STATE SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00651
• Publication Date: May 1, 1986

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Directorate of
Intelligence
State Support for
International Terrorism, 1985 (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
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May 1986
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Directorate of
Intelligence
State Support for
International Terrorism, 1985 (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
and other analysts in the Policy Support Branch of the
Counterterrorism Center. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Policy
Support Branch, u)
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State Support for
International Terrorism, 1985 (u)
Key Judgments
Information available
as of 1 April 1986
was used in this report.
State support constituted a significant and lethal component of internation-
al terrorism in 1985. All but a handful of incidents were of Middle Eastern
origin; state-supported terrorism has become an established instrument of
foreign policy of some Middle Eastern countries. In our judgment, a
significant change in the level or type of support provided to terrorist
groups by states is unlikely, although the number of incidents in any given
year may rise or fall
The three trends we identified in 1985 probably will continue through
1986:
� Greater use of surrogates.
� More violent incidents.
� Higher number of bystander casualties.
States increasingly use other groups as their surrogates to conduct
terrorism that the states later can deny having sponsored or encouraged.
Many such groups owe no formal allegiance to the state but are willing to
accept weapons, money, or training.
The second and third trends identified in state-supported terrorism are
associated: as terrorist groups conduct proportionately more armed at-
tacks�including assassinations�and bombings, the number of innocent
victims grows. Americans particularly have suffered from this: US citizens
have been singled out for beatings, torture, and death in instances when the
terrorist target was not initially American, as in the Achille Lauro and
Egyptair hijackings.
US facilities and personnel unquestionably will remain targets of state-
supported terrorism. Victims in the Middle East have become more
difficult to find as US installations improve their security and Americans
keep a lower profile in these countries. As a result, we expect spillover into
other areas�Western Europe in particular�to be more common in the
coming year.
Libya moved toward closer ties to the radical Palestinian group Abu Nidal,
a relationship that may have influenced the group's decision to carry out
the Egyptair hijacking in November 1985 in which three Americans were
shot, one fatally. Libya probably also provided support to some of the Abu
Nidal terrorists involved in the attacks on two El Al ticket counters at
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airports in Europe last December. Qadhafi almost certainly would like to
forge closer links to terrorist groups that have proved their mettle.
Iran has employed terrorism as a primary instrument for exporting its
revolution, but more pragmatic leadership has�temporarily at least
reduced Iran's terrorist profile. Economic turmoil and the war with Iraq
have compelled Tehran in recent months to pursue a strategy of diplomacy
rather than subversion, particularly in its relations with the Persian Gulf
states. In Lebanon, groups like Hizballah still derive their inspiration from
Iran, but they increasingly follow an independent course.
Syrian-supported groups dramatically stepped up their terrorist campaigns
against Jordanian and Israeli targets. Responding to the rapprochement
between PLO chief Arafat and Jordan's King Hussein that began in late
1984, the radical Palestinian group Abu Nidal carried out almost two-
thirds of the attacks attributable to Syria. President Assad uses the
terrorist weapon when he deems it serves Syrian national interests.
Iraqi involvement in terrorism continued at reduced levels, with most of its
activity directed against Syria and Libya. Baghdad significantly increased
support to Arafat last year to counterbalance Syria's domination of the
more radical PLO factions. The movement of several hundred PLO
fighters to Baghdad after the Israeli raid on Tunis in October 1985 may
presage increased Iraqi support for PLO terrorist activities. Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn, however, will try to prevent the PLO from attacking
Israeli targets outside Israel and the occupied territories.
Before its bloody coup d'etat, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
had begun curtailing Aden's direct involvement with insurgent groups from
Oman and North Yemen as well as with the PLO, but continued to provide
safehaven, passports, and training facilities to some Palestinian groups.
The new leadership, however, may resume a more active role in supporting
terrorism in the future.
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Cuba maintains a large and complex apparatus for subversion that provides
various forms of support for leftist revolutionaries and terrorists. The bulk
of Cuban assistance goes to the Salvadoran leftist insurgency, although
Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, and Chile also are targets of Havana's
subversive efforts.
Nicaragua continues to provide training and support to Latin American
revolutionary and guerrilla groups. Despite the publicity generated by US
accusations, international disapproval has not discouraged the Sandinistas
from pursuing terrorist ties, including the training of West European
terrorists.
North Korea maintains ties to a variety of foreign extremist groups,
although we are not aware of any North Korean�sponsored terrorist
attacks since the October 1983 bombing directed against the South Korean
Government.
The Soviet Union supports groups such as the PLO through training and
the sale of weapons to countries like Syria and Libya that later end up in
terrorist hands. In addition, Soviet influence over its Bloc allies gives
Moscow the leverage to elicit Bloc support for radical groups. Such support
includes travel assistance, safehaven, and the sale of weapons through the
international gray arms market. Bulgaria is the most active of the Bloc
countries, although Yugoslavia initially harbored Abu Abbas, the Palestin-
ian leader who planned the Achille Lauro hijacking
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
Libya
Ties to Radical Palestinian Groups
Libyan Antiexile Campaign
Other Plots
Support for African Insurgents and Terrorists
Activities in Latin America and Asia
Threat to the United States
Iran
The Main Targets
The Persian Gulf
Activities Elsewhere
Syria
Syrian Use of Surrogates
Cooperation With Other State Supporters
Attacks on US Targets
Iraq
Restraining Radical Palestinian Groups
South Yemen
Cuba
Nicaragua
North Korea
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc
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State Support for
International Terrorism, 1985 (u)
State support constituted a lethal and significant
component of international terrorism throughout
1985. All but a handful of incidents were of Middle
Eastern origin; state-supported terrorism is an estab-
lished instrument of foreign policy of some Middle
Eastern countries. Terrorism in the Middle East has
become so institutionalized that as long as Qadhafi
and Khomeini are alive neither Iran nor Libya is
likely to cease abruptly its support for terrorism. The
number of terrorist incidents in any given year may
rise or fall, but we do not foresee a significant change
in the level or type of support provided to groups that
undertake terrorist activity on behalf of a state
States provide a variety of support to terrorist groups;
much of it is not direct assistance. Few states actually
engage in terrorism using their own nationals: Libya
is a notable exception. Some states like Nicaragua,
Cuba, and Libya have ties to numerous organizations
that are involved in dissident activities and insurgen-
cies worldwide. Sometimes these groups�such as the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El
Salvador or Colombia's M-19�also engage in terror-
ist activity.
