<SANITIZED> THE INSURGENT SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00716215
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01785
• Publication Date: July 7, 1982

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SE CET
TOT: 070014Z JUL 82
CIA 269159
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SERIAL:
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06 JULY 1982
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENLY
WARNING: INFORMATIW REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS S E VR E T WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
DIST : 06 JULY 1982
COUNTRY: iir
SUBJECT:
SOURCE:
THE INSURGENT SITUATION
SUMMARY, THE SALVADORAN INSURGENTS RETAIN APPROXIMATELY
THE SAME STRENGT HAS BEFORE THE 28 MARCH 1982 ELECTIONS,
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OCCUPY ESSENTIALLY THE SAME BASE AREAS, AND HAVE SUFFICIENT
ARMS, ALTHOUGH AMMUNITION IS IN SHORT SUPPLY. THEY HAVE ALSO
IMPROVED THEIR TACTICS. MORALE IS GENERALLY HIGH AMONG RURAL
INSURGENTS WHILE LOWER AMONG URBAN CADRE. ARMS INFILTRATION
CONTINUES BY AIR, LAND AND SEA. A CONTINUED WEAKNESS IS THE
INSURGENTS INABILITY TO REINITIATE URBAN MASS ACTIVITIES AND
ANY MEANINGFUL URBAN MILITARY OPERATIONS. FACTIONALISM ALSO
CONTINUES AMONG THE INSURGENT GROUPS, ALTHOUGH THE GROUPS
HAVE APPARENTLY AGREED ON A COMMON MILITARY PLAN. HOWEVER,
THE INSURGENTS ARE DIVIDED IN THEIR POSITION TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.
INSURGENT GOALS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE TO REASSERT THEIR MILITARY
PRESENCE, STRIKING AGAINST THE ECONOMY, MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT.
THEIR LONG-TERM GOAL IS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO THE CITY
ALTHOUGH THEY LACK THE ABILITY TO DO SO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
END SUMMARY.
1. INSURGENT STRENGTH REMAINS ABOUT EQUAL TO
THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD WITH APPROXIMATELY 5000 ARMED.
FULL-TIME INSURGENTS IN THE FIELD. WE BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBER
OF INSURGENTS THAT IS ACTUALLY IN COMBAT AT A GIVEN TIME IS
LESS THAN THE TOTAL ARMED BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
TRAINING, STATIC DEFENSE IN BASE AREAS, AND RESUPPLY AND OTHER
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. IN FACT. THE MAJORITY OF THE
ARMED INSURGENTS' TIME IS PROBABLY OCCUPIED WITH RESUPPLY
AND HOUSEKEEPING FUNCTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL BASE AREAS
BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF RESUPPLY AND LIVING CONDITIONS.
OTHER THAN FULL-TIME INSURGENTS, THERE ARE MILITIA ELEMENTS
THAT ARE CHARGED WITH ORGANIZING THE LOCAL POPULATION
IN RURAL AREAS, DEFENDING THE MASSES DURING RETREATS FROM BASE
AREAS, AND RESUPPLY. ARMED WITH OLD CAST-OFF ARMS, THESE
INSURGENT MILITIA CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS OF RURAL INSURGENTS. THE NUMBERS OF MILITIA
VARY; THE INSURGENTS GENERALLY INCLUUE ALL ABLE-BODIEU
MEN NOT INVOLVED IN FULL-TIME UNITS AS PART OF THE MILITIA
WITHIN EACH BASE AREA. THUS, THE TOTAL NUMBERS ARE A FUNCTION
OF THE NUMBER OF PEASANTS IN EACH BASE AREA.
2. FOLLOWING THE FAILED PRE-ELECTION OFFENSIVE, THERE
WERE SEVERAL REPORTS OF FOREIGNERS LEAVING INSURGENT RANKS AS
WELL AS INCREASED DESERTIONS OF INSURGENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE
CITIES; HOWEVER, DESERTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH
TO AFFECT SERIOUSLY THE INSURGENTS' OPERATIONAL ABILITY. A
CONTINUAL PROBLEM IS THE RECRUITMENT OF NEW CADRE. THE AGE
RANGE OF POTENTIAL RECRUITS IS APPROXIMATELY 12-18.
