SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01247369
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01084
• Publication Date: December 18, 1975

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Prospects for Further Praferation
of Nuclear Weapons
SNIE 4.1.74
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Warning Notice
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WNINTEL)
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
SNIE 4-1-74
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIKECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE,
THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:
The following Intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State, Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Agency, and the Energy
Research and Development Administration,
Concurring:
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the
Treasury
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research und
Development Administration
Abstaining:
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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CONTENTS
DISCUSSION , 3
I, INTRODUCTION AND REAFFIRMATION OF SNIE 41.74 . 3
A, New Estimates , L1141 ,,,,, .11.111.1 4
B. Key Technical Considerations � � 4
C. Uncertainties and Principal Determinants , . 5
D. National Objectives in Developing a Nuclear Device � .
II, EARLIEST DATES OF TIIE TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF
POSSESSION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE ... , ,
A. The Republic of China ,
B. Pakistan ..... ..... � � � ......... � � ,
C. South Africa ....... IIIII/111111111111111111i.t.;.1i
D. The Republic of Korea
E. Other Countries 9
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PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PRECIS
We reaffirm the major judgments of SN1E 4-1-74 which addresses
the problem of prospects for further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
It is concluded in the SNIE that in the 1980s the production of nuclear
weapons will be within the technological and economic capabilities of
many countries but that the principal determinant of the extent of nu-
clear weapons proliferation in the coming years will be political con-
siderations,
This Memorandum to Holders addresses the concept that some coun-
tries might seek to further their political, and even military, objectives
by the acquisition of a very modest nuclear explosive capability with-
out time-consuming "weaponization" efforts. It concludes that there are
a number of countries that could accumulate sufficient fissionable
material, complete the necessary nuclear explosive research and de-
velopment work, and thus be in a position to fabricate a nuclear ex-
plosive device without having violated the letter of the safeguard
provisions of the IAEA or NPT. The fabrication could take no more
than a few days. In virtually all cases, taking this step would involve
the violation of safeguard agreements.
The earliest technically feasible dates when various countries could
have a nuclear device in hand are shown in Table 1, page 6. The dates
are based on technical capability. They are not dates considered prob-
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DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION AND REAFFIRMATION
OF SNIE 4-144
1. SNIE 4-1-74 of August 1974 addresses the
problem of the prospects for further proliferation of
nuclear weapons. We reaffirm the major judgments
that it contains, Still valid is its discussion about
the "barriers" to proliferation, including the tech-
nological requirements for developing a nuclear ex-
plosive and the international restrictions such , as
the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
Agency ( IAEA) and provisions of the Treaty on -
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ( NPT ).
2. The major judgments of SNIE 44-74, in es-
sence, are:
� In the 1980s, the production of nuclear weap-
ons will be within the technological and eco-
nomic capabilities of ninny countries, The prin-
cipal determinant of the extent of nuclear
weapons proliferation in coming years will,
however, be political considerations�includ-
ing the policies of the superpowers with re-
gard to proliferation, the policies of suppliers
of nuclear materials and technology, and re-
gional ambitions and tensions.
It is likely that India will proceed to fabri-
cate weapons covertly, lint the US or the USSR
still might be able to dissuade its leaders. An
Indian decision to proceed with an overt
weapons program on any scale will he one
factor inclining some other countries to fol-
low suit,
� A large collection of - fragmentary and partly
circumstantial evidence leads IN to believe
that Israel already has produced nuclear -
weapons. We do not expect the Israelis to
provide confirmation of widespread suspi-
dons of their capability, either by nuclear
testing or by threats of use, short of a grive
threat to the nation's existence,
It would require very fundamental changes,'
such as the breakup of major defense alliances
accompanied by a substantial increase in strife
and tension throughout the world, to induce
countries like West Cernumy, Sweden, Can-
ada, and Italy to exercise their near-term
capability.
The Director of Central Intelligence, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Department of
� State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for In-
telligence, Department of the Army believe
that japan would not embark on a program of
nuclear weapons development in the absence
of a major adverse shift in great power rein-
tionships which presented Japan with a dear-
cut threat to its security.' The Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, De-
* The Energy Berardi nod Development Administra-
tion now associates Itself with this position, The Defense
Intelligence Agency was associated with this position, hid
It is now associated with the position of the Director of
Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and OW AN.
