THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06500913
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02488

Approved for Release: 2016/02/10 C06500913
B2B2267 Tactical Fundamentals�Intro to Tactics
The Principles of War
The nine principles of war are aids to a leader as they consider how to accomplish a mission. As
opposed to being prescriptive steps or actions that must be accomplished, they are guidelines for
conducting operations through all the levels of war; strategic, operational, and tactical. (Warfighting, 28-
32) Sightless adherence to these principles will not guarantee success, but each deviation increases risk.
It is the tactician who will thoughffully apply these principles, recognizing the risk versus gain of any
omission, to focus their tactical thought into execution. The nine Principles of War are easily remembered
by the acronym MOOSEMUSS. They are defined below:
Mass
The concept of "concentrating the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time to
achieve decisive results." (Marine Corps Operations, 8-1) As you learned in Warfighting, we must first
identify which factors are critical to the enemy, and then identify a relative weakness to that strength � this
is the enemy's critical vulnerability. Vital to the concept of mass is having the insight to identify the
decisive place and time in which to attack the enemy's critical vulnerability. Concentrated fire power is
irrelevant if applied to an objective of no significance. We seek mass to overwhelm the enemy in an
attempt to deliver the decisive blow. It applies not only to fires, but supporting elements as well. It is
closely related to economy of force, as force available is limited and we must decide when and where it is
appropriate to mass or economize our force.
Objective
The concept of "direct[ing] every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and
attainable objective." (Marine Corps Operations, 8-2) Related to mass and economy of force, we must
know where to mass and where to economize, which is defined by a decisive objective. It is also related
to unity of command, as each subordinate must be lead by the intent of one commander, towards the
commonly defined objective. Communication is also critical, ensuring that the elements of the military
operation are acting in consonance towards the same end.
Offensive
The concept that we, as a fighting force, are continuously focused on "seiz[ing], retain[ing], and
exploit[ing] the initiative." (Marine Corps Operations, B-2) Maintaining an offensive mindset does not
imply that we seek to avoid defense. Rather it implies the use of the defense as a temporary expedient to
prepare to resume the offense. Offense being the decisive form of combat, it is the method by which we
exploit the enemy weakness, impose our will, and determine the course of war.
Security
The concept of "never permit[ing] the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage." (Marine
Corps Operations, 8-2) We look to, at appropriate times and places, adopt measures to prevent the
enemy from imposing their will on us faster than we can react. It allows us to ensure our freedom of
action on the battlefield and preserve our combat power for decisive action. It does not imply the over-
application of caution to eliminate risk, but rather seeks to enhance our operations through bold
maneuver and acceptance of calculated risk.
Econcimy of Force
The concept of "allocat[ing] minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts." (Marine
Corps Operations, 8-3) This goes hand-in-hand with the concept of mass. In order for us to concentrate
decisive combat power at the decisive point, we must know where to economize forces at our secondary
efforts. This also implies an acceptance of calculated risk at these secondary efforts. Limited attacks,
defense, deceptions, or delaying actions can help us economize forces allowing us to weight the main
effort with mass.
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B2B2267 Tactical Fundamentals- Intro to Tactics
The Principles of War (Continued)
Maneuver
The concept that we seek to "place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible
application of combat power." (Marine Corps Operations, B-3) The traditional understanding of maneuver
is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. (JP 1-02, 200) However, in
order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in other dimensions as well.
The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the
enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be
psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial. Especially important is maneuver in time�we
generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver
in all dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.
(Warfighting, 72) Maneuver alone will not defeat a force, however maneuver in conjunction with Mass,
Surprise, and Economy of Force allows a seemingly inferior force to achieve decisive superiority at the
necessary time and place.
Unity of Command
Best exemplified by commander's intent, "Unity of Command" is the concept that "for every
objective, [we] ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander." (Marine Corps Operations, B-4)
Mass, economy of force, and maneuver would be impossible without the vision of a single leader. To
ensure that vision is carried to the lowest levels while still allowing for flexibility and initiative we use
commander's intent. It allows for and leverages mass, objective, and economy of force at the decisive
point.
Surprise
The concept that we seek to "strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is
unprepared." (Marine Corps Operations, B-4) It does not require the enemy to be caught unaware, but
rather that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. May include the use of speed (maneuver in
time), unexpected forces (mass), operating at night (psychological and technological maneuver),
deception (psychological maneuver), security, variation in techniques, and use of unfavorable terrain
(spatial maneuver).
Simplicity
The concept that the preparation of "clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders
ensures thorough understanding" (Marine Corps Operations, B-4) and therefore ease of execution. Plans
-and-orders should-be-as-simple and direct-as the situation-and-mission dictate. This reduces the chance
of misunderstandings that inject internal friction and therefore cause ineffective execution. Ceteris
paribus (all variables being equal), the simplest plan is preferred.
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