MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENT - USSR-EE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05241561
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02129
• Publication Date: August 18, 1983

Approved for Release: 2016/03/03 C05241561
411 JG LAW.<
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #5949-83
18 August 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Stanley M. Moskowitz
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment - USSR-EE
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3. Yugoslavia.
A. Discussion.
We remain uncomfortable about the situation in Yugoslavia.
While the economic news is not uniformally bad, there are tough
patches ahead and the political leadership still seems at a loss to
how to energize the Yugoslav people to pull together.
On the positive side, the federal assembly recently adopted
the Kraiger Commission report which calls for the use of more
market mechanisms in the economy. Implementation is to come this
fall and will meet opposition. The news on the balance of payments
Is mixed. Austerity measures are beginning to pay off, but in 1983
the Yugoslays will still have a $700 million shortfall (vice 1.4
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billion in 1982) which means that they will either have to
reschedule or somehow obtain another package of emergency aid from
Western banks and governments. After 1983, even though they might
begin to show either balance or even a surplus in the current
account, they will remain under considerable economic pressure.
Thus, in 1984, they will have to repay about $2.56 in principal
which is maturing -- for a combined total of $4.56 principal and
interest repayments. The biggest political unknown is how the
country at large and the political leadership will react to the bad
economic news for 1983. The population has seen a steady decline
in its standard of living, while the leadership has had to accept
externally-imposed austerity in order to get the Western rescue
package. When the news of another deficit in 1983 becomes public,
both the leadership and the country may well ask themselves if the
sacrifices have been worthwhile.
Against this economic backdrop, Defense Minister Mamala's open
attack on the parochialism of the party leadership, and his
references to the Army putting itself at the disposal of the
working people, is a remarkably open expression of disappointment
with the political leadership.
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Approved for Release: 2016/03/03 C05241561
Approved for Release: 2016/03/03 C05241561
Approved for Release: 2016/03/03 C05241561