NiNtnili Chief of Stall', Intelligence, Department of the Air
Force, See the SNIP'. for the development of this position
awl for the expansion ol these and the other follginents,
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partment of the Air Force, we a strong champ
that Japan's leaders will conclude that they
must have nuclear weapons if they are to
achieve their national objectives in the devel-
oping Asian power balance. Such a decision
could come in tlw early 19K0s.
Less sweeping changes could induce one or
another of the lestondvanued nations to mount
the sort of nuclear effort India mid Israel have
made.
A, New Estimates
3. The possibility that some countries might seek
to further their political and even military objectives
by the acquisition of a very modest nuclear explo-
sive capability, without time-consuming "weapon-
Ization" efforts. Is referred to in SN1E 4-1-74 (see
Conclusion j), but it is not explored in depth. In
the past year, additional analysis has refined esti-
mates about the facilities and the time that are
required for development of an unweaponized de-
vice by certain countries. This Memorandum to
Holders is intended to supplement the SNIE by
presenting the estimates derived from the results
of this analysis. The criteria used in making these
estimates are:
a nuclear device based on the possession of
about 10 kilograms or more of chemically
separated plutonium 2 or a somewhat larger
amount of uranium highly enriched in U-235,
and the completion of high explosive (11E)
weapon research for the design of an implo-
sion system and fabrication of a device, It
would be capable of being delivered to a
target only by a transport aircraft or some
form of surface transport; or, in the extreme,
it would be so large that It would be suitable
only for a demonstration test.
(b) an indigenous development program to in-
clude contracted assistance from outside
sources. Neither national, or subnational,
theft nor purchase of nuclear weapons is
Separated plutonium ix plutonium (either weapon-grade
or reactor-grade) that has been removed by chemical re.
processing from irradiated reactor fuel. Reactor-grade plu-
tonium in "dirty" plutonium (1,e� high Pu-240 content)
produced in a power reactor in normal operation. Weapon-
grade plutonium is "Clean" plutonium (i.e., low ru.240
content ) produced In a lamer reactor or research reactor
where the irradiation time of the fad Is limitvd,
considered. Also not considered are the Use
of nuclear material owned by other countries
or the "crash.' construction of nuclear re-
actors designed only for the production of
plutonium,
a production capability that would not neces-
sarily violate the letter of the safeguard prm
visinits of the IAEA or NP'!', NPT safeguards
prohibit the manufacture of nuclear explo-
sives, IAEA safeguards that apply to non-
NPT parties do not necessarily preclude the.
development of peaceful nuclear explosives,
The Director General of the IAEA has stated,
however, that the safeguards involve an
obligation that the nuclear materials should
not be used for the development, manufao
tore or testing of nuclear explosives of any
kind, Neither set of safeguards addresses
high explosive research or nuclear explosive
design work, A treaty or safeguard violation
would not occur until fissionable material
was diverted to prohibited nuclear explosive
use. A violation would be confirmed if an
unauthorized device were to be exploded
or if the possession of illegal -nuclear explo-
sives were officially. acknowledged.
4. Based on the foregoing criteria, our evidence
on the plans and activities of the various countries,
and our assessment of their technical capabilities,
we have estimated an earliest technically feasible
date that a country could have an .unweaponized
nuclear device in hand. No allowances are made
for possible delays in decisionmaking that might
stem from poor technical planning and execution,
or for delays generated by external obstacles and
pressures. It is an earliest date based on technical
feasibility, not a date considered probable.
B. Key Technical. Considerations
5. Our estimates are based for the most part on
the availability of plutonium that is produced by
power or research reactors and the assumption that
It is usable in a nuclear explosive.3 In the case of
3 Thix relatively crude assessment stands In Lt,wrast to
the US nuclear weapons program where overriding im-
portance attaches to many other considerations such Its
very elaborate requirements for nuclear safety and the spe-
cial design oblective of high efficiencies produced by com-
pact devices deliverable by advanced weapon systems. -
�
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treolL
the South Africans, however, our estimate IISSUIlleS
as the fissionable material enriched uranium from
their uranium enrichment pilot plant now re-
portedly in operation.
