MONTHLY WARNING AND FORECAST MEETINGS FOR AUGUST 1984

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05242031
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00701
• Publication Date: September 7, 1984

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The Director of Central Intelligence
WashintoiLD.C.20505
National Intelligence Council
7 September 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for August 1984
1. Summary of key warning issues:
USSR
NIO/USSR's meeting was devoted almost entirely to a discussion of ways to
improve warning of major Soviet military operations. NIO/Warning agrees with
the thrust of the group that Soviet economic mobilization may be the earliest
detectable warning. We feel even stronger on this issue and will continue to
try to move the community toward focusing on the economic and political areas.
USSR/India/Pakistan/Afghanistan
There are few new indicators of military hostilities between India and
Pakistan. There have been some Indian troop withdrawals from the Punjab,
Mrs. Gandhi has toned down her rhetoric and appears to be focusing on Sri
Lanka and domestic issues, but there were military clashes in northern Kashmir
recently. Tensions remain high.
Pakistan's troubles increased with an unusually high number of cross-
border incidents--shelling and air strikes--from Afghanistan territory in
August. Some analysts believe there is a likelihood of a small-scale Soviet
ground incursion into Pakistan in the near future. Whatever the intent of
past cross-border incidents, the Pakistani government sees them as conveying a
direct threat from the USSR and wants the US to be more active in backing
Pakistan. '
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Zia, given his belief that Soviet pressure is mounting, is likely to see
the US reaction to his request for support of Pakistan through diplomatic
channels and statements denouncing the attacks, as a test of the strength of
the US-Pakistani relationship.
France
The second half of 1984 should be easier for the Mitterrand government
than the first because the economic recovery program is working slowly, and
the opposition forces are in some disarray.
Foreign Minister Cheysson's visit to Washington (19-21 September) will
bring little in the way of new French initiatives because of his "lame duck"
status. Discussions will probably focus on the Middle East, arms control, the
LDC debt problem and US Central American policy. Cheysson will travel to
Latin America after his Washington visit and we believe Central America could
be a major focus of his interest.
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El Salvador
The predicted major insurgent offensive may be launched by mid-September
in a likely series of coordinated attacks with increased terrorist attacks and
a possible objective to cause casualties among US military advisors.
New Zealand/ANZUS
Newly elected New Zealand Prime Minister Lange has little, if any, room
to maneuver on the issue of a Nuclear Free Zone and nuclear ship visits to New.
Zealand.
We also doubt that Lange or the
Labor Party wants New Zealand to leave ANZUS. As long as Lange can keep the
issue on the back burner and focus on economic problems, ANZUS can continue to
function--probably without US nuclear powered or armed ships visiting New
Zealand.
Angola
A generally higher level of Angolan military activity in areas where
UNITA forces have been operating over the past year, greater security at key
points, and more air activity are additional indications that preparations for
an Angolan offensive against UNITA are under way.
Liberia
There is an increasing atmosphere of political uncertainty. Doe's recent
arrest of opposition party leaders seems to have intimidated potential rivals
but many Liberians question Doe's commitment to a transition to civilian
rule. There is a high potential for student activism and violence could
result further provoking severe internal unrest.
2. Trend Commentary
FRG/GDR/East Europe
Most analysts agree that there is no major split between Moscow and East
Berlin and that the recent Soviet press campaign is designed to dampen West
German hopes for greater humanitarian concessions. However, Moscow probably
has greater concerns about the longer-term implications of inner-German
ties. NI/Warning agrees that relations between the
Germanys have shown a remarkable improvement with only a slight interruption
caused by the INF deployment and Soviet countermeasures on GDR territory.
NIO/W believes Soviet concern is evidenced by their propaganda emphasis on the
post-war four-power agreements, the permanency of Yalta provisions, efforts to
unlink FRG credit guarantees and loans from GDR concessions on inner-German
travel, the lifting of the WEU restrictions on production of selected weapons
by FRG, and the "German Revanchist" theme. This situation is a part of long-
term developments in Eastern Europe; including, a weakened Communist party in
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Poland; Romania's independent foreign policy; Hungary's increasingly Western-
oriented economy; a more controversial political-economic discussion among
Warsaw Pact nations; and the general economic problems in Eastern Europe that
stimulate requirements for Western technology, products, financial support,
and increased dialogue.