Other states support groups whose terrorist activities
dovetail with the state's policy agenda, whether or not
the group acts directly as a surrogate on behalf of the
state. Syria controls the activities of Saiqa and the
Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party (JPRP), for
instance, but Abu Nidal does not act at the order of
either Syria or Libya. Finally, the support provided by
state actors is instrumental in a group's ability to
carry out acts of terrorism, but such acts may occur
with or without the state's approval. The assistance
provided ranges from false documentation, training,
and active coordination to passive acquiescence in
terrorism launched from a safehaven in the state's
own territory
1
Figure 1
State-Supported International Terrorist
Incidents by Country, 1985
Percent
Unclassified
308676 4-86
Three trends stand out in 1985: the increased role
played by surrogates, the high level of violence associ-
ated with these state-supported attacks, and the grow-
ing disregard for the fate of innocent bystanders. In
most cases, states involved in supporting terrorism use
surrogates to conceal their own involvement. Even
Libya�virtually the only state sponsor that still uses
its own nationals to carry out terrorist activity also
is seeking non-Libyan assailants to conduct attacks on
its behalf. Libya may have encouraged the Abu Nidal
Group to hijack the Egyptair jetliner that ultimately
landed in Malta.
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By contrast, neither Syrian nor Iranian nationals
actually carried out any terrorist attacks in 1985.
Both countries relied entirely on other groups to act as
stand-ins. In fact, some of these organizations appear
to be moving toward greater independence, a develop-
ment that could presage increased attacks as such
groups try to demonstrate their autonomy. The radi-
cal Lebanese Hizballah, for example, still take their
inspiration�although less direct guidance from
Iran, but greater independence is not likely to affect
the group's choice of targets for terrorist attack. They
will continue to oppose the remaining US and West-
ern presence in Lebanon and will focus their attacks
against Western targets. Moreover, Syria worries that
its efforts to consolidate its position in Lebanon may
encounter opposition from radical Shia groups en-
couraged by Iran. The Abu Nidal Group, once spon-
sored by Iraq and later by Syria, appears in recent
months to have shifted some operatives to Tripoli,
where Abu Nidal himself now resides, as evidenced by
his interview from Tripoli in September 1985
Armed attacks and bombings accounted for about
three-fourths of all state-sponsored incidents last
year�a key reason for the escalation in violence
associated with such attacks. Americans often were
the victims of that violence-13 US citizens died as
result of state-sponsored terrorism in 1985, in many
cases because they presented targets of opportunity.
The attacks in Rome and Vienna and the Egyptair
hijacking are examples�unlike the TWA hijacking
where Americans were not the initial targets but
nevertheless suffered the violent consequences.
Figure 2
State-Supported International Terrorist
Incidents by Type of Attack, 1985
Percent
ArmLd attack 40
Extortion 1
Skyjacking 4
Kidnaping 16
Bombing 39
Unclassified
303900 4-86
In Latin America, both Cuba and Nicaragua continue
a their support for subversive and revolutionary groups
that sometimes use terrorist tactics to advance their
cause. Neither is likely to cease aiding and abetting
groups that engage in subversive activity
We continue to watch for evidence that state sponsors
of terrorism�particularly in the Middle East�are
forging operational links, and by year's end only
Libya and Iran had discussed terrorist cooperation.
We lack information that any sort of broad-based
"terrorist entente" is currently under development. In
the Middle East, rivalries and jealousies impede ef-
forts toward tactical cooperation; elsewhere, targets
and motivations of state supporters are too diverse to
warrant cooperation. If such cooperation were to
occur in the future, it would probably be in targeting
US facilities or personnel, but we have no evidence
that even preliminary planning is yet occurring.
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In addition to direct state supporters of terrorism,
other states either provide support indirectly or are
willing to tolerate the presence of known terrorists
within their borders. East European countries have
harbored known terrorists�Yugoslavia, for example,
sheltered Abu Abbas, the Palestine Liberation Front
leader who planned the Achille Lauro hijacking that
took place in October 1985. Bulgaria is heavily
involved in the gray arms market, and the weapons
sold on this market often end up in the hands of
terrorists. Such diverse nations as India, Greece, and
Sudan also either tolerate, or fail to act against,
terrorist activity carried out on their soil. The USSR,
for its part, surely is aware of its East European allies'
activities, and the Soviet Union itself continues to
assist states and revolutionary movements that in turn
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provide training, weapons, and funds to terrorists. We
have no evidence, however, of direct Soviet involve-
ment in planning or carrying out terrorist operations.