MOST RECRUITS ARE PROBABLY 15 OR UNDER AS OLDER TEENAGERS ARE
EITHER ALREADY INVOLVED IN INSURGENT GROUPS, IN SCHOOL, OR
PERFORMING OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE. OLDER RECRUITS ARE
SOMETIMES FOUND AMONG SOLDIERS WHO COMPLETE MANDATORY MILITARY
SERVICE. AS OLDER, EXPERIENCED INSURGENTS ARE LOST IN BATTLE,
THEY ARE BEING REPLACED BY YOUNGER AND INEXPERIENCED CADRE.
THIS TREND SHOULD CONTINUE, THUS DECREASING THE OPERATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS. THE CONSTANT REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINED FIELD
LEADERS DOWN TO THE SQUAD LEVEL PUTS A STRAIN ON INSURGENT
GROUPS THAT MUST SEND THEIR BEST CADRE ABROAD FOR TRAINING.
INSURGENT LEADERS ARE STRETCHED THIN IN THE FIELD. THE POOL OF
OLDER, EDUCATED AND HIGHLY-TRAINED COMMANDERS IS LIMITED.
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THUS, FRONT GROUP LEADERS ARE ABSORBED INTO THE ARMED GROUPS.
SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPING THE INSURGENTS' MASS ORGANIZATIONAL WORK.
3. INSURGENT STRONGHOLDS HAVE CHANGED LITTLE SINCE
1981. THE FARABUNDO MARTI POPULAR LIBERATION FORCES (FPL)
DOMINATES CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT WITH MOST UNITS DEPLOYED IN
THE EASTERN PART OF THE DEPARTMENT. THE FPL ALSO IS THE
LARGEST FACTION IN SANTA ANA DEPARTMENT EAST OF METAPAN AND IN
SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT ON CHINCHONTEPEC VOLCANO. THE PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) IS THE DOMINANT FACTION IN MORAZAN
NORTH OF THE TOROLA RIVER, USULUTAN DEPARTMENT, AND LA UNION
DEPARTMENT. THE ERP AND REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF CENTRAL AMERICAN
WORKERS IPRTCI HAVE DISPLACED THE FPL AS THE DOMINANT FACTION IN
THE TRES CALLES/SAN AGUSTIN AREA OF USULUTAN DEPARTMENT. THE
PRTC ALSO HAS CONTROL IN THE CERROS DE SAN PEDRO AREA OF
SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT. THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE
(EARN) CONTROL THE GUAZAPA VOLCANO BASE AREA. THE ARMED FORCES
OF LIBERATION (FAL) IS A MINOR PLAYER ON ALL WAR FRONTS.
RECENTLY ERP UNITS FROM USULUTAN AND SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT HAVE
DEPLOYED TO NORTHERN SAN MIGUEL DEPARTMENT, TRADITIONAL FPL
TERRITORY, TO ESTABLISH MORE SECURE BASE AREAS. AT THIS TIME.
THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG THE INSURGENT GROUPS APPEARS TO
HAVE SWUNG TOWARD THE EP. THE rpp rxrprIcEc CONTROL OVER FAPN.
FAL, AND PRTC UNITS IN THE EASTERN AND PARACENTRAL FRONTS AND
HOLDS A DOMINANT POSITION IN DECISIONMAKING IN THE CENTRAL
FRONT. THE FPL, ON THE OTHER HAND, FOR THE MOST PART ACTS
ALONE. THUS, THE ERP HAS BEEN ABLE TO SHOW THE STRONGEST
PRESENCE IN RECENT INSURGENT ACTIVITIES.
