THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL JANUARY 1952 - DECEMBER 1971

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06166885
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 237
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2017
• Case Number: F-2014-00788
• Publication Date: October 1, 1973

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THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
JANUARY 1952 - DECEMBER 1971
CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by
CIA Historical Staf
se,41-
DCI� 7
October 1973
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WARNING
This document contains information aff g the national
defense of the United States n the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 an , of the US Code, as amended.
Its trans or revelation of its contents to or re-
y an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
WARNING NOTI
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METHODS INVOLVED
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Access Controlled by CIA Historical Staff
THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
JANUARY 1952 - DECEMBER 1971
DCI-77
LI NIIITED ACCESS
by ,
Kenneth E. Greer
RIISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Foreword
This history of the Office of the Inspector
General traces the development and performance of the
inspection-function under four successive Inspectors
General, beginning with the appointment of the first
1 ' on 1 January 1952 and ending with the departure of
the fourth on 16 December 1971.
There are three exclusions of matters that fit
more appropriately into other.histories. References
are made to each at relevant points in the chronology,
but none is treated in detail. The first is of the
performance .of the inspection function from mid-1947
�through 1951, when it was assigned to the component
now known as the Office of Security. The second is"
of certain functions performed for the Director by
our first two Inspectors General, which were wholly
unrelated to the mission of the Inspector General.
' The third is of the Audit Staff, which is now organ-
izationally part of the Office of the Inspector
General, but for which a separate history has been
written (:LA Historical Series, DCI-5).
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This history was written by an officer who was
assigned to the Inspection Staff during all of the
Stewart years and all but the first eight weeks of
the Earman years. He worked (and suffered) with
Earman on the three reports dealing with the Cuban
missile crisis and with Stewart on the massive Sam
Adams case. The author is perhaps too close to the
events of the past decade to view them objectively;
�thus, allowance must be made for a certain amount .
of unintended and unknowing bias.
�
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Foreword
Contents
I. The Inspection Function Prior to 1952
Pageiii
1
'II; The Hedden Years, October 1951 -
*January 1953 . . . , ...... 5
III. The Kirkpatrick Years, April 1953 -
April 1962 38
IV. Interregnum 102
V. The Earman Years, May 1962 - March 1968 . 108
VI. The Stewart Years, April 1968 -
December 1971 168
Appendixes
A. Personnel Roster. 203
B. � Component Surveys 207
C. Special Studies and Surveys of Functions 212
D. Source References 219
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Office of the Inspector General
January 1952 - December 1971
Chapter 1
The Inspection Function Prior to 1952
The position of Executive for Inspections* and
Security was established effective 1 July 1947 "to
provide overall inspection, audit, and security ...
service for CIG." 1/** Inspections and Security
subsequently evolved into the present-day Office of
Security; thus, the performance of the inspection
function during the period July 1947 through October
1951 should properly be included in the history of
the Office of Security. The treatment of that period
in this history of the Office of the Inspector General
is limited to a brief recital of the organizational .
*Changes affecting the inspection function and of the
* Referred to as "Inspection and Security" in sub-
sequent Agency issuances.
** For serially numbered source references, see
Appendix D.�
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progressive refinements in the definition of the
function, culminating in the establishment of the
position of Inspector General.
The General Order that established the position
of Executive for Inspections and Security did not
define the inspection function, but it is evident
that the function did not include review of Agency
management practices. The General Order established
the position of Executive for Administration and
Management and transferred to it the functions of the
Advisor for Management, which formerly were (lodged
in the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
Staff.
A published statement of organization and
functions for CIA appeared on 1 January 1949. Inspec-
tion and Security then consisted of four branches:
Employee Investigative, Inspection, Audit, and Secur-
ity. The mission of the Inspection Branch was stated
thus:
Conducts special inspections and investi-
gations. Inspects on a continuous basis
the utilization, maintenance, and disposi-
tion of CIA property, equipment and supplies,
and evaluates the property procurement
program. 2/
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Subsequent revisions of the Agency regulation
on organization changed the title of the office and
of its chief, but the statement of mission and func-
tions remained unchanged until 19 January 1951, when
a revision of CIA Regulation
was published. (b)(3)
Two of the functions listed for the Assistant Deputy
(Inspection and Security) [under the Deputy Director
(Administration)] were: "Perform audits of unvouchered
funds and all property" and "Make inspections, investi-
gations and reports as directed.' 3/
That assignment of functions remained in effect
only until 18 April 1951, when CIA Regulation
was again revised. The April revision established
an Audit Office under the Deputy Director (Administra-
tion) and assigned to it the responsibility for
performing audits of unvouchered funds and all property. 4/
Making "inspections, investigations and reports as
directed" remained as a function of the Assistant
Deputy (Inspection and Security), but the wording
of the statement of his mission was changed to limit
the inspection role to "the performance of certain
special security inspection functions." 5/
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(b)(3)
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This organizational arrangement was still in
effect when Stuart Hedden entered on duty on 30 October
1951 as a Special Assistant to the Director but ear-
marked to be the Agency's first Inspector General.* 6/
Hedden assumed the inspection function beginning in
November 1951 and was named to the newly established
position of Inspector General effective 1 January
1952. 7/ Hedden's assignment as Inspector General
,was accomplished in the context of creating a new
.function, rather than of transferring an existing
function from one official to another. He inherited
no files nor personnel from Inspection and Security.
The inspection function as it was perfOrmed prior to
1952 bore little resemblance to the inspection role
assigned to Stuart Hedden and even less to. the ex-
panded roles of his successors.
For a roster of Inspectors Generaland their staffs,
see Appendix A.
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Chapter II
The Redden Years', October 1951 - January 1953.
Stuart Hedden first came to General Smith's
attention as a prospective Agency official early in
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the summer of 1951. Hedden was then 52 years old
and had retired at age 40 from a successful career
as a lawyer, investment banker, and industrialist.
He had retained his memberships on the boards of
directors of a number of corporations 8/ and also
served as the legal representative in America. of
Boris Hagelin, a Europe-based manufacturer of crypto-
graphic devices. Hedden had been dealing with General
Smith in this latter capacity in early 1951.
Hedden's employment was under consideration at
least as early as June 1951, although not necessarily
in the capacity of Inspector General. 9/ John Earman,
who was then an assistant to the Director, remembers
Hedden calling on General Smith, probably early in
September 1951, and that Smith commented after the
meeting that he had found Hedden to be a hard-headed
man whom he planned to make his Inspector General.
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At his morning meeting with his deputies on 11 Sep-
tember, General Smith asked William Jackson what he
thought of Hedden as a candidate for the job of
Inspector General. Jackson's reply was in the negative,
noting that Hedden would need much training before
he would be qualified for the role. General Smith
remarked, somewhat testily, that he naturally expected
Hedden would have at least six months of training
and experience in the Agency before undertaking the
duties of Inspector General. 10/ Smith repeated the
question on 16 October. Jackson's response again was
negative, although he said that he had no doubts
concerning Hedden's character and ability. 11/ Hedden
had completed his Personal History Statement on
15 October 12/, which suggests that Smith had already
decided on the hiring of Hedden well before his repeat
query to Jackson on 16 October.
Hedden was granted a provisional clearance for
full duty with CIA on 30 October 1951 under a special
approval authority reserved to the Director. 13/ He
entered on duty that same day as a Special Assistant
to the Director, GS-16. 14/ It seems likely that the
initial designation as Special Assistant, rather than
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an Inspector Inspector General, was for the purpose of allowing
General Smith to observe Hedden's performance on the
job before committing him to the post intended for
him. It may also have been an administrative conven-
ience made necessary by the fact that the position
of Inspector General had not yet been established.
Although not yet carrying the official title,
it is clear that Hedden immediately began working as
if he were an Inspector General. The inspection
function, without the title, had been performed for
some time before Hedden's arrival by William Jackson,
and Hedden merely joined Jackson and worked with
Jackson during Hedden's early weeks with the Agency. 1
The earliest record of Hedden's activities in his
inspection role is a reference dated 13 November 1951
to a survey that he made with Jackson of the Office
of Operations in which he recommended that the Office
of Operations be transferred to the DD/I. 16/
Hedden was also engaged beginning in November
1951 and continuing for several weeks thereafter in a
study of the feasibility of establishing a separate
administrative office under the DD/P. His draft report
in the form of a memorandum for Jackson, dated 26 November
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1951, recommended in favor of a separate DD/P admin-
istrative structure. 17/ He also conducted a survey
of the Office of Current Intelligence during the
period 19-30 November 1951.* The report of survey,
which was issued on 7 December 1951, concentrated
on administrative matters and made no significant
recommendations. 18/ The last survey begun in 1951,
probably sometime in early December, was of the
Office of Scientific Intelligence and was made with
the assistance of Dr. Edward L. Bowles, an OSI con-
sultant from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The first draft of the Agency Notice appointing
Stuart Hedden as Inspector General is dated 28 December
1951. 19/ His position title as given in the original
draft was "... Assistant Director to serve on the
staff of the Director of Central Intelligence with
the duties of Inspector." Handwritten editing of the
draft changed the text to read "... is appointed
Inspector with the rank of Assistant Director." An
Office Message dated 28 December 1951 to Walter R.
Wolf, the DDA, records the substance of a telephone
* For a list of component surveys, see Appendix B.
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call to Wolf from the Director. The message reads:
"In getting out the order covering Mr. Hedden's
appointment, Gen. Smith wants 'with the rank of
Assistant Director' left out. He wants Mr. Hedden.
to be designated as just 'Inspector. 20/ When
the notice was issued on 2 January 1953, over
Director Smith's signature, the applicable para-
graph read: "Effective 1 January 1952, Mr. Stuart
Hedden is appointed Inspector General." 21/
There is nothing in the available records
indicating how the confusion over the precise job
title arose. Hedden had carried the title of
Special Assistant to the Director prior to January
1952 and may have been referred to unofficially
as "the Inspector." The DD/P was still calling
him "the Inspector" as late as May 1952. 22/ Gen-
eral Smith's clarification of what he.wanted as
a job title for Hedden is important to the record.
By deleting "with the rank of
he removed from the title any
of command responsibility for
eral.
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Assistant Director,"
possible connotation
the Inspector Gen-
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Hedden was transferred from the position of
Special Assistant to the Director to the position
of Inspector General and was simultaneously promoted
from GS-16 to GS-18 effective 1 January 1952. 23/
He began keeping an official diary the following
day in which he recorded telephone calls, meetings,
and other significant events. It is the best, and
sometimes the only, surviving source of information
on Hedden's activities -- especially of those things
he did for the Director that were unrelated to his
role as Inspector General. He noted on 2 January,
for example, that he "continued OSI survey," the
earliest indication that a survey of OSI had been
started. Other diary entries in early January
reveal that he was already serving as a member
of the Project Review Committee and that he was
intimately involved with Thomas Corcoran in trying
to secure the release of certain airplanes claimed
by Civil Air Transport, Inc.
but impounded in Hong
Kong. This latter activity oc pied Hedden's
attention for several months and � beginning
of a continuing relationship between Co coran and
DIR redacted Thomas
'Corcoran..KSB
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Hedden, as the Director's representative, on other
intelligence matters.*
The survey of the Office of Scientific Intelli-
gence continued through January 1952, but from the
other subjects that were occupying Hedden's time it
may be inferred that the bulk of the work was being
done by the consultant, Dr. Bowles. Hedden himself
was engaged in a survey of the unclassified personnel
. holding and training pools, which resulted from com-
plaints that were discussed at the Deputies' meeting
on 4 January. 24/ His report was issued on 8 January
and included among its recommendations the separation
of covert from overt employees in the pools and the
transfer of training responsibility from Personnel
* CATI had bought the assets of two Chinese airlines
from the Nationalist Government and Pan American Air-
ways, but pro-Communist employees of the lines were
trying to deliver the planes to the Communist admin-
istration set up to take over the assets of the two
airlines. The Hong Kong Supreme Court had ruled in
favor of the Communists, and the American claimants
had appealed to the Privy Council. Meanwhile, the
planes were being held by the Hong Kong Aviation
Department. Eventually, the Privy Council 'ruled in
favor of CATI, and the planes were removed from Hong
Kong.
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to Training. 25/ Although the basic report was
finished by 8 January, it generated a series of
memorandums on follow-up actions continuing through
February.
An Agency notice was published on 10 January
1952 announcing that the Inspector General would be
in his office from 2 p.m. until 6 p.m. on the first
and third Monday of each month to hear, on a confiden-
tial basis, complaints or constructive suggestions
that had not been satisfactorily handled through
normal channels. The notice stated that anyone in
CIA would be welcome at those times. 26/ The notice
was meaningless in practice; Hedden received complaints
at the convenience of the complainant and without
regard for his announced office hours.
L. K. White sent a note to Hedden informing
him that the above notice was being issued and
pointing out that it made no provision for reCeiving
complaints from employees assigned outside the Wash-
ington area. White suggested the possibility of
designating a Post Office Box or some other means
of addressing correspondence so that it would reach
the Inspector General unopened. Hedden added this
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handwritten comment at the bottom of White's note:
"Thanks. Let's wait and see if any of them write
to me by name. I am inclined to think field people
will have to wait until I visit them."* 27/
On 21 January 1952, Hedden spoke with
This was the
beginning of Hedden's involvement
in covert action that culminated in 1954 in
the ousting of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. His
diary records almost daily conversations or meetings
dealing with the operation, extending through his
�final days with the Agency and covering such topics
as the military capabilities of the plotters and the
means of procuring and shipping weapons to them.
It is clear that Hedden had no command respon-
sibility for the conducting of the Guatemalan operation,
but it is equally clear that he played a prominent
role in it as the Director's spokesman in negotiations
with the principals. This diary entry of 7 July 1952
is illustrative.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
* A means by which field personnel could communicate
directly and on a confidential basis with the Inspector
General was not provided until May 1955. See p. 62,
below. 28/
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Hedden was also engaged during the early months
of 1952 in a number of other activities having little
or no connection with his duties as,Inspector General.
He was negotiating on behalf of the Armed Forces Secur-
ity Agency for the purchase of certain cryptographic
devices from their European inventors. 30/ He pursued
this matter during his survey trip to Europe in May
and June and remained in correspondence with the
European principals during the remainder of his
service with the Agency.
* Hedden's entree to cryptographic circles came from
his having previously been the owner of the Hagelin
Cryptograph Co., which produced the M-.209 cipher device
for the U.S. Army Signal Corps during World War II. 31/
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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The Inspector General's report of survey of
the Office of Scientific Intelligence was completed
in February 1952. Unlike Hedden's other "surveys,"
which were limited in scope and in depth, this was
a true survey as the term came to be understood by
his successors. As a result of his and Dr. Bowles'
inquiries, Hedden concluded that OSI had declared
for itself a statement of mission and functions not
envisioned in existing policy authorizations (DCID
3/3, dated 28 October 1949). and that the military
services had issued internal directives that also
were in conflict with the authorizations. He found
that the coordinating mechanisms set up under NSCID
No. 3 were working well in the field of atomic energy
and reasonably well in the field of chemistry, but
that the subcommittees on electronics, guided missiles,
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and chemical warfare had been voted abolished. He
concluded that:
A good case can be made that the
ideal to meet the national requirements
of scientific and technical intelligence
would be a strong centralized group under
single direction. Regardless of the ideal,
it seems clear that the services will not
forego independent scientific and technical
intelligence production, nor is it important
to CIA that American collection and pro-
duction be on an ideal basis so long as
the job is done to the utmost of the capa-
bilities of the combined intelligence com-
munity. 33/
Hedden proposed that the
vised to reflect the situation
In the resulting revision, the
brought about was a separation
NSC directives be re-
as it then existed.
most important change
between scientific
and technical intelligence. OSI was assigned respon-
sibility for basic scientific intelligence, and the
military agencies were made responsible for technical
intelligence relating to weapons and means of warfare
that had been reduced to known prototypes.* 34/
* Subsequent IG surveys of OSI in 1954 and again
in 1964 found that the division of labor proposed
by Hedden, while perhaps sound in theory, was a
failure in practice. OSI's full charter was re-
stored by DCID No. 3/5 (New Series), "Production
of Scientific and Technical Intelligence," 3 Feb-
ruary 1959.
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Because Hedden's 1952 report of survey of OSI
made recommendations affecting the scientific and
technical intelligence responsibilities of the mili-
tary services, it was decided that copies of the
report would be distributed outside the Agency.
Hedden attended the 18 February meeting of the Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee (IAC) "to discuss the
scientific intelligence problem." 35/ The Director
announced at that meeting that the report would be
distributed to IAC members 36/, and Hedden forwarded
copies to Army, Navy Air, AEC, and JCS on 19 February. 37/
From mid-February through March 1952 Hedden was
occupied with a number of matters, only one of which
was of real historical significance. He conducted
a "survey of Inspection and Security," which was
in reality confined to reviewing the security brief-
ings given to new employees. 38/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The significant development during this period
was the approval, although not the publication, of the
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first statement statement of mission and functions of the
Inspector General. The need for such a statement
was first noted by L. K. White in a memorandum to
the DD/A on 16 January 1952. White pointed out
that "we are a civilian, not a military, organization
and that the functions of an Inspector General
probably are not well understood by everyone." White
proposed that he have Mr. Peel, the Management Officer,
work directly with Hedden in preparing the needed
statement. 40/
Peel called Hedden the following week and asked
for an outline of mission and functions of the Inspec-
tor General for CIA Regulation
Hedden promised
to prepare a draft. 41/ The surviving draft carries
this notation in Hedden's handwriting: "... Above
approved by DCI 3/4/52. DCI also approved holding
this until revised CIA
comes out." The draft
approved by General Smith did not include a statement
of mission, but it did list four functions for the
Inspector General, as follows:
A. Study and make recommendations with
respect to the missions performed by
� the several Offices of the Agency and
with respect to such ways and means as
may assist the. Offices of the Agency
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. I I appeared as a published regulation in
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more fully to perform their respec-
tive functions.
B. Make recommendations with respect to
the proper assignment of missions and
functions in the over-all interests
of the Agency.
C. Provide a forum where Agency personnel
may, on a highly confidential basis,
confide suggestions or complaints which
have not received satisfactory consider-
ation through regular channels of com-
mand or through the procedures provided
for in CIA Regulation and make
recommendations for the correction of
any unsatisfactory situations so dis-
closed.
D. Perform such other functions as may
be determined by the Director.
As was noted previously, this statement of func-
tions was not published during Hedden s tour as
Inspector General. Publication was first deferred
pending a planned revision of CIA Regulation
and was further postponed awaiting a restructuring of
the Agency regulatory issuances. The statement first
dated
20 March 1953, some two months after Hedden's resigna-
tion.
the earlier draft lacked. The text
of functions differed slightly from
included a statement of mission, which
of the statement
the text approved
by Director Smith in March 1952 but was identical with
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that of an undated draft in Hedden's files bearing
the handwritten notation "dup cy sent to Mr. Peel
7/10 [1952)." Thus, it would appear that the state-
ment of mission and functions published after Hedden's
departure was essentially identical with Hedden's own
understanding of his responsibilities as Inspector
General. This is the text as it was published.
4. MISSION
The Inspector General is charged with conducting
investigations throughout the Agency on behalf
of the Director and with inspecting throughout
the Agency the performance of missions and
exercise of functions of all CIA offices and
personnel.
5. FUNCTIONS
The Inspector General shall:
a. Make recommendations with respect to the
missions prescribed for the several Offices
of the Agency and with respect to such
procedures and methods as may assist the
Offices of the Agency more fully to perform
their respective functions.
b. Make recommendations with respect to the
� proper assignment of missions and functions
� in the overall interests of the Agency.
c. Provide a forum where Agency personnel may,
on a highly confidential basis, confide
suggestions or complaints which have not
received satisfactory consideration through
regular channels of command or through the
Drocedure! provided for in CIA Regulation
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d. Perform such other functions as may be
determined by the Director.
Hedden took on an assistant in April 1952, a
former Foreign Service Officer named Willard Galbraith.
The earliest reference to Galbraith is in a Hedden
diary entry of 24 March 1952 in which he noted that
"Col. King said he would still like to have Mr. Galbraith
even if he did resign from State." Years later,
Kirkpatrick, in a memorandum dealing with the manning
of the Inspector General Staff, recorded that Galbraith
had been released by State for refusing an assignment. 42/
The precise circumstances of Galbraith's resignation
from State and his employment by CIA in the Office of
the Inspector General cannot now be reconstructed.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
He entered on duty with the Office of the Inspector .
General on 13 April 1952. 43/
A sequence of events beginning in early April
1952 culminated in mid-May in the signing of an
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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� agreement among Hedden, the DD/P, the AD/SO, the
AD/PC and the AD/C0 clarifying the command relation-
ships between the Inspector General and the operating
components and establishing ground rules for the
conducting of IG investigations. The surviving records
provide a reasonably straightforward account of the
events that led to the signing of the agreement, but
they do not reveal the full extent of the professional
animosity that prevailed between the Inspector General
and the DD/P, who was then Frank Wisner. There are
numerous entries in Hedden's diary recording meetings
with the DD/P during the early months of Hedden's
service as Inspector General, but there are few
indications as to the substance of the talks and
none at all as to their flavor. However,
did not get along at all well and that many of their
meetings were marked by heated exchanges. The agree-
ment probably was an outgrowth of frictions existing
between the DD/P and the Inspector General on a variety
of subjects, but the impetus for it was provided by
two unrelated developments involving Inspector General
recommendations to the Director to which the DD/P
strongly objected.
Hedden's secretary, recalls that the two men
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The chronology chronology of this particul r episode began
on 1 April 1952 when Hedden met with Dr. Gibbons, of
the Technical Services Staff, to discuss the need for
an expansion of the TSS research program. 44/ Their
talks culminated in a proposal to the Project Review
Committee for the establishing of an $8 million per
year research program under the directorship of Admiral
de Florez. 45/ Hedden wrote the proposal himself,
which seems out of keeping with his role as Inspector
General. In preparation for the writing of the proposal,
Hedden made a two-day "survey" of TSS, which resulted
in a memorandum from Hedden to the Director recommend-
ing improvements in
46/ Hedden's recommendations appear to have
been based largely on the substance of a memorandum
submitted to him, at his request, by an employee of
A detailed survey of the
branch might have resulted in essentially the same
recommendations, but the DD/Pis own investigation of
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the situation situation in the branch disclosed that Hedden's
strong recommendations were narrowly supported. The
DD/P objected to the Inspector General's having gone
forward as he did with so little in hand.
Within the same time frame as
Hedden recommended to the Director an independent
evaluation
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and naming people who might make the ODA
evaluation. Simultaneously, a memorandum on the same
subject, but proposing a different team of evaluators,
was prepared for Wisner by Gerald Miller. Unhappily
for those concerned, the twi differing proposals
reached General Smith at abo t the same time, without
Wisner having seen either of hem, and the Director
was furious.
Smith called Wisner in an demanded an explana-
tion of the faulty staff work on the proposals for
the evaluation an of the conflicting
information he had received on th quality of documen-
tation. Smith told Wisner that he d his operations
people should not be so sensitive t. criticism from
the Inspector General since, by its ery nature, the
inspection function involved criticiz ng and making
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recommendations
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recommendations for improvements. Smith added that
the operations people should expect that a certain
percentage of their plans and proposals would be
turned down when they reached higher levels, as this
is normal in any organization. 47/
Wisner replied that he was pleased that the
Director had raised these matters with him, since
he had planned to raise them with the Director himself
in the near future. He said that he realized that
certain of his proposals would be turned down, but
that he expected that criticisms would be based on
accurate renderings of the facts and that projects
would be turned down by persons responsible for sub-
stantive consideration of them -- and not by the
Inspector General. Wisner referred to recent instances
in which the Inspector General had interfered in the
chain of command and had issued instructions to
Wisner's people concerning operational matters.
Further, Hedden had rested his recommendation to the
Director on "incomplete and half-baked investigations"
in which he had taken the testimony of only one or
two witnesses who knew only a fraction of the whole
picture. 48/
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Wisner asked for an early meeting of the
Director with Hedden and Wisner and his four principal
staff officers. The Director declined to call such
a meeting, preferring instead that the others meet
and work out their differences. Any unresolved
points could be referred to him for decision. 49/
Concerning the charge that Hedden was interfer-
ing in the chain of command, the Director authorized
Wisner to inform his subordinates that they, could
ignore any orders or requests from Hedden that did
not fall within the scope of his responsibilities
as Inspector General. On the other hand, DD/P officers
should respond, and promptly, to any requests from
Hedden for information. With regard to �the charge
that Hedden's recommendations were based on one-sided
or incomplete information, the Director said that
Hedden could handle his job in this' fashion if he so
chose but that the reports did not achieve credibility
for that reason. The Director said that he did not
intend to take action on Inspector General reports
until he had discussed them with the principal staff
officer concerned,.and there would always be an
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opportunity to get in the other side of the story.* 22/
In compliance with the Director's instructions,
a meeting was held on 13 May 1952 among Colonel
Johnston (AD/PC), General McClelland (AD/C0), Wisner
(DD/P), Helms (Acting AD/S0), Miller (Deputy AD/PC),
and Hedden. The meeting resulted in a memorandum
for the record, signed by the participants, setting.
forth the terms of the agreements. In sum, it was
agreed that the AD/PC would brief the Inspector
General on the nature and extent of the OPC mission
and on all programs and major projects and the problems
relating to them which suggests that the Inspector
General was not then privy to all of them. It was
further agreed that in the future the Inspector
General would notify the AD/S0 or AD/PC, as appropriate,
whenever a project was to be investigated, along with
* The only surviving record of the Director's views .
on this subject is in the form of a memorandum prepared
by Wisner on 2 May 1952 following his meeting with �
the Director. It would be interesting to know what,
if anything, Smith said to Hedden on the matter and
how Hedden interpreted the Director's views. It is
unfortunate from the standpoint of history that Hedden
kept no records of what was discussed in his almost
daily meetings with the Director.
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a statement of the objective of the investigation.
The Inspector General might call on any echelon to
report on any subject of a matter under investigation
and the report would be forwarded directly to the
Inspector General without editing by higher echelons.
Simultaneously, a duplicate of the report would be
forwarded to the Inspector General, through channels,
for comment or assent by higher echelons. It was
also agreed that the Inspector General's report of
inspection would not be placed before the Director
prior to receipt of the copy of the report that was
forwarded through channels.* 51/
Hedden stated that he wanted to make it very
clear to all concerned that he did not consider him-
self to be in the chain of command over operations
nor to have the authority to issue orders to opera-
tional personnel. He said that he would appreciate
having brought to his attention any instance in which
one of his requests for information had been miscon-
strued as an order. 52/
* From reviewing Hedden's records, it is evident
that this cumbersome arrangement was never put into
practice.