6. There IS little reasonable doubt that many.
countries could design and manufacture a few nu-
clear devices using either weapon-grade Onto-
tilui� or reactor-grade plutonium.4 The designers
probably would have high cmifklence, without
testing, that their devices would yield at least a
kiloton or two, though they might be less certain
about minal yields which indeed would be highly
variable, especially if reactor-grade plutonium were
involved. We do not know, of course, whether that
confidence in the potential performance of an un-
tested device could be imparted successfully to a
country's military and political leadership,
7. If size is not a constraint, development of a
fuzing and firing system suitable for a nuclear de-
vice entails fairly standard technologies and there-
fore does not constitute a significant barrier. Many
of the components needed for such a system could
be purchased in international markets, and the
necessary development and fabrication ,work could
be performed secretly at a standard electronics
Installation.
C. Uncertainties and Principal Determinants
8. There are uncertainties of an essentially tech-
nical nature involved in estimating the earliest
technically feasible date for the fabrication of a
nuclear device. They are;
� the time needed to construct a fuel reproc-
essing facility (such a facility is needed to
remove the plutonium from the irradiated
fuel elements);
� the wide range of times that might be needed
to design a suitable implosion system and con-
duct its testing;
� alternative possibilties for fissionable mate-
rial production such as using the kind of plu-
tonium produced by power reactors operating
normally or reactors operated in a manner that
would result in the production of weapon.
grade plutonium; and
4 See footnote 2, page 4.
� the degree of confidence In the potential per-
holmium of a device that the designers feel
must be achieved in order to meet whatever
criteria have been imposed by the national
leadership.
9. And there are much greater uncertainties
about potential proliferation that are not technical.
To a greater or lesser degree, economic costs must
be weighed by &vision-makers. But, as we note
in SNIP; 44-74, the principal determinant of the
extent of thicitiar weapons proliferation in coining
years will be political considerations. These will in-
chide the policies of the superpowers with regard
to proliferation, the policies of suppliers of nuclear
materials and technology, and regional ambitions
and tensions.
10, Recently major suppliers of nuclear materials
and technology tentatively agreed on a series of
guidelines 5 intended to reduce the possibility that
their exports :night be applied to nuclear weapon
programs. In addition, all major suppliers which are
parties to the Nil', undertake not to assist any non-
nuclear-weapons state develop nuclear explosives
for any purpose, and not to transfer any nuclear
material unless it is subject to IAEA safeguards.
France has indicated publicly that it would act as
though it were a party to the NPT in regard to
these obligations.
11. A nonnuclear-weapons state that is an NPT
party accepts IAEA safeguards covering the full
nuclear fuel cycle. A non-NPT state accepts IAEA
safeguards on materials received from suppliers that
are NPT parties. These safeguards provide for peri-
odic inspection of facilities and accounting of nu-
clear materials by IAEA inspectors. There are only
a few countries, including Egypt, Israel, India,
South Africa, and Spain, which have certain nuclear
facilities that are not subject to IAEA inspections,
In some of these cases, however, facilities are sub-
ject to bilateral safeguards.
12. Although there is no system of formal sane-
tions against unauthorized use or diversion of nu-
clear materials, exposure of such an act through the
IAEA inspection system would almost certainly risk
Thr US, USSR, UK, Canada, France, West Germany,
and Japan are the enuntrleti Involved in developing these
guldellnec
5
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loss or curtailment of foreign nuclear assistance. A
country undertaking, for example, an ambitious nu-
clear power program predicated on outside assist-
ance might well regard this risk as unacceptable.
A country whose primary objective is fabrication
of a nuclear explosive and whose acceptance of
safeguards arose from a desire to facilitate acquisi-
tion of nuclear materials and technology would pre-
sumably be willing to take its chances. It Is unlikely
that diversion of significant amounts (kilogram
quantities) of nuclear materials in violation of safe-
guards would remain long undetected; thus, in the
perception of a potential proliferator, there might
be little meaningful choice between clandestine di-
version and outright abrogation of safeguards,
D. National Oblectives in Developing a
Nuclear Device
13. The countries considered in this Memoran-
dum might have one or more objectives for trying
to develop a nuclear device despite adverse world
opinion. They might wish to have a status symbol
which would permit them to achieve recognition
as an advanced, and potentially powerful, 'state.