4. A PRINCIPAL INSURGENT STRENGTH HAS BEEN THEIR
ABILITY TO MAINTAIN STABLE BASE AREAS IN GUAZAPA, SAN AGUSTIN.
NORTHERN MORA7AN AND THE SAN VICENTE VOLCANO AREA. GOVERNMENT
MILITARY SWEEPS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY CLEARED INSURGENT STRONGHOLDS
FOR SHORT PERIODS, BUT FOLLOWING SWEEPS, THE INSURGENTS RETURN.
UNLESS SWEEPS ARE FREQUENT, AND THE MILITARY PRESENCE IS
MAINTAINED IN INSURGENT BASE AREAS, THERE IS LITTLE PERMANENT
DISRUPTION TO INSURGENT OPERATIONS. ONLY IN THE C:RROS DE
SAN PEDRO AREA AND EASTERN CHALATENANGO HAVE MILITARY OPERATIONS
SERIOUSLY HAD AN IMPACT ON INSURGENT ACTIVITIES.
5. INSURGENT URBAN OPERATIONS AND URBAN SUPPORT NETS
HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY DISRUPTED BY INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE POLICE
OPERATIONS. THE INSURGENTS BELIEVE THAT ARGENTINE ADVISORS
HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING AND CARRYING OUT
URBAN COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE AND TEACHING POLICE EFFECTIVE
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES. THERE IS A CONSTANT FEAR OF
INFILTRATION AND OPERATIONAL SECURITY HAS BEEN TIGHTENED.
FEAR HAS DRIVEN SOME URBAN CADRE TO SEEK REASSIGNMENT TO
RURAL UNITS.
6. BECAUSE OF THEIR LONG-TERM RESIDENCE IN THEIR
VARIOUS BASE AREAS, THE INSURGENTS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO BUILD
ELABORATE DEFENSES, DEVELOP FALLBACK DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. AND
ESTABLISH ROUTES OF RETREAT. THEY ALSO HAVE AN INHERENT
TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE ARMED FORCES BECAUSE OF THEIR
INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN. THESE BASE AREAS ARE SITUATED
TO ALLOW EASY ACCESS TO MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE
ELECTRIC GRID, AND RURAL GOVERNMENT OUTPOSTS. THUS, THE
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INSURGENTS HAVE THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT HIGH VISIBILITY,
ECONOMICALLY DESTRUCTIVE, BUT LOW-RISK, MILITARY OPERATIONS
WITH FEW LOSSES. THIS ABILITY SHOULD NOT BE SERIOUSLY REDUCED
IN THE SHORT TO MID-TERM AS LONG AS SECURE BASE AREAS ARE
MAINTAINED.
7. TACTICALLY, THE INSURGENTS HAVE IMPROVED
OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS. AMBUSH OPERATIONS ARE
BETTER PLANNED AND EXECUTED BUT MORE IMPORTANT, INSURGENT
COMMANDERS CAN NOW MOUNT COMPANY-SIZE OPERATIONS EFFECTIVELY.
ALSO, DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ARE BETTER DESIGNED ONLY TO YIELD
TERRITORY GRUDGINGLY AND EMPLOY CREATIVE COUNTERATTACKS TO HIT
THE ARMED FORCES AT THEIR WEAK POINTS. SNIPERS ARE EMPLOYED
TO KILL MILITARY OFFICERS. FIELD COMMUNICATIONS HAVE ALSO
BEEN IMPROVED WITH CAPTURED MILITARY RADIOS AND HAND-HELD
TRANSCEIVERS. FINALLY THE INSURGENTS HAVE GIVEN ATTENTION TO
FIELD INTELLIGENCE,
THE LACK OF A SUFFICIENT
TACTICAL AIRLIFT CAPABILITY BY THE ARMED FORCES ENSURES THAT
THE INSURGENTS ARE NOT OUTFLANKED.
8. THE INSURGENTS APPEAR TO BE WELL EQUIPPED WITH
ARMS, BUT AMMUNITION IS APPARENTLY IN SHORT SUPPLY.