Libya
Qadhafi has been disturbed by his domestic opposition's apparent strength
since the May 8 barracks attack in Tripoli. He has pursued a two-track
policy: first, to get his regional relations in better order so as to focus
on domestic dissent and secondly to project a moderate image particularly to
the West--illustrated by recent talks with Italian Prime Minister Andreotti.
Nonetheless, Qadhafi 's efforts to subvert Egypt and Sudan have not lessened
and there is considerable evidence that Libya was responsible for the Red Sea
mining. We must expect subversion attempts against Sudan to continue and
Libyan operations against dissidents in Europe and elsewhere to intensify.
Nicaragua
During August the Sandinistas launched their most sophisticated offensive
to date against insurgents in the north making heavy use of artillery and air
strikes, including napalm. Although insurgent casualties may have been heavy,
they are still operating effectively. They continue to need additional
outside support.
Honduras
Sandinista efforts to increase subversion and terrorism in Honduras are
increasing. The infiltration of a new small insurgent group and reports of
preparations to launch a new terrorist campaign are signs of this trend. The
leftist capabilities are still weak and developing and the threat is likely to
be long term.
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Narcotics
Analysts report that DEA has been doing a satisfactory job of reporting
on brokers and traffickers associated with pharmaceutical companies in
Europe. DEA has also input this information into a data base file which will
provide the basis for further analysis.
(:).--1 I
Pala
vid Y. McM is
Attachments:
Monthly Warning and
Forecast Meeting Reports
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7 September
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings for August 1984
Distribution:
Cy 1 - DCI (w/att)
Cy 2 - DDCI (w/att)
Cy 3 - Executive Director (w/att) -
Cy 4 - SA/DCl/IS (w/o att)
Cy 5 - Executive Registry (w/att)
Cy 6 - C/NIC (w/att)
Cy 7 - DDO/C/EPDS (wlatt)
Cy 8 - DDO/C/PCS (w/att)
Cy 9 - V I att)
Cy 10 - DDI Rep/SAC Omaha (w/o att)
Cy 11 - DDI Rep/OLL (w/o att)
Cy 12 - D/AG (w/o att)
Cy 13 - NIO/AF (w/o att)
CV 14 - NIO/AL (Hutchinson) (w/o att)
Cy 15 - (410/AL (Low) (w/o att)
Cy 16 - NIO/EA (w/o att)
Cy 17 - NIO/GPF (w/o att)
Cy 18 - NIO/LA (w/o att)
Cy 19 - NIO/NESA (w/o att)
Cy 20 - NIO/Econ (w/o att)
Cy 21 - NIO/SP (w/o att)
Cy 22 - (410/USSR (w/o att)
Cy 23 - (410/Europe (w/o et)
Cy 24 - NIO/S&T (w/o att)
Cy 25 - (410/CT (w/o att)
Cy 26 - NIO/FDIA (w/o att)
Cy 27 - D/CPAS (w/o att)
Cy 28 - D/OCR (w/o att)
Cy 29 - D/SOVA (w/o att)
Cy 30 - D/EURA (w/o att)
Cy 31 - D/ALA (w/o att)
Cy 32 - 0/0 IA (w/o att)
Cy 33 - D/NESA (w/o att)
Cy 34 - D/OEA (w/o att)
Cy 35 - D/OGI (w/o et)
Cy 36 - D/OSWR (w/o att)
Cy 37 - C/COMIREX w o att)
Cy 38 - OD&E/F0 (w/o att)
Cy 39 - E/FO (w/o att)
Cy 40 - o et)
Cy 41 - Richard Beal, WHCMF (w/o att)
Cy 42 - NWS (w/o att)
Cy 43 - DDI/IPC (w/o att)
Cy 44 - C/SIGINT Corn. (w/o att)
Cy 45 - SRP (w/o att)
Cy 46 - DDI/CRES (w/o att)
Cy 47 - Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (w/o att)
Cy 48 - A/NIO/W (w/o att)
Cy 49 - SA/W (w/o att)
Cy 50 - NIO/W Chron (w/o att)
Cy 51 - NIO/W Subject File (w/att)
1984
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