They might wish to have n deterrent to discourage
or at least raise the potential cost of the initiation
of either conventional or nuclear hostilities by an
adversary. A country might want to be able to em-
ploy a direct or implied threat to use a nuclear de-
vice in order to demand and obtain concessions
from an adversary without a similar capacity. It
might wish to use the device in n military conflict
with a nation that had no ability to retaliate in kind.
Finally, a peaceful nuclear explosive program might
be the sole objective.
14. Many of the possible objectives of a would-be
nuclear proliferator might be achieved without the
actual testing of a nuclear explosive or officially
acknowledging that it possesses such a capability.
A case in point is Israel. It "enjoys" many of the
advantages of such possession without having to
risk thri possible consequences of an official ac-
knowledgement or an actual test of a device or
weapon. Israel is, however, remarkable for its tech-
nical sophistication. Countries less endowed with
skilled personnel may feel that testing is necessary,
both to prove design performance and to attract
world attention.
IL EARLIEST DATES OF THE TECHNICAL
FEASIBILITY OF POSSESSION OF A
NUCLEAR DEVICE
.15. Estimates of the earliest technically feasible
dates, based solely on technical requirements, when
potential nuclear proliferators could have their first
nuclear explosive follow, (See Table 1 for the listing
of these dates by country.)
A. The Republic of China (ROC)
10. There is convincing evidence that the ROC
has a specific program to 'develop nuclear devices.
There is, however, no evidence on which to base
a judgment about whether or when this work might
be converted into a nuclear weapons- program. We
believe, nonetheless, that .the ROC's fear of the
power of the Peoples Republic of China and of iso-
lation from the other nations of the free World and
its concern over the extent of US support establish
n strong incentive for development of a nuclear
weapons capability.
17. Shortly after the detonation of the first nu-
clear device in Chinn In October 1904, Chiang Kai-
slick ordered the establishment of a nuclear weapon
TABLE 1
EARLIEST TECIINICALLY FEASIBLE DATE FOR
A NUCLEAR DEVICE*
Japan
Vest Germany, Italy, Can-
ada, Sweden, Spain
Republic of China
Pakistan
South Africa
Argentina
Republic of Korea
RrniI
Yugoslavia
Iran
Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Libya
North Koren, Cuba, North
Vietnam
Eastern European nations
Within 1.2 years of n decision.
Within 1.2 years of a decision
1978
1978
1970.1978
1978
1979
1980
1980
1082
Unlikely before 1983
Not within next 10 years
Not in the foreseeable future
�A nue/par device based on the possession of about 10
kilograms or more of separated plutonium or n somewhat
larger amount of highly enriched U-235, and the comply-
thin Of I1E weapon research for a successful implosion sys-
tem and fabrication of a device,
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Nuclear Activities of Selected Countries
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.AUSTRIA__. 1 950 R R
BELGIUM - R R
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BRAZIL. _ _ 2,350
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,BULGARIA 1 3 150 2,760 _ R R
CANADA ,.. 8 5 _4,550 17,700 , 0 R R
CHINA, RIP, 01 3_ 16 1,500 R R
. .
CZECHOSLOYAIAA � 330 1,600 R R
DENMARK(GRF1NLAND) � R R
EGYPT _ _ _ � R
.FINLANO�, R R
1,350
GERMANY' , Et iT 2 2 260 R R
.._ . .. 3,300_,
-A R R
GERMANy,..ifir 57 A a _ . _ ..... ..
*51 q_ ,L350 20,400
GREECE _ � _ . _ R R
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_HUNGARY._ 1. PR
INDIA 2 3 2 1,230_ �. 3,300., 0., 0 R
IRAN_ _ _ 1 PR
ISRAEL � ci 13,' .....,..._._ ..._.....
