mirage Ills
in inventory. It also has a license to assemble
the more advanced Mirage F-1 and will begin
doing so in 1975, building up a planned in-
35
South Africa: Facilities Suitable for a Uranium Weapon
Uranium
4
Concentration
4",
iil'rekl"n LTIM:rit Fab
Gun - barrel Weapon
or
I mpI�Weapon
ventory of about 50 by 1980. It does not cur-
rently have any capability to produce a ballis-
tic missile.
Uranium Isotope Separation Facility, Valindaba, South Africa
OP
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36
1.--C3r�KCIET
Intentions
95. Although South Africa has not signed
the NPT, it has required application of IAEA
or other safeguards on most of the uranium it
has sold over the years, and it has indicated
that the output of the enrichment plant will
be safeguarded. It is unlikely, however, that
the South Africans would permit IAEA inspec-
tion of facilities on its territory. And they are
unlikely to follow through on their hints of
possible . eventual NPT ratification. South
Africa's political isolation is growing�slowly
but inexorably�and its suspicion of the out-
side world is bound to increase over time.
Such trends no doubt have been accelerated
by recent events in Portugal, which raise
the prospect of hostile states on South Africa's
borders in the near future. There is no indica-
tion that South Africa currently is pursuing
a nuclear weapons program, and it is unlikely
to add to its troubles with the world com-
munity by initiating one solely for prestige
reasons. But we believe the South Africans
would go forward with a nuclear deterrent if
they saw a serious military threat from their
African neighbors beginning to emerge. This
condition does not at present appear at all
likely to be fulfilled within the next few years.
G. Other Countries .
96. Several European countries and Canada
have a near-term capability to produce nu-
clear weapons but little or no incentive to
translate that capability into action. Canada
has vast uranium resources and a nuclear pro-
gram that is the country's largest scientific
and technical undertaking. Its independently
developed CANDU reactor system is a valu-
able export item, as well as a source of great
national pride. With the exception of an op-
erating chemical separation plant, all the nec-
--in;14.4.15.CLEJ
essary facilities for weapons construction exist
or could be established in a short time. Power
reactors now in operation could produce
enough plutonium for a few hundred fission
weapons per year. But the Canadians do not
perceive a . need for an indigenous nuclear
force, since US forces provide them a high
level of security. In short, Canada is the least
likely of any near-nuclear country to seek
its own weapons.
97. West Germany has a similar near-term
capability that is, for various reasons, highly
unlikely to be translated into an independent
weapons program. Its extensive and well-de-
veloped nuclear program is firmly oriented
toward peaceful applications, completely
under safeguards and subjected to more than
ordinary scrutiny by the rest of the world.
Even a hint of a German nuclear weapons
program, which would be a flagrant violation
of the agreements under which Germany
joined NATO, would have a major, divisive
impact on the alliance, which is Bonn's most
reliable source of security. Indeed, even the
possibility of German participation in a multi-
lateral European nuclear force is a subject of
considerable concern in Western Europe. And
the USSR would react very negatively to
German acquisition of nuclear weapons. The
Germans are well aware that any sort of nu-
clear exchange in Europe would be disastrous
for them. In the absence of a total upheaval
of relationships within the Western alliance,
there is no reason for them even to contem-
plate nuclear weapons acquisition.
98. Other European countries are highly
unlikely candidates. Sweden has an advanced
nuclear research and power program and
most of the facilities required for a weapons
program. But it has ratified the NPT and
closed down its only natural uranium reactor,
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�T-1:12=6E.GR:FT-
at Agesta, which was unsafeguarded. And it
has abandoned plans for a chemical separation
facility, choosing instead to use facilities else-
where in Europe and in the US for fuel re-
processing. Italy has the technical capability
to fabricate a weapon within three to five
years. It has three nuclear power reactors in
operation and most of the ancillary facilities
that would be necessary for production of a
plutonium device. But all its nuclear mate-
rials .and facilities are safeguarded, and it has
shown no serious interest in independent de-
velopment of weapons. NATO participation
and US nuclear defense arrangements satisfy
its security interests .and obviate any need by
Italy for weapons of its own.