DEFENDING AGAINST LARGE-SCALE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND
CONDUCTING LARGE UNIT OPERATIONSS THEMSELVES SERIOUSLY DRAINS
AMMUNITION RESERVES. THUS, THE INSURGENTS' CAPABILITY TO MOUNT
SUSTAINED MILITARY OPERATIONS SHOULD NOT IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY
WITHOUT AN IMPROVED RESUPPLY SYSTEM. EARLIER THIS YEAR
INSURGE4T GROUPS HAD A MIXTURE OF AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AND
BOLT-ACTION RIFLES; IT NOW APPEARS THAT THERE ARE ENOUGH
AUTOMATIC RIFLES FOR ALL ARMED INSURGENTS, WHICH ALLOWS INSURGENTS
TO ARM MORE MILITIA ELEMENTS. THE INSURGENTS APPEAR TO HAVE
IMPROVED THEIR DIRECT FIRE AND INDIRECT FIRE CAPABILITY WITH
THE USE OF RECOILLESS RIFLES AND MORTARS. THEY HAVE ALSO
A GREATER NUMBER OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM MACHINEGUNS USED IN A
FIRE SUPPORT AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ROLE. THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED
REPORTS THAT THE INSURGENTS HAVE OBTAINED ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILES
BUT NONE HAVE YET TO BE EMPLOYED.
9. THERE IS LITTLE HARD EVIDENCE OF LARGE-SCALE ARMS
_ENTERLIHE COUNTRY BY AIR. LAND AND SEA. SUPPORT NETS ARE RUN
INFILTRATION. IT APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT ARMS CONTINUE TO 7/
(b)(1)
FOR OVERLAND TRANSPORT OF
NICARAGUA HAS TAKEN ((ITO)
LARGE- AND SMALL-SCALE SHIPMENTS THERE HAS BEEN ONE REPORT OF
AN AIR BRIDGE OPERATED
EXTREME MEASURES TO MAINTAIN PLAUSIBLE DENIAL OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT (b)(3)
IF___N_AiricKittailY_s_bamrici_DPERArtnustery_rsuitlmtr_s__
(b)(1)
FRAGMENTARY REPORTS INDICATE THAT ARMS ARE STILL (b)(3)
ARRIVING ALONG THE PACIFIC COAST BETWEEN EL CUCO AND THE RIO LEMPA,
POSSIBLY BEING SHIPPED FROM NICARAGUAN PACIFIC PORTS SUCH AS
VENICIA. UNLESS THE SALVADORAN MILITARY INITIATES AGGRESSIVE
OPERATIONS TO CLEAR INSURGENT BASE AREAS AND FORCE THE INSURGENTS
TO EXPEND AMMUNITION, INSURGENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION STOCKS
SHOULD REMAIN ADEQUATE. ATTEMPTS BY THE ARMED FORCES TO
INTERCEPT ARMS SHIPMENTS INTERNALLY HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE
BECAUSE OF THE NUMEROUS ROUTES OF TRANSPORT AVAILABLE AND THE
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RANDOM NATURE OF THE SHIPMENTS. ALSO, SHIPMENTS ARE BROKEN
DOWN INTO SMALL QUANTITIES WHICH REDUCES THE IMPACT OF ANY
INDIVIDUAL ARMS BUST. INSURGENTS TAKE FEW PRECAUTIONS TO
CONCEAL WEAPONS FOR INTERNAL TRANSPORT AND EXPRESS LITTLE FEAR
OF INTERCEPT. THE SALVADORAN MILITARY HAS MADE LITTLE HEADWAY
IN DISCOVERING ORGANIZED ARMS INFILTRATION NETS.