We believe state-supported terrorism will remain a
major feature of international terrorism in 1986, and
that US citizens will continue to be both targets and
incidental victims. Increased security�and reduced
numbers in terrorist hot spots like Lebanon�have
made Americans on official assignments in the Mid-
dle East somewhat less vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
As a result, state sponsors of terrorism are likely to
turn to other areas�to Western Europe, in particu-
lar where the publicity payoff for high-profile at-
tacks is considerably higher, and where large numbers
of US citizens remain highly visible. The trend toward
more indiscriminate violence probably will continue,
and casualties may well increase. Finally, we believe
that, while states may continue to seek foreign opera-
tives to conduct attacks on their behalf, they could
well choose to resume more direct involvement in
terrorism should they determine that such action
would serve their policy interests.
Libya
Libya's terrorist effort took a new direction in 1985,
as attacks on Libyan exiles slowed, and Libya forged
closer links to the radical Palestinian group Abu
Nidal. The assassination campaign against anti-Qa-
dhafi exiles remained a top priority, however, and still
accounted for the majority of attacks. In addition to
increasing its operational support for radical Palestin-
ian groups, Tripoli focused on efforts in Sudan and
the Caribbean. Libya provides training, weapons,
money, and other forms of support to about 30
insurgent and terrorist groups worldwide.
Qadhafi stepped up the pace in his longstanding
program of support for Palestinian radical groups,
particularly Abu Nidal. The extent of Libya's role in
the Egyptair hijacking and the Rome and Vienna
airport attacks is not yet clear, but we believe Libya
financed, and possibly armed, the assailants and
supported their actions
Tripoli's apparent willingness to undertake terrorist
activity in the United States is of grave concern. The
FBI foiled an ambitious plan to kill several Libyan
exiles in the United States last May. Tripoli also
continues activity abroad that lays the groundwork
for potential anti-US attacks: some US embassies
have reported that Libyan agents may be gathering
intelligence on US installations and personnel in
several countries. Serious constraints against such
attacks remain.
Ties to Radical Palestinian Groups
There are several reasons for Qadhafi to draw closer
to radical Palestinians ' such as the Abu Nidal Group.
These groups target Israel and moderate Arabs, and
oppose Arafat and moderate Palestinians. Abu Nidal
attacks are ruthless, and the group operates success-
fully in both the Middle East and Western Europe, in
contrast to Qadhafi's often inept and blundering
operatives. Qadhafi may already have bargained his
increased support to the Abu Nidal Group for a role
in its target selection. Before last November�when
Egyptair flight 648 was hijacked�the Abu Nidal
Group had not attacked an Egyptian target in seven
years.
Libyan support to
radical Palestinians last year took several forms:
� Cooperation. Libya provided the passports used by
Abu Nidal terrorists in the December 1985 attack
on the El Al counter in Vienna
' The factions that Libya is known to support include: Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GO, the
Fatah dissidents, the Abu Nidal Group, Si:11ga, the Popular
Struggle Front (PSF), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the
umbrella group Palestinian National Salvation Front (which in-
clude t" PPI P PI P-C�C V",h ,issidents, PST, Saliqa, and the
PLF)
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Victims of Abu Nidal attack on the Rome El Al
ticket counter, December I985.
� Scdehaven
Abu Nidal is living in Tripoli and has moved part of
his organization there. George Habash, leader of the
PFLP also has moved to Libya.
Libyan Antiexile Campaign
Many of Libya's attacks last year were against its
own exiled dissidents. Qadhafi maintains a hit list of
exiles and pursues these individuals around the world.
Some attacks are planned months in advance, while
others are spontaneous and opportunistic. Libya runs
antiexile operations out of several People's Bureaus in
Western Europe; Bonn, Vienna, and Athens were
particularly active last year, an0
adrid may become a new center for such
activity. Qadhafi generally uses Libyans for attacks
on dissidents in Europe, although he tends to employ
surrogates or mercenaries for attacks in other loca-
tions and against other targets:
� Tripoli's antiexile assassination campaign accounted
for a greater percentage of attacks last year than in
1984, when Qadhafi reintroduced the tactic after a
three-year respite. Anti-Qadhafi exiles were killed
in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy, and Aus-
tria in 1985.
� The Libyan exile community in Egypt also has been
a frequent target, but Egyptian authorities have
been effective in thwarting attacks. A four-man
Libyan team was arrested in November 1985 during
an attempted attack against a gathering of exiles
near Cairo.
� Libya also plotted antiexile attacks in the United
States. In May 1985 a Libyan diplomat at the
United Nations was declared persona non grata,
and 16 nonofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to
appear before a US grand jury in connection with a
plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four states.
Other Plots
Qadhafi has long targeted moderate Arab govern-
ments for their refusal to continue the military strug-
gle against Israel and for their links to the West. The
primary targets of such attacks in 1985 were the
governments of Egypt and Tunisia:
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� Egypt remains a principal target
During the Egyptair hijacking
in November, Libyan officials in Kuwait wrote and
secretly distributed to the media a vitriolic state-
ment apparently on behalf of the hijackers con-
demning Mubarak and the Camp David accords.
� Tripoli expelled more than 30,000 Tunisian workers
from Libya in August�infiltrating terrorist agents
among them�hoping to further destabilize Tuni-
sia's shaky economy. Tunisian authorities captured
a team of Libyan terrorists carrying bombs and
expelled the diplomat responsible for running the
operation
Tunisia
severed relations after two postal workers were
injured when several of these bombs exploded.
Support for African Insurgents and Terrorists
Qadhafi often tries to disassociate Libya from direct
responsibility in attacks to maintain plausible denial.