99. Spain is the one European country that is
deserving of some attention as a possible pro-
liferator in the years ahead. It has indigenous
uranium reserves of moderate size, an ex-
tensive long-range nuclear power program
( three reactors in operation, seven under
construction and up to 17 more planned), and
a pilot chemical separation plant. It has re-
fused to sign the NPT, on grounds that
pledges of protection for non-nuclear states
are inadequate and requirements for inspec-
tion potentially harmful from the standpoint
of commerical competition. However, Spain
is linked to the US by a bilateral military
agreement which Spanish leaders are likely
to view as offering better security than any
independent Spanish nuclear capability. Only
an unlikely combination of circumstances,
growing out of Spain's location with respect
to Gibraltar, Portugal and North Africa�
coupled with the loss of security ties to the
US or NATO, and perhaps a -post-Franco
government unsure of itself�seems in any
way plausible as a reason for Spain to develop
a nuclear capability unless such weapons- be-
come commonplace.
37
100. Australia is another of the possible but
implausible nuclear powers. It has huge
uranium reserves, neglected until recently be-
cause it also has abundant cheap coal. Having
maintained for some time that it would not
again export uranium except in enriched form,
it has recently announced its intention of
establishing a substantial enrichment plant.
It probably will seek foreign participation.
Should it decide to pursue a weapons program,
it presumably could obtain the necessary
facilities.
101. Once opposed to the NPT on grounds
of possible interference with peaceful nuclear
programs, Australia signed in 1970 and par-
ticipated in the negotiation of safeguards pro-
cedures. It also sought US assurances that the
NPT would in no way alter the US commit-
ment to Australia, embodied in the ANZUS
pact, that the Australians see as the founda-
tion stone of their security. Under the Labor
government that has held office since 1972,
Australia has shown decreasing inclination
to participate in extra-Australian defensive
arrangements and has reduced the size of its
own military forces. No Australian govern-
ment likely to hold power in the next few
years would embark on an independent nu-
clear weapons program, although such a
course is hypothetically possible.
102. There are several other countries
which could feel strong urges to develop in-
dependent nuclear weapons but which have
no capability in this decade. In the 1980s, the
production of nuclear weapons will be within
the technological and economic capabilities
of many additional countries. Whether such
countries do in fact become proliferators will
depend largely on the degree of proliferation
elsewhere in the interim, the reaction of the
world at large to entry into the nuclear
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38
weapons field of additional countries, and
regional ambitions and tensions.
103. Iran's much publicized nuclear power
intentions are entirely in the planning stage.
A number of electric power reactors are
scheduled and under negotiation, but the first
will not become operational until 1979 or
1980. Iran now lacks all the non-reactor fa-
cilities necessary to weapon development and
production. It is a party to the NPT and all its
reactors and other facilities will be safeguard-
ed. Although withdrawal from the NPT or
abrogation of safeguards is possible, no
Iranian leader is going to take that step while
a nuclear energy program is in the middle of
implementation. There is no doubt, however,
of the Shah's ambition to make Iran a power
to be reckoned with. If he is alive in the mid-
1980s, if Iran has a full-fledged nuclear power
industry and all the facilities necessary for nu-
clear weapons, and if other countries have
proceeded with weapons development, we
have no doubt that Iran will follow suit.
Iran's course will be strongly influenced by
Indian nuclear programs.
104. Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil and South
Korea are also potential third-generation pro-
liferators. None DOW has any of the facilities or
skills necessary for fabricating nuclear weap-
ons. A power reactor offered to Egypt by the
US could not become operational before
about 1981. It would be provided under a
proposal calling for exceptionally stringent
security and safeguard measures, including a
US veto over all arrangements for physical
security of facilities and fissionable materials
and a provision whereby the US can demand
return to its custody of all fissionable materials
produced in the reactor, even if fuel of non-US
origin is used. To date Egypt's modest nuclear
program has been limited to basic research;
any substantial expansion would require major
foreign assistance.
105. Pakistan has one natural uranium
fueled power reactor�supplied by Canada,
dependent on the US for heavy water and sub-
ject to safeguards. It has no capability to pro-
duce heavy water, but it has facilities under
construction for fuel fabrication and evidently
is planning to construct a chemical separation
plant. It is far inferior to its prime rival, India,
in terms of nuclear technology and could not
have a nuclear device by 1980 without ex-
tensive foreign assistance in constructing
needed facilities. Nonetheless, Pakistan will
certainly try to press ahead with nuclear
weapons development as rapidly as its limited
capabilities will permit. And in the interim it
might attempt to obtain enough weapons
grade material for a crude demonstration de-
vice from some foreign source.