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Hedden added a handwritten comment at the
bottom of his file copy of the memorandum agreement
in which he noted that "I am a bit shocked that any-
one thought it necessary, or that any worthwhile
purpose would be served by reducing this to writing." 22/
Other things were going on in March, April,
and May 1952 but they seem, in retrospect, rather
trivial in comparison with the problem of sorting
out command relationships between the Inspector
General and the DD/P. The General Counsel proposed
on 11 March that Hedden be made a member of the
Loyalty Board and subsequent diary entries make
it clear that he did serve on the board. He also
noted in a diary entry of 26 March that he attended
a budget hearing before the House Appropriations
Committee. Willard Galbraith, who entered on duty
with the Inspector General on 13 April, reviewed a
request for
55/ Much of April and
early May was spent by Hedden in preparing for an
inspection trip to CIA stations in Western and
Eastern Europe.
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Hedden's survey of certain of the European
stations was made between 19 May and 20 June 1952.
He was accompanied on at least a portion of the
trip by the AD/SO, then Lyman Kirkpatrick.
Hedden's secretary, recalls that Kirkpatrick's
accompanying Hedden was treated as a sort of office
joke. Kirkpatrick had only recently returned from
Europe, and the need for him to make another trip
at just this time was solely so that he could serve
as the DD/P's "watch dog" on the Inspector General.
Although nothing was said openly, it was tacitly
understood that this was the case. The cable alerting
field stations to Hedden's arrival stated that the
purpose of his trip was "for IG to acquaint himself
with field operations and personnel and to survey
certain specific problems for [The Director)." Hedden
transmitted trip reports from the stations he visited,
and upon his return he submitted a six-page report
to the Director summarizing his findings and conclusions
The report covered a variety of operational and admini-
strative matters, but in little more than outline form.
It contained no formal recommendations, but it did
include a number of suggestions that may have had the
force of recommendations. 56/
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There is is little available
Willard Galbraith may have been
period. He did prepare a quite
evidence of what
doing during this
detailed report on
which was
completed in August 1952. 57/ Presumably, he also
was acting Inspector General during Hedden's absence.
If this is so, he generated no correspondence that
has survived in the written record. Hedden's former
secretary had the impression that Hedden, ordinarily
an astute judge of people, realized that he had made
a mistake in the case of Galbraith and regretted
having hired him. There is relatively little docu-
mentation on the nature of their working relationship,
but the tone of what there is suggests that it was
neither close nor cordial.
Hedden's last major activity as Inspector General
before submitting his resignation was a survey trip
to field stations in the Far East and Near East areas.
The trip began on 29 September and ended on 17 November
1952. The announced purpose of the trip was the same
as that for his trip to Europe a few months earlier.
He took his wife with him -- at his own expense. His
report to the Director was submitted in increments
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in the form of trip reports from each station. He
did not submit a consolidated report of his observa-
tions upon his return. 58/
Hedden submitted a memorandum to the Director
on 5 January 1953 entitled "1953 Problems." The
problems he listed might have been matters that would
have occupied his attention had he planned to remain
indefinitely as Inspector General. He referred to
them in his lead paragraph as "organizational and
functional problems which should be resolved if this
Agency is to fulfill its major intelligence functions
efficiently." The problems that Hedden enumerated
are relevant to the history, of his period as Inspector
General, because they are illustrative of the grasp
he had acquired of our covert operations and of the
way they were managed. Clearly, he did not think
much of the way they were being run.
a. We are grossly overstaffed, primarily
in the covert divisions .... I believe
a major reduction in force is called for,
choosing only the ablest people and letting
the others go.
b. If a reduction as above is effected,
the Personnel Office can be reoriented as
a Personnel Relations Office, a function
which is not adequately performed today.
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c. The time has also come for a serious
and critical appraisal of the Defector
Program. It is a very expensive program
and I have serious doubts that the results
can possibly justify its continuance.
d. We have also learned by experience,
the only way it could be learned, that we
are not particularly fitted to engage in
paramilitary activities .... The whole
of our stay behind and E and E activities
should be critically reviewed.
e. Plans have already been laid to
review our psychological warfare program.
It is clear to me that generally speaking
it has not been a well organized, well
designed and well administered program.
f. It is also submitted that the time
has come for a reappraisal of all our border
crossing operations .... My guess is that
except in active theaters of war such as
Korea, the material is necessarily of such
low level that the expense, the risk and
the time devoted is not justified.
g. There are, of course, many other
problems which must be solved before we
have a streamlined and effective intelli-
gence service. For example, a study must
some day be made of ways to reduce the
volume of paper which we are producing and
handling on the intelligence side. The
above, however, are the more immediate
problems which seem to me ripe for immediate
consideration and constitute a large enough,
perhaps too large program for consideration
in 1953.
� The Hedden era of the Office of the Inspector
General came to an end with Hedden's resignation which
was effective with the close of business 19 January 1953.
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The resignation resignation was accomplished by memorandum to
the Director of Central Intelligence dated 13 January
1953 after it became known that General Smith was
leaving the Agency. 59/ Hedden pointed out that it
had been understood from the beginning that his own
commitment to the Agency would not extend beyond the
tenure of General Smith as Director. With General
Smith about to leave, Hedden felt free to consult
only his own convenience in the matter. He expressed
his concern that his resignation not be interpreted
as a lack of confidence in the new Director, whoever
he might be, especially if Allen Dulles were named
as the successor. Hedden is on record with the
statement that he hoped that Dulles would be named,
his true preference reportedly was William Donovan. 60/
Mr. Dulles was indeed chosen as the new Director,
and he named Lyman Kirkpatrick as his new Inspector .
General replacing Stuart Hedden. The last entry in
the written record of the Hedden era is in the form
of a handwritten personal letter from Hedden to Kirk-
patrick dated 15 April 1953. The following excerpts
from it reveal Hedden's perspective on the job:
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... May I give you a hint? I insist
that Allen agree that you are to be re-
sponsible only to him, and are to take
orders only from him. I do not think
you will have any problem getting Allen
to back you up thoroughly. But that too
is important. He must rely on you clear-
ing with him first on matters which are
that important, but once you have cleared,
or decided not to, it is vital that he
back you to the limit and allow no appeal
over your head. The importance of being
responsible only to Allen is that his
deputies can crucify you and nullify your
effectiveness when they understand thor-
oughly that you can move in on any of
them any time you think necessary, and
report on their shortcomings -- and virtues.
As I grew older in the organization and
came to know it well, it became more and
more evident to me that the most useful
function I could perform was to sit and
think; to think about the advisability
of each course of action and each major
program the Agency undertakes. No other
top officer does this. And no other has
time to. The demands of command make it
impossible. We were doing a lot of things
which just couldn't stand up under scrutiny.
Stop a couple such a year, and you will
earn your stipend times over.
One that I planned.to get tip was the
relevance of the detailed research which
is dope. Others I have mentioned to you..
While serving with the Agency, Hedden had remained
active in the affairs of Wesleyan University. Many
of the entries in his diary recorded calls from or
meetings with other people who were similarly interested
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in supporting supporting the school. Hedden noted in a post-
script to his letter to Kirkpatrick that he was
"busier than ever -- mainly helping to make Wesleyan
all it should be."
On balance, Hedden was probably a good choice
as the Agency's first Inspector General. He came to
the Agency knowing very little about it, served a
two-month apprenticeship before taking over as
Inspector General, and then left the post after
occupying it for little more than one year. The
qualifications that he brought to the job -- maturity,
judgment, and decisiveness --more than offset his
ignorance of the Agency and of its business. In
fact, his ignorance of the Agency may have been a
net plus: he brought no preconceptions to the job,
and he was unfettered by prior allegiances or alliances.
He clearly held General Smith in high regard, and it
is equally clear that the Director had confidence
in Hedden, both as his Inspector General and as his
personal representative.
In comparing Hedden 's work with that of later
Inspectors General, it is evident that he made little
progress during his short stay in launching a formal
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inspection program. Indeed, it may be inferred that
this was not his intention. He saw no need for a
staff beyond himself, a secretary, and one assistant.
He was less concerned with how well a particular
component was doing its total job than with how well
individual functions or operations were being carried
out -- and with whether they were even necessary.
What Hedden did accomplish during his brief
tenure was to establish the role of the Inspector
General in the Agency's scheme of things, laying the
basis for the consolidation, refinement, and expansion
of the function by his successors.
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Chapter IT'
The Kirkpatrick Years, April 1953 - April 1962
President Eisenhower announced the appointment
of Allen W. Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence
on 24 January 1953, and he was sworn in on 26 February. 61/
Dulles had no one in mind to replace Hedden as Inspector
General; in fact, Dulles had little understanding of
'the role of the Inspector General in Agency affairs. 62/
Upon Hedden's departure, Willard Gilbraith assumed
the role of Acting Inspector General, although he
was never officially designated as such. Dulles
continued General Smith's practice of meeting daily
with the Deputy Directors and other top Agency officials,
but Galbraith did not replace Hedden as a participant. 63/
Galbraith had an Agency Notice issued on 10 March 1953
� announcing that the Acting Inspector General would be.
in his office during regular Agency working hours each
Monday to hear complaints or constructive suggestions. 64/
The first official statement of mission and functions
of the Inspector General, which had been drafted by
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Hedden, was published on 20. March 1953. 65/ Presumably
Galbraith was working on something during the period
from 20 January through the end of March 1953, but
the surviving records give no indication of what it
might have been.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, who was then AD/SO, was
stricken with polio on 20 July 1952 and was hospitalized
until 27 March 1953. 66/ The polio left him partially
paralyzed and destined to be confined to a wheel chair
for the rest of his life, but his mental faculties
were unimpaired. When he returned to duty at the end
of March, he was given an office in what is now known
as East Building, but there was no job immediately in
prospect for him. 67/ OSO and OPC were merged during
Kirkpatrick's absence, and his former deputy, Richard
Helms, was named Chief of Operations and deputy to the
DD/P. 68/ As of 26 February 1953, Kirkpatrick was
carried as a Special Assistant to the DD/P. 69/
Dulles discussed possible assignments for Kirk-
patrick with John Earman, who had served as Executive
Assistant to Director Smith and continued in that role
under Dulles. Dulles first considered creating a
position for Kirkpatrick as Special Assistant to the
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Director and dispatched Earman to make the offer to
Kirkpatrick. Kirkpatrick declined it, saying "that's
where I came in."* Earman then suggested to Dulles
the possibility of assigning Kirkpatrick to replace
Hedden as� Inspector General. Dulles thought this an
excellent idea and instructed Earman to get the views
of DD/P Wisner. If Kirkpatrick were acceptable to
Wisner, then Earman and Wisner were to sound out
Kirkpatrick on the job offer. Wisner also thought
that the Inspector General job would be suitable for
Kirkpatrick. Wisner and Earman discussed the idea
with Kirkpatrick, and he was receptive to it. 71/
Dulles told Kirkpatrick on 1 April 1953 that he had
decided to appoint him Inspector General "for the
present" and asked if he would look into the over-all
matter of public relations of the Agency. 72/
The functions of the new Inspector General were
discussed at Dulles' Deputies' Meeting on 7 April.
Dulles directed that all cases of involuntary separa-
tion of employees be referred to the Inspector General
* Kirkpatrick had served as Executive Assistant to the
Director from 13 December 1950 until his appointment
as Assistant Director for Special Operations on 17 Decem-
ber 1951. 70/
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who, if he were unable to reach a settlement, would
make his recommendations to the Director for final
decision. A question was raised by two of the
Deputies as to whether the Director should be named
chairman of the Career Service Board. Dulles directed
Kirkpatrick to make a study of the matter and submit
his recommendations. 73/ Kirkpatrick submitted his .
report to the Director on 20 April recommending that
the Director: appoint Kirkpatrick chairman of the
board for an indefinite term; direct the Inspector
General to make a thorough investigation of the
handling of personnel throughout the Agency; and,
subsequent to these steps, make changes in the top
level of the Personnel Office. 74/ He was designated
Chairman, CIA Career Service Board, on 24 April 1953. 75/
Kirkpatrick had accompanied Hedden on Hedden's
1952 trip to inspect certain of the European stations
and had no doubt been well exposed to the work of the
Inspector General from this. He appears to have brought
to the job his own ideas concerning the nature of the
role of the Inspector General as a staff officer to
the Director. Within a week of assuming office, he
submitted a memorandum to the Director proposing an
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expansion of the role of the Inspector General beyond
that specified in the formal statement of mission
and functions for the office. The broader responsi-
bilities that he envisioned for himself included:
Acting as the Director's watchdog on
the subject of unvouchered funds, back-
stopping the other Deputy Directors and
the Comptroller.
'Sitting as an observer on the Project
Review Committee and maintaining a general
familiarity with all projects and their
fulfilment.
Assuring that the appropriate outside
policy clearance is obtained for projects
undertaken by the Agency at the behest
of other agencies.
Maintaining continual surveillance to
� insure that the Agency has an efficient
and economical organization and a sound
method of operation.
Trouble-shooting at the request of
the Director.
Acting as arbitrator in the event of
differences between different parts of
the organization.
At least once during each year giving
a fairly thorough review to the activities
of each unit of the Agency on a divisional
or staff level by Office, ascertaining
whether the units are soundly conceived
and appropriately functioning. 76/
Dulles noted that he wanted to discuss the above
with Kirkpatrick. How much of the proposal Dulles
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accepted cannot now be discovered, but he was persuaded
at least of the need for closer control of accountability
for unvouchered funds. On 15 April 1953, he signed
a memorandum drafted by Kirkpatrick urging that the
DD/P make sure that all staff, division, and branch
chiefs were aware of their obligations and responsi-
bilities in connection with the approval of expendi-
tures. 77/
Kirkpatrick was later to back off from some of
these proposals -- the one concerning arbitration of
differences is a case in point -- but their submission
was the opening gun of a battle he waged over the
ensuing years to gain acceptance of his understanding
of the proper role of the Agency's Inspector General.
Colonel Stanley Grogan was then Assistant to
the Director (for Public Affairs), and Walter Pforzheimer
was Legislative Liaison Officer and Assistant General
Counsel. Grogan complained to Kirkpatrick in early
May 1953 that General Smith had put Pforzheimer under'
him but that since Smith had left he had seen nothing
of Pforzheimer. He wondered whether he was still
Pforzheimer's boss. 78/ Kirkpatrick checked with the
Director who decided that Pforzheimer was to report to
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the Inspector General on all legislative matters
but was to keep the General Counsel generally informed
as to his activities. Dulles concurred in Kirkpatrick's
suggestion that Pforzheimer be removed from the
Loyalty Board. 79/
Kirkpatrick began a survey of the Personnel
Office in early May 1953 on which he worked alone,
although he invited Galbraith to sit in on the brief-
ings if he cared to do so. 80/
Also within days of assuming office, Kirkpatrick
was briefed by Winston Scott on the work of the DD/P's
Inspection and Review Staff (I&R). Kirkpatrick told
Scott and Wisner that he would like these briefings
to continue on a periodic basis so that he might be
kept thoroughly informed of I&R's activities. He
also told them that he planned to work through I&R
on all matters affecting the Clandestine Service that
required action by the Inspector General. He recom-
mended to Wisner that two experienced officers be
added to the I&R Staff. 81/
Kirkpatrick met with Helms on 1 June and proposed
that a corps of field inspectors be created and that
I&R immediately undertake an inspection of TSS.
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Helms agreed. Kirkpatrick discussed his ideas for
a field investigation staff with Scott and Scott's
deputy,
on 2 June. They agreed that
the field investigators should remain on the head-
quarters T/0 and be sent abroad for temporary tours.
Scott said ;that he would also recommend to Wisner
that all individuals chosen for his staff be approved
by the Inspector General. 82/ Kirkpatrick met with
Dulles and Wisner on 3 June to review his proposal
for the'establishment of a corps of field inspectors,
and both agreed to it. 83/
Kirkpatrick submitted an inspection program for
the Director's approval in June 1953 in which he
outlined his plans for periodic review of each of
the components of the Agency. An inspection of the
Personnel Office was already in progress as a conse-
quence of Kirkpatrick's recommendation of 20 April
that this be his first order of business. He pro-
posed that Galbraith concentrate on DD/I components
plus the Office of Communications, that he be per-
mitted to recruit John Blake from the DD/P Administra-
tive Staff and assign him to DD/A offices plus the
Office of Training, and that the I&R Staff continue
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to act act as the arm of the Inspector General in the
DD/P complex. He noted in this last connection that
"this may be subject to review at a later date."
Dulles approved the program. 84/
Thus, within three months after taking over,
Kirkpatrick was already embarked on what he envisioned
as a broad program of component surveys covering all
offices of the Agency. Kirkpatrick was himself a
working inspector and carrying a full workload,
although during the early months he was required to
be away from the office about one and one-half hours
each day for medical treatment. 85/
Also by mid-1953, he had begun to take on respon-
sibilities beyond those normally associated with the
position of Inspector General. As noted earlier, he
was supervising the activities of the Legislative
Liaison Officer. He was also participating in the
deliberations of the Loyalty Board, of the Employee
Review Board, of the Project Review Committe, 86/ and
was reviewing the hiring of consultants. 87/ Before
the year was out, he was to give his first lecture
in a training course -- an activity that was later
to be expanded and to occupy a significant portion of
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his time. time. 88/ There is evidence in the records that
he very early began exerting an influence on Agency
affairs more in the role of a staff officer to the
Director than as a mere monitor of those affairs.
One of the earliest examples concerns a meeting on
official cover in which he participated. He commented
that it was obvious that no progress had been made
toward reconciling the differences in views between
Security and the DD/P. He told the group' that he
would "take over the matter and write my own regu-
lation." 89/
Kirkpatrick initially accepted the exclusion' of
Clandestine Service components from his inspection
responsibility, although he was clearly dissatisfied
with the arrangement whereby the chief of the I&R
Staff reported to the Inspector General through the
DD/P. In September 1953, he began a series of
maneuvers aimed at bringing Clandestine Service
elements under his purview. He met with Wisner on
10 September to discuss the functions of the Inspector
General's office and its relations with the I&R Staff.
He told Wisner that the fact that the principal arm
of the Inspector General for handling DD/P matters
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was under the command of the DD/P caused him some
concern, feeling that this might subject Wisner and
the Agency to criticism for not having a completely
independent unit inspecting the work of the DD/P.
He also stated his reservations concerning the
methods of handling I&R reports. They became the
subject of debate and negotiation, which Kirkpatrick
thought was wrong. He believed that responses to
reports of inspection should be confined to errors
in statements of fact or to dissent from recommenda-
tions. Kirkpatrick acknowledged that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for him to duplicate
the staff of I&R and that he would not wish to
attempt such duplication. 90/ Kirkpatrick sent Wisner
a memorandum record of their conversation but received
no reply nor comment from Wisner. 91/
Kirkpatrick's next move in this regard took the
form of a written proposal to the Director, dated
7 December 1953, for an inspection of the Inspector
General's office by the DDCI. He expressed his con-
cern over the ability of his office to inspect each
component of the Agency on a recurrent basis, the
propriety of the major part of the inspection work
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in the DD/P area being done by a unit under the
command of the DD/P, and the accuracy of the then-
existing system for calling matters of concern to
the attention of the Inspector General. He noted
that the staff of the Inspector General was then
limited to three professionals (John Blake having
been added in August 1953) and that the staff could
be kept small by using the task force system. He
. asked that the DDCI "make a determination as to whether
the I&R Staff should remain in its present position
or be transferred in toto to the IG." 92/
Kirkpatrick prepared a brief study for the Direc-
tor in January 1954 entitled Targets of Congressional
Investigation of CIA. He again zeroed in on the DD/P,
recommending that, in order to make faster progress in
clearing up administrative weaknesses in the operational
areas, he be authorized to use ten additional officers to be borrowed from other Agency components -- to com-
plete on a priority basis a full inspection of all com-
ponents in the DD/P area. He followed up on this recom-
mendation with a formal proposal to the Director, dated
20 February 1954, in which he named the officers he would
like to borrow and the area divisions he hoped to cover.
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Twelve officers were to come from I&R, one from
another DD/P component, three from IG, and twelve
from DD/I and DD/A components. He asked approval
to begin the inspection immediately with a target
date for completion of 1 April 1954. The inspec-
tion would be carried out under his personal super-
vision .with the assistance of the Chief, I&R. 93/
Wisner and Kirkpatrick discussed the above
proposal on 3 March, and Kirkpatrick left with Wisner
a list of the names of people he proposed for detail
to the task forces. 94/ Then, on 15 March, Kirkpatrick
met informally with the DCI and the DDCI for a dis-
cussion of the problems of the work of the Inspector
General. The Director approved enlarging Kirkpatrick's
staff. Kirkpatrick once again raised the issue of
the bulk of the inspection in the DD/P area being
done by a unit under the DD/P's command. The DDCI
pointed out that this question revolved largely around
the DD/P's own role -- whether he was to be considered
a staff officer of the DCI or the commander of the
DD/P area. Dulles took the position that Wisner was
primarily a commander, that the I&R Staff was an
important asset of the DD/P, and that members of the
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Staff should not be lost to the DD/P. 95/
Dulles asked Kirkpatrick to seek Wisner's views,
which Kirkpatrick did by memorandum of 19 March. He
offered these as possible solutions;
Place I&R under the command of the
Inspector General, reporting to the
Inspector General on all inspections
but remaining available to the DD/P for
review purposes.
Eliminate inspection from the I&R
charter, leaving it as purely a 'review
organization. Transfer some of the I&R
Staff to IG for use primarily in inspect-
ing DD/P components.
Leave I&R intact and increase the size
of the IG Staff, to cover the DD/P area.
Kirkpatrick stated that he had listed the choices in
his order of preference and asked for a prompt reply
from the DD/P. 96/ It might be noted that no reply
was ever received.
. Kirkpatrick made reference in this memorandum
to his earlier request for an inspection of his office
by the DDCI and commented that the DDCI had not yet
been able to fit this into his schedule and that there
was little likelihood of his being able to do so in
the near future. He also remarked that he considered
the work of the I&R Staff to be of the highest order
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and took note of the arrangement then existing between
him and Winston Scott: Scott kept Kirkpatrick informed
of his work and plans and provided carbon copies of all
I&R reports to the Inspector General.
The Director in early April 1954 told Kirkpatrick
that he wanted to meet with Kirkpatrick and Wisner to
_discuss inspections of DD/P elements. Wisner had
complained to Dulles of friction between the DD/P and
the Inspector General and had said that a general
inspection would upset delicate operations in progress.
Kirkpatrick told Dulles that he still believed these
inspections to be of utmost importance, that Wisner
had never discussed with him any problems of friction,
and that Wisner had never replied to any of his inquiries
or requests. 97/
Another area of potential conflict existing at
the time was between the functions of the Inspector
General and those of the Management Staff. Kirkpatrick
met on 6 April 1954 with L. K. White, then Acting DD/A,
and John O'Gara, Chief, Management Staff. They agreed
that it was not feasible to draw a line clearly
separating the two functions inasmuch as the Inspector
General, in making his over-all inspections, necessarily
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had to consider management as well as other aspects
of the offices concerned. It was also agreed that
in the future the Inspector General would depend on
the Chief, Management Staff, to provide appropriate
management, studies for inclusion in IG inspection
reports. Management Staff personnel undertaking
management studies in connection with inspections
made by the inspector General would remain responsible,
to the Chief, Management Staff. Kirkpatrick. invited
O'Gara to attend his monthly staff meetings and
offered to make available to O'Gara complete copies
of IG reports of inspection. 98/. The agreement
appears to have caused no later frictions, perhaps
because the parties to it quickly found that it was
wholly unworkable. It was first tried in the IG
survey of Security and failed because O'Gara could
not make people -available. 99/ It was agreed that
the plan would be abandoned. 100/
John Routh and Paul Eckel were added to the.
staff as inspectors in mid-1954, followed soon there-
after by Herman. Heggen and Richard Drain. Eckel was
slotted against the deputy position but was not given
the title 101/, probably because Kirkpatrick was
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interested in obtaining Winston Scott as his deputy. 102/
Thus, by mid-August 1954, Kirkpatrick had a staff of
151 seven of whom were inspectors. He had completed
surveys'of Personnel, Training, Research and Reports,
National Estimates, and Security. An inspection of
the Office of the Comptroller was then under way,
and inspections were scheduled to begin in September
of Logistics and of Scientific Intelligence. 103/
Kirkpatrick's proposal to the Director in
February 1954 that he be permitted to borrow a corps
of officers for a massive one-time inspection of the
entire Agency came to nought, for reasons that cannot
now be discovered. With a staff consisting of himself,
Galbraith, and later Blake, a component inspection
was made by a single IG officer. However, as his
staff built up in size, he was able to resort to
the team concept used in the military services. One
member of the team was designated captain and was
given responsibility for preparing for the survey,
for pursuing it, and for preparing the report of
survey for Kirkpatrick's approval. The team captain
was given considerable latitude in the conduct of the
suavey, the only requirement being that the end product
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be a report that was acceptable to Kirkpatrick. All
, inspectors were assigned at all times to component
surveys. When a grievance or complaint was brought
to the Inspector General and an investigation was
required, one of the inspectors was temporarily with-
drawn from the component survey to which he was
assigned and was given the grievance to investigate.
The same thing was done when the office was required
to investigate instances of possible wrongdoing or to
look into flaps or other situations requiring attention.
Inspection manpower is
the same way today.*
By October 1954,
assigned and used in precisely
Kirkpatrick had returned to the
subject of his responsibility for inspecting DD/P
components. He again wrote to the Director, reminding
him that the DD/P had never replied to any of his oral
or written communications on this matter. He noted
that the Director had informed him orally on 17 April
that "upon advice from the DD/P and others you were
concerned that an inspection by this office at this
time would disrupt operations and therefore had decided
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that no such inspection would be conducted." He cited
Regulation
in support of his recommendations (b)(3)
that: the injunction against inspection in the DD/P
area by the Inspector General be removed, all cases
of alleged or suspected malfeasance in the DD/P area
be referred to the Inspector General for action, and
the I&R Staff act on behalf of the Inspector General
only by prior agreement between the DD/P and the IG.
General Cabell concurred in the recommendations, but
Dulles did not approve them. 104/ Kirkpatrick's diary
entries recording conversations with Dulles and Cabell
during this period reveal that Dulles and Cabell
differed on this matter -- with Cabell supporting
Kirkpatrick and Dulles supporting Wisner.
There matters stood until 13 December 1954 when
Kirkpatrick forced the issue again. Following dis-
cussions among Dulles, Cabell, Wisner, Kirkpatrick,
and Scott concerning the duties and responsibilities
of the Inspector General and of the Chief, I&R, Dulles
on 17 January 1955 signed a memorandum addressed to
the DD/P and the IG setting forth his decisions "based
on our mutual understanding." The effect of the memo-
randum was to lift the restriction on IG inspections
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of DD/P components, but it accomplished other things
as well. It is worth quoting at some length, because
it established guidelines that were to prevail for
some years to come.
