BULGARIA: COPING WITH THE PAPAL ASSASSINATION SCANDAL

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06531449
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00502
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984

Approved for Release: 2016/05/11 C06531449
Directorate of
Intelligence
e_z:nt 6444 _ c
Bulgaria:
Coping With the
Papal Assassination Scandal
An Intelligence Assessment
0
27
fop�gecret
(b)(3)
EU? 84-10.7.31C
December 1984
(WY 1 56
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/05/11 C06531449
Approved for Release: 2016/05/11 C06531449
� (b)(3
kir
(b)(3)
(b)(3)�
(b)(3)
110
Bulgaria:
Coping With the
Papal Assassination Scan&
Introduction
Bulgaria has been struggling for two years with thc
fallout from its alleged complicity in the 1981 papal
assassination attempt, and it now faces renewed nega-
tive publicity as the trial date approaches. In Novem-
ber 1982 Italian authorities in Rome arrested the
Balkan Airline manager. Scrgcy Antonin,. after the
papal assailant, Mehmat All Agca, identified him as
one of several coconspirators in thc attempt to take
the life of Pope John Paul II. Aftcr a three-year
� invcstigation into allegations of an international con-
spiracy in the attack. investigating Magistrate Ilario
MarieIla in late October 1984 formally indicted An-
tonov, two other Bulgarian officials currently in Sofia,
and four Turks. The trial probably will begin some-
time in 1985
This Intelligence Assessment analyzes how Sofia has
coped with allegations about its involvement in the
assassination attempt and considers how it plans to
contain any future damage resulting from the scan-
dal. It also assesses some of the longer term implica-
tions for Bulgaria for its relations with the East and
West and its involvement in other illicit activities,
such as arms and narcotics smuggling and foreign
intelligence operations. This paper does not treat the
ultimate question of Bulgaria's guilt or innocence in
the affair and does not weigh the voluminous and
frequently contradictory information concerning this
controversial case. This paper therefore focuses on
Bulgarian and�to some extent�Soviet policy reac-
tions to the affair, on the key elements of Sofia's
defense strategy, and on the broadj,licy implica-
tions of the scandal for Bul3ariall
Skirting Diplomatic isolation
The arrest of Sergey Antonov seriously embarrassed
the Zhivkov regime and threatened to undermine
Bulgaria's push for improved relations with the
West�a strategy intended in large part to offset
1
Se � ivanov Antonov
waning Soviet economic support.' The ensuing inter-
national publicity further tarnished Bulgaria's already
unsavory image and drew attention to its links to some
terrorist groups and to arms and narcotics smuggling.
Many journalists, for example, also cited the bizarre
1978 murder of emigre dissident Georg' Markov in
London as corroborating evidence of the hcavyhanded
tactics used by the Bulgarian Intelligence Service
(Durzhavna Sigurnost (DS)
�0 7 3 7
eo.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/05/11 C06531449