COLOMBIA: UPDATE ON LINKS BETWEEN MILITARY, PARAMILITARY FORCES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00632937
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-01908
• Publication Date: December 2, 1997

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oaR) �.-Nr4"..`
telligence Report
Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis
xs
2 December 1997
Colombia: Update on Links Between Military, Paramilitary Forces
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Summary'
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reports linking members of the Colombian Army to illegal paramilitary groups,
including:
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security forces�possibly
including units that receive or may be eligible to receive US aid�did
nothing to stop two massacres of civilians perpetrated by paramilitaries
and may have facilitated the arrival and escape of those involved in the
attacks
Despite the recent retirement of at least one Army officer linked to paramilitaries
and human rights abuses, prospects for a concerted effort by the military high
command to crack down on paramilitaries�and the officers that cooperate with
them�appear dim.
�
The continued presence in the military of an Army general, who is
widely regarded within the military as having links to paramilitaries,
is likely to be perceived by other officers as tolerance for
paramilitary links.
� Military links with these illegal groups will continue to complicate US efforts to
provide aid to military units engaged in counternarcotics efforts:
AMA IR: 97-41037
TN: 97-05392
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: Multiple Sources
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Fugitive Warlord Carlos Castano: More Than a Mercenary?
Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano Gil appears to be trying to cloak his notorious
outlaw persona with some political legitimacy. Despite the $1 million government
bounty on his head, Castano has recently conducted press interviews to explain the
actions of�and possibly to cultivate a legitimate political image for�his Peasant
Self-Defense Group of Cordoba and Uraba (ACCU), Colombia's largest and most (b)(1)
widely feared paramilitary force. Castano�who has (b)(3)
been described by journalists as a "short, surprisingly normal-looking" 32-year-old� 1
has cleverly manipulated his media image to strike a chord with the average citizen's (b)(1)
disgruntlement over the decades-long war, claiming that his troops are not ruthless (b)(3)
killers but men with principles and fellow victims of the insurgency. According to
press reports, Castano has also tried to maneuver for a role in any
peace process, maintaining that the paramilitaries have been a strong force throughout
the war and should be involved in its resolution, the
warlord's strategic paramilitary goal is to control all of northern Colombia.
Some journalists speculate that Castano's fight against the guerrillas may be
motivated, at least in part, by revenge. Nine siblings have been killed in the
insurgency, and, according to press reports, he and a now-deceased brother started the
ACCU shortly after guerrillas kidnapped and killed their father. Castano�who
travels with several well-armed bodyguards--i
fearing for his wife and young child, he is exploring the possibility of getting his
family out of Colombia
The lure of illicit financial gain also plays a role in Castano's paramilitary objectives,
despite the warlord's public denials. He has been involved in various aspects of the
narcotics trade since the' late 1980s,
A north coast trafficker claims that Castano's organization currently provides
logistic and security support to traffickers in Valle del Cauca. Antioquia, and
Atlantico Departments and that no trafficker can operate within Castano's sphere of
influence without his approval.
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--secret__
reports linking members of the Colombian Army operating in various parts of the
country to paramilitary groups, particularly those affiliated with Carlos Castano.1
collectors to find out more about the nature and extent of the links. In other instances,
however, the reports appear to portend efforts by paramilitaries to establish
relationships with local commanders in new areas where the groups seek to expand
their operations, such as in the southern departments of Meta and Caqueta. Indeed the
expansion of paramilitary groups into areas long Considered to be strongholds of
Colombia's two largest guerrilla groups�the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)�is the most significant
change we have seen in recent months and one. which has further degraded
Colombia's already poor security and human rights situation.
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Setting the Tone (b)(3)
Like his predecessor Harold Bedoya, Military Forces Commander Maj. Gen. Manuel
Bonett, shows little inclination to combat paramilitary groups.
Direct Links With Individual Officers
direct contacts between paramilitary leaders or their
representatives and three Army officers;
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do not present a comprehensive
picture of ties between paramilitaries
and the Colombian officer corps, nor should they
be regarded as
an indication that all
high-ranking officers have such relationships.