The Inspector General has the duty
from time to time as the situation wan-
rants to inspect all elements of the
Agency. Before undertaking an inspec-
tion of a particular division, staff or
unit of the DD/P he will notify. the
Director, the DD/P, the Chief of I&R
(DD/P), and the head of that particular
unit in order to avoid the overload of
inspection work. The Inspector General
will, insofar as practicable, fix the
time of particular comprehensive inspec-
tions in a manner not to directly follow
a comprehensive inspection which has been
carried on internally in any division,
staff or unit, by the Inspection and Review
Staff. Upon completion of an inspection,
the Inspector General will include in
his recommendations to the DCI, one deal-
ing with what portions of his report
should be provided DD/P or Chief, I&R.
The Chief, I&R, office of the DD/P,
will be directly responsible to .the DD/P.
It is understood, however, that copies of
I&R written reports will be sent to the
Inspector General for his information and
guidance but that the Inspector General
will not take action on such reports with-
out consultation with the Director or with.
the DD/P. It is further understood that
the Chief, I&R, will afford full coopera-
tion to the Inspector General in connection
with any inspections the Inspector General
may make of the office of the DD/P. Simi-
larly, the Inspector General will afford
all possible cooperation to the Inspection
and Review Staff in connection with inspec-
tions conducted by I&R.
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In case in any division, staff or unit
an internal inspection develops evidence
indicating malfeasance, misappropriation
of funds, or evidence concerning any other
�
situation deemed by the DD/P to be of a
possibly critical nature, the matter shall
immediately be referred to the Director or
to the Inspector General and further inspec-
tion or investigation of that particular matter
will, unless the Director otherwise decides,
be directed or taken over by the Inspector
General.
In event that reports reaching the
Inspector General indicate that a partic-
ular situation in the office of DD/P calls
for investigation but does not in his
opinion justify immediate action by the
office of the Inspector General, he may
request the Deputy Director/Plans to cause
the matter to be inspected by him or by
his Inspection and Review Staff and a report
thereon shall be made to the Deputy Direc-
tor/Plans and to the Inspector General.
Any individual in the DD/P area wishing
to see the Inspector General as provided
for in Agency Regulation will
be permitted to do so after having ex-
hausted the command facilities within the
DD/P area. 105/
This should have been the end of it, but it wasn't.
For nearly two years, the DD/P had simply� ignored all
communications he recieved on this subject, but he
replied to this one within two days. He reported that
all officials of the DD/P area whose work was directly
affected by the new guidelines were being informed
of them "in order that they may comply with the terms
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thereof." However, However, he took exception to two provisions
of the directive: he thought that he should receive
complete copies of all reports of inspection dealing
with the DD/P area, and he quibbled over the meaning
f the word "malfeasance." He noted that the word
is differently defined in different dictionaries and
even the legal dictionaries "do not declare it to be
a term of art." He added that the use of the expres-
sion was more apt to generate than to reduce argumentsy
since it was susceptible to such broad construction. 106/
He may well have had a good point, but he then
made it sound ridiculous by launching into a legalistic
differentiation among maZum in se, malum prohibitum,
and malitis praecogitata. General Cabell was obviously,
offended by the carping tone of the DD/P's response
and brusquely recommended to the Director that he
"not modify the directive or interpret it ... no com-
mitment is in order." 107/ Dulles accepted Cabell's
recommendation,. told Wisner that he was going to let
the directive stand, and then confirmed this in writing.
He disposed of the problem of malfeasance by suggesting
that if a question of jurisdiction arose "we could dis-
cuss the matter together and determine the appropriate
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method of procedure in the light of the facts." 108/
If Dulles thought that he had firmly and
finally settled the question of the handling of cases
of malfeasance,
he was wrong. The DD/P
Agency Regulation
initiated
relating
by the Inspection and Review
to overseas inspections
(b)(3)
Staff. It provided that when evidence was discovered
of possible acts of nonfeasance, misfeasance, or mal-
feasance, the matter would be immediately referred to
the Director of Central Intelligence, the Inspector
General, and the Deputy Director (Plans); however,
the Regulation was given a limited distribution, and
the statement of mission and functions of the Inspector
General was not correspondingly revised to reflect
this added authority. The problem was also tied in
to the Agency's concern over its obligation to report
to the Attorney General evidence of criminal acts on
the part of Agency employees, which had been the subject
of correspondence among the Director, the General
Counsel, and the DD/P for many months. Another two
years were to pass before the Inspector General's
authority in this area was fully clarified and made
a matter of official record. 109/
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An inspection of Eastern Europe Division was
begun immediately after receiving authorization in
January 1955 for Inspector General surveys of DD/P
components. Kirkpatrick put his best inspectors on
the team and instructed them to move gingerly and to
make no mistakes. They recall that their reception
within the Clandestine Service was correct but noticeably
cool. 110/ The inspection was completed and the
report issued in May 1955. It contained an astounding
number of recommendations by today's standards, 121
in all, and most of them concerned matters of trivial
importance. These were the more significant of the
report's conclusions:
The division is well organized but lacks
an adequate mix of experienced officers.
The German Mission is too large and
should be reduced.
Intelligence production is high in
quantity but low in quality.
PP activities suffer from a lack of an
authoritative listing of priorities.
The collection picture is one of recent
emergence from the developmental stage.
The division has a few long-range assets
and has been slow in creating them.
CE operations are weak and inadequately
staffed. 111/
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John Bross, Bross, who was then Chief, EE Division, told
Kirkpatrick on 27 June that he thought the report
was excellent and that the conduct of the Survey had
been "irreproachable." 112/ The DD/P's response was
generally constructive. Inspections of two other
DD/P components were completed before the end of the
year -- Southern Europe Division and
(b)(3)
The effect of the nearly two-year impasse be-
tween Wisner and Kirkpatrick had been to deny to the
Inspector General the authority to inspect DD/P field
stations, which presumably had been given him by
Regulation
Once the Director (b)(3)
had confirmed the authority of the Inspector General,
Kirkpatrick took steps to get the word out to the
field in the form of a Field Notice dated 9 May 1955.
The Notice included a statement of mission and func-
tions for the Inspector General and for the first
time provided
communicate directly and on a confidential basis
the Inspector General.
forwarded by
a means whereby overseas employees could
with
Such correspondence was to be
pouch in a sealed envelope addressed("3)
to "INSPECTOR GENERAL--EYES ONLY." Replies from the "3)
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Inspector General were to be handled on the same
confidential basis. 113/ The same arrangement
exists today.*
Kirkpatrick realized from his experience in
sending inspectors abroad to inspect the stations
in Eastern Europe that he had no secure means of
communicating with them privately on sensitive
Inspector General matters. Accordingly, his admin-
istrative assistant, called the (b)(3)
Cable Secretary on 25 May 1955 and asked that an
indicator be assigned for sensitive Inspector General
cables that would provide for distribution to the
Inspector General and to no one else. The Cable
Secretary assigned
for this purpose. 114/ (b)(3)
The indicator was reserved exclusively for use by
the Inspector General and traveling inspectors, and
no reference to its existence appeared in Agency
regulations until many years later.
By Executive Order 10590 of 18 January 1955
the President established the President's Committee
on Government Employment Policy and directed that
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each agency head designate an Employment Policy
Officer for his agency. One of Kirkpatrick's
inspectors, John F. Blake, was named as the Agency's
first Employment Policy Officer. He was succeeded
by Herman F. Heggen, also of the IG Staff, in December
1955. 115/ Although the title of the position was
to change in succeeding years, the precedent established
of assigning the function to an inspector as an added
duty to be continued.
An Agency Notice was issued on 2 November 1955
transfering the functions of the Legislative Counsel
from the Office of the General Counsel to the Office
of the Inspector General. The effective date of the
transfer was 1 December, although this merely confirmed
an arrangement that had been in effect for quite some
time. Simultaneously, Normal Paul replaced Walter
Pforzheimer as Legislative Counsel. 116/ Pforzheimer
explains the reason for the transfer thus. In those
days neither the Legislative Counsel nor the General
Counsel attended the Director's daily meetings with
his deputies. The Inspector General did. Kirkpatrick
volunteered to serve as a channel between the Director
and Pforzheimer for matters that came up at the morning
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meetings of of concern to legislative liaison. Eventually,
the arrangement was formalized by the issuance of a
Notice. Pforzheimer gives as the reason for his
replacement the fact that Dulles was dissatisfied
with his approach to the job.
This had been a busy and productive year for
the Inspector General. He had finally obtained the
authority for the full exercise of his responsibilities,
and he and his staff were well into the first cycle
of inspections. In addition to those surveys previously
mentioned, the staff completed inspections in 1955
of Logistics, Medical Staff, Audit Staff, Commercial
Staff, and Foreign Documents Division.
The President established his Board of Consultants
on Foreign Intelligence Activities in January 1956. 117/
Dulles asked Kirkpatrick to prepare the necessary paper
work for the first meeting of the board on 23 January. 118/
Thereafter, Kirkpatrick continued as the focal point
within the Agency on dealings with the board, and the
function was officially added to his duties in September
1956. 119/ This was obviously a demanding and time-
consuming job. Of the few written records surviving
in the Office of the Inspector General from the
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Kirkpatrick era, era, more relate to his liaison with the
Board of Consultants than to his work as Inspector
General. Soon after the board was established,
Kirkpatrick began providing to it copies of all of
his reports of inspection. 120/
It would be interesting to know how Kirkpatrick
viewed this part of his work and how he approached it.
Unfortunately, the surviving records reveal only the
results of his work and then in only fragmentary form.
The one thing that does come through clearly is that
Mr. Dulles was disappointed with the way the role of
the board evolved. He had expected that it would be
helpful to him in managing the affairs of the intel-
ligence community; instead, it took an adversary posi-
tion.
Except for this added responsibility, the work
of the Inspector General during 1956 was devoted to
continuing the first cycle of inspections. Nine
additional component surveys were completed during
the year. One of them was of the Office of the DD/S
including the Management Staff and the Office of the
General Counsel (OGC). His findings and conclusions
concerning the Management Staff are of interest because
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of the the potential conflict between the functions of
that office and his own. He concluded that there
were necessary and valid functions to be performed
by the Management Staff but that "the exercise of
leadership and initiative in improvement of manage-
ment throughout the Agency has been relinquished by
the Chief, Management Staff, to the Operating Officials."
Although he did not feel that the Management Staff
was an effective organization, he did not recommend
that its activities or staff be curtailed at that
time. 121/
�During his first four years in office, Kirk-
patrick had operated without a formally named deputy.
Herman F. Heggen was designated as Deputy Inspector
General effective 1 March 1957. 122/ Kirkpatrick
was abroad during the summer and early fall of 1957.
Three things of significance happened during his
absence. Heggen, as Acting Inspector General and
presumably upon Kirkpatrick's instructions, submitted
a memorandum to the Director urging that, unless
definite action were taken to revitalize the Manage-
ment Staff along the lines recommended by the Inspector
General in his 1956 report of survey, substantial
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reductions in the strength of the staff be effected
by transfers of personnel to more productive work. 123/
A new statement of mission and functions for the
Inspector General appeared in July 1957 adding the
new functions of controlling liaison with Congress
and investigating instances of wrongdoing. 124/ On
9 September, the functions and responsibilities of
the Legislative Counsel were transferred from the
Office of the Inspector General back to the Office
of the General Counsel, and John Warner replaced
Norman Paul as Legislative Counsel. 125/ In November,
the statement of mission and functions for the Inspector
General was amended to reflect the loss of responsi-
bility for Legislative Liaison and the addition of
liaison with the 'Board of Consultants. 126/
John Warner does not recall that the transfer
was in any way controversial. Normal Paul was not a
member of OGC, and it made �just as good sense for
him to report to Kirkpatrick as to anyone else. How-
ever, when Warner took over legislative liaison, he
continued in his position as Deputy General Counsel.
Since he was wearing two hats, it made sense for him
to doff them both to the same master. Additionally,
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the General General Counsel was by then attending the Director's
morning meetings and could provide the channel that
Kirkpatrick had provided for Pforzheimer and Paul.
Kirkpatrick, however, clearly considered the transfer
as not being in his best interest. He included the
following paragraph in a personal and confidential
letter he wrote to "Dear Allen" on 7 March 1959.
Whereas the recommendation of the Presi-
dent's Board speaks of the expansion of
the authorities and responsibilities of
the Inspector General, there actually has
been a contraction in recent years. I
would point 'out that from June 1953 to
August 1957 I also had the responsibility
for supervising the relations of the Agency
with the Congress. During my absence from
the United States this was transferred to
the General Counsel's office under the
DD/S and the Legislative Counsel now
consults with me sporadically, and I am
not kept informed of Congressional matters
on a current basis, which unfortunately
lessens the effectiveness of any contri-
bution.
Only three component surveys were completed in
1957: International Organizations Division, Technical
Services Staff, and Near East and Africa Division.
The reduced production was attributable to two factors.
One of them was turnover of personnel: one experienced
inspector was reassigned, another was transferred after
serving only eight months on the staff, and a third
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was away on detail for much of the year. Three new
inspectors were added, but Kirkpatrick promptly dis-
missed one of them for unsatisfactory performance.
The most important factor, however, was that Kirkpatrick
appears to have lost sight of his goal of early comple-
tion of the first cycle of component surveys. Thirteen
special studies were made in 1956 and another seven
were completed in 1957.* Thus he had concentrated
the bulk of his inspection manpower on noncomponent-
survey work and failed to make the "starts" needed
to reach the end of the cycle.
Kirkpatrick wrote toward the end of 1958 that
the first cycle of inspections would be completed in
early 1959, but the end did not actually come until
December 1959. Thus, the first cycle took nearly
seven years to complete. Kirkpatrick himself attributed
the length to the fact that the Staff was in the
process of being organized during the early part of .
the cycle and that only in the last two years had it
* For a complete list of special studies, see
Appendix C.
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been at at its full strength of six officers, plus the
Inspector General. He anticipated that the second
and subsequent cycles could be completed in two years
"due to the fact that the original inspections will
serve as a point of departure in most of the units
of the agency which will not have changed in any
major aspects between inspections." He noted that.
the IG staff then had a T/O calling for seven officers,
including himself, and six secretaries �and had a
total budget of $166,000 for fiscal year 1959. He
recommended that the Staff be enlarged by three
officers and one or two secretaries. He suggested
that one of the officer slots be a GS-17 so that he
could create a special slot for General Dunford.
Dunford was a retired army officer hired on a reserve
appointment as a GS-17. He was then slotted against
a GS-16 position as special Assistant to the Inspector
General for Personnel Matters. Heggen, then a GS-16,
was occupying the only GS-17 slot as Deputy Inspector
General. He also proposed that beginning in 1959 he
institute a program for visiting each
field station and base at least annually.
These annual visits would not be full inspections
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but would be mere checkups on previous inspections.
The Director approved the recommendations. 127/
Kirkpatrick additionally proposed in that
memorandum that he conduct an inspection of the
immediate office of the DD/P to include a study of
the relationships between the I&R Staff and the
Inspector General. Acting DD/P Richard Helms com-
mented on the proposal in a memorandum to the
Inspector General of 8 December 1958. He referred
to "recent decisions of the DCI directly affecting
some of the proposals." Specifically, Richard Bissell
had been selected as the new DD/P, and it had been
agreed that the Inspector General would postpone his
inspection of the immediate office of the DD/P until
Bissell had assumed his new duties. Helms also noted
that "since the DCI has approved the abolishment of
the I&R Staff the relationship of the latter to your
staff will no longer be a problem." Helms also gave
his thoughts on the frequency of IG inspections of
DD/P units and on the areas
He hoped for IG inspections
Service component every two
that should be emphasized.
of each Clandestine
or three years with in-
creased attention being given to operations. He
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objected, however, to the Inspector General's proposal
for annual visits to every field installation. He
felt that formal inspections every two to three years,
plus annual IG visits, plus all of the visits made
by the Clandestine Service officers "raised the problem
of keeping a proper balance between giving the stations
and bases the personal attention they require and
disrupting their day-to-day work by too frequent
visitors who demand attention if their visits are
to be worthwhile." 128/
The Inspector General took on a new task in
early 1958. The Director had said that he would find
useful a summary of the high points contained in the
monthly letters from chiefs of field stations -- the
so-called
letters -- and Kirkpatrick volunteered
to prepare the summaries since he was already reading
all of them. 129/ Initially, the summaries were pre-
pared monthly, then quarterly, and finally simi-annually.
The President's Board of Consultants in its
report to the President on 16 December 1958 repeated
an earlier recommendation that a Chief of Staff or
Executive Director of the Agency be named or "in lieu
of such action ... the expansion of the authorities
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and responsibilities responsibilities of the Agency's Inspector Gener-
al." 130/ This recommendation formed the basis for
a proposal from Kirkpatrick to the Director that the
Director issue a formal statement describing the
actual duties and responsibilities of the Inspector
General. The proposal was put forward in four related
memorandums all dated 7 March 1959. There was a brief
transmittal memorandum to which was attached a paper
explaining the work of the Inspector General's staff
and another draft memorandum to the Deputy Directors
listing the duties assigned to Kirkpatrick that were
unrelated to his role as Inspector General. The
fourth paper was in the form of a "personal and con-
fidential" letter from "Kirk" to "Dear Allen."
The general conclusion reached in the paper
concerning the work of the Inspector General's staff
was that it would be inappropriate to increase the
authority of the Inspector General to include imple-
mentation of recommendations. The paper
description of the working of the Office
�spector General, of its composition, and
gave a good
of the In-
of progress
to that date. Kirkpatrick noted that he then had a
staff of 13 consisting of himself, a deputy, a special
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assistant, five inspectors, and five secretaries.
He had approval to enlarge the staff to 18 by adding
three officers and two secretaries. A total of 32
major components had been surveyed since the first
cycle began in 1953 and the second cycle had been
started in February 1959 (although the first cycle
was not actually completed until December). The
Inspector General's program of interviewing returnees
from overseas, which was begun in mid-1956, was con-
tinuing, and a total of 320 returnees had been inter-
viewed. The staff had handled some
individual
case investigations in the preceding five years.
Kirkpatrick also noted that he was then a member of
the Project Review Committee, Career Council, Build-
ing Steering Committee, and non-voting advisor to the
Supergrade Promotion Board. 131/
The brief transmittal memorandum pointed out
that the above-described paper dealt exclusively with
the role of the staff of the Inspector General. Not
dealt with was Kirkpatrick's personal role, which was
considerably broader than that of an Inspector General
in the conventional sense. Kirkpatrick noted that
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There are many things that I do for you
which are of the nature performed by a
chief of staff. Thus in responding to
this latest action of the President's
Board recommendation, I believe it im-
portant to distinguish between what I
do as Inspector General and what I do as
an executive for you. 132/
The draft memorandum to the Deputies for Dulles'
signature was described by Kirkpatrick as an attempt
to make it clear to the Deputies that the Director
was responding to the board's recommendation "not by
the insertion of another echelon, but by an extension
of your executive arm." 133/
The opening paragraph of the draft memorandum
to the Deputies, which survived intact in the final
version that Dulles signed, gave the rationale for
the memorandum:
For some time I have been looking to
Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick for advice and
assistance on a variety of matters not
strictly related to the duties normally
to be expected of an Inspector General.
This has been the case because of the
long and varied experience of Mr. Kirk-
patrick in the affairs of this Agency.
The title, Inspector General, is thus
not an entirely inclusive description
of the duties currently being performed
by Mr. Kirkpatrick or which might be
given to him from time to time in the
future.
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Kirkpatrick proposed that he be assigned the follow-
ing specific duties in addition to those already
officially assigned to him. Some of them were already
being performed by him without formal assignment; some
of them were new.
(a) Give general guidance and super-
vision to the Legislative Counsel on
Congressional matters.
(b1 Direct and guide the Efficiency
Task Force.
(c) Assume Chairmanship of the Publi-
cations Board.
(d) Advise the Executive Officer on
more efficient operation of the Office
of the Director.
(e) Review all Agency Regulations prior
to their submission to the DCI.
(f) Advise with the heads of major
Headquarters components concerning any.
cases of unsatisfactory behavior of
personnel which might reflect on the
Agency.
(g) As the first elements of his
future Inspector General reports on any
particular activity, report any failures
of compliance with approved recommendations
of former report.
(h) Serve as a member of the Supergrade
Board.
(i) Maintain liaison with the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence.
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Kirkpatrick further proposed that he carry the addi-
tional title of "Executive Advisor" in order to
provide Agency-wide recognition of the additional
duties proposed for himself. 134/
General Cabell reviewed the proposal, striking
out item d. and changing "Executive Advisor" to "Special
Advisor." The proposal was then forwarded to the
Deputy Directors in draft form, as originally pre-
sented by Kirkpatrick, for their comments. Not
unexpectedly, the proposal encountered sharp resist-
ance from some of them.
General Truscott, Deputy Director/Coordination,
felt that the proposed expansion of the role of the
Inspector General was entirely in line with the
services that he could perform for the Director and
for the Agency and recommended approval. 135/
Robert Amory, Deputy Director/Intelligence, con-
curred in the proposal except for the item on the
Publications Board, which directly threatened his own
authority for control of publications. 136/
L. K. White, Deputy Director/Support, stated
his belief that, as a matter of principle, the Inspector
General should not have command or line responsibility.
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He throught it improper to assign to the Inspector
General responsibilities already assigned to Deputy
Directors or to establish the Inspector General as
a channel through which Deputy Directors would deal
with the Director. Either arrangement would be
organizationally unsound and inconsistent with good
management practices. White said he realized that
the proposal intended to set up Kirkpatrick as an
Executive Advisor in an entirely different role from
that of the Inspector General.
Frankly, I don't think that this is
possible and believe that the net re-
sult would lead to confusion and frus-
tration .... It would be far wiser to
have the Director continue to use him
on an ad hoc basis in order to take
advantage of his unusual qualifications
than it would to set him up as an
Executive Advisor. 137/
Richard Helms, Chief of Operations, received
the DD/P copy of the draft proposal and wrote a note
on the buckslip to Bissell: "Needless to say, I have
some views on this proposal which I would like to
discuss with you and Tracy (Barnes]." Presumably
the DD/P's views, whatever they may have been, were
given to the Director orally; no written record of
them has been found.
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Dulles signed the official memorandum to the
Deputy Directors on 26 May 1959. The specific addi-
tional duties enumerated for Kirkpatrick were essentially
the same as those proposed by Kirkpatrick. The only
one that was deleted was the one proposing that he
advise the Executive Officer on the running of the
Director's office. Also, the final document made no
reference to a new job title for Kirkpatrick. The
term "Executive Advisor," which General Cabell had
changed to "Special Advisor," was deleted entirely. 12y
The DD/I raised the issue of Kirkpatrick's assuming
the chairmanship of the Publications Board at the
Deputies' Meeting of 24 June 1959. The original
wording of that item had referred to standardization
and reduction of numbers of Agency publications.
Amory felt that it was appropriate to strive for
standardization but that reduction of numbers was
beyond the Agency's control. The statement was
revised accordingly. 139/
The "personal and confidential" letter to "Dear
Allen," which accompanied Kirkpatrick's proposal for
the assignment of additional duties to him was
essentially a protest concerning the difficulties he
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had experienced in establishing his authority within
the Agency and of what he saw as a progressively
diminishing role for himself.
The statement of mission and functions of the
Inspector General was again revised in December 1959,
on the basis of Dulles' memorandum of 26 May listing
Kirkpatrick's duties, to specify that the Inspector
General would provide general guidance and supervision
to the Legislative Counsel on all Congressional matters
other than legislation affecting the Agency. 140/
Six component inspections were completed in 1959,
although the report of survey of the Counterintelli-
gence Staff was never published. The surviving draft
is poorly organized and badly written. Kirkpatrick
sent it to his deputy, Herman Heggen, with this comment:
I do not believe that it meets our
standards and I feel that many broad and
sweeping statements are made herein that
are not substantiated by the discussion
produced. I do think that the survey
can be saved and much of the present
material utilized, but I feel that it
needs further investigation and consider-
able' rewriting. 141/
Additional inspectors were added to the survey team,
and more work was put into the report, but CI Staff's
reaction to the initial draft was so negative that the
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effort was eventually abandoned.
On the basis of surviving records, 1960 might
well be termed a lost year for the Office of the�
Inspector General. Only three component surveys and
two special studies were completed; yet, Kirkpatrick
had eight inspectors on duty for the full year and
five others for portions of it. Inspectors who were
assigned to the staff at the time recall that they
all were busy and are in a loss to account for -the
decreased production. It may be speculated with
some confidence that the lower production resulted
from two factors. The first was a change in the
inspection philosophy. The production rate of about
eight or nine inspections per year that prevailed in
the mid-fifties fell to an average of about four or
five per year at the end of the decade and remained
at roughly that level through the 1960's. In com-
paring reports of survey from the second cycle of
inspections with those from the first cycle, it is
apparent that the surveys of the second cycle were
done in appreciably greater depth than those in the
first and thus took longer to complete. The second
factor causing production to fall was that Kirkpatrick
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had become increasingly drawn into work that inter-
fered with his managing his. own staff. His diary
records in reasonably good detail what he did each
day; by 1960, entries relating to IG work had become
very sparse indeed. The most serious hindrance came
in mid-1960 when he was named by Dulles as chairman
of a Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activ-
ities. The group, consisting of representatives of
CIA, State, Defense, Bureau
NSC Staff, began its work i
its report until December.
of the Budget, and the
July and did not complete
Kirkpatrick was with the
group almost full time and spent a month with it
abroad. 142/
Kirkpatrick was aware of falling production and
took steps in early 1961 to try to correct the situa-
tion. He met with his staff on 28 February and
stressed that the head of each inspection task force
was responsible for. the writing and prompt publica-
tion of the reports of inspection. He authorized
overtime for the secretaries, including on Saturdays
and Sundays, to speed up completion of reports. 143/
The Inspector General's report of survey of the
Cuban Operation was the office event of 1961 and caused
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almost as much trauma as the Bay of Pigs disaster
itself. The survey had its origins on 22 April
when Dulles called in Kirkpatrick to ask for recom-
mendations on actions to be taken to cope with "the
Cuban disaster." Kirkpatrick recommended that the
first thing that should be done was to call a meeting
of senior officers of the Clandestine Service and
tell them to work together and stop feuding. Dulles
agreed that the situation in the CS was "explosive"
and asked Kirkpatrick to draw up a list of those who
should attend. Kirkpatrick also suggested that an
inspection of the operations be made at a later date,
to which Dulles agreed. 144/ The meeting of senior
officers was held on 26 April. 145/
Dulles spoke with Kirkpatrick again on 30 April
about "the present problem regarding the Cuban Opera-
tion." Dulles directed that the Inspector General
immediately begin a thorough review of the operation
and suggested that it might be advisable to give a
preliminary report to General Maxwell Taylor before
the Taylor report was submitted to the President. 146/
Kirkpatrick got the survey under way immediately.