The use of surrogates is one example. Libya trains,
funds, and arms dissident and insurgent groups of
many ideological stripes and from many different
countries. Libya is particularly active in supporting
groups in Sub-Saharan Africa:
� Tripoli has conducted extensive subversive activity
in Sudan since a coup in April ousted longtime
Qadhafi enemy President Nimeiri. Qadhafi has
developed a network that could be activated with
little difficulty, despite the recent expulsion from
Khartoum of several known terrorists and the disar-
ray within the Libyan-backed Sudanese Revolution-
ary Committees. We believe Tripoli has held back
from terrorist activity in Sudan because diplomatic
channels have proved so fruitful in advancing Liby-
an goals there. If Libyan-Sudanese relations deteri-
orate, however, or if a Sudanese political crisis
arises that is too opportune to ignore, Tripoli could
well decide to employ the terrorist weapon.
Libya continues to
fund, train, and arm Zairian dissidents in Libya and
send them home to conduct terrorist and subversive
activity.
� In February 1985, Chad complained to the United
Nations that Libya had attempted to assassinate
President Habre the previous September. Photo-
graphs of the Libyan-made attache case bomb that
was to be used in the attack were provided as
evidence.
Activities in Latin America and Asia
Qadhafi appears increasingly anxious to extend his
revolution to areas far removed from Libya. Libya
uses propaganda organizations such as the Islamic
Call Societies, and the funding of numerous dissident
and leftist groups in Asia and Latin America to
extend its reach.
In the Caribbean, Libya is gathering intelligence to
advance its goal of gaining political influence and
undermining US and French interests. Tripoli offers
dissidents training in Libya and promises large sums
of money if they will undertake acts of violence, a
tactic that has met with virtually no success to date.
Leftists in the English-speaking Caribbean states are
likely to continue to reject violence. Libyan contacts
with the more militant French-speaking separatists
were initiated only last year, however, and may
increase the potential for terrorist activity in French
Caribbean territories. Cuba reportedly is concerned
about the increasing Libyan role in the Caribbean and
has warned several groups against accepting support
from Libya:
� We believe the People's Bureaus in Caracas and
Panama coordinate activity for the region. Libya
uses nonofficial facilities such as the Islamic Call
Society in Curacao and a regional newspaper office
in Barbados as cover organizations for subversive
activity.
� Qadhafi has courted groups in Dominica, Guade-
loupe, Martinique, and French Guiana, where gen-
erally his overtures have been relatively well re-
ceived.
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Qadhafi also is interested in fomenting radical activi-
ty in Central and South America
dissidents in several countries receive aid from
Tripoli:
� Libya has promised financial support to the Move-
ment for the Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Chile in
return for more visible terrorist operations
� Libya supports Colombia's M-19, although we
doubt Libya has outdistanced Cuba as the group's
major source of arms, money, and training. A high-
ranking member of the M-19 recently alleged,
however, that Libya had become the group's princi-
pal patron.
Threat to the United States
Qadhafi fears retaliation for attacks against US tar-
gets and at year's end had not yet attacked an
American official or facility. There clearly are cir-
cumstances, however, in which he is willing to take
the risk. Currently, we believe Qadhafi would directly
target US personnel or installations if he believed he
could get away with the attack without US retalia-
tion, or if he believed the United States directly
threatened his personal safety or the existence of his
regime. Libya probably is preparing contingency
plans to attack US targets, and we attribute Libya's
failure to follow through with plots against the United
States to its poor operational planning and security,
incompetence and fear of US retaliation
Libyan agents
have been gathering intelligence on US personnel and
facilities in Tunisia, Sudan, Somalia, Greece, Italy,
and Saudi Arabia
� In October 1985 the Morazanist Front for the
Liberation of Honduras received an unspecified
amount of money from Libya
� Libya reportedly has agreed to provide financial
support to the terrorist groun Alfaro Vive Cara io!
(AVC) in Ecuador.
The Libyan effort in Asia and the Pacific is smaller
than in Latin America but it is growing. Libyan
activity largely revolves around the provision of funds
and training to dissidents:
� Tripoli has provided $100,000 to opposi-
tion groups in Vanuatu and New Caledonia The
� Libya welcomed a Japanese Red Army (JRA) ter-
rorist who was released from an Israeli prison last
summer after being captured in the Lod Airport
massacre in 1972.
� Last May, Bangladesh police arrested a Libyan-
trained Bangladesh national for plotting to kill
President Ershad. The individual had received Liby-
an support for an earlier coup attempt.
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Attacks against US targets in the United States are
unlikely, but Libya would like to embarrass the
United States with terrorism on its own soil by
targeting anti-Qadhafi dissidents here. In both cases,
Libya is handicapped by its reduced presence and lack
of an embassy. A Libyan attack against US personnel
or facilities elsewhere in the world cannot be ruled
out, and Qadhafi now is especially likely to seek
opportunities to attack the United States in an effort
to exploit the growing anti-US sentiment in the Arab
states. Qadhafi probably believes that anti-US attacks
would keep him in the forefront of the worldwide
revolutionary struggle. Should he elect to take the
risks associated with such an attack, he would be
likely to work through surrogates to disguise the
Libyan hand
Iran
The level of terrorism by Iranian-supported groups in
1985 remained high but declined from the record level
of 1984. Groups with established ties to Iran carried
out some 30 attacks in 1985, although there is no
evidence to link Iran directly to most of these attacks.
While Iraq, France, and the United States remain the
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primary
primary targets, the Persian Gulf states face a con-
tinuing terrorist threat that could escalate sharply any
time Iran chooses to exercise its terrorist option.
Export of the revolution is a central tenet of the
clerical regime in Iran, and terrorism has been a
primary instrument in advancing this objective. Eco-
nomic necessity and the war with Iraq, however, have
compelled Iran to reduce its direct involvement in
terrorism and pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy.
Tehran has used terrorism increasingly to support
Iranian national interests, with less emphasis on the
ideological use of terrorism to support the violent
export of its Islamic revolution. Some groups, more-
over, such as the Lebanese Hizballah, owe their
inspiration and their origin to Iran but have become
increasingly independent. Their activities still serve
Iran's foreign policy goals, even if they do not coordi-
nate their actions with Iranian officials.