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This report was prepared b ffice of Asian Pacific and Latin American
Analysis with contributions from APLA.
It was
requested by a senior Department of Defense official. Comments and queries are welcome
and
may be directed to the author lind to the Latin America
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Regional Issues Manager, APLA, on
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Reports of of Cooperation During Recent Operations
i)aramilitaries provided
assistance to the military during two recent large-scale operations against guerrilla
strongholds:
�
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paramilitaries were providing
information to the military during an offensive against the FARC in
the Yari plains of southern Colombia in September and October.
he
7th Brigade, 12th Brigade, and the 2nd Mobile Brigade�all potential
recipients of US aid�were involved in ground operations.
� The operation is scheduled to conclude this month;
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paramilitary forces loyal to Carlos Castano moved into (b)(1)
Arauca Department as of September to assist the military there, (b)(3)
Possible Complicity of Security Force Members
claim that, at a minimum, Army and antinarcotics police units
did nothing to stop the two massacres of civilians that presumably were regarded by
paramilitaries as sympathetic to the guerrillas and m7, have facilitated the arrival and
escape of the paramilitaries.
Mapiripan. In July, members of Carlos Castano's paramilitary group killed between
15 and 30 civilians in Mapiripan, Meta The
paramilitaries arrived by chartered planes at the San Jose del Guaviare airport and
apparently were not subjected to identification or cargo checks by airport police who
control the commercial sector of the airport; the countemarcotics police control the
other sector of the airport,
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that Castano would not have
flown forces and weapons into a civilian airport known to have a large
police presence if he had not had received prior assurances that they
would be allowed to pass through.
During the paramilitaries' five-day stay in Mapiripan, the commander of a nearby
military base�Maj. Heman Orozco, then acting commander of the Joaquin Paris
Battalion�received several reports of a problem in the town, including killings, but
offered a variety of excuses, such as not enough troops or transport, to explain why he
did not respond. Colombian officials are currently investigating Orozco, Brig. Gen.
Jaime Humerto Uscategui�commander of the parent unit, the 7th Brigade�and
other officials, including the mayor and other civilians who live in Mapiripan,
presumably for complicity in the massacre.3
3 Under the recent command changes, Uscategui will soon assume command of the
4th Brigade, which is headquarted in Medellin. Antioquir
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�SeeFet-
tinny helicopters extricated the paramilitaries in the days
following the attack,
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Miraflores. Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC:1�
paramilitaries killed six civilians in Miraflores, Guaviare, in
October and that security forces in the town did nothing to prevent the massacre or to
pursue the killers:
� AnICRC official claims that an unknown number of gunman arrived
by air in Miraflores and that the proximity of the airport to the town
and military facilities suggests there was "at least cohabitation"
between the paramilitaries and the security forces
� In addition, a human rights group has alleged that unnamed soldiers
facilitated a getaway by air for two of the killers.
a counternarcotics police company that receives US aid is
stationed at Miraflores and that Army units in this area are subordinate to the
7th Brigade
Outlook
Prospects for concerted action by the military high command to crack down on
paramilitaries�or the officers that cooperate with them�appear dim. Although steps
against some egregious human rights abusers such as Lieutenant Colonel Rubio will
continue, the presence of others like Major General Ramirez in key positions suggests
that achieving results against the guerrillas�rather than rooting out paramilitary
links�remains the top priority for the Colombian military.
Scrutiny by US and other international observers will continue to play a key role in
encouraging the military high command to focus on human rights and take steps
against violators, but some links�particularly those involving turning a blind eye to
paramilitary activities�are longstanding and will not be easily reversed.
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This situation will complicate US efforts to provide aid to military units engaged in
critical countemarcotics efforts in southern Colombia. The number of paramilitaries
operating in these areas is likely to remain relatively small and their activities
sporadic unless and until they are able to gain a foothold there. This limitation,
however, suggests that they will continue to seek out links to security forces operating
in the areas to facilitate their transit and activities.
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