The survey team consisted of William Dildine, Robert
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Shaffer, and Robert Shea, with Dildine as team
captain. The Director called Kirkpatrick on 4 May
saying that he would provide all of the papers from
the Taylor Committee and suggesting that the start
of the IG survey be postponed for ten days, because
the people concerned were so busy preparing reports
for the Taylor group. Kirkpatrick replied that his
people were not bothering those who were preparing
reports but that they were trying to see those people
who would be leaving soon. Dulles agreed to this. 147/
An IG survey team customarily assembles'a con-
siderable volume of paper in the course of a survey
consisting of documents and of notes and memorandums
of interview. When the report of survey is completed
and the response is in and is accepted, the back-up
material is disposed of. Some of it is destroyed,
and some is returned to the suppliers. Those documents
that are felt should be retained for record purposes
are filed in what is commonly referred to as "the
green folder" (because it is a green pressboard binder),
which is permanently retained with the report of
survey. Unfortunately for the historian, Kirkpatrick's
practice was to strip the green folder when the file
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was retired to Records Center. The green folder on
the Cuban Operation contains two sheets of paper,
one listing the names of the team members and of the
typists and the other being a brief transmittal memo-
randum requesting the DD/P's comments on the report.
A review of Kirkpatrick's diary failed to find any
entries relating to this survey between the date
the survey began and the date the report was submitted.
Robert Shaffer, one of the team members, is now
retired but still lives in the area and was available
for interview. He remembers the survey well because
of the controversy it caused, and because it was his
last assignment on the Inspection Staff. He recalls
that Kirkpatrick did not follow the course of the
survey closely and that the team did not function as
a team. Each inspector went largely his own way,
with Shea concentrating on FI matters, Shaffer on PM,
and Dildine on PP and the chronology of the operation.
After the team members began writing their contributions
to the report, the team met with Jacob Esterline, who
was chief of the Cuban Task Force, and with others
whose names Shaffer does not now remember for a round-
table discussion of the operation. Each inspector
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then completed his portion of the report with little
consultation with the other team members. Dildine
assembled the contributions into a draft report, which
was reviewed by Deputy Inspector General David McLean
from the sole standpoint of any minor editing that
might be required. It then went to Kirkpatrick, who
apprarently approved it virtually as submitted.
Shaffer recalls, that there was no rewriting at all.
� He also remembers that Kirkpatrick directed the team
members to destroy all of their working papers re-
lating to the survey because of the report's sensi-
tivity. 148/
The report was completed and was forwarded to
John McCone under cover of a transmittal memorandum
dated 20 November 1961. McCone had been named on
27 September to replace Dulles, although he was not
actually sworn in until 29 November. Kirkpatrick
noted in his transmittal memorandum that he considered
the 150-page report to be fair, even though highly
critical. He called attention to
a tendency in the Agency to gloss over
CIA's inadequancies and to attempt to
fix all of the blame for the failure of
the invasion upon other elements of the
Government, rather than to recognize the
Agency's weaknesses reflected in this report.
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He added that, as a consequence, he would make no
additional distribution of the report until McCone
had indicated who else should receive copies. 149/
McCone called Kirkpatrick on 23 November (Thanksgiving
Day) and directed that immediate distribution be made
to Dulles, which was done. 150/
It seems odd that Kirkpatrick would have chosen�
to make an initial, one-copy distribution to John
McCone, who was merely Director-designate, rather
than to Allen Dulles, who was still Director. Tracy
Barnes in a memorandum to the DD/P dated 19 January
1962 referred to the distributipn as being "so peculiar
and contrary to normal practice that it raises an
inference of intended partiality." Kirkpatrick wrote
to Barnes on 22 January 1962 protesting Barnes'
criticisms of the report of survey. He had this to
say concerning the report's distribution:
You apparently feel there was something
unusual in the distribution of the final
report. The only thing unusual in it was
that we had two Directors at the time, and
Mr. McCone having asked for it received
it as he was leaving for the West Coast on
the day before Thanksgiving and everybody
else got their copies on the day after
Thanksgiving.
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sge-Rff
Dulles gave McCone his views on the IG report in a
memorandum of 15 February 1962 and had this to say
about the distribution:
Upon receipt of the Inspector General's
report of October 1961 on the Cuban
Operation, which reached my desk prior
to my resignation as Director of Central
Intelligence, I immediately transmitted
a copy to the Deputy Director (Plans)
for his comment.
A�check of Executive Registry reveals that the report
was not 'delivered through ER. ER's records reflect
that Kirkpatrick's secretary reported to ER thatall
copies of the report Were delivered by hand on 24 Novem-
ber 1961 .(the day after Thanksgiving).
Earman called Kirkpatrick on 24 November, pre-
sumably at Dulles' direction, to ask who had prepared
the Cuban report and to request a description, of the
material to which the team had had access. 151/
Kirkpatrick sent a memorandum to the Director that
. same day saying that the 'report represented the views
of the Inspector General himself and describing the
source materials, 152/
General Cabell called Kirkpatrick on 28 NOvem-
ber and instructed him that the fact of the existence
of the IG report on the Cuban Operation was to be
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restricted on a "must-need-to-know" basis and directed
that no distribution be made to the President's Board
of Intelligence Advisors. No further distribution was
to be made without authority of the DCI or DDCI. 153/
The report's summary conclusions are worth
quoting here, because they well convey the highly
critical nature of the report.
The Central Intelligence Agency,
after starting to build up the resistance
and guerrilla forces inside Cuba, drasti-
cally converted the project into what
rapidly became an overt military operation.
The Agency failed to recognize that when
the project advanced beyond the stage of
plausible denial it was going beyond, the
area of Agency responsibility as well as
Agency capability.
The Agency became so wrapped up in the
military operation that it failed to
appraise the chances of success realisti-
cally. Furthermore, it failed to keep
the national policy-makers adequately
and realistically informed of the condi-
tions considered essential for success,
and it did not press sufficiently for
prompt policy decisions in a fast moving
situation.
As the project grew, the Agency re-
duced the exiled leaders to the status of
puppets, thereby losing the advantages of
their active participation.
The Agency failed to build up and supply
a resistance organization under rather
favorable conditions. Air and boat opera-
tions showed up poorly.
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The Agency failed to collect adequate
information on the strength of the Castro
regime and the extent of the opposition
to it; and it failed to evaluate the
available information correctly.
The project was badly organized. Com-
mand lines and management controls were
ineffective and unclear. Senior Staffs
of the Agency were not utilized; air sup-
port stayed independent of the project;
the role of the large forward base was
not clear.
The project was not staffed throughout
with top-quality people, and a number of
people were not used to the best advantage.
The Agency entered the project without
adequate assets in the way of boats, bases,
training facilities, agent nets, Spanish-
speakers, and similar essential ingredients
of a successful operation. Had these been
already in being, much time and effort
would have been saved.
Agency policies and operational plans
were never clearly delineated, with the
exception of the plan for the brigade
landing; but even this provided no disaster
plan, no unconventional warfare annex, and
only extremely vague plans for action
following a successful landing. In
general, Agency plans and policies did not
precede the various operations in the
project but were drawn up in response to
operational needs as they arose. Conse-
quently, the scope of the operation itself
and of the support required was constantly
shifting.
Set against this list of criticisms was a single
paragraph of praise:
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There were some good things in this
project. Much of the support provided
was outstanding (for example, logistics
and communications). A number of individ-
uals did superior jobs. Many people at
all grade levels gave their time and
effort without stint, working almost
unlimited hours over long periods, under
difficult and frustrating conditions,
without regard to personal considerations.
But this was not enough.
To say that the report was not well received
would be putting it mildly. General Cabell put his
views in writing in a memorandum of 15 December 1961.
These excerpts are typical of his reaction to the
report:
It is not clear what purpose the In-
spector General's report is intended to
serve. If it is intended primarily as
an evaluation of the Agency's role, it
is deficient. Neither Mr. Dulles nor I
was consulted in the preparation of the,
Inspector General's report. As a result,
there are many unnecessary inaccuracies.
The report misses objectivity by a
wide margin. In unfriendly hands, it can
became a weapon unjustifiably to attack
the entire mission, organization, and
functioning of the Agency. It fails to
cite the specific achievements of persons
associated with the operation and presents
a picture of unmitigated and almost will-
ful bumbling and disaster.
In its present form, this is not a
useful report for anyone inside or out-
side the Agency. 154/
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McCone commented at his Deputies' Meeting of
4 January 1962 that heiwas under pressure from the
Attorney General and the Killian Board for copies
of the IG report on the Cuban Operation. He said
that, inasmuch as this had occured before he assumed
responsibility, he was going to send the report over
with the responses to it bound with it. He noted
that he had the DDCI's comments but not those of the
DD/P. Helms said that Bissell, Barnes, King, and
Esterline were working on the DD/P response and that
Barnes had promised to have it ready by the end of
the week.
The DD/P response, which was dated 18 January
1962, was only three pages shorter than the report
itself. The response argued that a large majority
of the conclusions reached in the IG survey were mis-
leading or wrong; that the report was especially weak
in judging the implications of its own allegations;
and that the utility of the report was greatly
im-
paired by its failure to point out fully or in all
cases correctly the lessons to be learned from the
experience. 155/
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Simultaneously with. with submitting the DD/P response,
Barnes forwarded a memorandum to the DD/P, with a
copy to the Inspector General, giving his personal
views on the IG report. He called it "an incompetent
job, biased, and malicious, or, if not malicious,
intentionally biased." Barnes stated that he was
addressing his memorandum to Bissell as his immediate
superior and added a hope that "you will agree with
my request that the memorandum be passed to the DCI
for his consideration. I do not, of couse, ask that
you associate yourself with it or any part of it
merely because you transmit it." 156/ Kirkpatrick
commented on Barnes' memorandum in a "personal and
confidential" memorandum for Barnes dated 22 January,
in which he took strong exception to the views expressed
by Barnes. 157/ Bissell forwarded Barnes memorandum
to McCone on 27 January with a transmittal memorandum
in which he endorsed Barnes' views;
I may say that I am in agreement with
Mr. Barnes that the Survey, largely by
reason of the omission of material relevant
to its conclusions, constitutes a highly
biased document and that the bias is of
such a character that it must have been
intentional. 158/
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Dulles gave McCone his views on the IG report
in a memorandum of 15 February. The tone of his
memorandum was remarkably temperate, given the
anguish that the failure must have caused him. He
commented that at no time during the preparation of
the report did the Inspector. General request any
information from him and added that the report made
serious errors in areas where his direct responsibility
was clearly involved. His views were adequately
summarized in a single paragraph:
The Inspector General's report suffers
from the fact that his investigation, was
limited to the activities of one segment
of one agency, namely, the CIA. Opinions
based on such a partial review fail to
give the true story or to provide a
sound basis for the sweeping conclusions
reached by him. 159/
Although there is no reference to it in Kirk-
patrick's diary or in any of the other papers available
for review, Dulles and Cabell confronted Kirkpatrick
with their views on the inadequacies of the survey in
a meeting in Kirkpatrick's office. John Earman was
present and recalls that it was an extremely stormy
session. Dulles, once a close friend of Kirkpatrick,
did not even speak to Kirkpatrick for over a year
following the meeting. 160/
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Kirkpatrick asked the inspectors who worked on
the survey of the Cuban Operation to give him their
comments on the DD/P's analysis of the IG report,
which they did in a short memorandum to Kirkpatrick
on 26 January. These are excerpts:
... The Survey's intent was to identify
and describe weaknesses within the Agency
which contributed to the final result and
to make recommendations for their future
avoidance .... The Survey expressly avoided
detailed analysis of the purely military
phase of the operation .... Much of the
�
DD/P's Analysis is devoted, however, to
a discussion of the governmental decision-
making and to a rehash of military opera-
tion .... There is a fundamental difference
of approach between the two documents ....
The Analysis shows a poorer grasp of
what was going on at the case-officer
level than of events in policy-making
circles ....
In retrospect, perhaps the best balanced state-
ment that was made about the IG report on the Cuban
Operation appeared in a memorandum that McCone wrote
transmitting a copy of the report to Killian:
As you readily understand, I am not
in a position to render a personal opinion
concerning the validity of the IG's re-
port or the statements by the DDCI and
the DDP because I was not in CIA at the
time. However it is my personal opinion
as a result of examinations I have made
of this operation after the fact that
� both the report and the rebuttals are
extreme. I believe an accurate appraisal
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of the Cuban effort and the reasons for
� failure rest some place in between the
two points of view expressed in the
reports. 161/
So much for the Cuban report. It may not merit
so full a treatment in this office history, but there
was never another like it. There have been other
controversial reports but never one that generated
so much high-level indignation and name-calling.
Copies are tightly held even today.* The Director's
approval is required before allowing anyone to read
the Inspector General's file copy.
The other major event in 1961 affecting the
Office of the Inspector General was the replacement of
Dulles by McCone in November, which led not long
thereafter to the transferring of Kirkpatrick to
other duties. In August, Dulles had discussed with
Kirkpatrick the possibility of finding a replacement
for Dulles from within the Agency. Dulles said that
he was pushing Tracy Barnes for the job and asked
Kirkpatrick if he had any views on who else besides
Kirkpatrick himself was qualified. Kirkpatrick recorded
* Early 1973.
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the question in his diary but not his answer. 162/
On 3 October, Dulles told Kirkpatrick that he doubted
that McCone would make any changes at the top levels
except for the DDCI. Kirkpatrick asked Dulles what
he thought the "appropriate actions" of the senior
lieutenants should be and said that he was considering
submitting his resignation so that McCone could
either make 6 change or reappoint him. Dulles
"violently disagreed" with this, saying that he
thought it would be very bad precedent. 163/
McCone told Kirkpatrick on 1 December 1961 to
turn his duties over to his deputy so as to be avail-
able to work for McCone on organizational matters for
the next three months. McCone said that he wanted
the other members of the working group he planned to
form to come from outside the Agency and mentioned
Patrick Coyne and General Cortlandt Schuyler as
possibilities. He said that he did not want it
advertised but that the working group would concern
itself with personnel assignments. 164/ A working
group to study CIA and intelligence community organ-
ization and activities was established by McCone on
5 December, with Kirkpatrick as chairman and Coyne
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I.
and Schuyler as members. 165/ David R. McLean was
named Acting Inspector General on that same date. 166/
The working group's final report and recommenda-
tions were submitted to the Director on 6 April 1962, )
and the group was dissolved on 10 April. 167/ Kirk-
patrick's days as Inspector General effectively came
to an end with the naming of him to the working group
on 5 December 1961. He never returned to the job.
In late March 1962, the DDCI offered the soon-to-be-
created position of Executive Director to Kirkpatrick,
and he accepted it. 168/ Kirkpatrick was named
Executive Director on 10 April 1962, the day that
the working group was dissolved. 169/
Thus came to a close the nine-year era of
Inspector General Lyman B. Kirkpatrick. The role
of the Inspector General as it was viewed in the
Agency when he left the job was largely his own
creation. He inherited little from his predecessor
in the way of tradition, doctrine, or procedures.
While it is true that Hedden had established the
position of the Inspector General in the Agency's
scheme of things, he had not consolidated the mission
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nor gained any appreciable degree of acceptance of
it by the Deputy Directors.
Upon taking over in April V_9,4 Kirkpatrick
moved forward on two fronts. On one front he began
building a staff large enough to do the job he en-
visioned for the office, worked out the procedural
aspects of conducting inspections, and launched a
comprehensive program of component surveys. On the
other front, he embarked on a two-year battle to
extend his inspection authority to include the
Clandestine Service. By the mid-fifties, he had
the office functioning as he thought it should and
had succeeded in establishing his authority as the
Inspector General for the whole of the Agency on all
matters properly of Inspector General cognizance.
The challenge of creation, however, is of a
much higher order than that of stewardship, and
Kirkpatrick was not content merely to oversee the
running of a small office whose work had settled
into a steady routine. The one job itself was no
longer enough to contain his drive, and he began
taking on other responsibilities. Eventually, these
other duties came to occupy a large portion of his
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time at the expense of detailed attention to the
work of inspecting. It cannot be domonstrated that
he in any way neglected his primary responsibility,
but it is abundantly clear that by the late 1950's
he had ceased to be a full-time Inspector General.
The story of the Kirkpatrick years as the
Agency's Inspector General would be incomplete with-
out a few words about Kirkpatrick, the man, as re-
vealed in the writings he left behind. He comes
through as a man of breadth, of imagination and
creativity, of ambition and drive, and with a deeply
felt concern for the well-being of the Agency. Per-
haps what strikes one most forcefully about his ap-
proach to the job was the marvelous self-confidence
he displayed in every aspect of'it.
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Chapter IV
IV
Interregnum
Deputy Inspector General David R. McLean was
named Acting Inspector General on 5 December 1961 to
cover the period of Kirkpatrick's detail to the
working group on intelligence community organization
and activities. He was to serve in that capacity un-
til 2 May. 1962, when Earman was named as the new
Inspector General. He took over a staff of eight
inspectors, two of whom left during the period. One
replacement was added. Although McLean had been
Deputy for only three months before taking over as
Acting IG, he had served on the staff for nearly
three years, was well acquainted with its work,
and had Kirkpatrick's confidence. He merely continued
the inspection program then under way.
The frictions between the Inspector General
and the Clandestine Service, which had always simmered
close to the surface, finally erupted in March 1962
with the filing by Bissell of a written protest to
the Director. In retrospect, the clash probably
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began taking shape as early as 1960. The IG report
of survey of NE Division submitted that year was
highly critical of Division management and most
especially of the Division Chief himself. The Divi-
sion Chief personally protested to the Director,
and the Division's response to the report caused so
much furor that Bissell thereafter had DD/P responses
to IG reports of survey prepared under the supervision
of the Chief, Operational Services. 170/ Bissell
himself had little complaint about the Inspector
General's formal inspection reports until he received
the report on the Cuban Operation in November 1961.
He considered it to-be prejudicial and replete with
errors of fact. Although generally satisfied with
the results of surveys, he had become progressively
less satisfied with the posture that the Inspector
General and his staff were assuming in relation to
the Clandestine Service. He saw evidence of what he
considered to be a tendency on the part of the In-
spector General increasingly to insert himself into
the management of the Clandestine Service and to be
hypercritical and occasionally less than objective
in his observations on CS matters. Bissell cited
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four specific specific instances in support of his view:
On 17 November 1961, the Inspector
General had sent a memorandum to Bissell
urging that he personally see that a
deep cover agent was promoted to GS-16.
� In late November 1961, the Inspector
General had sent a cable to an Area Divi-
sion Chief,'who was then abroad, request-
ing that he look into the morale of the
Bissell did not receive (W(1)
a copy of the cable. (b)(3)
On 11 December 1961, the Acting IG
sent a memorandum to Bissell recommend-
ing that a letter of reprimand be given
five officers involved in an attempted
recruitment which failed. (W(1)
(b)(3)
On 8 February 1962, the Acting IG
sent a memorandum to the DD/P which
Bissell interpreted as an assertion of
the right of the Inspector General to
insist on the prior coordination with
him of specific personnel arrangements
and of the Inspector General's right to
enforce this requirement by issuing
instructions to the Director of Personnel.
Bissell recommended that the Director redefine for
all concerned the role of the Inspector General
basing the definition on "the generally recognized
function of a senior staff officer who was an in-
spector and adviser." 171/ '
McLean's rebuttal of Bissell's charges, which
he coordinated with Kirkpatrick, argued that the IG
Staff consisted of a small group of senior and widely
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experienced officers who provided a seasoned objective,
and independent view of Agency activities; that no
case had been made for changing the procedures of the
Inspector General; and that it would be a mistake to
restrict the Staff to rigidly and narrowly defined
limits and procedures. He defended his and Kirk-
patrick's actions in each of the cases. cited by
Bissell. McLean, incidentally, was the instigator
of all of them. On the first two points he merely
argued that the IG actions did not represent undue
interference in the prerogatives of command. He
pointed out that the investigation of the unsuccess-
ful recruitment attempt
by Dulles himself. The
proposal to re-employ a
had been ordered (W(1)
(b)(3)
fourth item concerned a
retiring staff employee on
a contract that would have paid him $3,000 per year
more than he had been paid as a staff employee.
Bissell acknowledged that the Acting IG's criticisms
were valid but said that the situation had been cor-
rected. McLean countered this by pointing out that
the proposal has been submitted to the DDCI twice
and had been approved by him both times in ignorance
of the full facts. 172/
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McCone chose to ignore the issue, because by
the time it arose Bissell was no longeg DD/P and
Kirkpatrick's replacement as Inspector General was
under consideration. 173/ At his Deputies' Meeting
on 20 March, he announced the changes being made
in the DD/S organization and raised the question of
an increase in the size of the IG Staff. He said
that he thought that this was important provided
the right caliber of officers could be assigned.
Helms commented that there was no argument about
the necessity for inspections but that finding good
people for assignment to the Staff was a real problem.
McCone had proposed, among other things, that the
Staff be expanded sufficiently to permit annual
inspections of all overseas installations. Scoville
questioned whether annual visits to field stations
were necessary. The Director asked General Carter
to look into the matter. After the meeting, White
suggested to Kirkpatrick that Bannerman would be a
good choice as Inspector General. 174/
Certain of the DD/S organizational changes to
which the Director referred at his morning meeting
of 20 March affected the Office of the Inspector
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General. Effective 1 April 1962, the DD/S was re-
lieved of responsibility for directing and coordinat-
ing the activities of the Audit Staff. Coincidentally,
the Inspector General was established as a separate
component reporting to the Office of the Director.
� The Inspector General was given responsibility for
coordinating and directing the activities of the
Audit Staff and was relieved of responsibility for
providing general guidance and supervision to the
Legislative Counsel. 175/
McLean's brief tenure as Acting Inspector
General came to a close on 2 May 1962 when John S.
Earman was appointed Inspector General. Simultane-
ously there were established in the Office of the,
Inspector General the positions of Chief of the
Audit Staff and Chief of the Inspection Staff.
McLean was designated Chief of the Inspection Staff. 176/
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Chapter .V
The Earman Years, May 1962-March 1968
John S. Earman had served under various titles
as the assistant or principal assistant to a succes-
sion of Directors beginning with Admiral Hillenkoetter,
and he continued initially in the same position under
McCone. There was no love lost between him and Kirk-
patrick. They had once worked together as assistants
to General Smith, with Kirkpatrick being the senior
of the two; and after Kirkpatrick became Inspector
General_ he was irked at having to go through Earman
to reach the Director. 177/ On the day Kirkpatrick
took over as Executive Director, he spoke with
Earman about his plans for the Director's staff, and,
according to Kirkpatrick's version of the meeting,
they agreed that after the transition period there
would not be much of a job left for Earman and that
perhaps a change to another office would be advisable. 178/
Earman recalls that Kirkpatrick told him bluntly that
he was finished and could start looking for another
job. 179/
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Earman thereupon reported to McCone that he had
been fired by Kirkpatrick. McCone said that he had
always had an executive assistant, that he intended
to continue the practice, and that Earman could continue
in the job if he wished. He suggested, however, that
after so many years of being at the beck and call of
the Director perhaps Earman would prefer something
in which he was "on the other end of the buzzer."
McCone offered Earman either of two positions if he
chose not to remain as Executive Assistant to the
Director: Assistant DD/S or Inspector General.
McCone said that he viewed the former as a "construc-
tive" job and the latter as a "destructive" one.
Earman chose Inspector General and disagreed with
McCone's concept of the position. He said that he
viewed the role of the Inspector General, if properly
discharged, as having a constructive influence on the
work of the Agency. 180/
The DDCI called a special meeting of the Deputies
on 13 April to announce among other things, the
appointment of Earman as Inspector General. 181/
The appointment was officially confirmed by Agency
notice with an effective date of 2 May 1962. 182/
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McCone gave Earman no instructions or guidance
on how he wished his Inspector General to operate,
although from his earlier reference to the "destructive"
aspect of the job it may be inferred that he envisioned
the Inspector General taking an adversary position
in dealing with the heads
sequent developments were
surely was his concept of
General. McCone did tell
of other components. Sub-
to demonstrate that this
the role of
Earman that
there should be annual inspections of
the Inspector
he thought
every field
station or, if that were impossible, at intervals of
not longer than every two or three years. He told
Earman to determine what he would need in the way of
men and money to meet this goal and assured him that
he would make the necessary resources available. 183/
Earman reviewed prior staffing and production
and concluded that annual inspections were out of the
question. He was sure that, even if he had the required
number of slots, he would not be able to obtain
qualified people to fill all of them. Accordingly,
he proposed a three-year cycle of inspections, which
he felt could be maintained by doubling the officer
strength from nine to 18 inspectors. General Carter
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accepted the proposal and authorized an increase in
the T/O of the Inspection Staff from its then-existing
strength of 15 to a strength of 29, adding nine
officers and five secretaries. Carter said that he
expected that the increase in staff size would permit
inspections of all major components at least once
every two or three years and added that he wished to
have all foreign field installations visited (but
not necessarily inspected in detail) by members of
the Inspection Staff at least once each year. He
urged each of the Deputies to ensure that top caliber
officers from their Directorates were recommended for
service on the Inspection Staff. 184/
Earman inherited a staff that consisted of McLean
as Chief of the Inspector Staff and six inspectors.
Three of the staff members were to leave before the
year was out, and the other four were due for rotation
by mid-1963. Thus, he was faced with the problem,
not only of finding officers
authorized positions, but of
for those soon to leave. He
to fill the nine newly
finding replacements
brought Lockhart and
Chapin with him from the Director's office, and his
predecessor had earlier arranged for the assignments
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of Greer and Dodge who were soon due to report. This
left 14 of the 18 authorized positions either vacant
or soon to become so.
The inspection program was at a very low ebb in
May 1962. Only two component surveys were in progress:
the National Photographic Interpretation Center and the
Operational Areas of the CA Staff. On 15 May, Earman
submitted to the Director a proposed inspection program
for the remainder of 1962. He contemplated at least
beginning inspections of the Estimative Process, of
Non-Arab Africa, and of ORR. He planned visits to
the field stations of EE Division, plus those WE sta-
tions that were missed in the most recent survey of
WE Division. He also proposed that he continue
Kirkpatrick's practice of making spot inspections of
the scattered units in the Washington area.* 185/
Unlike Kirkpatrick who was quick to decide and
sure-footed in execution, Earman was a cautious man
who preferred to examine all of the possible implica-
tions of a decision before making it. Two other
In fact, the making of short-notice spot inspec-
tions had ceased in mid-1961, and the practice was
never resumed.
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factors influenced his approach to the job. One
arose from his own background in the Agency. Although
he was a long-time GS-18, this was his first actual
command, and he was most anxious to avoid any serious,
early mistakes. The second was a legacy from his
predecessor. Kirkpatrick left behind an atmosphere
of mistrust of and resentment toward the Inspector
General, especially on the part of the Clandestine
Service. Earman was thus faced in his early months
as Inspector General with having to demonstrate that
he could handle the job and then to begin trying to
ease the blight of mistrust and resentment attached
to the role of the Office.