106. Brazil has one reactor under construc-
tion and due for completion in 1977 and two
others planned; all will be dependent on im-
ported enriched fuel and subject to safe-
guards. It has begun seeking assistance from
Japan, West Germany and France in building
facilities such as fuel fabrication and chemical
reprocessing plants, but plans are not yet firm.
It trails well behind Argentina in terms of the
time it would take to fabricate a first device;
over the longer run, however, Brazil undoubt-
edly would be able to outdistance any Argen-
tine nuclear weapons effort.
107. South Korea's
Seoul has em-
barked on a relatively ambitious nuclear pro-
gram to meet urgent energy needs. It has
two US-supplied research reactors, and a two-
unit nuclear power station is under construe-
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39
tion. Negotiations have begun for five more
power reactors. Seoul is also seeking fuel re-
processing technology in Europe and Japan
with an eye to constructing a plant in South
Korea.
108. Each of these four countries has a real
or potential antagonist which it sees as having
actual or potential capabilities in the nuclear
weapons field. If the worldwide non-prolifera-
tion effort is not reinvigorated, each is likely
to feel increasingly stiong desires to join the
nuclear weapons race when possible. The
strongest impulses will probably be felt by
Pakistan; Egypt and Brazil currently -appear
to fall into a second category of likelihood. In
this context, Arab countries in addition to
Egypt must also be viewed as potential long-
range candidates; several will have vast sums
of money they might choose to spend on pur-
chasing nuclear facilities and technical serv-
ices abroad, when such are more readily
available.
III. PROLIFERATION BY PROXY
109. Past proliferation of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems has been facilitated by
the present nuclear powers, deliberately or
otherwise. The US, as the first and biggest
of the nuclear powers, with an open society
and many allies, has undoubtedly been the
prime source of nuclear technology. It has
provided many of the reactors currently in
operation throughout the world. Through de-
fense cooperation agreements�particularly
with the NATO countries and Japan�it has
spread knowledge of missile-related tech-
nology. It has sold nuclear-capable aircraft
to a number of allies. Most notably, French
development of nuclear weapons and delivery
systems was expedited by knowledge gleaned
from the US and by experience with US equip-
ment supplied to NATO allies.
RET
110. The French, in turn, have become a
source of nuclear knowledge and equipment.
French spokesmen have often said that the
spread of nuclear weapons was inevitable, and
one rationale for their own nuclear force has
been that true independence requires such
weapons. The French provided Israel with a
reactor capable of producing fissionable ma-
terial and a missile system designed to carry
a nuclear warhead. Subsequently, French gov-
ernment policy turned against Israel, and de-
liveries of nuclear-capable aircraft were em-
bargoed,
Although the French
have refused to sign the NpT, they have de-
clared their intention of abiding by its pro-
visions. On the whole, now that they are a
nuclear power, we doubt that they will foster
proliferation as a matter of national policy,
but they probably would not resist the tempta-
tion to sell technology and nuclear-capable
delivery systems�and possibly even unsafe-
guarded uranium�if the price were right
and the purchaser politically acceptable at the
time of sale. They have been displaying the
new nuclear-capable Pluton tactical missile
at their export shows and advertising it in such
publications as Aviation Week. And they have
sold Mirage aircraft or licensed them for pro-
duction in many countries. It is possible that
French policy under Giscard will be some-
what more sensitive to the spirit of the NPT
than it was under Pompidou, but this has yet
to be demonstrated.
111. In the 1950s, the USSR provided China
with substantial technical assistance and equip-
ment related to nuclear weapons; since the
Sino-Soviet split, however, Moscow has usually
been a strong advocate of non-proliferation
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40
--T-192=ac-c-44F.z.
France's Pluton Missile
Configuration
Maximum range
Minimum range
Accuracy (CEP)
Guidance system
Length
Lift-off weight
Warhead weight
Warhead yields
Styx rocket motor
Single stage
65 nm
8 nm
400 yd.