10. MORALE AMONG INSURGENTS VARIES ACCORDING TO THE
AREA OF OPERATION, LEVEL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, HEALTH AND
NUMEROUS OTHER VARIABLES. GENERALLY, HOWEVER, INSURGENT MORALE
AMONG RURAL CADRE IS HIGH. THE COMMUNAL ATMOSPHERE OF RURAL
CAMPS AND RESTRICTED ACCESS TO OUTSIDE MEDIA TEND TO ESTABLISH
AN "ESPRIT DE CORPS- AMONG CADRE WHO REMAIN IGNORANT OF ANY
NEGATIVE FACTORS AFFECTING ON THEIR POSITION. SOME CADRE ARE
DISENCHANTED BECAUSE OF THE LENGTH OF THE STRUGGLE AND
HARD LIVING CONDITIONS. ALSO, BOREDOM SETS IN DURING LULLS IN
FIGHTING. IN EASTERN CHALATENANGO AND THE CERROS DE SAN PEDRO AREA,
MORALE IS APPARENTLY LOW BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF FOOD AND FREQUENT
HARASSMENT BY THE ARMED FORCES. AS CROPS ARE BROUGHT IN LATER
THIS YEAR, THE FOOD PROBLEM WILL BE EASED. THE INSURGENTS' TACTICAL
TRIUMPH IN THE MORAZAN OPERATON, WHICH THEY CALL
"COMPANERO GONZALO," SHOULD ALSO
GIVE THE INSURGENTS A MORALE BOOST. IN URBAN AREAS, INSURGENT
MORALE IS GENERALLY LOWER THAN IN THE COUNTRYSIDE BECAUSE OF
THE EXPOSURE TO GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA AND A MORE DIFFICULT
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.
11. SOME INSURGENT GROUPS BELIEVE THAT TOO MUCH
EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND NOT ENOUGH
ON MASS ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE CITY.
THIS HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY REASON FOR THE INSURGENTS' INABILITY
TO CREATE AN INSURRECTIONAL CLIMATE AND THEIR RETREAT TO A
STRATEGY OF ATTRITION, COUPLED WITH ISOLATING THE GOVERNMENT OF
EL SALVADOR DIPLOMATICALLY. THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY BLOC
IBPRI AND THE UNITED POPULAR ACTION FRONT (FAPU) HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO REINITIATE ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR SECTOR BUT WITH LITTLE
SUCCESS. THE SALVADORAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCES) IS ATTEMPTING
TO REBUILD ITS DEPLETED RANKS OF INTELLECTUALS. HOWEVER, THE
LOSS OF EXPERIENCED FRONT GROUP CADRE TO ARMED GROUPS OR POLICE
ROUNDUPS, THE LACK OF FUNDS, AND IMPROVED POLICE OPERATIONS IN
THE CITY WILL MAKE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL MOBILIZATION PRACTICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CITY FOR THE NEAR TO MID-TERM.
12. DESPITE THEIR LACK OF SUCCESS IN ORGANIZING THE
MASSES IN THE CITY,, THE INSURGENTS HAVE MADE GOOD STRIDES IN
ORGANIZING PEASANTS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN AREAS THEY CONTROL.
GOAZAPA IS A NOTABLE EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION. HOWEVER, INSURGENT RESOURCES ARE STRAPPED TO
HANDLE LARGE NUMBERS OF FOLLOWERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT FOLLOWERS
ARE NEEDED TO SUSTAIN THE INSURGENTS. THE ERP HAS HAD A
PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM HANDLING ITS FOLLOWERSI
THIS HAS CREATED FRICTION BETWEEN THE ERR AND FPL BECAUSE OF THE
LATTER'S DESIRE TO ABSORB THE ERP'S FOLLOWERS INTO ITS MORE
HIGHLY DEVELOPED ADMINSTRATIVE ORGANIZATION. AS LONG AS BASE
AREAS REMAIN SECURE, THE PROBLEM WITH FOLLOWERS SHOULD DECREASE
AND STAIBLIZE, ESPECIALLY AS HARVEST APPROACHES. THE SALVADORAN
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ARMED FORCES' HEAVY USE OF ARTILLERY AND THEIR TENDENCY TO ESTABLISH
FREE FIRE ZONES SHOULD CONTINUE TO CAUSE RURAL PEASANTS TO SEEK
THE PROTECTION OF THE INSURGENTS IN TRADITIONAL INSURGENT
TERRITORY.