Much of the inspection manpower available in
the summer of 1962 was devoted to investigating some
thirty appeals from separation as surplus under the
so-called 701 program, although a survey of NE Divi-
sion was begun in early July, and surveys of AF and
EE Divisions were started in the fall. Earman was
himself a member of the team visiting the African
stations, and McLean participated in the EE Division
survey.
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In October 1962, Patrick Coyne, of the PFIAB,
asked the Executive Director why the PFIAB no longer
received CIA's IG reports. Kirkpatrick told him that
Agency policy had been changed, and that IG reports
would no longer be distributed outside of the Agency.
Coyne objected, pointing out that this was contrary
to previous practice and that he received IG reports
from other agencies., Kirkpatrick said that perhaps
summaries of information could be prepared for the
PFIAB, and Coyne said that this would be helpful. 186/
No such summaries were ever prepared, and only one
internal IG report was subsequently furnished to the
PFIAB, and it was modified to disguise that it was,
in fact, an IG report. 187/
Earman's real baptism as Inspector General
began in early November 1962 as a consequence of the
Cuban missile crisis. As early as 10 August 1962,
nearly three weeks before photography disclosed the
presence of SA-2's in Cuba, McCone.suggested to a
group of Government officials, including Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara, that the Soviets might be planning
to place offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba. He
repeated these warnings to the President and to our
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committees in Congress. During September 1962, while
in France on his wedding trip, the Director forwarded
a series of cables in which he repeated his belief
that offensive weapons would be installed; urged
frequent repeat reconnaissance missions; suggested
that the Board of National Estimates study-the motives
behind the defensive measures; and finally expressed
a reservation regarding SNIE 85-3-62, the substance
of which had been cabled to him. 188/
After the offensive missiles were discovered,
President Kennedy reportedly asked McCone how it
happened that he, McCone, was the only senior member
of Government who accurately foresaw what the Soviets
were up to. Kennedy also asked McCone if he had
been privy to any information that the rest of the
community had not seen. The President then directed
that an investigation be made within CIA by "the
people who looked into those charges down in Miami."*
McCone directed at his morning meeting of 5 November
* The reference was to an investigation by CIA's
Inspector General of charges of CIA misdoings in the
Miami area, which had reached the President from a
newspaperman. A report disproving the charges was
furnished to the President. 189/
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that the the Inspector General make a study of all of the
inputs of raw intelligence that, in retrospect, might
have been evaluated as indicators. 190/
There is one point of interest in this connection
that was later to cause McCone to become dissatisfied
with Earman's work as Inspector General. Very little
action was taken on the cables that the Director sent
from France. They were initially distributed by the
Cable Secretariat to the Office of the DCI, and pertinent
portions were passed to the DD/I and to the AD/NE by
General Carter. McCone was highly incensed over the
seeming disregard of his cables.
Earman formed a team consisting of himself,
Greer, and Dildine and by working on a crash basis
completed and submitted his report to McCone on
12 November. McCone read the report and returned it
with 27 marginal comments or questions asking for
clarification. Unfortunately, the report opened with
a brief chapter entitled The NPIC Caution, which
McCone found difficult to accept, and this may have
prejudiced him against the report as a whole. Be-
ginning in May 1962, the analysts had made it a
practice to check with NPIC any report that was
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susceptible to photographic verification. When the
Director briefed the President in mid-August on the
situation in Cuba, the President directed that every
effort be made to check out these continuing reports
of an arms build-up in Cuba, mentioning specifically-
the new NPIC facility. The Director then orally instructed
the DD/I to check every available source, particularly
including NPIC. His admonition was passed on orally.
By the time it reached the analytical level, an admo-
nition to check had been distorted into a ban on
publishing anything that could not be verified by
NPIC; and, in fact, nothing susceptible to photo-
graphic verification was published that had not been
so verified. 191/ McCone was furious when informed
of this and wanted to know who had garbled his instruc-
tion. None of the officers in the communications
line between the DD/I and the analyst could recall
having heard of the instruction. The Inspector
General concluded that when the Director's instruc-
-tion of mid-August reached the analysts they assumed
that the procedures in effect since May were inade-
quate and that a more positive and all-inclusive
check was desired. 192/ McCone liked this explanation
even less.
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Meanwhile, the Chairman of the PFIAB on 14 Novem-
ber 1962 asked McCone to prepare and submit to the
PFIAB a joint report on intelligence community
activities relating to the Soviet arms build-up in
Cuba' and to the missile crisis itself. McCone named
a steering committee with himself as chairman and
consisting of General Carter from CIA, Roger Hilsman
from State, General Carroll from DIA, and General
Blake from NSA. He appointed CIA's Inspector General
as chairman of an interagency working group to conduct
the review and draft the report for the steering com-
mittee's approval. Members of the working group were
Greer and Dildine from CIA's Inspection Staff (who did
all of the basic writing of the report), Samuel Halpern
representing the DD/P, J. J. Hitchcock representing
the DD/I, William McAfee from State, John Connelly
from NSA, and Colonels Gillis and Wright from DIA. 193/
Earman and his IG team began work immediately
on the PFIAB report, while simultaneously working on
the revision of the internal IG report. The revised
internal report was submitted to McCone and was accepted
by him as finished on 20 November. Meanwhile, Earman
had met with the working, group and furnished the non-IG
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members with a questionaire to be used by their
agencies in preparing contributions to the joint
report. When the contributions were received, the
IG team put together an initial draft. There then
followed a seemingly interminable series of meetings
of the working group and of meetings of the working
group with the steering committee, with the IG team
rewriting the drafts for each subsequent review. In
all, the report went through seven draft versions.
Many of the changes were made to accommodate the
need of each agency representative to protect the
interests of his own Agency, but much of the delay
was caused by McCone's own dissatisfaction with the
various drafts.
McCone's unhappiness centered on two points,
one expressed and the other not. First, the report
was silent concerning the views he expressed in his
September cables from France, and second, the account
it gave of what transpired at a Meeting of the Special
Group on 9 October differed from McCone's understanding
of what the Special Group had approved.
There were two reasons for omitting mention of
the Director's cabled views. The other members of the
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working group would not agree to including reference
to them in a joint report, since they had not been
passed to the other members of the community at the
time they were received nor at any time later. Also,
McCone had returned from France in time to have done
something about the cables, but he had done nothing.
Earman could not bring himself to freeing McCone of
fault by shifting all of the blame to General Carter.
McCone never actually said that he wanted the report
to give him full credit for his foresight, nor would
he go so far as to insert his own language to accomplish
this, but he was obviously upset with Earman over
Earman's unwillingness to accede to his unspoken
wishes.
The difficulty over interpretation of what
happened at the 9 October Special Group meeting arose
in an odd way. One of the major problems facing the
community at the time was that it did not know the
operational status of the SAM sites in Cuba and,
hence, the risk of continuing U-2 overflights of the
island. Accordingly, the Special Group approved a
U-2 overflight of the two SAM sites that were most
likely to be operational "to see if they lit up."
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What the Special Group members did not fully under-
stand was that there was a strong view held at the
analytical level that something unusual was going on
in a specific area west of Havana. Consequently,
having gotten approval for an overflight, the analysts
and the flight-planners got together and drew the
flight tract to pass over and photograph the suspect
area enroute to the target SAM installations. Thus,
the mission that first detected the MRBM's was actually
approved primarily as an overflight of known SAM sites.
McCone had not been aware of the dual targeting of the
mission, and convincing him of it proved to be an
extremely difficult task. He finally agreed, however,
that the evidence was overwhelming and accepted the
working group's version.
Dr. Killian had requested that the community's
Taport be radv- for review by the PFIAB at its meeting
of 7 December, but it soon became apparent that the
report could not be completed by then. The steering
committee met on 5 December to review the draft sub-
mitted by the working group. Numerous changes were
suggested and accepted. It was agreed that when the
steering committee and the working group met with
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certain members of the President's Board on the
following day the discussion would be limited to an
oral progress report. The board members would not
be given a copy of the draft then in being, because
it had not been fully agreed to by the steering com-
mittee.
The steering committee and working group met
with Messrs. Doolittle, Gray, MurpOy, Ash, and Coyne
on the afternoon of 6 December. It was agreed at
that meeting that the steering committee, only, would
meet with the full board the following morning. The
steering committee committed itself to having a com-
pleted report ready for submission th the PFIAB in
about ten days to two weeks.
McCone informed the other members of the steer-
ing committee in a memorandum of 11 December that the
President's Board would meet in Washington on 27 and
28 December to consider the community's report., He
promised that a revised draft of the report would be
in the hands of the steering committee members on
17 December and proposed that the steering committee
meet on 19 December to fully consider the revised
draft.
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On 14 14 December, Earman forwarded to each member
of the working group a copy of a draft report, revised
in accordance with the suggestions of the steering
committee at its meeting of 5 December. He called
for a meeting of the working group on 15 December to
consider the draft and to agree upon changes to be
included in the draft to be submitted to the steering
committee for review at its meeting scheduled for
19 December. The working group met on the 15th as
proposed and agreed upon changes to the draft. A
revised draft was forwarded to each agency on 17 Decem-
ber as promised.
At the USIB meeting on the morning of 19 December,
McCone informed the USIB of the status of the report.
The minutes note that
With respect (to the report], the Board
concurred in the Chairman's view that
formal USIB consideration and action on
this report would not be required beyond
completion of the report by the steering
committee ...
The steering committee, plus Mr. Kirkpatrick,
met with the working group on the afternoon of 19 De-
cember. It was unable to complete its review of the
draft at that meeting and agreed to resume the follow-
ing morning. The review was finished the next day,
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and the steering committee agreed that the draft was
near enough to being in final form that no further
meetings of the steering committee were needed.
Following its meetings with the steering com-
mittee on the 19th and 20th, the working group revised
the draft to conform to the working group's understand-
ing of the wishes of the steering committee. Earman
and his assistants prepared anew draft based upon
the agreed suggestions of the steering committee and
of the working group. A copy of this draft was hand-
carried to McCone on the West Coast by his Executive
Assistant, Walter Elder. Elder called Earman from
the West Coast at midday on 24 December and dictated
the changes that McCone wanted made in the draft.
McCone, too, participated in the telephone call.
Also, while Elder was speaking with Earman, McCone
placed a call to McGeorge Bundy to discuss the dis-
tribution of the report. Bundy asked that a copy be
delivered to him in Boston that day and directed
that no distribution be made "outside the Government"
until he had had an opportunity to read and approve
it. One of McCone's security aides flew a copy to
Bundy on Christmas eve, and Earman and his assistants
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worked until the small hours of Christmas morning
revising the text to accommodate McCone's most recent
changes, getting copies reproduced, and preparing
them for distribution.
The final version of the report listed these
as its summary conclusions:
Although the intelligence community's
inquiry into its actions during the Cuban
crisis revealed certain areas where short-
comings existed and where improvements
should be made in various areas of intelli-
gence collection and processing, the intel-
ligence community operated extensively and
well in connection with Cuba. Every major
weapons system introduced into Cuba by
the Soviets was detected, identified and
reported (with respect to numbers, loca-
tion and operational characteristics) be-
fore any one of these systems attained an
operational capability.
A relatively short period of time
ensued between the introduction of stra-
tegic weapons into Cuba, particularly
strategic missiles, and the commencement
of the flow, although meager, of tangible
reports of their presence; detection of
their possible presence and targeting of
the suspect areas of their location was
accomplished in a compressed time frame;
and the intelligence cycle did move with
extraordinary rapidity through the stages
of collection, analysis, targeting for
verification, and positive identification.
The very substantial effort directed
toward Cuba was originated by an earlier
concern with the situation in Cuba and
the effort, already well under way,
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contributed to the detection and analysis
of the Soviet build-up.
Information was disseminated and used.
Aerial photography was very effective
and our best means of establishing hard
intelligence.
The procedures adopted in September
delayed photographic intelligence, but
this delay was not critical, because
photography obtained prior to about
17 October would not have been suffi-
cient to warrant action of a type which
would require support from Western
Hemisphere NATO allies.
Agent reports helped materially, how-
ever, none giving significant information
on offensive missiles reached the intel-
ligence community or policy-makers until
after mid-September. When received, they
were used in directing aerial photography.
Some restrictions were placed on dis-
semination of information, but there is
no indication that these restrictions
necessarily affected analytical work or
actions by policy-makers.
The 19 September estimate, while indi-
cating lack of probability that MRBM's
would be placed in Cuba, did state that
the contingency must be examined care-
fully; the estimators in preparing the
19 September estimate gave great weight
to the philosophical argument concerning
Soviet intentions and thus did not fully
weigh the many indicators.
The estimate of 19 October on probable
Soviet reactions was correct.
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Bundy called General Carter on the morning of
26 December. He said that he had been through the
report and that he thought it "a pretty adequate
job." Carter told Bundy that commitments had already
been made to make distribution of the report that
day. Carter's assistant, Enno Knoche, was flying
to Chicago to meet McCone, taking with him the latest
version of the report; a copy was to be flown to
Dr. Killian in Boston; and copies were to go to
PFIAB Secretary Patrick Coyne and to the members of
the steering committee. Bundy said that in view
of this he would consider himself as having been
furnished an advance copy purely for information
purposes and would not inject himself into the matter
at that time.
The version that was distributed was labelled
a "draft report," since the final text had not been
reviewed by the ()tiler members of the steering com-
mittee. Roger Hilsman, of State, called General
Carter on the 27th, taking exception to several
portions of the text. General Carroll of DIA,
also objected to certain portions of the draft report
as distributed. His suggested changes were submitted
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in writing. writing. McCone, Carter, Kirkpatrick, and Earman
and his assistants met on the afternoon of the 27th
to consider the changes recommended by State and DIA.
The result of that meeting was the issuance of "change
sheets" asking the various holders of the draft report
to make the changes noted. Very few of the changes
recommended by State and DIA were considered to be of
enough importance to warrant their being included
in the change sheets.
In an executive session of the USIB on January 3rd
The Chairman explained that, in sub-
mitting the draft report regarding Cuba
to the President's Board, he had offered
to provide supplementary information if
requested. Not having received such a
request, the Chairman proposed, and the
USIB concurred, that he would advise the
President's Board that the draft report
submitted on 26 December 1962 should be
considered the final report.
Thomas L. Hughes, Acting Director of Intelligence and
Research, represented the Department of State at the
t 1
3 January USIB meeting. McCone, in a memorandum of
7 January, informed the PFIAB and the members of the
steering committee of the USIB decision.
Earman may have thought that he was finished with
the Cuban missile crisis, but this proved to be far
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from so. McCone had told Earman that he thought it
a fine report, although, in retrospect, none who had
worked on it was satisfied with the end product. Too
many compromises were necessary in order to arrive
at a text that was in any way acceptable to all
concerned. Patrick Coyne, the Executive Secretary
to the PFIAB, thought the handling of the crisis had
been an intelligence failure rather than the success
claimed in the joint report. He apparently found
McCone willing to listen, for a short while later
McCone told Earman that "your report is a complete
whitewash."
Subsequently, when McCone met with the PFIAB
to discuss the report, he took Earman with him to
answer any questions that McCone might be unable to
field. Earman remained in an outer office while
McCone met with the board. Dr. Killian came out
and spoke with Earman, telling Earman that he and
the rest of the Board thought that the report was
excellent. Coyne persisted, however, and asked for
follow-up reports. McCone wrote these supplementary
reports himself, probably reflecting his dissatisfac-
tion with the earlier IG-written report. Earman did
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not learn of the existence of the other reports until
much later. They are not included in the IG files
on the Cuban missile, which incidentally occupy some
four linear feet of storage space.
The USIB at its meeting on 27 February discussed
the matter of Congressional briefings on the Cuban
missile crisis. The following is an excerpt from the
minutes:
Discussed various aspects related to
hearings concerning Cuba before Congres-
sional committees. In this connection,
the USIB members agreed that the DCI's
report to the President's Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board on Intelligence
Community Activities Relating to the
Cuban Arms Build-up (14 April through
14 October 1962) provided the best
reference document available for guidance
in testifying before Congressional Com-
mittees regarding intelligence actions
during that period. The Chairman stated
that he was also preparing a memorandum
today on U-2 overflights of Cuba during
the period 29 August-14 October 1962,
and that he would circulate copies to
interested Board members when it was com-
pleted.
Earman and his assistants had already prepared
such a memorandum at McCone's direction and it was
distributed on 27 February with this admonition:
"The attached paper and its enclosure is for back-
ground use only. It will not be used as a verbatim
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briefing paper." paper." The paper, "Chronology of Cuban
U-2 Overflights," gave a factual and accurate account
of the differing views held within Government at the
time concerning the need for U-2 reconnaissance of
Cuba and the tracks to be flown on the various missions.
U. Alexis Johnson wrote to McCone'on 6 March
1963 stating his objections to the briefing paper.
He made it clear that he was speaking for the Secretary
of State. These are the more interesting of his
comments:
... my own preference would be toward
revision of the memorandum to delete all
reference to personalities and institutions
as well as debatable subjective judgments
... and to confine the memorandum to a
straight factual account of events.
With respect to Mr. McGeorge Bundy's
memorandum of February 25 addressed to
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, you will note that he refers to
the top secret code word report prepared
by you for the Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board with respect to intelligence on Cuba
before and during the October crisis as a
"coordinated report." In this connection,
it is my understanding that, while other
agencies assisted in the drafting of the
report, you did not seek nor obtain their
concurrence in the final draft but rather
considered it your personal report to the
Intelligence Advisory Board. This was
certainly entirely proper on your part
and accordingly the Department of State
did not insist that a number of suggestions
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and amendments, which it offered but were
not accepted by you, be made prior to
submission of the report. Thus, if you
concur, I suggest that Mr. Bundy's under-
standing of the exact status of the report
be clarified.
McCone replied to Johnson in a coldly worded memorandum
of 7 March. He traced the evolution of the final
draft version, noting State's participation throughout,
and concluded thus:
... I continue under the impression
that the report is the product of a joint
effort and the final draft representative
of the coordinated viewpoint of the intel-
ligence community. I therefore feel that
Mr. Bundy's understanding of the status of
the report is correct.
McCone sent Bundy a copy of his memorandum to Johnson,
as Johnson had done with his memorandum to McCone,
and there that particular controversy ended, although
this was by no means the last of Earman's involvement
with the Cuban missile crisis.
In late February 1963, McGeorge Bundy asked
that he be furnished 12 copies of the original report.
for distribution to certain members of the White House
staff. Since the clearances of those who might read
the report were unknown, the report was sanitized by
deleting reference to a sensitive program, which per-
mitted it to be circulated with fewer controls. 194/
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Throughout this period, Earman was heavily
engaged in shepherding the Cuban report through its
several drafts, and he left the Inspection Staff
largely in charge of his deputy, David McLean.
McLean was due for rotation, having already served
on the Inspection Staff for over four years. He
returned to his parent component, WH Division, in
March 1963 and was replaced as Chief of the Inspection
Staff by Edgar J. Applewhite, who had joined the staff
as an inspector in August of the preceding year. 195/
The Cuban missile crisis reared its head again
in June 1963. Patrick Coyne, still unpersuaded, pre-
vailed upon McGeorge Bundy to sign a memorandum re-
questing an intelligence community report on actions
taken or contemplated to avoid getting caught short
with another crisis such as that in Cuba. The memo-
randum posed six questions to which detailed replies
were requested. 196/
Essentially the same exercise that had been
gone through in late' 1962 was repeated. The steering
committee had the same membership, except that Thomas
Hughes replaced Hilsman as the State member. The
working group differed only slightly. Colonel Blake
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replaced Colonel Wright from DIA. Greer was abroad
on a survey of SR Division, and Earman recalled him
to work on the writing of the report. Dildine had
left the staff, and his place was taken by Breckinridge.
Although the participatants were little changed,
the approach to the writing of the report was quite
different from that used in the PFIAB report. All
of the drafting of the original PFIAB report was done
by the working group, primarily by the CIA IG team
members. This second report, which was called U.S.
Foreign Intelligence Objectives, was compiled initially
by editing and assembling drafts submitted by intel-
ligence community components assigned to write drafts
in response to assigned questions. The effort got
under way on 1 July. The steering committee and
working group had experienced no great difficulty in
putting together the original report to the PFIAB --
other than the usual problems of trying to write and
to edit in committee. The earlier report became the
subject of controversy after it was distributed, but
the drafting was done in relative harmony. This was
not at all true of the second report.
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The first first draft consisted merely of the assembled
contributions from those components assigned to write
responses. By 16 August, the working group had edited
these contributions and had a second draft ready for
distribution. McCone, Carter, and Kirkpatrick received
copies. Kirkpatrick called it "extremely wordy,
repetitive, hortatory, and adjectival." McCone said
simply that it was too long and too detailed. (It
ran to some 60 pages.) He directed that it be shortened
to not more 'than four or five pages per objective and
that the tone be moderate -- neither apologetic nor
arrogant. He asked for a completed draft by 24 August,
since he planned to leave town the following day. He
wanted the final report to be ready for USIB considera-
tion at its meeting on 4 September.
At that point there was no choice but for the
IG team members to write a completely new draft, which
they did, producing a paper that reduced the original
submissions from 60 to 28 pages. This draft was
extensively edited by the working group on 19 August
and was reproduced and distributed on 20 August.
Another meeting of the working group was scheduled
for 22 August to incorporate any changes desired by
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McCone or the other members of the steering committee.
McCone reviewed the fourth draft on 21 August.
He considered it too negative in tone and asked that
it be completely rewritten "to make it more construc-
tive." (What he actually meant was that it dwelt
too much on what the community was doing and too
little on CIA's role.) Since a major rewrite was
required, the 22 August meeting of the working group
was cancelled, and the group was never reconvened.
The DIA and NSA members of the working group
called on 21 August. They had checked the fourth
draft with their principals, and it was acceptable.
No comments were received from the State member.
However, since McCone was dissatisfied with
the fourth draft, a new draft was written by the
IG team members, and a copy was forwarded to McCone
on the West Coast.
Walter Elder reported on 29 August that McCone
had read the report, although not in detail, and
thought the approach was about right. He asked that
the draft be circulated to the other members of the
steering committee and that they give him their views
by 3 September. This was done on 30 August. That
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same day, both the NSA and DIA members of the working
group called with a few suggested changes. Earman
called the State member who reported only that he
had been unable to see Hughes.
McCone had completed his detailed study of the
report by 3 September and furnished his instructions
regarding revisions. He deleted the entire Section
IV on National Estimates and substituted therefor
a report that had been prepared for him by a panel
of consultants. He directed that a new version be
prepared, incorporating his changes, which he would
then forward as "his" report. Anyone who objected
to it "could take a footnote."
A new draft was prepared and was reproduced
and distributed to the members of the steering com-
mittee on 4 September. The transmittal memorandum,
which was signed by McCone, requested comments by
close of business, 6 September, and noted that any
such comments would be forwarded as annexes to the
report. NSA agreed to endorse the report as written.
DIA provided a short annex describing existing watch
mechanisms in somewhat fuller detail.
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At the morning meeting of 5 September, the
Director said that he had talked with Clark Clifford,
the new PFIAB chairman, and that Clifford was most
interested in getting the report without delay.
McCone told Earman to call the working group members,
get all of their comments, and then "get it out of
here." .
McCone called Earman on 8 September and said
that he was making some further changes in the estimates
section. The report had still not gone to the PFIAB,
because McCone was not yet satisfied with it.
State's footnote was delivered to the CIA Watch
Office on the night of 7 September. It was wholly
unacceptable to McCone. He called Hughes and asked
that it be withdrawn. Hughes refused. Hughes said
that he had not seen any draft after the draft of
20 August and that the report had become McCone's
report rather than a community report. (In fact,
State had received additional drafts on 30 August
and 4 September.) McCone sent Earman to State to
try to persuade Hughes at least to revise the first
two paragraphs of his annex in which he protested
State's exclusion from participation in the final
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drafting. Hughes finally did so but with great
reluctance.
The report went to Bundy and to PFIAB on
10 September. Change sheets were sent to the other
members of the committee as a way of bringing their
latest drafts up to date.
The first two of the six objectives dealt with
in the report concerned improved current intelligence
and early warning capabilities. The report treated
them as a single objective, because no clear line
could be drawn separating one from the other. It
had this to say:
We do not hold that any of our systems
is perfect, nor do we expect that one ever
will be. Moreover, we doubt that real
progress can be made through procedural
modifications. Real advances in the
quality of early warning can be achieved
only through improved ability to acquire
information from within the Communist
Bloc (particularly the Soviet Union):
the continued improvement of our capa-
bilities to collect signals intelligence,
the refinement of overhead reconnaissance
techniques, and the building of a clandes-
tine apparatus.
Objective number three concerned intensified
resort to automatic data processing applications.
The position taken by the intelligence community
was that
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USIB has for the past year been con-
ducting a study of the community's in-
formation processing systems in an effort
to improve and make compatible the handling
of information among the several agencies.
This study, plus further detailed investi-
gations, will provide the community with
essential information concerning the
objectives, capabilities and common prob-
lems of intelligence information process-
ing systems, which is now lacking. Re-
search in this field continues at a very
high level.
Objective number four called for a re-examina-
tion of existing methods of arriving at national
intelligence estimates. McCone wrote this response'
himself and had this to say
The ... questions concerning National
Intelligence Estimates have given the
Directorate of Central Intelligence the
greatest of concern. The most important
ingredient for the production of an
intelligence estimate is the employment
of highly qualified and intelligence-minded
men whose purpose is to present their
best objective judgment upon the complex
questions normally involved in the prepara-
tion of an estimate. In this respect we
feel that the Director of Central Intel-
ligence and the United States Intelligence
Board are well served, for the Board of
National Estimates is well equipped with
men of such qualifications and capabilities.
Objective number five proposed that discovering
the terms of the agreements between the USSR and Cuba
be made a major intelligence goal. Number six called
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for an intensified effort to improve clandestine
collection capabilities with respect to Cuba. The
report combined the two objectives, since they were
so closely related. The report had this to say:
The USIB has for some time considered
Cuba a top priority target for the clan-
destine collection of information and
has expressed this concern through the
medium of its Priority National Intelli-
gency Objectives. The goals of discover-
ing the terms of agreements between the
USSR and Cuba and of improving clandestine
collection capabilities against Cuba are
treated collectively in the PNIO. We
agree that collection operations should
�be pressed aggressively, and we will con-
tinue to do so. 197/
Most of the language of the report was McCone's
own. He was exasperated with Earman's inability to
prevail upon his colleages on the working group t
produce a joint report phrased as McCone wished, and
he simply took it over and wrote much of it himself.
He had lost patience with Earman, expressed his strong
dissatisfaction to the DDCI, and instructed Carter
to discuss with Kirkpatrick possible candidates as
a replacement. Carter reviewed the situation with
Kirkpatrick on 4 September 1963. 198/
Earman survived this crisis and eventually
gained McCone's confidence. One can only speculate
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as to why McCone decided to retain Earman in the
job. Perhaps it was as a consequence of a report
on personnel security, which was submitted about
a month after completion of the Intelligence Ob-
jectives report. J. G. Dunlap, an Army sergeant
assigned to NSA, had committed suicide on 23 July.