Inertial
24.9 ft.
5,325 lbs
730 lbs
10 and 25 Ids
Dual concentrically-
cast solid-propellant
motor
Mounted on AMX-30 tank chasis
563931 8-74 CIA
�1189;
in both word and deed. The Soviets have, of
course, provided their allies with reactors and
nuclear knowledge, as well as some delivery
systems suitable for employment with nuclear
weapons. But, they apparently have main-
tained rigid controls over fissionable materials
and have allowed no warheads to leave the
possession and control of Soviet forces. They
initially pressed hard for worldwide adherence
to the NPT, and signature by all of their East
European allies means that nuclear facilities
in the area are subject to IAEA safeguards,
rather than the unilateral Soviet controls that
governed them previously. We believe that
the USSR will continue to export nuclear ma-
terials, but only under safeguards. We do not
expect the Soviets to provide their allies with
nuclear warheads�or permit them to develop
independent weapons capabilities�in the
foreseeable future. But the Soviets apparentR',
are not willing to subject otherwise good rela-
tions with an important non-Communist coun-
try to severe strains in the 'interests of non-
proliferation; they have taken no strong ac-
tions in the case of India.
112. Neither London nor Peking has con-
tributed materially to weapons proliferation
in recent years. The British have been in the
forefront of countries urging controls on pro-
liferation; in general, their sensitive tech-
nology in nuclear and missile fields has not
been made available to outsiders. In many
cases, it is based on technology received from
the US and could not legitimately be passed
on without US permission. So far as we know,
Peking has provided no assistance to other
countries in either the peaceful uses of atomic
energy or in the nuclear weapons field. Both
the UK and China like having an instrument
of power that is available only to a select
group, and neither has a close ally with a
pressing need for nuclear weapons. We believe
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41
both countries are likely to cling to their
established policies in this field for the fore-
seeable future.
113. India and Israel also are potential
sources of assistance relevant to nuclear
weapons proliferation. The Indians are busily
signing nuclear cooperation agreements. De-
spite their professed opposition to weapons
proliferation, they may in time find themselves
giving help that is turned to military ends.
Certainly the Israelis will not assist other
countries directly in nuclear weapons devel-
opment while their own capabilities remain
secret. They will be highly unlikely to do so
while they are dependent on the US for crit-
ical military items. They may, however, be
willing to entertain requests to purchase nu-
clear-capable missiles or related equipment.
Production of the Jericho missile may satisfy
Israeli requirements for the system within
a short time and economics would dictate
continued production for export rather than
shutdown of a factory built at considerable
expense. The Israelis have close ties both
to Taipei and to South Africa and we cannot
rule out bilateral or trilateral cooperation in
the nuclear weapons field.
114. Sweden, West Germany and Japan are
likely to be the source of considerable exper-
tise in atomic energy and in fields related to
delivery systems. We would not expect any
of the three to knowingly assist another na-
tion in developing nuclear weapons. They
might, however, be willing to sell delivery sys-
tems�in whole or in part�to a country that
had obtained a nuclear weapon without vio-
lating the NPT.
115. It is highly unlikely that any govern-
ment now possessing nuclear weapons or ca-
pable of developing them over the next few
years would wittingly make nuclear materials,
TOP�SECREI
weapons or technology available to a non-
governmental entity such as a terrorist group
or a government-in-exile. International coop-
erative efforts to keep nuclear materials out
of such hands probably will prove popular,
so long as they do not appear to impinge on
national sovereignties. But it is unlikely that
any agreement requiring international inspec-
tions, audits or security checks additional to
those of the IAEA would be widely acceptable.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR DETECTION OF A
COVERT PROGRAM
116. It is technically possible for nations
capable of developing nuclear weapons to
keep a program completely secret, up to the
test of a first device�and a country deter-
mined to develop a nuclear capability need
not conduct a test. A country wanting uranium
badly enough probably can obtain it. Most
of the facilities needed to produce plutonium
are also used in peaceful nuclear programs
and can be so justified. New enrichment tech-
nologies just coming into use will make it
feasible for countries to opt for U-235 weap-
ons. Gas centrifuge facilities have no unique
characteristics; those necessary to support a
small nuclear weapons program could be con-
cealed.