The Main Targets
Iraq is a primary target of Iranian-sponsored groups.
Iran trains and finances several Iraqi dissident groups,
such as the Dawa Party, that are dedicated to over-
throwing Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. Although
the Dawa Party activity inside Iraq declined after
security forces penetrated the group's clandestine
network and arrested hundreds of its members in
1983, it began to recover in 1985. Dawa Party
members carried out two bombings in President Sad-
dam Husayn's hometown of Tikrit and in October
engaged in firefights with Iraqi security forces in two
communities near Baghdad
If Iran suffers further setbacks in its
war with Iraq, Tehran may focus greater effort on
terrorism against Iraqi targets.
Lebanon has been the scene of most of the terrorism
perpetrated by groups that have Iranian support.
Iran's role in instigating this terrorism, however,
became more obscure in 1985. Iran did not play a
direct role in the majority of attacks on foreigners in
Lebanon. Iran has ties to the radical Shias that have
kidnaped foreigners, however, but the nature of these
ties�and the extent to which Iran is able to control or
direct the Shias' activities�is unclear. There is no
indication that Tehran ordered or assisted in the
kidnapings
7
The rivalry between Iranian bu-
reaucracies, however, for control over activities in
Lebanon, and the absence of clear lines of authority,
further complicates our ability to draw firm conclu-
sions about Iran's role in Lebanese terrorism
In 1985 pro-Iranian
Shias in Lebanon were responsible for nearly 20
international incidents, including eight attacks
against French targets and five against US targets.
Among the more notorious acts:
� Radical Shia terrorists probably were responsible
for the murders of four members of the French
observer force in January and February 1985, and
the kidnaping of three French diplomats in March.
Two of those diplomats still are being held. An
additional two private French citizens remain miss-
ing. Anonymous callers claimed "Islamic Jihad"
was responsible for several of these incidents.
� Hizballah kidnaped three private US citizens last
year. Although the Rev. Benjamin Weir was re-
leased in September, Hizballah elements still hold
at least four Americans.
Iran is not aware in advance of every Hizballah
attack. Tehran, moreover, attempted to tone down
Hizballah's involvement in terrorism.
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The Persian Gulf
Iran has recently intensified its efforts to cultivate
good bilateral ties to the Gulf states, gain internation-
al respectability, and expand commercial relations
worldwide. As long as these goals are given priority,
Tehran is likely to restrict its support for overt
terrorist acts in the Gulf. Iran is most likely to support
terrorism actively if it suffers a serious setback in the
war, or perceives that the Gulf states are increasing
their support for Iraq.
Tehran maintains the capability to resume terrorist
activities throughout the Persian Gulf quickly. Shia
dissidents from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain
continue to receive military training in Iran and then
return home to undertake subversive activity. More-
over, discoveries in 1985 of terrorist cells and planned
operations against several Gulf states by Iranian-
sponsored groups suggest that Tehran is maintaining
its terrorist option:
an Iranian-sponsored team of
Lebanese Shia terrorists was planning terrorist ac-
tions directed at Kuwaiti or US interests.
� UAE security officials in August arrested five
heavily armed members of two Iranian terrorist
were plotting to attack UAE
cells who
and US facilities.
�rOp�SoczEL
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Iran was training individuals of various Middle
Eastern nationalities late in 1985 to hijack an
airliner belonging to a Persian Gulf state
Tehran reportedly obtained and
altered Algerian passports for the operation and
trained the terrorists in two camps in Iran on an
aircraft from its own commercial fleet.
Iran explicitly abandoned
this tactic after the hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner
in December 1984.
� Critical Gulf economic facilities, such as oil facili-
ties and desalinization plants, could be future tar-
gets. Kuwaiti officials claim to have identified nine
Iranian-trained members of an underwater demoli-
tion team who were to attack oil platforms and port
facilities in the Gulf.
Activities Elsewhere
Pro-Iranian terrorists also operate in Western Europe,
and the potential for terrorist operations there re-
mains high, especially against Iranian opposition
groups. Tehran recently opened an unofficial office in
Barcelona, and Spanish security services are con-
cerned that the new office could become a center for
terrorist activity. Spanish authorities closed an unoffi-
cial Iranian office in July 1984 after they obtained
evidence that the Iranians planned to hijack a Saudi
airliner. The Iranians also were charged at the time
with illegal possession of arms and explosives.
During the hijacking of TWA flight 847, Elizballah
elements initially took five US hostages and continued
to hold them even after the United States and Syria
had reached a deal.
Iran did not plan or stage the hijacking of TWA
flight 847, which originated in Greece in June 1985.
Iran makes extensive use of its network of diplomatic
and cultural missions to support terrorist operations.
Many elements of the Iranian Government, including
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1 OD
several senior senior officials, are directly involved in terror-
ist activity. For example, direct links between Tehran
and terrorist activities abroad have been maintained
through the Foreign Ministry and the Pasdaran (Rev-
olutionary Guards). Iran also supports cultural institu-
tions and pro-Khomeini student associations in West-
ern Europe, particularly in Italy, West Germany,
Spain, and France. These institutions spread pro-
Iranian propaganda among the sizable expatriate
Iranian and Arab student and worker populations in
Europe and may also be involved in recruiting
Iran attempts to propagandize the Muslim popula-
tions of countries as diverse as Nigeria, Pakistan,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. For example, in Paki-
stan, militant Shias
have demonstrated violently to force the government
to allow Shias to impose their version of Islamic law in
their own community. In September an exiled Iranian
tribal leader with close ties to the Shah was gunned
down in Karachi. In 1985, Iran also began to take
more interest in events in South Africa, seeking a
more strident antiapartheid stand as a means of
gaining influence with black African states.