After his death, evidence was found indicating that
he was a Soviet agent. At his morning meeting of
27 September, McCone said that the Agency's security
program had been explained to him and he had been
assured that it was effective. He wondered, though,
if the Agency actually did all that it said it did
in the security field and if the measures were effec-
tive. He directed Earman to make a study of personnel
security in CIA. 199/
The study was made on a crash basis, and the
report was submitted to McCone on 10 October. Its
findings and conclusions which were to the effect
that our personnel security program was sound and
effective, apparently matched personal views that
McCone had arrived at independently and merely wanted
confirmed. He liked the report and took not a single
exception to it. 200/ He mentioned it to Clark
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Clifford! then Chairman of the PFIAB, and Clifford
asked if he might have a copy. McCone asked Earman
on 21 October if the report could be revised to con-
ceal the fact that it resulted from an IG inquiry.
Earman assured him that it could be so revised, and
this was done. 201/
It is perhaps unreasonable to assume that so
relatively minor a report could have influenced McCone
to change his mind about his Inspector General, but
this seems to have been the case. There is nothing
in the available records to indicate that McCone
was thereafter in any way dissatisfied with Earman's
work. In fact, within less than a year he was to
accept an IG report on a controversial issue without
question and to use it as his sole evidence in facing
down his critics. The 12 June 1964 issue of Time
magazine had carried an item about the seizure by
the British near Anguilla Cays of a boat and its
eight occupants, including Manolo Rey, a Cuban freedom
fighter. Rey and his companions had set out to "in-
vade" Cuba. Time reported -Ehat Rey's boat had been
launched from a CIA mother ship and that a "CIA type"
had appeared at his trial in Nassau to pay his fine.
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McCone ordered Earman to send a team to Miami to
investigate CIA's reported involvement in the bungled
.operation. The team confirmed the accuracy of the
earlier assurance given McCone
that CIA had nothing to do with Rey's "invasion."
McCone tried to get Time to retract the story but
failed. 202/
By November 1963, the Inspection Staff had 11
inspectors actually on duty, all of whom had entered on
duty after Earman's takeover. The Executive Director,
1::1)(3)
on 7 November, pointed out to Earman that together the
Inspection and Audit Staffs had a total of 14 unencumbered
positions and asked if Earman would object to "lending"
these vacancies to John Bross' new National Intelligence
Programs Evaluation (NIPE) Staff "until such time as
the Overall Agency ceiling was squared away." Kirk-
patrick stressed that this would not constitute a reduc-
tion in the IG's T/O, but was-only a stop-gap measure
to enable Bross to get into business. Earman checked'
.and found that there were 13 rather than 14 vacancies
and that commitments had been made to fill four of
them. All of the unfilled positions were in .the
Inspection Staff. Earman agreed to "lend" Bross the
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nine unencumbered and uncommitted positions. 203/ It
is perhaps relevant to note that the "lent" positions
were soon to become "given" positions. Action Memo-
randum No. 319 of 6 December 1963 called for economy
measures. Earman complied by proposing to reduce the
number of inspector positions from 18 to 14 and the
number of clerical positions from ten to six. 204/
In December 1963, John Clarke, Director of the newly
established Budget, Program Analysis, and Manpower (BPAM),
asked if he could review all reports of survey and special
studies prepared since Earman became Inspector General
and also asked if he could be placed on the distribution
of future surveys and studies. Barman checked with Kirk-
patrick and then told Clarke that he would make the re-
ports available on the understanding that they be held
within BPAM on a strictly need-to-know basis. 205/
This had been a busy year for Earman and the
Inspection Staff. In addition to the Intelligence
Objectives report and the Personnel Security study,
the Staff had completed surveys of four DD/P divisions,
one DD/I office, and the Cable Secretariat. Two
other minor special studies were made. At year's
end, surveys were in progress on ORR, OSI, and the
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Office of Personnel. The repeat inspections of ORR
and OSI marked the end of the second cycle of inspec-
tions, which Kirkpatrick had begun in 1959, and the
beginning of the third cycle. As was noted earlier,
the Director wanted subsequent cycles to be completed
in no more than two or three years, but the reduction
in authorized strength made this impossible. Although
no written mention was made of it at the time, the
goal settled upon was a five-year cycle.
There are repeated references in Kirkpatrick-
originated correspondence to the so-called "cycle"
of inspections, but those who worked for him do not
recall any stress having been placed on completing
a cycle by any given date. 206/ This was also true
of the first year and a half of the Earman era. At
the end of 1963, however, E. J. Applewhite, who was
then Chief of the Inspection Staff and Deputy Inspector
General, laid out a precise inspection program for
calendar year 1964, which assigned inspectors to
specific teams and scheduled opening and finishing
dates for each of the surveys. Unfortunately, the
proposed program provided no cushion for unexpected
investigative requirements nor for surveys that ran
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into snags. It contemplated varying team size so as
to complete each survey in about 14 weeks, flying ,
in the face of accumulated evidence that the average
survey took six to eight months to complete and that
increasing team size did not significantly decrease
time to completion. By the end of the first quarter
of 1964, it had become apparent that the schedule
was unrealistic and it was abandoned. 207/
The arrangement that Kirkpatrick had made with
the Cable Secretary in 1955 for use of the
(b)(3)
indicator on sensitive IG cables provided for an
initial single-copy distribution to the Inspector
General. He was responsible for passing its contents
to those with a need to know. In February 1964, the
DD/P proposed to the Inspector General that he be
included on the distribution of all
his point being that any such cables
to his own responsibilities for the
(b)(3)
cables,
would relate
conduct of
Agency activities abroad. Earman agreed, and Cable
Secretariat dissemination procedures were revised
accordingly. 208/
Eleven component surveys were completed and
reports distributed during Earman's first two years
in office. He reviewed each report with care, but
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he did little actual editing himself. He began his
reading with a full jar of paper clips at his elbow
and inserted clips at those points in the text about
which he had questions or comments. He then met with
the team captain and gave oral instructions on the
needed revisions of the report. The same process
was then repeated and perhaps repeated again and
again until he was satisfied with the text.
The first 11 reports moved smoothly through
the response and review cycle, but the twelfth
caused a flap of truly magnificent proportions. It
was a survey of the Office of Research and Reports
(ORR), which was nearing completion in May 1964.
The team captain, Scott Breckinridge, with Earman's
approval, distributed to ORR copies of the inspectors'
first drafts of reports on the ORR components they
had inspected. Breckinridge's intention was to meet
with the various ORR officers concerned for discussions
of the accuracy and validity of the findings before
beginning serious writing of the report. He knew
that one section was controversial, but he did not
anticipate the violence of ORR's reaction. The
Director and Deputy Director of ORR took the report
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as being being an attack on their stewardship over the years,
and the chief of the Economic Research Area was furious
over what was said about this area. ORR's reaction was
so extreme that the hoped-for dialogues was out of the
question. 2Q9/
In reviewing the report after a lapse of several
years, it is difficult to see the reason for all of
the shouting. At the root of the problem was the
managerial style of the chief of the Economic Research
Area, although the criticisms of him were by implica-
tion only. The three points made by the inspectors
to which ORR most vociferously objected were
There was an imbalance between ad hoc
reporting and the basic research effort.
Economic intelligence research needs
the services of a variety of economic
intelligence officers, not all of whom
need to be economists in the formal aca-
demic sense. In short, a balanced mix of
officers is needed.
Employees greately resent the office
policy of requiring after-hours training
in economics in order to advance within
the office.
The report was written with great care and was
intensively edited but without further consultation
with ORR. The ORR response, as had been expected,
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was almost wholly negative and was unacceptable to
the Inspector General.
Executive Director Kirkpatrick urged that an
attempt be made to break the impasse by having the
Inspector. General and the survey team sit down with
ORR officials in an attempt to resolve the differences.
Earman flatly refused to be a party to negotiation
and told his staff that, in the future, draft texts
would not be submitted for review by the component
being surveyed. 210/ He was later to relent on this
somewhat, but he always remained wary of allowing
a report to become the subject of controversy before
he had fully committed himself to approving the report
for distribution.
Earman inherited few files from his predecessor
on the policies and procedures that had been developed
during Kirkpatrick's years as Inspector General. He
became concerned in 1964 that the office had little
"memory" except as might reside in the secretaries
who had long been with the office. Earman himself
was relatively new in the job, and his deputy and all
of his inspectors were on tours of from two to four
years' duration with the staff. He saw a need for
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having one one or two officers permanently assigned to
the staff to provide continuity. Earman discussed
this with the Executive Director and obtained approval
to transfer two inspectors to the E Career Service.
He chose Breckinridge and Greer for permanent assign-
ment to the Inspection Staff. Breckinridge changed
career designations in August 1964 and Greer the
following January. 211/
An Agency-sponsored reconnaissance aircraft
was shot down in January 1965 while on a sensitive
operational mission over North China by an SA-2
missile in an area where NPIC had reported no SAM
sites present. The DDCI asked for statements from
OSA and NPIC relating to the shootdown. The memo-
randums he received were not at all in agreement.
OSA claimed it had been assured by NPIC that there
were no SAM sites along the flight tract; NPIC denied
that it had been asked to survey the track. The DDCI
and DCI were angry and directed the Inspector General
to undertake an immediate and full investigation to
determine the true facts. McCone said that he then
wanted a full inspection of NPIC to follow immediately
thereafter, since he feared that he had been oversold
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on NPIC's capabilities. The report of investigation
of the loss of the aircraft was completed in early
February and was accepted by all parties as a fair
and objective appraisal of what had gone wrong. The
Inspector General concluded that
The requirement for coverage was
clearly established.
There was clear-cut approval of the
mission by USIB and the 303 Committee.
There was a high degree of urgency
attached to completing the mission as
soon as feasible.
The specific requirement on NPIC to
make a search for SAM sites within a
50 mile radius of the target was not
generated until 4 December 1964, and it
applied only to photography received
after the effective date of the require-
ment. There was no new photography
available.
NPIC did not survey the flight track
for the mission. It was not asked to do
so, and the flight track was not made
available to NPIC in advance of launch.
NPIC was not clearly and unmistakably
asked for a current updating and survey
of possible hazards to the mission.
NPIC has assigned an officer to con-
duct liaison with OSA, but his responsi-
bilities are ill-defined and he is not
generally used by either OSA or NPIC as
a channel for levying requirements and
making responses.
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The undue reliance on the dependability
of NPIC reporting stems in part from NPIC's
tendency to overstate Its capabilities.
OSA's standing operating procedures
for mission planning are detailed, are
in writing, and are meticulously followed;
however, there are gaps at both ends of
the mission planning procedure: (1) in
not referring specific flight tracts to
NPIC for survey in advance of launch, and
(2) in not notifying senior Agency officials
of the complete details of the mission
plan. 212/
The directed survey of NPIC was quite another
matter, however. The last survey of the office had
been completed only two and one-half years earlier,
and the findings had been generaly favorable. The
Director of NPIC, Arthur Lundahl, interpreted McCone's
order that the office be inspected as an indictment
of his leadership of the Center. Lundahl and his
Executive Director, Charles Camp, met separately
with Earman to protest the fact of the survey being
made. Lundahl was particularly incensed at having
heard of the planned survey from DIA officers working
in the Center, rather than from his own superior,
the DD/I. 213/ The inspection team that Earman formed
consisted of the two inspectors who had investigated
the loss of the aircraft plus a borrowed officer,
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John Vance, who was then Director of Central Reference
but had previously served on the Inspection Staff
and had been team captain on the 1962 IG survey of
NPIC. 214/
The survey got under way in February 1965 and
was well along when Admiral Raborn replaced McCone as
DCI in April. Raborn invited Earman to have lunch
with him on his first day in office and to bring two
inspectors to report on current surveys. Earman never
had a chance to present his prepared briefing on the
mission and functions of his office. When he mentioned
that the intelligence community's capability for
acquiring photography was growing at a far faster
rate than was NPIC's capacity to interpret it, Raborn
immediately proposed as a solution the automation
of NPIC's readout resources. The survey team was
convinced that NPIC was already far down the road
on automation and that further progress had to await
advances in the state of the art. At Raborn's direc-
tion, a team of outside consultants was brought in
to review NPIC's use of computers. They, too, con-
cluded that NPIC was well advanced in the computer
field and that its storage and retrieval system might
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very well well be the best of its kind anywhere in the
world. Raborn was unconvinced and remained uncon-
vinced until the end. 215/
In retrospect, the survey did accomplish a
useful purpose. The Inspector General concluded that
collection capability was being expanded and that
requirements were being generated with insufficient
regard for NPIC's processing capacity. His recom-
mendations in that regard led to the creation of
an interagency group to examine the whole field of
photo interpretation within the Government and even-
tually to the establishment of a new USIB committee,
COMIREX.
Another event of 1965 was to have a substantial
impact on the progress of the inspection program.
Earman asked Col. White, then DD/S, which of his
components he would like to have inspected next.
White replied that he would welcome surveys of any
of his offices or functions at any time the Inspector
General could undertake them but said that he believed
more benefit might be realized with less expenditure
of manpower from surveying areas or functions as
opposed to surveying entire offices. He suggested
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these as possible areas for investigation; procure-
ment, industrial security, real property accountability,
Li EOD and exit processing, Agency regulatory processes,
travel administration, and records administration. 216/
Earman began surveys of each of these subjects
as inspectors became available. All of them were
completed with the exception of the survey of records
administration. That study was completed, but no
report was issued. It fell victim to the editorial
process. The initial draft was mainly the work of
inspector Michael Rura who had headed the study team.
The first draft still survives, and its findings and
conclusions stand up very well in the light of later
developments in records administration. It was a bit
wordy, however, and lacking in focus. It was rewritten
by Scott Breckinridge and then again by Ruth Gillard.
By the time that Gillard's draft was .finished, the
data base had become so stale that most of the state-
ments of fact would have had to be rechecked for
accuracy. This, combined with the fact that the
conclusions and recommendations had been drastically
watered down, suggested that there was no point in
putting out a report. The effort was abandoned.
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The time spent on these functional surveys was
probably worthwhile, but the effect was to cause a
near standdown on the starting of new component
surveys. Only three were completed in 1965 and two
in 1966. Subsequent analysis of the reasons why the
goal of a five-year inspection cycle was never
achieved by either Kirkpatrick or Earman indicated
that failure to make the needed starts was the
principal difficulty. It is pertinent to note here
that there is nothing "magic" about a five-year cycle,
and there is no evidence of criticism of either
Kirkpatrick or Barman for having failed to keep the
cyclical program on schedule.
A survey of the Clandestine Service's Domestic
Operations Division was under way during 1965. The
report of survey, which was issued in August 1965,
had this to say concerning the organizational sub-
ordination of DCS:
In June of 1962 the DDCI approved the
proposal of the Working Group on Organ-
ization to transfer the former Contact
Division, 00, from the DDI and assign it
to the new DO Division in order to
centralize in one place all Agency con-
tacts with non-governmental U.S. organ-
izations. Although this action was
never formally rescinded, the proposed
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re-organization has not since been put
into effect. We believe that the basis
for the original decision is still valid,
and that many of the objections which
prevailed at the time are not now suf-
ficient to justify indefinite delay.
This suvey recommends reconsideration
of the question at this time.
The recommendation proposed the establishment within
the Plans Directorate of a Central Division consisting
of DO Division, DCS, part of the Fl Staff, and part
of Operational Services.
The recommendation was still under serious
consideration at the time of the Tofte incident.
Hans Tofte was a career agent assigned to DO Divi-
sion. He offered his house for rent. While examin-
ing the house, another Agency employee, who did
now know that the owner was also an Agency employee,
noticed a stack of classified documents in one of
the rooms. He reported the discovery, and the docu-
ments were recovered in a way that caused embarrassment
to the Agency. As a consequence of the Tofte affair
Earman reported to the Director that he was with-
drawing his recommendation that DCS be transferred
to DD/P. The final straw, as far as Earman was
concerned, was the finding in Tofte's safe of DO
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Division's copy of the 1965 IG report of survey of
the Division. 217/
E. J. Applewhite returned to the Clandestine
Service on 16 March 1966, and his place as Deputy
Inspector General and Chief of the Inspection Staff
was taken by S. Herman Horton, who had most recently
served as
218/
Although only two component surveys were com-
pleted in 1966, 11 special studies were produced,
two of which were of particular significance and
were conducted in unusual ways. One was a study
of the procurement systems of CIA, which was done
under contract by
Admiral Raborn knew of the firm's work
from his prior association with the Polaris program
and directed that the firm be hired. It was up to
Earman to find the $50,000 or so that the study would
cost. Breckinridge, of the Inspection Staff, was
assigned as coordinator of the effort. Two employees
of the contracting firm were assigned space in the
Inspector General's suite of offices and worked
full time on the premises. They prepared the draft
of the report, and CIA's Printing Services Division
reproduced it. 219/
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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The consultants consultants were impressed with the quick
results and relative economy of some of the Agency's
larger R&D programs, but they found that the Agency
was untidy in much that it did. Reporting on the
progress of contracts, for example, left much to be
desired. As the consultants began developing their
proposals for change, it became obvious that they
favored more centralized control of procurement
authorities, somewhat along the lines of the Pentagon's
procurement organization. Oddly enough, the consultants
had once made a study of military procurement and
had been critical of its degree of centralized con-
trol. As the writing progressed, Breckinridge pointed
out that the consultants were arriving at recommenda-
tions that would not be acceptable. He had earlier
discussed with Earman the approach that the consultants
were taking, and Earman arranged for them to give
Col. White an oral interim report -- probably in
order to give Col. White a chance to set them straight.
Col. White lectured the consultants on the conscious
philosophy behind the Agency's procurement organiza-
tion but to no avail. When Breckinridge later tried
to discourage the consultants from taking a line that
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that was not acceptable, they simply screened him off
from their writing.
When the consultants'. report was distributed,
the Agency's procurement people reacted forcefully
and attacked it in detail. One issue that they
concentrated on was the consultants' description of
the planning for the Support Information Processing
System. Bannerman himself took exception to the
description. When Breckinridge briefed Bannerman
on what the consultants had been told about SIPS
planning, it became evident that the SIPS planners
had not been telling Bannerman the things they told
.the consultants. Bannerman later reported to Breckin-
ridge that he and his SIPS planners had arrived at
a meeting of the minds.
� Earman's tactic was to associate himself with
the report, accepting the findings of fact but saying
that some of the recommendations might not fit the
Agency's traditional way of conducting its affairs.
The Director of Logistics later called Breckinridge
to josh him about the Inspector General's Obvious
fence-straddling. The procurement people were pre-
pared to contest the report for its Misstatements
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and factual inaccuracies. The DD/S chose, instead,
to ignore the details of the report and to address
himself to the main issues. In effect, he accepted
the basic criticisms in principle but devised different
solutions than those proposed by the consultants. 220/
The other unusual study was of foreign intel-
ligence collection requirements. The Inspector
General assigned inspector Dildine as team captain
and borrowed Hugh Cunningham from ONE and Henry
Lowenhaupt from OSI to work on the report. Cunningham
played so prominent a role in the drafting of the
final text that the survey has ever since been
referred to as "The Cunningham Report." The thrust
of the report was conveyed by its opening sentence:
"CIA is collecting too much information -- more than
it can use properly, probably far more than the
Government needs." 221/
The idea of borrowing people to work on surveys
was not new. Kirkpatrick had resorted to the practice
extensively in his early years when the staff was
small. Earman was so pleased with the outcome of
the requirements study that he employed a somewhat
similar technique the following year in a special
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study of Agency proprietaries. The proprietaries
study was initiated as a consequence of DO Division's
failure to follow through on changes it had agreed
to in its response to the IG survey of the Division
in 1965. Earman named Breckinridge as task force
captain to lead a group consisting of representatives
of Finance, Audit, and MPS.
a retired senior CS officer, was hired as a consultant
to work on the study. Again, the product was excellent.
remained under contract to the In-
spector General and headed an IG team in a survey of
Soviet Bloc (SB) Division, which was not completed until
after Earman left. Earman also hired another retired
employee, Gates Lloyd, former Assistant DDS, to par-
ticipate in a survey of the Office of Finance. Both
left when those surveys were finished.
In retrospect, the practice of borrowing people
to work on surveys had more disadvantages than advan-
tages. While it augmented available manpower, the
outsiders were largely ignorant of Inspection Staff
procedures, and the team captain had to devote an
inordinate amount of time to guiding and counseling
them.
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By 1967, the staff had recovered reasonably
well from'the impact of the 1965-66 series of special
studies and had resumed work on the current cycle
of component surveys. It also had recovered from
the heavy rotation that occurred in 1965 and 1966.
Nine of the inspectors that Earman had brought on
board in 1962 and 1963 completed their tours and
returned to their parent components. Only six re-
placements had entered on duty by the end of 1966.
By the end of 1967, however, a full complement of
13 inspectors was on duty, and all but two of them
were well experienced. Five component surveys and
eight special studies were completed during the
year.
A significant change in the role of the Inspector
General occurred in 1967. The change reflected the
difference in the approaches to the job taken by
Earman and his predecessor. Kirkpatrick considered
it His duty to be on the lookout for evidence of
wrongdoing and to take the initiative in investigating.
Earman felt that this was a responsibility of command,
with his role being that of monitoring or of stepping
in only if command were unwilling or unable to carry
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out its responsibility. The specific impetus for
change came from a special study that Earman had
made of the responsibility of the Inspector General
in cases of shortages, losses, or misuse of official
funds. The principal conclusion of that study was
that the Inspector General should not have independent
authority to undertake the investigation of charges
or evidence of wrongdoing. 222/
in April 1967 requested that
the mission and functions of the
Accordingly, Earman
which set forth (b)(3)
Inspector General,
be revised to specify that the Inspector General
would investigate indications of wrongdoing only upon
direction of the DCI, the DDCI, or the Executive
Director-Comptroller or upon request of the responsible
Operating Official. 223/
Earman completed five years in office in May 1967.
He took stock of his stewardship of the Agency's in-
spection program -- with disheartening results. Based
on the goal of a five-year cycle, there were then ten
components overdue for inspection representing an
aggregate delinquency of 55 years. With the inspec-
tion manpower then available to him, he estimated
that the best he could do would be to maintain a
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It
seven-year cycle. 11 discussed the problem with the
Executive Director-Comptroller who agreed with Earman
that a seven-year average interval between inspections
was too long. Accordingly, Earman requested that the
planned incumbency of Position No. 0091 be increased
from eight to eleven, which would bring the staff back
to the total of 13 inspectors that were authorized in
1964. The request was approved. 224/
Earman announced at his staff meeting on 9 November
1967 that he planned to retire upon reaching age 55,
in March of the following year. 225/ His replacement,
Gordon M. Stewart, began reading in to the job in mid-
February and took over,officially upon Earman's retire-
ment at the end of March 1968. 226/
The one thing that most impressed the author as
an observer of Earman's work was the degree of selfless-
ness in Barman's approach to the job. He brought no
loyalties nor obligations ot the task, except for those
owed to the Director and to the Agency as a whole,
and he had no personal ambitions other than to be a
good Inspector General. He refrained from inserting
himself into matters that he thought properly a preroga-
tive of command and insisted upon his inspectors doing
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likewise. He deliberately set about in the early
portion of his tenure to improve the image of the
role of the Inspector General within the Agency, most
especially within the Clandestine Service. He was
largely successful in this. In retrospect, Earman's
single most important accomplishment as Inspector
General was in gaining acceptance of the office else-
where in the Agency.
The fact of his success in gaining acceptance
of the office is evident, but the reasons for it are
not. Adding the DD/P to the distribution of
cables was a small step. Revising
to deny the
Inspector General the authority to take the initiative
in investigating cases of possible wrong doing was a
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
major step. Probably the most significant factor,
however, was the attitude that Earman took toward his
own role in his dealings with the other office heads.
He consistently took the position that his goal was
to be helpful to them and not to set himself up in an
adversary capacity. Since he demonstrated by his actions
that he meant what he said, they eventually came to
believe him.
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Chapter VI
The Stewart Years, April 1968-December 1971
Gordon M. Stewart's career with the Agency be-
gan on 28 July 1943 when, as Captain Stewart, he joined
the Office of Strategic Services and was assigned as
Chief of the German Section of R&A, serving in Wash-
ington, London, and Germany. In October 1945 he became
chief of the Steering Division of SI in Germany and
served subsequently as Chief, SI from December 1945
until March 1947. His experience in OSS/SSU/CIG
marked him as the logical choice for appointment as
chief of the OSO Station in Germany, a position
that he assumed in March 1947.
After nearly a decade of continuous service in
Europe, Stewart returned to headquarters and became
chief of the Fl Staff in January 1954, a position that
he was to occupy for the next three years. He was
next assigned as Director of Personnel from January
1957 until June 1960. At that point he returned to
the Clandestine Service and served as Chief, EE Divi-
sion for the next two years. Although he had indicated
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some years earlier that he had no wish to become
known as a German specialist, his long service in
Germany made him the obvious choice as the next
Chief of Station, Germany. He served there again
from June 1962 until October 1966, when he returned
to headquarters and was named to the Board of National
Estimates. 227/ His last assignment with the Agency
was as Inspector General beginning on 30 March 1968
and continuing until his retirement in December 1971. 228/
Stewart had a six or seven week overlap with his
predecessor, spending the time reading case files and
reports of survey and being briefed by the Deputy
Directors and their principal subordinates.
Earman had occasionally met with his full staff
when he had something of importance to announce or to
discuss, but he did not have regularly scheduled staff
meetings during his last few years in office. Stewart
thought the staff would benefit from getting together
regularly to report on work in progress. He first met
with his full staff on 17 May 1968 and announced that
staff meetings would be held every other week there-
after. 229/ Each inspector was invited to comment
briefly on what he was doing, and then Stewart would
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report on items of general interest gleaned from the
Director's morning meetings or from his other contacts.
He also used the staff meetings as occasions for sharing
with his staff his concepts or philosophies concerning
the inspection function.: In the early weeks he designated
certain inspectors to research and to report in detail
at a. later staff meeting on topics of importance to the
work of the office, but the practice was soon discon-
tinued.
The author recalls a conversation with Stewart
during Stewart's early weeks in office in which Stewart
remarked that he had concluded that the staff was spend-
ing far too much time in digging for inconsequential
details and in writing overly long and poorly focused
reports. He said that the approach he favored would
involve taking a sharp but relatively brief look at a
component and then preparing a short, tightly written
report. He felt that the stature of the office was
such that the Deputy Directors and office heads would
accept the Inspector General's findings on faith, thus
making it necessary for IG reports to recite the
detailed evidence upon which the conclusions and recom-
mendations were based..
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Stewart expounded expounded this philosophy at his staff
meeting of 7 June 1968, which was largely devoted
to a discussion of the writing and editing of reports.