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ITALY � 0 0 2 3 'R _
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JAPAN a a 0 i ..,k 8 2J...' 4,408 24,500, _ !'.. R
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LIBYA R R
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PAKISTAN _ ._ � 210 1 050
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-PORTUGAL . ... � ... � S.
ROMANIA R.
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research institute, which he initially placed under
military control. Although it was announced in 1988
that the Institute was being transferred to civilian
authorities, there is evidence that the military still
plays a major role In its operation. There have been
several recent reports that the institute is now carry-
ing out research and development on high explo-
sives and design work on nuclear explosives and
that it is acquiring certain materials suitable for the
fabrication of nuclear devices.
18. A 40 megawatt, natural uranium reactor has
already operated long enough to have produced
irradiated fuel elements cant ming enough plu-
tonium for one or two nuclear devices. A pilot
chemical separation plant Is planned; it will have
the capacity to separate enough plutonium each
year for at least one device. The ROC attempted
earlier this year to obtain from France the design
of a separation plant, but the French Government
aborted the transaction. There is recent evidence
that the ROC now intends to desige and build the
facility on its own with some foreign technical as-
sistance and using components purchased abroad.
We judge that Taiwan has the technical compe-
tence to succeed in this project within two or three
years. It will then be in a position to divert sep-
arated plutonium to fabrication of a nulcear device.
In so doing, however, it would violate its obligations
under the NPT as well as the resultant IAEA safe-
guards that apply to all of its nuclear materials. The
potential availability of this plutonium, coupled
with the ongoing high explosive and weapon re-
search and development, lead us to the judgment
that the ROC could have a nuclear device in hand
as early as 1978. It is unlikely to attempt to actually
fabricate a device, however, before it judges the
political and strategic situation to be desperate
enough to justify open acknowledgement of a nu-
clear explosive capability.
B. Pakistan
19. The uneasiness in Pakistan which developed
after the Indian nuclear test of 1974 was subse-
quently increased by India's continuing naval de-
velopment program, its absorption of Sikkim, and
its agreement with Kashmiri nationalist leader
Sheikh Abdullah in February 1975 that further
consolidated its hold over most of disputed Kash-
min Although India and Pakistan made progress
in the past year in resolving some of their differ-
ences on trade and communications, key differ-
ences remain, and the Pakistanis continue to hold
that India seeks a weak, unstable, and even a dis-
membered Pakistan.
20. Shortly after the Indian nuclear test, Prime
Minister Bhutto reportedly stated
hat he had completed a plan which would
insure that Pakistan would produce a nuclear de-
vice in four years. 'Bhutto stated publicly in late
1974 that Pakistan would explode a nuclear device
if denied the help it sought in strengthening its
conventional military capabilities. The US decision
in February 1975 to end its embargo on sales of
conventional arms to Pakistan and India may have
reduced Pakistan's motivation to develop nuclear
weapons, but we believe that it did not remove
it. On balance, we conclude that the Pakistanis
still intend to try to acquire a nuclear capability.
21. Since 1972, the Pakistanis have been operat-
ing a natural waning; power reactor. We estimate
that there could be as much as 200 kilograms of
plutonium in irradiated fuel elements being stored
in the site's cooling ponds. Pakistan plans to con-
struct a small chemical reprocessing facility with
French assistance, but negotiations have been dead-
locked over the issue of safeguards and no contract
has yet been signed. The French are insisting . on
stringent conditions which include IAEA safeguards
and a prohibition against retransfer of materials
and against replication of the technology. Strict
adherence to these conditions would severely cir-
cumscribe the facility's value for a nuclear weapons
program. We believe that the facility could be com-
pleted two or three years after construction begins.
Assuming an early start, as well as completion of
HE and weapons research and development (R&D)
concurrent with construction of the reprocessing
plant during this time period, the Pakistanis could
develop a device as early as 1978.
C. South Africa
22. There is no indication that South Africa cur-
rently is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The
only likely military threat to South Africa would
come from its African neighbors, Its military capa-
bility is so much greater than theirs that it has
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no military need for nuclear weapons in the fore-
seeable future. Its political and psychological ha-
Intim could, however, affect its perception of such
a threat and it might then fed the need to enhance
its already significant deterrent capability with
nuclear weapons,
23, South Africa is not a party to the Nrr and,
although it requires IAEA safeguards, to apply to
all nuclear materials It exports, some of its own �
nuclear facilities are not subject to safeguards.