117. In practice, it is highly unlikely that
any such program could be undertaken by a
government in the non-Communist world with-
out our getting some indications of it. A weap-
ons program necessarily involves a number of
people and facilities and extends over a period
of time. To date, all countries with interest
in weapons have relied fairly heavily on for-
eign technical assistance�official or other-
wise. But the countries interested in weapons
development, even as a very tentative option,
clamp tight security on their programs. Infor-
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42 -MrEC.RET.
mation is, therefore, likely to be intermittent
and inconclusive. Although we could detect a
weapons test under most circumstances, we
cannot realistically expect to predict a test
or to have details on weapons in being that
are stockpiled without testing.
118. A country bent on keeping its inten-
tions secret, however, would have to rely on
aircraft delivery of nuclear devices, since air-
craft are a normal component of national
power and no indicator of nuclear intentions.
We believe that no nation could long conceal
a program for the production of nuclear-ca-
pable ballistic missiles. Most countries would
have to signal their missile intentions early,
through purchase of critical components and
employment of foreign technicians. Highly
developed nations such as West Germany and
Japan might avoid that indicator, but they are
relatively open to outside observation�par-
ticularly by Americans and others participat-
ing with them in research and development
efforts. In any event, actual missile production
requires testing on instrumented ranges that
are readily identifiable, and deployment in-
volves unique equipment such as transporters
and launchers or silos. These latter factors
mean that even the possession of a complete
operational missile system obtained from a
foreign country probably would not remain
undetected for any significant period.
V. THEFT OF MATERIALS OR WEAPONS
119. A government or a terrorist group
seeking a nuclear capability solely for its value
in blackmail, terror and international attention-
getting might consider acquiring that capabil-
ity by stealing either fissionable materials or
existing weapons. Generally speaking, a coun-
try with a relatively advanced nuclear program
is unlikely to see any attraction in that route;
indigenous development of a weapon would
appear far more sure and less hazardous. A
country with the personnel and facilities to
assemble nuclear weapons might find itself
without fissionable material and try to divert
or steal some; it is much more likely, however,
to have some weapons-grade material on hand
as a result of its peaceful program.
120. A country with a very limited techno-
logical base or a terrorist group would be more
likely to concentrate on weapons than on
fissionable materials, particularly if its pur-
pose would be served by knowledge of its
action. ( Theft of a weapon almost certainly
would be detected, though it might not be
publicized.) An actual weapon, no matter how
well protected with failsafe devices, represents
an immediate capability. No prudent observer
could afford to proceed on the assumption
that it could not be detonated or so damaged
as to leak highly toxic material into its en-
virons.
121. Theft of fissionable materials with the
intent of assembling weapons would be only
part of a much more complex operation. Steal-
ing natural or low-enriched uranium is no use
unless the fuel can be put through an enrich-
ment process. Theft of irradiated reactor fuel
after its removal from a reactor and before
chemical separation would be extremely haz-
ardous; it would also require a reprocessing ca-
pability. Thus, highly enriched uranium and
separated Pu-239 are the only reasonable tar-
gets of such an operation. Separated plu-
tonium is so highly toxic that it can in a sense
be considered a weapon in and of itself, and it
might attract the attention of terrorist groups
on that basis. But a thief who wanted to go
from U-235 or Pu-239 to an explosive device
would have to arrange some sort of fabricat-
ing capability�in particular a few people with
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�Z3P---3EcArti_
the proper training and skills. Clearly, any
country probably could make these arrange-
ments. Terrori�t groups would confront more
difficulties than governments. But for all the
practical arguments against it, diversion of fis-
sionable materials from the world's ever-grow-
ing supplies is a possibility that will become
more troublesome with the passage of time.
122. In sum, a country capable of producing
nuclear weapons is highly unlikely to attempt
to steal them; there is a chance that one might
43
seek fissionable materials by theft or diversion.
Competently done, diversion might go unde-
tected. And even detected diversion might be
concealed by the victim, who might be re-
luctant to face the political outcry that would
result or the increased and expensive security
measures that would be imposed. Weapon-
seeking terrorists and governments backward
in the nuclear field are more likely to go after
weapons themselves than fissionable materials,
despite the fact that the latter are less well
protected.
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