He said that he favored reports that were "shorter
rather than longer;" otherwise, they could not be
expected to command management's attention. If no
problems of significance were found, the report of
survey could be very short indeed. A longer report
might be needed if there were an unpopular case to
defend or if the report dealt with a complex subject.
He saw no need for any fixed style although he felt
that the requirements survey, for example, was too
discursive in its approach.*
He asked that drafts be prepared in greater
length and in more detail than he would expect to
publish. He thought this desirable in order to
persuade him of the validity of the inspectors'
conclusions and recommendations. He would then
delete superfluous material when he was convinced
that the inspectors were on solid ground. He also
* The Inspector General's report of survey of
"Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements,"
December 1966, which totaled 216 pages.
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suggested that it might be possible to furnish him
the needed details in separate supporting papers.
Stewart said that his deputy, Herman
follow the development of the survey
concerned primarily with content and
Horton, would
and would be
comprehensiveness.
Stewart himself would see to the editing and packaging.
When he was satisfied with the final text, he would
pass it to an inspector not involved in the survey
for review by "a fresh pair of eyes." 230/
There were five component surveys in progress �
when Stewart took over as Inspector General: Office
of Medical Services, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Soviet Bloc Division, Office of Communica-
tions, and Office of ELINT. Since he envisioned
that the short, pithy reports he preferred would
require that terms of reference be carefully drawn
before beginning the
already under way to
originally conceived.
with the first three
surveys, he allowed the surveys
continue to completion as
He inaugurated his new approach
surveys that were begun after
he took office: Foreign Missile and Space Analysis
Center, Office of Current Intelligence, and Foreign
Intelligence Staff. The reports of survey of FMSAC
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and of OCI were completed and forwarded in December
1968. Both were short and both contained recommenda-
tions for major change. The OCI report, for example,
recommended the elimination of one entire echelon
of command within the Office. The DD/I nonconcurred
in the major recommendations relating to OCI, and
the DD/S&T did the same on the FMSAC report. This
put Stewart in the awkward position of having to
come forward with additional evidence in support
of the recommendations, which he had not thought
,necessary to include in the reports.
The concept of the short report to be taken
on faith finally collapsed entirely in March 1969
as a consequence of the Inspector General's report
of investigation of charges of mismanagement of
a CA Staff project operating in
Stewart referred to the report and
(b)(1)
the problems it caused in his staff meeting of (b)(3)
12 March 1969. A short report had been forwarded
to the CA Staff through the Executive Director and
the DD/P. The headquarters case officer for the
project came back with a "hot-eyed blast" charging
that the report was not documented, that unsupported
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statements were made in it, and that those responsi-
ble for the project were being condemned without
evidence of their being at fault. Stewart said he
had had to concede that the critical judgments in
the
report were not adequately supported by
the evidence presented in the report. He announced
to his staff that thenceforth reports would be written
to include all documentation or argumentation required
to back the statements made in the reports. 231/
The first draft of the report of survey of the
Fl Staff reached Stewart for review soon after his
experiences with the responses on OCI, FMSAC, and
He demonstrated the completeness of his
about-face on the matter of report length by directing
the survey team to spend another several weeks gather-
ing additional evidence in support of its findings
and to give him a new draft in appreciably greater
detail.
Stewart's introduction to the investigative
aspect of his job came within a week of his assuming
office, and it was a thunderbolt. Samuel A. Adams,
a DD/I analyst who specialized on the war in Vietnam,
walked in on the morning of 1 April 1968 and asked
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to see the Inspector General. He was referred to
an inspector. Adams charged the Agency
with responsibility for an intelligence failure
in Vietnam, which he attributed to "long-standing
mismanagement of CIA's research effort." He suggested
that because we had failed to devote enough effort
to basic research on the Viet Cong, especially on
captured documents, policy-makers may have made wrong
decisions on the basis of inaccurate intelligence.
He had much earlier decided that he would take this
case to the Inspector General and ultimately to the
,white House when the administration changed. President
Johnson's announcement on 31 March that he would not
be a candidate for re-election in the fall caused
Adams to decide that the time was ripe for him to
file his charges.
reported the interview to the Inspector
General, and Stewart reported the charges to Col.
White who asked that Stewart see Adams himself,
which Stewart did on 3 April. Adams told Stewart
that he held the Director and the DD/I personally
responsible for these intelligence failures. Adams
offered to submit his charges in writing, and Stewart
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accepted the offer. The written charges were received
on 27 May in a memorandum of that date. Adams requested
that copies of his memorandum be forwarded to the
White House Staff, to the President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board, to the Director, and to the
DD/I and that Adams be informed in writing when this
had been done. He asked for an IG investigation. He
.also asked that he be provided With a modest amount
of storage space for the safekeeping of documentary
materials he had been collecting over the previous
two.years in support of his charges.
Stewart sent copies of Adams' charges to the
Executive Director and to the DD/I and met with them
on 28 May to discuss the approach to the case. Col.
White said that he would brief the Director and would
recommend to him
assigned to make
propose. that
that Breckinridge and Greer be
the investigation. He also would
, a former Chief of
Station, Saigon, and then chief of DO Division, be
added to the team as a consultant. The Director
approved this arrangement. After a series of prelim-
inary internal meetings and the drawing up of terms
of reference for the investigation, Stewart and the
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team met with Adams on 5 June. Stewart told Adams
that his charges would be investigated, that storage
space would be provided for his documents, and that
copies of Adams' memorandum had been sent �to the
Director and to the DD/I. Decision on sending copies
of the complaint to the White House and to the PFIAB
would be deferred until the Inspector General's investi-
gation had been completed. Stewart warned Adams that
his charges were considered to be an internal matter
and that it would be a great mistake for Adams himself
to take them outside the Agency.
The investigation opened with nine and one-half
hours of interviews with Adams, which were devoted to
a detailed oral presentation by him of his case forrn
a much higher over-all strength figure for the Viet
Cong than the U.S. Military was Willing to accept.
Adams felt that MACV's order of battle on the Main
Force elements was reasonably accurate but that the
size of the irregular (or guerrilla) Viet Cong forces
had been consistently and seriously underestimated.
The investigative team had completed its informa-
tion gathering and had begun writing its report by
mid-July. This was at a time when Stewart was still
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bent on turning out short reports. The report was
nearing completion at the end of the month when
diseovered�that his notion of what constituted
ort differed from that of Breckinridge
Greer. They were heading toward a draft of some
75 to 80 pages. He directed that the effort then under
way- be abandoned and that a new draft be prepared that
would run to no more than 12-15 pages. The final
report, which was forwarded on 1 August, totaled 17 -
pages.
The principal finding of the IG investigation
was that
We could have put more people on VC
research sooner, but we question whether
it can fairly be said that we should have.
In retrospect, there might have been some-
thing to be gained from putting more people
on it earlier, but it is our judgment that
the results would not have been different
from those we already obtained. However
... we do not have a satisfactory answer
to the question of why we did battle on the
strength figures at such high levels of
government on the basis of a questionable
case, most of which was developed by one
part-time researcher.
Stewart began three weeks of annual leave on
5 August leaving his deputy, Herman Horton, in charge.
The Director informed Horton on 14 August that he had
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read the Inspector General's report on Adams' complaint.
He said that in view of the fact that very serious
charges of irresponsibility on the part of management
had been made, including calling his own role into
question, he had decided to appoint a board of review
of the most senior officials of CIA to examine the
charges and the IG report and to recommend to him an
appropriate course of action. .Admiral Rufus Taylor,
.Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was designated
chairman. Members were John Bross, Deputy to the
DCI for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation,
and Lawrence Houston General Counsel.
Horton mentioned to Admiral Taylor that a much
more detailed report of investigation existed in nearly
completed draft form. Taylor said that he thought it
would be helpful for the members of the board of review
to read the more comprehensive report. It was completed
and was forwarded on 4 September labeled as a background
paper and not to be considered as an official IG sub-
mission.
.The board of review submitted its report to the
Director on 4 November. The board found no reason to
disagree with the essential finding of the Inspector
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General that the manpower allocated to basic research
was about as much as the problem could justify through
1966. The board did feel, however, that there was
some basis for Adams' criticism of lethargy in expanding
the effort, since there was considerable delay through-.
out 1967 in increasing the research effort on the
additional documentary material then becoming available.
While the board of review was examining the case,
Adams sought and was granted two meetings with Colonel
White and one with Admiral Taylor to discuss the
mechanics of taking his complaint to the White House.
He also sought legal advice on the same matter from
the General Counsel. The Director met with Adams
after reading the report of the board of review.
He invited Adams to submit a paper outlining his
organizational criticisms and his recommendations
for improvement. He also told Adams that he would
arrange for Adams to meet with the Chairman of the
PFTAB, General Maxwell Taylor.
The original charges that Adams submitted to
the Inspector General in his memorandum of 27 May
related solely to the management of the research
effort on Vietnam. However, when he met with the
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Director in early November, he expanded his charges
to include the operational side. The Director met
on 14 November with White, Bross, Karamessines, R.
J. Smith, Carver,
range handling of
to make sure that
and Stewart to discuss
the Adams complaints.
those Agency officials
the short-
He wanted
responsible
for the activities of which Adams was critical gave
Adams an opportunity to make his charges to them in
person and they in turn to discuss the charges with
Adams. As a consequence, Karamessines and
Chief, Far East Division, met jointly. with
Adams as did Smith and Carver.
All of the reports and several of the memorandums
relating to the Adams case were delivered to the PFIAB
in mid-November, and Stewart and Greer briefed General
'Taylor, General Cassidy, and Patrick Coyne on the
details. It was the Director's hope that General
Taylor would be willing to meet with Adams as an
amicus curiae rather than in His role as Chairmen of
the PFIAB. Admiral Taylor met with the members of the
Board on.25 November, and the Director met with them
on 26 November. General Taylor felt that, if he
approached Adams at all, it would have to be in his
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official role. All of the Board members were dubious
about taking any step that might lead to the Board
becoming known as a sort of wailing wall for malcontents
in the intelligence community. Accordingly, the Board
accepted General Taylor's suggestion that Pat Coyne
meet with Adams, tell him that the Board had been
briefed on his case, and to inform him that the Board
felt that he had already had his day in court.
Coyne met with Adams as directed on 3 December
and reported the above to him. Coyne also invited
Adams to submit to him in writing for Board considera-
tion any suggestions he might have for improvement in
the intelligence effort. Coyne later reported that
when he told General Taylor of his meeting with Adams
they agreed that, if Adams inquired as to the action
taken by the Board on his recommendations, the reply
would be that the Board reports only to the President.
The suggestions for reform that Adams had been
invited to submit both by the Director and by the
PFIAB appeared in a long memorandum dated 24 January
1969. He called for a board of inquiry, asked per-
mission to send a copy of the memorandum to the �PFIAB,
and requested that he be allowed to take his charges
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to Dr. Kissinger. The Director gave Adams' new memo-
randum to Admiral Taylor for review. He found it to
be a re-hash of the old charges. He forwared a memo-
randum to Adams on 31 January informing him that his
recommendations would be considered by John Bross and
suggesting that further attempts to ventilate his
charges would serve no useful purpose. The final
paragraph of Admiral Taylor's memorandum to Adams
reads as follows:
In conclusion, I suggest to you that
if you cannot abide the decision implicit
in the above, you cannot continue to con-
sider yourself a helpful member of the
intelligence team here in CIA. and should,
therefore, submit your resignation.
Adams had been invited to read the short, official
IG report on his complaints, which he did in Stewart's
office in late November 1968. His request that he be
allowed :to take notes was refused. He subsequently
wrote to the Inspector General asking for an oppor-
tunity to prepare a written critique of it. .That re-'
quest also was refused.
Adams chose not to resign. He was still with
the Agency in October 1972, although he had been in
career difficulties 'since about mid-1969 resulting
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from his lack of production. The case file, which
occupies a full safe drawer, has been preserved
intact in anticipation of its one day being revived. 232/
The Adams case was the attention-getter during
1968, but steady progress was made on the inspection
program. Seven component surveys were completed
during the year (FI/D, OMS, FBIS, SB, OC, FMSAC, and
OCI), and two others (CA Staff and CI Staff) were
in progress at the end of the year. Stewart himself
did a special study for the Director on morale in the
Clandestine Service, which was completed in November.
He reported in his five-page report that
There is a morale problem among members
of the Clandestine Services but this
doesn't mean that poor morale is general
.... Morale for the most part is an
individual thing. In both groups, the
older and the younger, there is a pre-
ponderate number of men who are optimistic
about themselves or who, although not
optimistic, have accepted their fate and
carry on in good spirit .... Intermingled
with this group are men who share the same
experiences, have about the same mental
equipment and prospects, but who can't
keep their spirits up. All sorts of
personal and professional considerations
combine to make for good individual
morale, and for this reason it can hardly
be considered as a simple infectious con-
dition. 233/
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The rate of production of surveys was slightly
higher than in the previous year, but Stewart was
disappointed with it. The year had begun with 12
experienced inspectors on board. Since only two of
them left during the period, there were 11.83 man-
years of inspector time available on the staff. Greer
and Breckinridge were team captains of surveys in
progress at the time the Adams case broke, and they
were off their surveys for �the six months that it
took to complete the Adams case, but there were no
other serious disruptions of the survey program.
inspectors were involved in the making of special
studies, and this had not happened since 1963. Unless
Stewart could somehow improve on the 1968 production
rate, the duration of the component survey cycle would
run closer to seven years than to the five years he
was determined to achieve.*
Stewart continued his predecessor's practice of
submitting an annual report to the Director. The
report actually consisted of two reports. One of
�
* Stewart continued to play tennis with some members
of the staff after his retirement. He remarked to an
inspector with whom he was playing in September 1972
that he had finally given up on this.
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them summarized the work completed during the year
and listed the components scheduled for survey during
the following year. The Director's acceptance of the
report constituted approval of the inspection program
contemplated for the next year, although he occasionally
made some changes in it. The other report was a summary
of findings from the year's returnee interview program.
When the Director received the returnee interview
report for 1968, he remarked that he thought that the
program was highly useful and wanted it continued but
that it completely missed the large number of employees
permanently assigned to Headquarters. He asked if it
would be possible to devise a means of testing the
temperature of the water among those who never go
overseas. 234/
This request led to a new program commonly re-
ferred to on the staff as HIP (for Headquarters Inter-
view Program). Ruth Gillard was placed in charge of
the HIP, since she was already monitoring the Returnee
Interview Program. The first thing requiring decision
was the type and size of the sample of employees
chosen for interview. After discussion in the staff
of various ways of choosing the sample, it was decided
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to confine confine the interviews to those employees who had
entered on duty in 1961. There were two main reasons
for this choice: first, the names and offices of
assignment could be taken from a machine listing, and,
second, it was felt that an employee with eight years
of service would have some well formed thoughts about
the Agency as a place in which to work. Gillard
obtained the machine run of employees who entered on
duty in 1961 and were still with the Agency. She
parceled the list out among the several inspectors
for interviewing. The results were assembled in a
summary report, which was forwarded on 8 January
1970. The interviews disclosed no unexpected weak-
nesses in our system and found no area in which there
was significant trouble. The subject that was talked
about most frequently and negatively was personnel
management. 235/
After the exercise was finished, the staff con-
ducted a post mortem of it. It was agreed that, if
the exercise were to be repeated, there was need for
finding a new way of choosing the sample of employees
to be interviewed. There were 203 people on the 1969
list, but only slightly over half of them were interviewed.
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For one thing, the machine listing turned out to be
based on service computation date rather than
entrance on duty date, and many of them did not have
eight years of service with the Agency. For another,
many of them were no longer available for interview.
Some had gone overseas, some had resigned, and several
were on leave without pay (usually maternity leave).
Futhermore, the sample was badly skewed by grade; of
the total of 203, 127 were in grade GS-10 or below and
included a preponderance of clerical and administrative
personnel. 236/
All of the special studies that were completed
during Earman's years in office were made by members
of the Staff. The study that Stewart made of Clandestine
Service morale in the fall of 1968 was the first done
by the Inspector General himself since the early Kirk-
patrick years. It established a pattern that was to
be continued until Stewart's retirement. The Director
asked Stewart in January 1969 to look, into the problems
arising from employing married couples in the Agency.
Stewart submitted his four and one-half page report
in March. He concluded that, from the Agency's point
of view, there are certain advantages in employing wives.
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Nonetheless, there are circumstances
in which employed wives create problems.
The wives of some senior officers have
been known to trade on their husband's
rank .... Most of the problems we have
with couples are related to rank. The
more senior the husband, the less in-
clined line management will be to treat
the wife just like any other person.
His principal recommendations were (1) that the Agency
not employ the spouse of any officer who is in grade
14 or above, (2) that the Agency not allow both husband
and wife to pursue professional careers within the
Agency, and (3) that be revised to (13)(3)
withdraw annual leave from the benefits accorded
contract wives. 237/
Stewart found himself in a dilemma in regard to
the recommendation on denying annual leave to contract
wives. He felt quite strongly that the advantages
enjoyed by a working wife overseas were so many that
it was preposterous to include annual leave as a
benefit. The report of survey of OEL was completed
in February 1969 while Stewart was still working on
his study of the employment of married couples. The
OEL report of survey struck very hard at the policy
of
denying sick and annual leave
to contract employee wives
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pointing out that, as a matter of law,
sick and annual leave benefits had to be granted to
contract employees working regularly scheduled tours
of duty. Stewart and the OEL team captain argued the
matter at length. Stewart finally approved the OEL
report, including the recommendation that annual leave
be granted to contract employees; yet, he made a
contrary recommendation in his own report issued a
month later.
Upon receiving Stewart's report on married
couples, the Director then asked Stewart to look into
"the whole matter of systems analysis." Most of
Stewart's time from then until October when his report
was finished was occupied probing into the functioning
of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.
He concluded that
PPBS as a body of management doctrine
and a system of resource control has much
to offer CIA. The Agency in turn has
made an intelligent and pragmatic appli-
cation of the system to its work. In doing
so, it has followed a middle course between
that advocated by the enthusiastic young
management experts and systems analysts
assigned to OPPB and that supported by
those who regard the system skeptically.
The principal benefit PPBS has brought
to the Agency is a broader appreciation of
the value of questioning the rationale
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behind projects, programs, and activities.
.... In sum, this study concludes on a
positive note because the record thus
far has been a good one and the Agency
appears to be moving in the right direc-
tion. 238/
Stewart's deputy, Herman Horton, was selected to
(WO)
be the next As his rep1ac4030)
ment, Stewart chose Kenneth Greer who had been working
on the staff as an inspector since June 1962. 12 April
1969 was the effective date of Greer's assignment as
deputy. 239/
The production record for 1969 was slightly
improved over that in 1968. Seven component surveys
were completed -- the same as in 1968 -- but eight
special studies were made, compared with only one the
previous year. Some of the special studies were
relatively minor, but three of them --
PPBS, and Control of Firearms -- were quite massive
efforts. Of perhaps more significance to the produc-
tion record was the fact that, in addition to the
seven component surveys completed, five were in progress
at year's end with four of them well along toward
f
f completion.
The preceding chapter on the Earman years referred
to a special study on records administration, which was
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completed but was never published. In January 1970,
the Director asked Stewart to have a substantial
survey make on information flow, dissemination of
information, and use of computers in information
storage and retrieval. Scott Breckinridge and
were assigned to do it, but Breckinridge
was never really freed to work on it. Most of the
information gathering and the writing of the report
fell to
The report was commonly referred
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
to as "The Information Explosion Report," although
its actual title was "Information Management in the
Agency." The draft report was completed in March
1971 and was distributed to various components in
the Agency for comment. The DD/I was so critical
of those portions pertaining to his responsibilities
that Stewart decided to postpone formal publication
of the report until the survey of the Central Reference
Service, which was about to begin, was completed.
The "Information Explosion" report was never published.
Until 1970, the volume and nature of complaints,
grievances, and appeals reaching the Inspection Staff
for action varied relatively little. During calendar
years 1968 and 1969, the staff handled six appeals to
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the Director for designation to the CIA Retirement
and Disability System (CIARDS) after having been turned
down by the CIA Retirement Board and the Director
of Personnel. The number of CIARDS appeals jumped.
to 12 in 1970.
Two developments accounted for the dramatic
increase. The legislation authorizing CIARDS provided
that a maximum of 400 employees could retire during
the first live years of operation of the system and.
another 400 during the second five years. The first
five years of operation ended on 30 June 1969. Pro-
jections made early in. 1968 disclosed that only about
350 would retire during the first five years. This
meant that there would be some unused "quota." Ac-
cordingly, the Executive Director-Comptroller .approved.
a proposal by the Director of Personnel for a less
rigid definition of qualifying service in order to
allow employees to retire who would not otherwise have
qualified for designation to the System.
When the second five years of operation began..
on 1 July 1969 .the Retirement Board reverted to its
former strict standards for designation to the System.
Most of those who appealed during. 1970 cited as precedent
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cases known to them of employees who failed to meet
the technical requirements for designation but were
admitted to the system under the relaxed standards
that prevailed during fiscal year 1969. The other
development that triggered a flood of retirement
applications .and a spate.of appeals from nondesigna-
tion to CIARDS was the 5.6 percent cost of living .
increase for those on the retirement roles as of
1 August 1970.
Each of these appeals was considered carefully,
and two of them were researched in massive detail.
These two involved a claim for the crediting of
domestic qualifying service performed in support of
operations. 240/ The Director accepted the Inspector
General's recommendation that the two appeals. be
denied, thus establishing a precedent for handling
future such appeals. Of the 12 appeals received
during the year, the Inspector General supported
and the Director granted only two. 241/
A charge of religious discrimination led to a
most unusual investigation in August 1970. An Army
enlisted man who had been an MP at
charged
that he had been relieved of his assignment for his
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religious
religious activities
The charges were
in the form of a letter from the lad's father to his
Congressman. The Congressman forwarded the letter
to the Inspector General of the Army for investigation
and report. As a consequence, the Agency invited
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(W(1)
the Army's Inspector General to send an inspector to (b)(3)
to conduct an investigation. CIA's Inspector(b)(1)
(b)(3)
General sent one of his inspectors to to
assist the Army inspector and to make a parallel,
independent investigation. The two inspectors met
frequently and compared their findings. The Army
Inspector General concluded that the charge was without
foundation. CIA's Inspector General concluded that
had acted decently
and humanely but that, in trying to correct a most
troublesome situation, he had left himself open to
the charge of religious discrimination. 242/
//A survey of AF Division was in progress in the
fall of 1970.
and
were the regular members of the team, with
assigned as team captain.
were added to the team for the
and
field portion of
the survey in order to reduce the time spent in
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traveling. Working out an air travel schedule covering
all of the posts in Africa is extremely difficult.
The inspectors were preparing to leave on 8 September
in expectation that many reservations would have to
be made on the scene. The first hitch occurred on
6 September when Palestinian guerrillas hijacked three
commercial jetliners in the Middle East. There was
an immediate standdown on all nonessential overseas
travel by Agency personnel. After much agonizing at
the highest levels, it was finally decided that the
inspectors could travel as planned but on the under-
standing that the trip might be aborted abruptly if
circumstances dictated it. It was a hectic trip
marked by cancelled flights, directives from Head-
quarters to
at home.
scheduled
change itineraries, and worried
to visit
had the most trouble.
wives
He was
(b)(1)
to (b)(3)
check on AF operations there. After arriving in
Europe, he was ordered
(b)(3)
to
avoid flights from Rome to Africa that transited either
Beirut or Cairo. The trip was completed roughly on
schedule and to the relief of all concerned.
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chose not to reveal until he returned to Headquarters
that his supposedly nonstop flight from Rome to
had made an unscheduled stop in Cairo.
Five component surveys and four .special studies
were completed. in 1970. In addition, four component
surveys were in progress and within four or five
months of completion at year's end.
The first quarter of 1971 was devoted to complet-
ing the four component surveys carried over from 1970
and launching four new ones. By the end of April,
only one of the carry-over surveys remained to be
finished and Stewart had given that to Greer to
rewrite. On 28 April, the CIA Historical Officer
asked Stewart if he would be willing to write the
history of the Dulles-Wisner period of the Office
of the DD/P. Stewart began assembling materials
and familiarizing himself with them in preparation
for beginning the actual writing. 243/
On 2 June, the Director asked Stewart to make
a study of the Agency's foreign intelligence liaison
activities. 244/ The impetus for the study came from
the Director's concern
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Accordingly,
Stewart withdrew from his commitment to write a
portion of the DD/P history and devoted full time
to the liaison study. He was assigned by Greer.
The major component survey of the year, which
eventually involved all of the inspectors, was that
of the Far East Division. Breckinridge was assigned
as team captain with Gillard and
as full- (b)(3)
time team members. The field portion of the survey
was divided into three segments requiring three
separate
team members
trips to the Far
made all three
East. The three regular
trips. The first phas(b)(1)
covered
and
the regular team
(b)(3)
was
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
supplemented
by adding Bishop,
and (b)(3)
The survey report on
the first
phase (b)(3)
was submitted
on 30 July. The
second trip covered (b)(1)
with
the regular
(b)(3)
team
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
being supplemented by Bishop
and
The team
(b)(3)
returned to Headquarters and prepared a draft but not
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a final report. The team then went
was supplemented by , Bavis, and
Stewart met with Col. White in July
his leave plans and to propose that he be
Iland
245/
to discuss
allowed
to participate in the two final phases of the FE
survey by visiting
He contemplated a trip of about six weeks
duration,
and taking his wife
with him at his expense. The Director approved the
trip on the understanding that Stewart would complete
the liaison study and the editing of the final report
of survey of FE Division prior to his retirement in
December 1971. 246/
Stewart was away on his trip from 6 September
through 15 October, precisely six weeks. The liaison
study remained largely dormant during his absence.
He and Greer had completed most of the internal infor-
mation gathering before his departure. He had requested
written contributions from NSA and DIA, and they were
in preparation during his absence. His final two months
were spent in putting the final touches on the liaison
report and in editing the FE report. The liaison study
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ran to 60 pages plus annexes, far longer than Stewart's
other special studies. These are the more significant
of the conclusions:
Our examination of foreign liaison
proved in general to be a reassuring one.
The Agency is controlling costs both in
money and manpower. It views the benefits
derived from liaison realistically and is
making a serious effort to achieve a low
profile in those areas where conspicuous
operations are likely to boomerang.
Those officers who are closest to
liaison have a good understanding of what
it may be able to do in the future.
It would seam to us to be logical
first to work out the means for a greater
degree of coordination of liaison planning
here in Washington; then attention can be
directed toward similar overseas coordina-
tion.
The main weight of responsibility for
coordinating liaison planning should be
transferred from the field to headquarters.
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If coordination of liaison activities
can begin at the planning stage and if
channels of communication between the CIA
directorates and within the community can
be opened, it should be possible to work
out an intelligence liaison strategy for
each important area and then to carry it
through. This, to us, is the way the
community should meet its liaison respon-
sibilities. 247/
Stewart completed all of the work to which he
was committed with the 'exception of the final chapter
of the FE report, which had not yet been written at
the time of his departure. When it was completed,
it was taken to his home for him to review there.