South Africa enjoys, therefore, a measure of flexi-
bility not available to Nil' states or to states de-
pendent on the major suppliers for nuclear materials
and technology. On the other hand, a South African
official has indicated that his government will (=-
skier ratification of the NPT, if it is demonstrated
that safeguards can be applied in a manner that
both satisfies IAEA requirements and preserves the
secrecy of South Africa's enrichment process. -
24. Although South Africa will have no power
reactors until the 1980s, a plant for the separation
of uranium isotopes is now in operation. The South
Africans have announced that the plant produces
only low-enriched material. But it may be able to
produce highly enriched material now; if not, It
probably could. be adapted either by use of a dif-
ferent operational mode (called "batch" operation)
or through plant modification which probably
would take a year or two. If the design of the
plant enables it to produce highly-enriched mate-
rial now, enough of this material could be available
for n nuclear device as early as 1976. Although we
have no evidence of high explosive and weapon
research and development underway in South
Africa, such activities could be taking place and,
indeed, could have been completed already without
our knowledge. We conclude that South Africa
could develop a nuclear device, using U-235, some.
time in the 19764978 period.
D. The Republic of Korea (ROK)
25. President Pak Chong-hors decision to give
high priority to a nuclear explosives program re-
portedly remains firm despite increasingly 'evident
problems associated with its cost and complexity
and the risk that pursuit of such a program will
have adverse political effects in the region and
seriously complicate ROK-US relations. Present ef-
forts largely are confined to tlw planning stages
and much of what has been done so far is in direct
support of the government's ambitious power pro-
gram, A US-supplied power reactor which uses
Slightly enriched uranium probably will be opera-
tional in 1977, and by 1978 will have produced
Irradiated fuel suitable for reptocessing, The ROK
government is currently negotiating with the French
for the construction of a small reprocessing plant.
In the face of strong US pressures to prevent such
an arrangement, the ROK has taken an equally
strong position that it has the right to have such
a plant, on the basis that it is intended only for
training purposes and therefore does not represent
a potential for the development of nuclear explo-
sives,
26. If the ROK and France conclude an agree-
ment and the ROK chooses to defy US prohibitions
against indigenous reprocessing of fuel from re-
actors it has supplied, the ROK might be able to
begin producing plutonium in 197$. On that basis,
and assuming that the high explosive and weap-
ons research and development are completed by
that time, the ROK conceivably could have a nu-
clear device as early as 1979. Even then, the ROK
would have to violate or abrogate safeguards and
NPT obligations in pursuing an explosives program.
E. Other Countries
27. We have detected no recent changes in the
basic attitude ok either Argentina or Brazil toward
nuclear weapons program. Recent publidty given
to thr potential for such a program in each coun-
try�sparked by the Brazil-West German accord�
has stirred up a good deal of nationalistic rhetoric.
Government spokesmen in. Brasilia . and Buenos
Aires still officially deny any intentions to go for-
Ward with a nuclear weapons program. Should
either become convinced that the other was cm-
barked on such it program, it undoubtedly would
follow suit.
28. Argentina. Irradiated fuel in a natural uran-
ium power reactor, in operation in Argentina since
1974, contains enough plutonium for several nu-
clear devices. A small chemical separation plant is
now under construction .and we estimate that it
probably will be able to separate enough plu-
tonium each year for a . few nuclear devices. It
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could be operational in 1977, Assuming that high
explosive and weapon meted' and development
are completed by then, a nuclear &vim could be
available as early as 1978. Argentina's current eco-
nomic crisis, however, liam slowed down woik on
some Of its nuclear projects. Financial and other
problems besetting its nuclear program will prob.
ably delay completion of the chemical separation
plant.
29. Brazil, There will not be a nuclear power
reactor in operation in Brazil before 1978. The
package deal that Nei been negotiated with West
Germany includes the acquisition by Brazil of a
chemical separation plant, in addition to several re-
actors and a facility for uranium isotope separation.