13. FACTIONALISM CONTINUES TO BE A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM
AMONG THE INSURGENT GROUPS. WHILE "DOMESTIC" DISPUTES ARISE
AMONG ALL FACTIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, THESE DO NOT
SERIOUSLY DISRUPT OPERATIONS. AT THE FRONT AND FARABUNDO
MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IFMLN1 CENTRAL COMMAND LEVEL,
BASICALLY THE FPL VERSUS (b)(1)
THE FMLN. IN OTHER WORDS, THE L RATES ALMOST TOTALLY (b)(3)
INDEPENDENT FROM THE OTHER FMLN GROUPS. MEANWHILE, THE ERP
APPEARS TO DOMINATE MILITARY PLANNING WITHIN THE FMLN COMMAND
STRUCTURE. THE DEEP PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES AND DISTRUST
AMONG THE GROUP LEAUERS SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAMPER JOINT
PLANNING AND REDUCE MUTUAL SUPPORT; PARTICULARLY DURING LARGE-SCALE
OPERATIONS. AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL, UNITS FROM THE DIFFERENT
FACTIONS ARE SEGREGATED INTO SEPARATE CAMPS AND DO NOT TRAIN
TOGETHER. THIS HAMPERS JOINT TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND INCREASES
THE INCIDENCE OF BICKERING AND INFIGHTING.
14. WHILE UNITY REMAINS A PROBLEM, THE FMLN HAS APPARENTLY
AGREED ON A COMMON MILITARY STRATEGY WHICH EMPHASIZES
"ANNIHILATION", "RECUPERATION", AND "DISRUPTION" OPERATIONS;
SMALL-SCALE ACTIONS AND MOBILITY ARE EMPHASIZED WHILE THE
TAKING OF TOWNS IS NOT ENCOURAGED. THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH FOLLOWS
A BASIC FPL STRATEGY, HAS ALREADY BEEN BROKEN WITH THE ERP'S
OCCUPATION OF PEROUIN AND SAN FERNANDO. YET, THE ERP'S ACTION
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED MORE AS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A FAVORABLE
TACTICAL SITUATION IN WHICH THE RISK WAS WORTH THE GAIN,
PARTICULARLY IN THE PROPAGANDA SENSE. THIS ERP PHILOSOPHY OF
OPPORTUNISM WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THEIR
OPERATIONAL GOALS IN ANY GIVEN ENCOUNTER.
15. THE INSURGENTS' POSITION TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT ALSO APPEARS TO BE DIVIDED. THE
INSURGENTS KNOW THAT THEY MUST SEEM INTERESTED IN A NEGOTIATING
IN ORDER TO RETAIN SUPPORT FROM WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SO THEY
WILL CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE NEGOTIATIONS. YET THERE APPEAR TO BE STRONG
DIVISIONS OVER WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE SINCERE OR ONLY
USED AS A TACTIC WHILE PURSUING A MILITARY VICTORY. WHILE THE
FPL SUPPORTS THE LATTER POSITION, THE OTHER FMLN GROUPS APPEAR
TO BE WILLING LEGITIMATELY TO SEEK SOME SORT OF DIALOGUE WITH
SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. THE DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTIONARY FRONT IFDR1, AND POSSIBLY THE PCES AND FARN, ARE
PUSHING THE LATTER LINE AS A RISK-FREE MEANS OF ACHIEVING
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND REDUCING SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN
GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY FROM THE U.S. YET, INSTEAD OF A
LARGE-SCALE EFFORT TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS, THE FOR AND ELEMENTS
OF THE FMLN WILL APPARENTLY SEEK TO ESTABLISH LOWER-LEVEL DIALOGUES
WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MILITARY ELEMENTS TO BUILD -
GRASSROOTS SUPPORT FOR SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, AS LONG
AS THE FMLN DOES NOT ACHIEVE A MILITARY PRESENCE TO THREATEN
SERIOUSLY THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES. THEY REALIZE THAT THE
GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE WILLING TO OFFER ACCEPTABLE CONCESSIONS.
