NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 2 MARCH 1981
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
05103281
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RIPPUB
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Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date:
December 1, 2017
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2017-01734
Publication Date:
March 2, 1981
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Monday
2 March 1981
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�T,op-Seeret�
(b)(3)
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Warning Notice
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PROPIN (PP)
N Fl BON LY (NO)
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The National Intelligence Daily is prepared in the
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articles are attributed to their authors.
This page is�Co4f4lerptial
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Contents
Situation Report
El Salvador 1
Tup Secret.
2 March 1981
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Pacific Ocean
0 30
Kilometers
Guatemala
SAN SALVADOR,*
El Salvador-
Pacific Ocean
13ounOary ropresontetton
not neoessardy etattwitnova.
629192 3-81 CIA
TEGUCIGALPA
MANAGUA
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Top Eccrct
SITUATION REPORT
EL SALVADOR
The lull in sustained guerrilla military operations continues,
but the insurgents are inflicting heavy damage to the economy and
they remain capable of launching an offensive in the coming months.
The diminished level of guerrilla operations is
attributable to several factors. Some units reportedly
are suffering spot shortages of arms and ammunition,
suggesting problems in supply distribution and a possible
temporary slowdown in arms deliveries from abroad. The
guerrillas also lack medicines, clothing, food, and other
supplies and apparently are having difficulty recruiting
new personnel.
Despite these problems, guerrilla hit-and-run
attacks on the electrical power system in recent weeks
have caused a virtual total blackout of the eastern half
of the country. Some 65 electrical towers have been
destroyed or damaged since the first of the year.
The guerrillas remain strong in Chalatenango depart-
ment, where they hold several small villages as well as
some larger, abandoned towns. The Salvadoran military
has only 250 permanently garrisoned, combat-ready troops
to counter heavily fortified insurgent strongholds in
the area. Low troop morale worsened by almost constant
contact with the guerrillas is affecting the military's
ability to conduct offensive actions.
--continued
1
2 March 1981
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OP eLt e
the guerrillas have enough weapons to sustain a higher
level of activity. Guerrilla casualties during the Janu-
ary offensive--perhaps 400 to 500 full-time cadre killed--
have not crippled the estimated 4,000-man insurgent force.
Military's Views on Negotiations
most officers oppose negotiations between the junta and
leftist opposition leaders. Junior officers are par-
ticularly strident about what they perceive as ill-
conceived efforts by Christian Democrats to seek politi-
cal accommodation with spokesmen of the Revolutionary
Democratic Front.
Hardline rightists in the military are attempting
to turn the recent arrest of former junta member Colonel
Majano into a test of the military's willingness to deal
harshly with those few officers still disposed to compro-
mise with the opposition.
that they are
opposed to General Torrijos' efforts to foster negotia-
tions. The officers said the Salvadoran military gener-
ally views Torrijos as an ally of Cuba and the insurgents.
2
Top Secrct
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,
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�TuirSc t�
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(b)(3)