The one characteristic of Stewart that those who
served with him on the Inspection Staff will remember
longest was his unpredictability. None of his staff
was ever able to anticipate with any confidence what
his reaction might be to a recommendation or proposal
reaching him for endorsement. He was quick to decide
-- often on the basis of insufficient evidence --
and just as quick to change his mind when it became
apparent to him that his earlier decision was wrong.
He was above all else a decent and honorable man but
one with a rather prickly disposition. He once
ordered from the office a quite senior officer who
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he thought was spending too much time visiting with
one of his inspectors.
There were few other officials in the Agency
with as diverse a career record as his, and he often
drew on his own experience in editing the report of
his inspectors. It was not unusual for him to discard
an entire chapter and substitute his own thoughts and
language. He was repeatedly called upon by the
Director to make personal special studies of matters
of concern to the Director. These requests were
addressed to him not as the Inspector General but
as Gordon Stewart, a man whom the Director knew well
and in whose judgment he placed confidence.
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Appendix A
Personnel Roster
Inspectors General
Stuart Hedden 1 January 1952-19 January 1953
Willard Galbraith (acting) 20 January 1953-31 March 1953
Lyman Kirkpatrick 1 April 1953-5 December 1961
David McLean (acting) 6 December 1961-1 May 1962
John Earman 2 May 1962-29 March 1968
Gordon Stewart 30 March 1968-16 December 1971
Deputy Inspectors General/Chiefs of Inspection Staff
Herman Heggen
David McLean
Edgar Applewhite
Herman Horton
Kenneth Greer
1 March 1957-3 September 1961
4 September 1961-26 March 1963
27 March 1963-9 April 1966
10 April 1966-11 April 1969
27 April 1969-
Assistants to Inspector General/Inspectors
Willard Galbraith April 1952-May 1955
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John Blake
Paul Eckel
John Routh
Richard Drain
Herman Heggen
Howard Osborn
Wallace Deuel
George Horkan
Donald Dunford
Turner Smith
Roy Tod
Robert Shea
Thomas Abernathy.
avid McLean
obert Shaffer
J hn Vance
eassigned as Deputy.
Ins ection Staff.
August 1953-December.1955
May 1954-July 1957
July 1954-October 1955
August 1954-May 1955
January 1956-March 1957
August-November 1957
August 1954-March 1957*
. January 1955-April 1956
May 1955-December 1958
February 1956-December 1959
February 1956-July 1963
May 1956-August 1958
December 1956-July 1957
June 1957-June 1961 0:0(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
September 1957-April 1958
December 1957-June 1960.
January 1959-October 1960
May 1961-March 1962
January 1959-July 1962.
February 1959-September 1961*.
September 1959-December 1961-
January 1960-July 1.963
August 1970-May 1971
spector General or Chief of
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William Dildine
William Edwards
Euan Davis
Claire Dees
Whitney Dodge
Frank Chapin
Vincent Lockhart
Kenneth Greer
Edgar Applewhite
Scott Breckinridge
Richard Mallett
Robert Bouchard
Goshen Zogby
Emmons Brown
William Watts
Michael Rura
John Oliver
Rodham Kenner
January 1960-January 1963
December 1965-May 1968
July 1960-June 1961
September 1960-April 1963
October 1960-November 1962
March-September 1962
August 1969- '
May 1962-January 1963
May 1962-September 1966
July 1962-September 1965
July 1962-March 1968*
August 1962-March 1963*
September 1962-
September 1962-August 1966
December 1962-July 1965
February 1963-July 1964
May 1963-July 1967
June 1963-April 1965
July 1963-September 1965
September 1963-September 1965
December 1963-June 1969
July 1964-March 1970 (b)(3)
* Reassigned as Deputy Inspector General or Chief of
Inspection Staff.
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Erich Isenstead
Davis Powell
Ruth Gillard
Thomas Lawler
Robert Singel
John G1 ennon
December 1964-September 1966
September. 1965-February 1970
May 1966-May 1968
(b)(3)
August 1966-June .1969
September 1966-
May 1967-November 1969
September 1967-October 1969
(b)(3)
October 1967-August 1969 (b)(3)
November 1968-
April 1968-July 1970
(b)(3)
December 1968-
Frank Bishop April 1969-
July. 1969-November 1971 ("3)
September 1969-
(b)(3)
Thomas Holmes.
Robert Voskuil
William Bavis
(b)(3)
December 1969-November 1971
June 1970-December 1971
(b)(3)
July 1970-
January-March 1971
September 1971-
November 1971- ("3)
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Appendix B
Component Surveys
Component
Office
Office
Office
Office
Office
Office
Office
Office
Office
of Scientific Intelligence
of Personnel
of Current Intelligence
of National Estimates
of Training
of Research and Reports
of Security
of the Comptroller
of Scientific Intelligence
Office of. Logistics
Medical Staff
Eastern Europe Division
�
Audit Staff
'Southern Europe Division
Foreign Documents Division
Office of Communications
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Date Completed
February 1952
November 1953
March 1954
April 1954
April 1954
June 1954
July 1954
October 1954
December 1954
January 1955
April 1955
May 1955
June 1955
July 1955
July 1955
October 1955
November 1955
January 1956
. (b)(3)
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Foreign Foreign Broadcast Information Division
Office of Central Reference
Contact Division
Office of the Assistant Director,
Office of Operations
Soviet Russia Division
Office of the Deputy Director (Support)
Office of the General Counsel
Management Staff
Planning and Program Coordination Staff
Western Hemisphere Division
International Organizations Division
Technical Services Staff
Near East and Africa Division
Western Europe Division
Office of the Deputy Director
(Intelligence)
Office of Basic Intelligence
Far East Division
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Counterintelligence Staff*
Office of the Deputy Director (Plans)
* Report of survey not published.
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February 1956
April 1956
April 1956
May 1956
June 1956
July 1956
October 1956
December 1956
March 1957
April 1957
July 1957
February 1958
April 1958
May 1958
June 1958
February 1959
April 1959
July 1959
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Records Integration Division
Assessment and Evaluation Staff
Office of Personnel
Near East Division
CIA Training Program
Office of Security
Field Stations of Western
Office of Logistics
Western Hemisphere Division
Air Activities of CIA
National Photographic Interpretation
Center
Office of National Estimates
Near East Division.
Africa Division
Eastern Europe Division
Office of Central Reference
Technical Services Division
Cable Secretariat
Far East Division
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July 1959
July 1959
December 1959
April 1960
August 1960
December 1960
March 1961
Africa Division May 1961
Europe Division June 1961
June 1961
December 1961
February 1962
July 1962 0:0(3)
July. 1962
September 1962
November 1962
February 1963
April 1963
September 1963
October 1963
December 1963
January 1964
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Office of Personnel
Office of Research and Reports
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Western Hemisphere Division
Special Operations Division
National Photographic Interpretation
Center
Domestic Operations Division
Western Europe Division
Printing Services Division
Office of Security
Office of Finance
Office of Training
Domestic Contact Service
Office of Medical Services
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Soviet Bloc Division
Office of Communications
Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center
Office of Current Intelligence
Office of ELINT
May 1964
June 1964
August 1964
December 1964
April 1965
June 1965
August 1965
August 1966
September 1966
June 1967
July 1967
November 1967
November 1967
December 1967
May 1968 M(3)
July 1968
August 1968
October 1968 '
November
1968
December
1968
December
1968
February
1969
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Special Intelligence Staff
Foreign Intelligence Staff
Counterintelligence Staff
Office of Logistics
Near East and South Asia Division
Office of Basic and Geographic
Intelligence
Office of Computer Services
Office of Special Projects
Operational Services
Special Operations Division
Africa Division
Office of Personnel
Technical Services Division
Far East Division - Phase I
Office of Scientific Intelligence
Domestic Operations Division
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March 1969
May 1969
July 1969
July 1969
August 1969
November 1969
March 1970
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
April 1970
(b)(3)
May 1970
June 1970
November 1970
April 1971
April 1971
April 1971
May 1971
July 1971
September 1971
September 1971
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Appendix C
Special Studies and Surveys of Functions
1952
Security Briefings
Documentation
1954
Reduction in Cable Traffic
CIA-State Department Relations
1955
Raw Information
Board of Consultants
Clandestine Services Staff Reorganization
1956
Termination of Agency Employees
Returnee Program
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CIA Regulations
Junior Officer Trainee Program
CIA Briefing and Debriefing System
ELINT Program
News Highlights
TDY Foreign Travel by Headquarters Personnel During FY 1956
Instructions to Chi)efs of Station
Cover Facilities
Conditions in Payroll Branch
Handling of State Department Sensitive Cables
Handling of Clandestine Services Pouched Information Reports
1957
CIA: Principal Weaknesses and Suggestions for Improvement
Analysis of Agency Methods for Handling Personnel
Security Cases
The Brentano Embezzlements
Relief of Employees at Hardship Posts
Publications Survey
Co-ordination of Clandestine Collection
Handling of Cash
1958
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1959
Georgetown Machine Translation Project
Conflict of Interest
Career Service Program
Library Procurement Procedures
Safehouses
1960
Headquarters Courier System
1961
Implementation of Intelligence Directives
OCR Minicard Project
Senior Research Staff on International Communism
The Cuban Operation
Deficiencies in the Defector Program
1962
Agency Activities in the Miami Area
Agency Responsibility to Female Employees (Under 21)
Morale in the Special Intelligence Library
Threats to the Director
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Handling of Intelligence Information During the Cuban
Arms Build�up
Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board on the Cuban Arms Build�up
1963
Contract Employment of Dependent Wives Overseas
Fitness Reports
Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board on U.S. Foreign Intelligence Objectives
Personnel Security in CIA
Report to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board on Personnel Security in the CIA
1964
Foreign Intelligence Liaison Representatives
Handling of Defector Goleniewski
Inquiry Into Operational Security of CIA Activities
in the Miami Area
Handling of Returnee Assignments by the Clandestine
Services Career Service
Investigation of CIA Domestic Installations.
� (b)(1)
(b)(3)
Special Study for the Director
1965
Inquiry Concerning OSA�NPIC Coordination on Missile CO25C
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CIA Watch Mechanisms*
Real Property Accountability
Industrial Security
CIA Regulatory Issuances
Travel Administration
1966
Entrance on Duty and Exit Processing
CIA Intelligence Publications
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Dissension
in NPIC's Photographic Laboratory Branch
Study of the Procurement Systems of CIA
Agency Regulation on Payment of Night Differential
Management of Non-Staff Personnel
Studies on CIA Shortage and Loss Procedures
The Role of the Inspector General in Cases of Shortages,
Losses, and Misuse of Official Funds
Employment of Retired Former Government Employees
Foreign Intelligence Collection Requirements
1967
Agency Proprietary Activities
Career Training Program
* Study completed but report not published.
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Control of Classified Documents and Related Matters
Agency Honor Awards Program
Loss of 14 July 1967 Copy of PDB for JCS
Security of CIA Courier Systems
Special Report for the Director
1968
Morale in the Clandestine Service
1969
Married Couples in the Agency
Vietnamese Piasters
Practices
- Budgeting, Accounting, and Audit
Aircraft Loss and Replacement
Loss of
Documents
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems
Control of Firearms
1970
Survey of Job-Related Attitudes
Foreign Language Program
Summer-Only Employee Program
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(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) (b)(3)
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'Format Staff Funding Activities
The Drug Problem Among Dependents Abroad
(b)(1)
Security of (b)(3)
1971
Central Accessibility of Sensitive Personnel Information
Information Management in the Agency
Working House in the FMSAC Operations Center
Review of Full-Time Academic Training
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Orientation for Wives
Liaison with Foreign Intelligence Services �
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Appendix D
Source References*
1.
2.
3.
4.
CIG.
Organization
CIA Regulation
CIA Regulation
General
&
Order
Functions
S.
S.
S.
S.
- CIA, 1 Jan 49.
5.
Ibid.
6.
Notification
of
Personnel Action, Stuart Hedden,
30 Oct 51,
U.
7.
CIA Notice
8.
Personal History
Statement (PHS),
Stuart Hedden. U.
9.
Ludwell Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as
Director of Central Intelligence, 1950-53, Vol. II,
pp. 118-123. S.
10.
Ibid.
11.
Ibid.
12.
PHS, Stuart Hedden
(8 above).
13.
CIA Regulation
S.
14.
Notification of
Personnel Action, Stuart
Hedden
(6, above).
15.
Montague, op. cit, (9, above), Vol. II, p. 118.
16.
Memo, Redden to DD/P, 11 Jan 52, ER 2-4749. S.
17.
Memo, Hedden to Jackson, 26 Nov 51. S.
18.
IG report of survey of OCI, 7 Dec 51. S.
* Unless otherwise noted, documents are located in files
of the Inspector General.
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19.
20.
21.
CIA Draft
Office Message,
the Director,
CIA Notice
Notice
JDC to Wolf, recording
28 Dec 51. U.
call from
S.
22.
Memo for record,
Wisner, 2 May
52, ER 2-8632. S.
23.
Notification of Personnel Action, Stuart Hedden,
29 Dec 51. U.
24.
Hedden, Diary, 4 Jan 52. S.
25.
IG report of
survey, 8 Jan 52, ER 2-4642. C.
26.
CIA Notice
U.
27.
Memo
White
to Hedden, 16 Jan
52. U.
28.
CIA.
S.
29.
Redden,
Diary, 22 Jan 52, et
seq. S.
30.
Ibid., 11 Feb 52 et seq. S.
31.
PHS, Stuart Hedden (8, above).
32.
Hedden,Diary, 20 Feb 52. S.
33.
IG report of survey of OSI Aug 64, p. 21. S.
34.
Ibid.
35.
Redden, Diary, 18 Feb 52. S.
36.
Ibid.
37.
Memo, Hedden to IAC members, 19 Feb 52, ER 2-6056.
S.
38.
IG file, Inspection & Security, 1952. S.
39.
Memo for record, Hedden, 3 Jul 52, ER 2-0605. C.
4G.-
Memo, White to Wolf, 16 Jan 52. U.
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41.
42.
43.
Hedden, Diary, 23 Jan 52. S.
Memo, Kirkpatrick to DDCI, 22 Mar 62, sub:
Staffing the Inspector General Staff. S.
Notification of Personnel Action, Willard
Galbraith, 1.3 Apr 52. U.
44.
Hedden, Diary, 1 Apr 52. S.
45.
Memo for Project Review Committee, 22 Apr 52,
sub: Technical Services Staff Program for
FY 1953, TS 63394-A. TS.
46.
Memo, Redden to DCI, 15 Apr 52, ER 2-8010. S.
47.
Memo for record Wisner, 2 May 52, ER 2-8632. S.
48.
Ibid.
.49.
Ibid.
50.
Ibid.
51.
Memo for record, sub: Meeting in Administration
Building, Tuesday, 13 May, at 12:00. Noon. S.
52.
Ibid.
53.
Ibid.
54.
Redden, Diary, 11 Mar 52. S.
55.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
56.
Memo, Hedden to DCI, 30 Jup 52, TS 63779. TS.
57.
Memo, Galbraith to DDCI, 29 Aug 52, TS 63987-A.
TS.
58.
IG file, Far East Survey, 1952.. S.
59.
Memo, Hedden to DCI, 13 Jan 53. S.
60.
Montague, op. cit., (9, above), Vol. II, p. 123.
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61.
CIA Historical Staff, Chronology 1946-65, Vol. I,
p. 53. S. (hereafter referred to as Chronology).
62.
Interview, Earman to Greer, Nov 70.
63.
CIA Chronology,
(61, Above), Vol.
I, pi 53.
64.
CIA NOtice
U.
(b)(3)
65.
CIA Regulation
S.
(b)(3)
66.
Memo, Kirkpatrick
to DCI, 24 Aug 54.. S.
67.
Interview, Earman to Greer Nov 70.
68.
CIA Historical Staff, Key Personnel Named in
Agency Regulatory Issuances, 23 Jan 46-1 Jul 70,
p. 66.. S. (hereafter referred to as Key Personnel).
69.
Ibid., p. 83.
70.
Ibid.
71.
Interview, Earman to Greer, Nov 70.
72.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 1 Apr 53. TS.
73.
Ibid., 7 Apr 53.
74.
Memo, Kirpatrick to DCI, 20 Apr, 53. S.
75.
Key Personnel, (68, above), p. 84.
76.
Memo, Kirkpatrick to DCI, 8 Apr 53, ER 3-9299. S.
77.
Memo, DCI to DDP, 15 Apr 53, ER 3-9173. S.
78.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 6 May 53. TS.
79.
Ibid., 7 May 53.
80.
Ibid., 11 May 53.
81.
Annual Report of the IG, 24 Aug 54. S.
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82. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 2 Jun 53. TS.
83. Ibid., 3 Jun 53.
84. Memo IG to DCI, 17 Jun 53, ER 4-2503. S.
85; Annual Report of the IG, 24 Aug 54. S.
86. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 4 Jun 53, et seq. TS.
87. Ibid., 3 Jul 53.
88. Ibid., 8 Sep 53.
89. Ibid., 3 Jul 53.
90. Memo, IG to DDP, 11 Sep 53. S.
91. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 8 Apr 54. TS.
92. Memo, IG to DCI, 7 Dec 53. S.
93, Memo, IG to DCI, 20 Feb 54. S.
94. Memo, IG to DDP, 19 Mar 54. S.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Memo, IG to DCI, 6 Oct 54.
98. Memo for record, L. K. White, 7 Apr 54 ER 5-4151.
S.
99. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 22 Jul 54. S.
100. Ibid., 20 Sep 54.
lal. Ibid., 19 Aug 54.
102. Ibid., 18 Nov 54.
103. Memo, IG to Special Study Group, 13 Aug 54. S.
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104.
105.
106.
Memo, IG to DCI, 6 Oct 54. S.
Memo, DCI to DID? & IG, 17 Jan 55, ER 6-5057. S.
Memo, DID? to DCI, 19 Jan 55, DD? 1-4473. S.
107.
Ibid., handwritten note by DDCI on Routing &
Record Sheet.
108.
Memo, DCI to DDP,
15 Feb 55, ER 6-6645.
S.
109.
CIA Regulation
S.
(b)(3)
110.
Interview, Drain
to Greer, May 71.
111.
IG report of survey, EE Division, May 55. TS.
112.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 27 Jun 55. TS.
113.
CIA. S.
(b)(3)
114.
Cable Secretariat, SOP 210-110.1-IG,,23
Jun 66.
S.
115.
Memo, Earman
U.
to Maxwell Abell, 14 Dec
55, ER 7-7136.
116.
CIA Notice
S.
(b)(3)
117.
Chronology,
(61, above), Vol. II, p.
3.
118.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 16 Jan 56. TS.
119.
CIA Notice
IUO.
(b)(3)
120.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 3 Oct 62. TS.
121.
IG report
of survey of DD/S, Jul 56. S.
122.
CIA Notice
S.
(b)(3)
123.
Memo, Acting
IG to DDCI, 5 Feb 58, ER 10-792.
S. (handwritten
note �indicates received
7 Jul 57).
124,
CIA Regulation
S.
(b)(3)
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125.
126.
. 127.
� 128.
129.
SECRET
S.
S.
ER 10-1209.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
CIA Notice
CIA Regulation
Memo, IG to DCI,
Memo, Acting DD?
Memo, IG to Executive
C.
14 Nov 58. S.
to IG, 8 Dec 58. S.
Officer, 19 Sep 58,
130.
"Personal and Confidential" letter from "Kirk" to
"Dear Allen," 7 Mar 59. U.
131.
Attachment to memo, IG to DCI, 7 Mar 59. S.
132.
Memo, IG to DCI, 7 Mar 59. S.
133.
/bid.
134.
Attachment to memo, IG to DCI, 7 Mar 59. S.
135.
Buckslip attached to 134, above.
136.
Ibid.
137.
Memo Acting DDS to DCI, 24 Apr 59, DDS 59-2225.
S.
138.
Memo, DCI to Deputy Directors, 26 May 59, ER 11-4468.
S.
139.
Memo, Executive Officer to Deputy Directors,
25 Jun 59, ER 11-5733.
S.
140.
CIA Regulation
S.
(b)(3)
141.
Memo to file, Kirkpatrick,
1959. S.
sub: CIA Staff
survey,
142.
Chronology, (61, above), Vol. II, p. 31.
143.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 28 Feb 61. TS.
144.
Ibid., 22 Apr 61.
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145. Ibid., 26 Apr 61.
146. Ibid., 30 Apr 61.
147. Ibid., 4 May 61.
148. Interview, Shaffer to Greer, Apr 73.
149. Memo, IG to McCone, 20 Nov 61. TS.
150. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 23 Nov 61. TS.
151. Ibid., 24 Nov 61.
152. Memo, IG to DCI, 24 Nov 61, TS 173040/Add. TS,
153. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 4 Jan 52. TS.
154. Memo for record, C. P. Cabell, 28 Nov 61. S.
155. .An Analysis of the Cuban Operation by the DD/P,
18 Jan 62, TS-181884. TS.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166. CIA Notice
Memo Barnes to DDP, 19 Jan 62. S. EYES ONLY.
Memo, Kirkpatrick to Barnes, 22 Jan 62.
Memo, DDP to DCI, 27 Jan 62. S.
Memo, Dulles to McCone, 15 Feb 62. TS.
Interview, Earman to Greer, Nov 70.
Memo, McCone to Killian, 19 Jan 62. TS.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 29 Aug 61. TS.
Ibid., 3 Oct 61.
Ibid. ,:.1 Dec 61.
Chronology, (61, above), Vol. II, p. 49.
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167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
Chronology, Chronology, (61, above), Vol. II, p. 49.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 29 Mar 62. TS.
Chronology, (61, above), Vol. II, p. 53.
IG report of survey, NE Division, Apr 60. TS.
Memo, Bissell to DCI, 5 Mar 62, ER 62-1777. S.
EYES ONLY.
172.
Memo, Acting IG to DCI, 28 Mar
62, ER 62-1777/a.
S. EYES ONLY.
173.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 20 Mar 62.
TS.
174.
Ibid.
175.
CIA Notice
C.
176.
CIA Notice
177.
Kirkpatrick,
Diary, 4 Aug 55.
TS.
178.
Ibid., 24 Apr 62.
179.
Interview, Earman to Greer, 10
Jun 71.
180.
Ibid.
181.
Kirkpatrick,
Diary, 13 Apr 62.
TS.
182.
CIA Notice
C.
183.
Interview,
Earman to Greer, 10
Jun 71.
184.
Memo, DDCI to Deputy Directors,
ER 62-3291. S.
19 May 62,
185.
Memo, IG to DCI, 15 May 62. S.
186.
Kirkpatrick, Diary, 3 Oct 62.
TS.
187.
Ibid., 21 Oct 63.
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188. Inspector General's Survey of Handling of
Intelligence Information During the Cuban Arms'
Build-up, 20 Nov 62, p. 35. TS. (hereafter
referred to as the Internal Cuban Report).
189. IG report, Agency Activities in the Miami Area,
Aug 62. TS.
190. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 5 Nov 62. TS.
191. Internal Cuban Report p. 2. TS.
192. Ibid. p. 3.
193. IG file, Report to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board on Intelligence
Community Activities Relating to the Cuban
Arms Build-up (14 April through 14 October
1962). TS. (hereafter referred to as PFIAB
Cuban Report).
194. . All of the material appearing between source
references 193 and 194 is drawn from the
permanent IG file on the PFIAB Cuban Report.
195. Chronology, (61, above), Vol. II, p. 65.
196. Memo, Bundy to Chairman, USIB, 17 Jun 63. TS.
197. All of the material appearing between source
references 196 and 197 is drawn from the permanent
IG file on U.S. Foreign Intelligence Objectives,
1963.
198. Kirkpatrick, Diary, 4 Sep 63. TS.
199. Ibid., 21 Oct 63.
200, IG file, Personnel' Security in CIA, Oct 63. S.
201. IG special study, Personnel Security in CIA. S.
202. IG special study, Inquiry Into Operational Security
of CIA Activities in the Miami Area, Jun 64. S.
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203.
204.
205.
206.
Memo for record, J. S. Earman, 14 Nov 63. S.
Memo, Earman to Executive Director, 13 Dec 63. S.
Memo, Earman to Clarke, 12 Dec 63. S. EYES ONLY.
Interview, Blake and Drain to Greer.
207.
Memo, IG to DDCI, 27 Nov 63. S.
208.
Memo,.IG to DDCI, 2 Mar 63, ER 64-1615. S.
209.
Interview, Breckinridge to Greer.
210.
Ibid.
211.
Notifications of Personnel Action, Breckinridge
and Greer. U.
212.
IG special study, Inquiry Concerning OSA-NPIC
Coordination on Mission CO25C, Feb 65 . TS.
213.
IG file, Report of Survey of National Photographic
Interpretation Center, Jun 65. TS.
214.
Ibid.
215.
Ibid..
216.
Memo, White to Earman, 7 Apr 65. S.
217.
Memo, IG to
DCI, 10 Aug 66. S.
218.
CIA Notice
C.
219.
IG special
study, A Study of the Procurement
Systems of the Central Intelligence Agency,
July 66. TS.
220.
Interview, Breckinridge to Greer, Apr 73.
221.
IG special study, Foreign Intelligdnce Collection
Requirements, Dec 66. TS.
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222.
223.
IG IG special study, The Role of the Inspector
General in Cases of Shortages, Losses, and
Misuse of Official Funds, Nov 66. S.
Memo, IG to Chief, Support Services Staff,
6 Apr 67. S.
224.
Memo,IG to D/Pers, 27 Sep 67. S.
225.
K. Greer,
notes on staff meeting. S.
226.
CIA Notice
C.
227.
Key Personnel,
(68, above), p. 165. S.
228.
CIA Notice
S.
229.
Minutes of
IG staff meeting, 17 May 68. S.
230.
Greer notes, 7 Jun 68. S.
231.
Ibid., 12 Mar 69.
232.
IG Case
TS.
233.
IG special
study,
Morale of the Clandestine
Services, Nov 68. S.
234.
Stewart, daily log, 13 Feb 69. S.
235.
Memo, IG to ExDir, 8 Jan 70. S.
236.
IG file, Headquarters Interview Program.
237.
IG special study, Married Couples in the Agency,
Mar 69. S.
238.
IG special study, Planning, Programming and
Budgeting Systems,
Oct 69. S.
239.
CIA Notice
S.
240.
IG Cases
S.
241.
IG Cases
S.
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242. IG Case
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
S.
Stewart, daily log, 28 Apr 71. �S.
Ibid., 2 Jun 71. S.
IG report of survey, FE Division, 1971-72. S.
Stewart, daily log, 8 Jul 71. S.
IG special study, Liaison with Foreign Intelligence
Services, Dec 71. TS..
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