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16. INSURGENT MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS
APPEARS TO BE DESIGNED TO REESTABLISH THEIR MILITARY CREDIBILITY
BY EXECUTING HIGH VISIBILITY ATTACKS THAT WILL DRAW ATTENTION
IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THE RECENT CAPTURE OF PERQUIN AND
SAN FERNANDO THUS WAS MORE A PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY TO REESTABLISH
THE FMLN'S PRESENCE THAN AN OPERATION SEEKING MILITARY GAINS.
YET, BECAUSE OF THE ARMED FORCES' MISTAKES, THE ERP WAS ABLE
TO GET THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VICTORY
AS A BONUS. INSURGENT TACTICS ARE DESIGNED TO CAUSE MAXIMUM
MILITARY CASUALTIES AND INFLICT MAXIMUM DAMAGE AGAINST THE
ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE. THE INSURGENTS HOPE TO CONTINUE TO
RETAIN THE TACTICAL INITIATIVE AND DICTATE THE TIME AND TERRAIN
OF BATTLE.
17. IN THE INTERMEDIATE TERM, THE INSURGENTS HOPE TO
CREATE A CRISIS OF DECISION WITHIN THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT
AND WEAKEN THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES. THEY HOPE TO MAINTAIN
AND EXPAND THEIR SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHILE REDUCING THE
SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. A PARTICULAR TARGET IS
THE U.S. CONGRESS, WHERE, THROUGH POLITICAL CONTACT, THEY ARE
ATTEMPTING TO RESTRICT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
18. THE INSURGENTS' LONG-TERM GOAL IS TO BRING THE
BATTLE TO THE ENEMY BY RETURNING THE WAR TO THE CITIES.
ALSO, THEY CONTINUE TO DESIRE A TOTAL CONTROL OVER
SOME TERRITORY WHICH WILL IMPROVE THEIR CHANCES OF GAINING
RECOGNITION OF THEIR STATUS AS
BELLIGERENTS. WHILE THEY HAVE IMPROVED THEIR
LARGE-UNIT OPERATIONS, CAN TAKE OVER TOWNS FOR SHORT PERIODS,
AND PRESSURE LARGE TOWNS IN EASTERN EL SALVADOR FOR SEVERAL
DAYS, THE INSURGENTS STILL LACK THE ABILITY TO TAKE AND HOLD
TERRITORY INDEFINITELY BECAUSE OF THE SALVADORAN MILITARY'S
SUPERIOR FIREPOWER. THE ERP'S HEAVY LOSSES DURING THEIR
OCCUPATION OF USULUTAN IN MARCH 1982 SHOWED THE PRICE THAT IS
PAID FOR OCCUPYING CITIES WITHOUT SUFFICIENT LOGISTICS OR
RESERVES. THE INSURGENT MILITARY CAPABILITY HAS PRACTICALLY PEAKED
BARRING (Al A CUTOFF IN AID TO THE SALVADORAN MILITARY;
(B) A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT;
(C) THE ACQUISITION BY THE INSURGENTS OF IMPROVED FIRE SUPPORT AND
ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, OR IMPROVED LOGISTICS; (D) A REVERSAL OF
THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM: OR fE) WIDESPREAD REPRESSION BY
THE MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICES. YET, AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL, IT
REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT THREAT FOR THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT
AND ARMED FORCES, PARTICULARLY OVER THE LONG TERM AS ATTRITION
TAKES EFFECT AND THE WILLINGNESS OF SOME COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT
THE SALVADORAN GOV
19
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