Syria
Syria in 1985 continued its role as a significant patron
of international terrorism. No attacks involved Syrian
personnel directly, but the number of attacks carried
out by groups operating with Syrian support in-
creased, compared with 1984. Syrian-sponsored
groups have conducted attacks in 15 countries in the
last two years. In 1985 these groups were involved in
30 terrorist attacks against moderate Arab (largely
Jordanian), US, British, Palestinian, and Israeli tar-
gets. Abu Nidal stepped up its campaign of terror
significantly and was responsible for nearly two-thirds
of the attacks attributed to Syrian sponsorship. Most
of these attacks occurred in Western Europe.
Assad probably will continue to encourage the selec-
tive use of terrorism when he believes it will advance
his political fortunes. The use of surrogates offers
advantages that will render the use of Syrian agents
almost totally unnecessary. Jordan's King Hussein
9
Abu Nidal attack on British Airways office in
Rome, September 1985.
and PLO leader Arafat will continue to be the most
obvious and accessible targets for the groups support-
ed by Syria.
President Assad uses terrorist tactics to dissuade
opponents and recalcitrant allies from pursuing poli-
cies inimical to Syrian interests. Syria is not ideologi-
cally committed to the use of terrorism, as are Iran
and Libya. Support for terrorist groups costs Syria
little but raises the cost to participants of any peace
initiative that excludes Damascus and serves to keep
Assad's regional rivals off balance.
Syria instigated terrorist operations against Jordanian
officials and facilities and pro-Arafat PLO officials in
reaction to rapprochement between King Hussein and
Arafat and in an attempt to stymie efforts to build
moderate Arab support for peace negotiations with
Israel. In the wake of the Palestine National Confer-
ence meeting in Amman in November 1984 and the
PLO-Jordan accord of February 1985, the number of
attacks against Jordanian targets by Syrian-supported
groups nearly doubled in 1985, compared with the
previous year. Increasing strains in Syria's relations
with Iraq, the Gulf states, Turkey, and others could
prompt similar terrorist responses.
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Syrian Use of Surrogates
The greater use of surrogates by Damascus reflects
Assad's desire to mask Syria's role in terrorist attacks
and to obtain leverage over the groups he supports.
Damascus enables terrorist groups to use Syrian or
Syrian-controlled territory for base camps, training
facilities, and political headquarters and provides
arms, travel assistance, intelligence, and probably
money. Palestinians who are largely funded, trained,
and armed by Syria include the PFLP-GC, Abu
Musa's Fatah rebels, and Saiqa. The degree of control
exercised by Syria over its surrogates varies. The Abu
Nidal organization appears to maintain a fairly high
degree of operational independence and in 1985
sought additional support from Libya. Saiqa and the
Jordanian People's Revolutionary Party are for all
intents and purposes puppet arms of the Syrian state.
Syrian-supported groups were involved in numerous
significant terrorist incidents during 1985:
� The Abu Nidal Group was responsible for the
vicious Egyptair hijacking in November 1985 and
also attacked the Rome and Vienna El Al ticket
counters on 27 December. The three attacks ac-
counted for nearly 200 casualties, including more
than 20 Americans.
� On a single day in March, Abu Nidal terrorists
bombed Jordanian Airways offices in Rome, Ath-
ens, and Nicosia, injuring three people. Black Sep-
tember an Abu Nidal covername�claimed
responsibility.
� A grenade attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe in
September injured 38 tourists, including nine Amer-
icans. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist
Moslems (ROSM)�another Abu Nidal cover-
name�claimed responsibility for the attack.
� Nine days after the attack on the cafe, police
arrested a Palestinian in connection with an explo-
sion at the British Airways office in Rome that
injured 15 people. The suspect claimed to be a
member of ROSM and was later identified by
witnesses as the same man who attacked the Jorda-
nian Airways office in Athens in March.
Remains of the Egyptair jetliner that was hi-
jacked by Libyan-linked terrorists in November
1985. The plane war later stormed by Egyptian
commandos.
� Rockets were fired at a Jordanian airliner leaving
Athens airport in April, and, one day earlier, a
rocket narrowly missed the Jordanian Embassy
building in Rome. Black September claimed respon-
sibility for both incidents.
Damascus also supports such non-Palestinian actors
as the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of
Armenia, the IFLB, and Iraqi dissidents. The Syrian-
controlled JPRP attacked US targets twice in early
1985:
� A bomb defused near a USAID employee's home in
Jordan was later discovered to be of JPRP origin.
The same day, two bombs were discovered at the
Iraqi and the Kuwaiti Embassies in Amman. They
too were probably the work of the JPRP.
� An explosive device defused at the American Center
for Oriental Studies in Amman also was determined
to have been the work of the JPRP.
The radical Lebanese Hizballah movement also re-
ceived Syrian support in 1985. Shortly after the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, Syria
allowed several hundred Iranian Revolutionary
Guards to set up training and staging bases for
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Hizballah
Hizballah in the Syrian-occupied Bekaa Valley. Syri-
an intelligence has closely monitored the activities of
nearly all factions in Lebanon, including the radical
Shia, and probably provided logistic and material
support for some Hizballah operations, including the
attack on the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983.
Syria has been working to stabilize the security
situation in Lebanon for nearly two years and is
currently pursuing a dual policy of imposing con-
straints on Hizballah, while at the same time attempt-
ing to co-opt them into activities that more closely
mesh with Syrian interests.
Cooperation With Other State Supporters
Syria cooperates selectively with the other two major
Middle Eastern sponsors of terrorism, Libya and Iran.
