ATTEMPTS BY IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ 'AZIZ TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE IMPASSE BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND IRAQ; IRAQI PUBLIC RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN'S DECISION TO SET A SIX-MONTH DEADLINE FOR UNSCOM INSPECTORS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06565963
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
March 16, 2022
Document Release Date:
July 27, 2016
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2015-02480
Publication Date:
January 26, 1998
File:
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Body:
Approved for Release: 2016/07/20 C06565963
SECtETHNOFORN
SEpt(ETHNOFORNMAR
Classified by: UNSPECIFIED
Reason: UNSPECIFIED
Declassify on: X1
(S ) SUBJ: ATTEMPTS BY IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ 'AZIZ TO FIND A
SOLUTION TO THE IMPASSE BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
AND IRAQ; IRAQI PUBLIC RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN'S DECISION TO
SET A SIX-MONTH DEADLINE FOR UNSCOM INSPECTORS
Central Intelligence Agency
26 January 1998
Doc Number
(S/
FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT, NOT
(U) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(U) INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS S E"4 E T--NOFORN DIST: 26
JANUARY 1998
(U) THIS REPORT IS CLASSIFIED SEZTZET...,� ONLY IN ITS ENTIRETY.
U REP RT
BIEDAM1401111100/10M11140-1eMi*M
ABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFIGA I ION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
SOURCE A
CONTEXT
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
A
(SNal F 1
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
AE(b)(3)
OF 16 JANUARY 1998, IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ (('AZIZ)) CONTINUED HIS ATTEMPTS TO
FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
(UNSC) AND IRAQ. 'AZIZ'S EFFORTS PARALLEL IRAQI PRESIDENT ((SADDAM)) HUSAYN'S ATTEMPTS
TO END THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE UNSC VIA IMPLEMENTATION OF LESS DIPLOMATIC
MEASURES SUCH AS SETTING DEADLINES AND WORKING PARAMETERS FOR UN SPECIAL
COMMISSION (UNSCOM) INSPECTORS.
(SNR) 2. ALTHOUGH 'AZIZ CONTINUES TO WORK ON (b)(1)
SECURING SUPPORT FROM UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS FRANCE AND RUSSIA, 'AZIZ HAS DECIDEC(b)(3)
TO PLACE HIS MOST VALUABLE RESOURCES INTO ESTABLISHING A DIRECT LINE OF
COMMUNICATION WITH SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, PRIMARILY SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS AT THE U.N. HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK. 'AZIZ'S
PRIMARY IRAQI INTERLOCUTOR ON THIS ISSUE IS NOT FOREIGN MINISTER MUHAMMAD SAID KAZIM
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AL-((SAHHAF)) BUT RATHER THE IRAQI PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
AMBASSADOR NIZAR ((HAMDUN)). ALTHOUGH 'AZIZ DISCUSSES AND COORDINATES GENERAL
ISSUES WITH SAHHAF, 'AZIZ VIEWS HAMDUN AS A MORE CAPABLE DIPLOMAT (b)(1)
AZIZ HAS TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN HAMDUN, MAINTAINS A DIRECT LINE OF (b)(3)
COMMUNICATION WITH HIM AND DISCUSSFS SSUES APPLICABLE TO THE UNSC WITH HAMDUN ON A I 4
DAILY BASIS AZIZ HAS ENTRUSTED HAMDUN WITH THE TASK OF (b)l I )
TRYING TO CONVINCE SELECTED SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS (NFI) TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT TALKS WITH (b)(3)
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION TO THE IMPASSE BETWEEN THE
UNSC AND IRAQ.
NF) 3. AS OF MID-JANUARY, SADDAM'S DECISION TO SET A SIX-MONTH DEADLINE FOR UNSCOM
INS ECTORS TO COMPLETE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ WAS WELCOME NEWS TO A LARGE
PERCENTAGE OF THE IRAQI POPULATION LIVING IN BAGHDAD. COMMENT: THIS LATEST (b)(1)
MOVE BY SADDAM HAS HELPED INDIRECTLY TO STRENGTHEN SADDAM'S POSITION AS LFADFR OF (b)(3)
IRA
(b)(1)
SADDAM'S DECISION TO APPLY (b)(3)
HE AVERAGE IRAQI AS A LEGITIMATE EFFORT BY
SADDAM TO END UNSC SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. ALTHOUGH CURRENT LIVING CONDITIONS INSIDE
IRAQ ARE SIMILAR TO WHAT THEY WERE IN MID-1997, THE IRAQI PEOPLE ARE AWARE THAT
CONTINUED DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNSC AND IRAQ ON THE FUTURE OF THE INSPECTIONS
WILL LEAD ONLY TO FURTHER CONFRONTATION AND NOT TO A SOLUTION. THEREFORE, THE
AVERAGE IRAQI IS PREPARING FOR THE WORST, I.E., CONTINUED MARGINAL LIVING CONDITIONS
FOR THE REMAINDER OF 1998 AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER MILITARY CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN IRAQ AND A NEW COALITION LED BY THE UNITED STATES.
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