It is highly unlikely that the uranium isotope sepa-
ration facility will be operational before 1980, but
the chemical separation facility could be operating
by the time that irradiated fuel is being discharged
by the power reactor supplied by the US. MNUM*
ing the successful completion of Ii I and weapon
R&D, at well as unrestricted Ilse 01 the Geri111111.
supplied reprocessing facility, Brazil could have
a device as early as 1989.
30. Iran, The very ambitious nuclear power pro-
gram of Iran includes the planned purchase of
reactors from the US. France, ancl West Germany,
and possible collaboration In nuclear development
with South Africa, Preparation of the site for the
first reactors is now underway. It is not likely, how-
ever, that any of these reactors will be in operation
before 1980-1981, Iran is also seeking a chemical re-
processing facility; one could be constructed by the
time the first power reactor is complete. (The US
lint not yet succeeded in its efforts to convince Iran
that such a chemical reprocessing facility should
be owned and operated on a multinational basis.)
Iran could also conduct the necessary IIE and
weapons R&D during this period and thus con-
ceivably could have a nuclear device as early as
1982.
31. Japan, iVest Germany, Italy, Canada, Swe-
den, and Spain. These Industrially advanced coun-
tries all have operating power reactors. In most
cases they possess significant quantities of phi-
tool= already separated from irradiated reactor
fuel. In the case of Spain, there is a report that the
Nuclear Energy Board has studied the feasibility of
producing nuclear weapons using such plutonium
from its power re:;, t,irs, However, there Is no Jodi-
cation that IIE and weapon R&D have actually
been undertaken either in Spain or in the other
countries, All of these countries have the clipability
to conduct such IIE and weapon R&D, however,
and any of them could have a nuclear device
within one or two years of a derision to develop
one.
32. The Arab States. Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia expressed an interest in developing
nuclear power programs. The development of nu-
clear devices depends on the time that. is required
to negotiate contracts for the acquisition of nuclear
power reactors and chemical separation facilities
and to eonstruct and operate them. Given the time
needed to satisfy all of these requirements it is
.
unlikely that any of these states could have a nn-
clear device in fess than eight years�that is, be-
fore about 1983. Although Libya has ratified the
NPT, acquisition of nuclear weapons became a
stated objective of Qadhafi in 1974 (indeed, Qa(l-
hail reportedly has tried to purchaSe nuclear de-
vices outright), lint the acquisition of nuclear re-
actors is still in the negotiating stage and .re-
portedly the negotiations are aimed at obtaining
one from the USSR for operation about 1982. Con-
sidering the time. needed for training personnel
and for reactor construction and operation, it is
unlikely that Libya could have a nuclear device
before :983.
33. North Korea, Cuba, and North Vietnam.
These countries have varying degrees of incentive
to acquire n nuclear weapon. North Korea and
Cuba have indicated an interest In obtaining nu-
clear reactors, and they have attempted to obtain
assistance to this end from the West as well as
the Soviet Union, We do not believe, however,
that sufficient aid will be supplied to permit the
development of it nuclear device by any of these
countries within the next ten years.
34. Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia has a program for
developing a capability to construct nuclear power
reactors and to fuel them with domestic uranium.
A very small chemical reprocessing facility also has
.been constructed, It has reprocessed some of the
irradiated fuel from a research reactor supplied
by the Soviets in 1980. Its first nuclear power re-
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actor was purchased horn the US and Is scheduled
to be operating about the beginning of 1979. There
Li no evidence that Yugoslavia intends to construct
reprocessing facilities large enough to handle the
irradiated fuel from this reactor, If it should decide
to do so concurrently with the construction of the
reactor, however, and if It completes necessary 11E,
and weapon MD, it could have it nuclear device In
being as early as 1980,
33, Other Eastern European Nations, Although
several of the Eastern European nations have nt.
clear power programs, it is not considered likely
that any of them will be able to develop a nuclear
device In the foreseeable future. The Soviet Union
probably will not permit these nations to build and
operate fuel reprocessing facilities of significant
slze or to have uncontrolled access to sufficient
tont= for site in fabrieating nuclear explosives.
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applico
arrangement wit
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