The three states share a desire to undermine US
policies in the Middle East, to "liberate" territory
occupied by Israel, and to weaken pro-Western mod-
erate Arab governments. Available evidence does not
indicate, however, that they are pursuing a coordinat-
ed terrorist strategy. Divergent interests and long-
standing rivalries among the three make temporary,
bilateral, tactical ties on a case-by-case basis the
norm.
Relations among Libya, Iran, and Syria recently have
fallen to a low point despite their continuing interest
in a radical "axis." Qadhafi continues to be ignored
by Syria in policy calculations that affect Lebanon; at
the same time, Tehran has become increasingly con-
cerned about Syrian dominance in Lebanon. Syria,
which is least dependent on the other two radical
states' good will and less committed to radical unity,
has, therefore, suffered least from frictions among the
three.
Attacks on US Targets
Syrian support for its surrogate groups in Jordan and
Lebanon and for Shia groups in Lebanon has made
Damascus a party to bombings of US facilities, but
we do not know if Syrian officials explicitly approved
the attacks. We do not believe that President Assad is
intent on targeting US personnel and facilities direct-
ly, but we believe that he would take advantage of the
anti-American militancy of these groups to encourage
attacks against the United States if he perceived they
served Syrian interests.
Iraq
Iraq, formerly a major sponsor of terrorism, continued
its lower level of involvement in international terror-
ism in 1985. Iraqi-sponsored terrorist activity last
year was targeted almost exclusively against Syria
and Libya in an effort to increase the cost to these
states of their support for Iran, dissident Iraqi Shias,
and Kurdish rebels. The evidence indicates that Iraq
has supported pro-Arafat Palestinian attacks against
Syria and provided assistance to Libyan dissidents.
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn still approves of
attacks by the PLO inside Israel and the West Bank
and may be drawn into providing at least indirect
support for such attacks. Baghdad significantly in-
creased support to Yasir Arafat in 1985 to counter-
balance Syrian domination of the Palestinian move-
ment. After the Israeli raid on Tunis, Baghdad
allowed several hundred additional PLO fighters to
move to Iraq and
allowed Fatah's Force 17 to establish offices in Bagh-
dad. Saddam, however, is not eager to host PLO
political or military headquarters for fear of Israeli
retaliation.
In an effort to protect its relations with the United
States, however, we believe Iraq will limit its involve-
ment in PLO operations against Israel and probably
will not countenance attacks outside Israel or the
occupied territories. Moreover, Baghdad almost cer-
tainly will continue to withhold support from radical,
non-PLO Palestinian terrorist groups.
In 1985, Iraqi-backed terrorism focused almost exclu-
sively on Syrian and Libyan targets:
� In early July, Syrian military intelligence arrested a
Syrian Ba'th Party official
The Syrians believe the official was respon-
sible for at least four attacks inside Syria.
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The PLO's Central Security apparatus has opened
three offices in Baghdad, and its leader was coordi-
nating attacks against Syria with Iraqi officials,
The Iraqi Government
reportedly halted these activities last fall after it had
several contacts with the Syrian Government
Relations between
Baghdad and Damascus have not improved, howev-
er, and Baghdad may again support Fatah attacks
against Syrian targets.
� The Libyan and Iraqi press reflect increased Iraqi
support for Libyan dissidents after Baghdad broke
relations with Tripoli in June 1985.
Other Iraqi-backed terrorist activity in 1985 included:
� The assassination of two Iraqi officials in Kuwait
and Sweden in March 1985. Iraqi intelligence
agents probably conducted these attacks. The mo-
tive for the assassination in Kuwait is unclear: the
victim in Sweden was an Iraqi defector.
� The arrest of four Iraqi nationals in August in the
United Kingdom for attempting to bomb a consign-
ment of war material that reportedly was destined
for Iran.
� The granting of asylum in late October to Palestine
Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas�the master-
mind of the Achille Lauro hijacking�who almost
certainly is still in Baghdad. Iraq has refused to
extradite Abu Abbas to the United States for
prosecution. however,
that Iraq will ban Abu Abbas if Italy can prove the
PLF did not intend to use the hijacked Achille
Lauro for an operation against Israel
Restraining Radical Palestinian Groups
In the face of continued pressure from the United
States and moderate Arab states, Baghdad in 1985
kept the pressure on to prevent radical, non-PLO
Palestinian terrorist groups from operating out of
Iraq:
� Iraq withheld its support from the 15 May Organi-
zation and inhibited the group from conducting
operations. Although two terrorists carrying
explosive-laden suitcases were arrested in Rome last
October after arriving from Baghdad, we do not
believe that the Iraqi leadership was aware of the
planned operation. The terrorists claimed they in-
tended to attack US and Israeli targets in Italy.
� The Israelis claim that the activities of Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine�Special Com-
mand (PFLP-SC) operatives in Iraq have been
frozen in recent months. The PFLP-SC may soon
move to South Yemen (PDRY).
In our judgment, Iraq will continue to use terrorism
primarily to undermine and isolate its Arab ene-
mies Syria and Libya. Baghdad is eager to end
Syrian and Libyan military support for Tehran and
for Kurdish and Shia dissidents in Iraq. To this end,
Iraq will pursue any reasonable opportunities for
reconciliation with the radical Arab states, according
to the US Embassy in Baghdad. Nonetheless, in our
judgment, Baghdad remains pessimistic about the
chances for rapprochement with Damascus and Trip-
oli in the near term and will continue to encourage
surrogate groups�Libyan dissidents, the PLO, and
possibly the Muslim Brotherhood�to conduct attacks
against Syrian and Libyan targets.
Iraq may also reluctantly support PLO attacks
against Israel in the near future. The Iraqis strongly
oppose Israel but recognize that their support for
terrorism against Israel risks Israeli retaliation and
would damage their relations with the United States,
whose technology and support for the arms embargo
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(b)(3)
against Iran Baghdad greatly values. Nonetheless,
Baghdad believes increased support for pro-Arafat
Palestinian factions is necessary to counter Syria's
efforts to dominate the Palestinian movement
Baghdad may not be able to prevent the PLO from
using Iraqi territory as a planning and staging area
for Fatah attacks in Israel and the occupied territo-
ries. Baghdad is likely to more actively discourage
PLO attacks against Israeli targets outside Israeli
territory. A senior Iraqi official told US officials early
in 1986 that Iraq opposes international terrorism as
legally and morally wrong and harmful to the Pales-
tinian cause. He distinguished between terrorist acts
abroad and those within Israel and the occupied
territories. The Iraqis are sympathetic to the Palestin-
ian cause, and Baghdad probably would directly
support such operations only if the position of Arafat's
moderate faction were seriously threatened. More-
over, Iraq will continue to withhold support from the
radical, non-PLO groups like the 15 May Organiza-
tion and the PFLP-SC.
South Yemen
In 1985 then South Yemeni President Hasani contin-
ued his more moderate foreign policy by curtailing
Aden's direct involvement with, and support for,
insurgent groups from Oman and North Yemen.
South Yemen also reduced support for the Palestin-
ians. The PDRY still provides safehaven, passports,
training facilities, and other low-level support to some
groups. The new leadership in Aden could mean a
higher terrorist profile eventually, but, in the near
term, the regime will be forced to focus on building up
and repairing both the physical and political
infrastructure:
� The PDRY provides safehaven for the PFLP-SC,
with the understanding that the group will not run
operations from South Yemen. The PFLP-SC is
headquartered in Aden but has focused its occasion-
al operational activity elsewhere in the Middle East
and in Western Europe.
13
Bulgaria (b)(1)
smuggled weapons to the Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine and the PLF through South
Yemen, although the degree of Yemeni involvement (b)(3)
in the transaction is unknown.
� Hasani's drive to normalize relations with Oman
resulted in greatly reduced support for the People's
Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), confined
to safehaven and subsistence-level financing. The
PDRY reportedly allows Bulgaria to supply the
PFLO with arms.
� South Yemen continues its political backing of the
PLO, but other support has declined.
Cuba
The Castro regime maintains a large and complex
apparatus for subversion that provides backing for
many leftist revolutionaries and terrorists. This sup-
port ranges from arms and funding to safehaven and
training, assistance that is indispensable for guerrilla
movements in Latin America. Castro has given logis-
tic and financial support to thousands of guerrillas
and has provided them with military training, usually
in courses lasting three to six months. These courses
cover the full range of insurgent/subversive terrorist
skills: underwater demolition, document falsification,
communications and cryptography, secret writing,
urban and guerrilla tactics, bomb fabrication, small-
arms handling, and marksmanship.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Although the bulk of Cuban support goes to the
Salvadoran leftist insurgency, Guatemalan and Hon-
duran insurgents also have received Cuban aid. In
Guatemala, Havana has provided training and some
financial support to three guerrilla factions. Hondu-
ran territory is a crossroads through which material is
conveyed to the Salvadoran insurgents, while the
government has been the target of Cuban destabiliza-
tion efforts. For example, many of the guerrillas
infiltrated into Honduras in 1983 and 1984 were
trained in Cuba. In addition, Colombia's M-19 has
long- and well-established relations with the Cuban
Government.
Throughout 1985, Cuba maintained its longstanding
support to terrorists in countries such as Colombia
and apparently has made new initiatives in others like
Bolivia Cuba, build-
ing on its traditional support for the Chilean left, is
encouraging at least one Chilean terrorist group to
step up its activity
Cuban President Fidel Castro has recently been
courting several South American nations diplomati-
cally as part of an effort to ease US pressure on
Cuban interests in Central America, to garner sup-
port for Havana's position on regional issues such as
the Latin American debt, and to gain access to new
economic markets. Nevertheless, Havana has not
ended its support for subversives in the region.
Some of the major examples of Cuban support for
terrorism over the past year include:
� In
1985
approximately 120 ex-
iles are returning clandestinely to Chile after receiv-
ing paramilitary training abroad. At least 20 were
trained in Cuba.
� A key member of the Chilean MIR says that Cuba
intends to assist the group�including its "Rebel
Youth" faction in rebuilding.
� A meeting was held at the Colombian/Soviet Insti-
tute of Friendship in Bogota in August 1985 to
coordinate a series of political actions in support of
Castro. Representatives from two Colombian ter-
rorist groups the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN)�and from Cuba attended and report-
edly were to undertake terrorist incidents to protest
Colombia's foreign debt.
Nicaragua
Nicaragua continues to provide training and support
to Latin American guerrilla groups, but evidence
linking the Sandinistas to recent terrorist incidents is
available in only a few cases.
We expect the Sandinistas to maintain contacts with
Latin American and West European groups that
engage in terrorism. Despite the publicity generated
by US accusations, international disapproval has not
discouraged the Sandinistas from pursuing terrorist
ties:
� At least six of the assault rifles used by Colombian
M-19 terrorists during the siege of the Palace of
Justice in Bogota last November came from Nicara-
gua. The rifles are the first hard evidence of Nicara-
guan arms being used by Colombian guerrillas,
although we do not know if the Sandinistas supplied
the weapons directly to the M-19.
� The PRTC, a Salvadoran insurgent group with close
ties to Nicaragua, claimed responsibility for the
killing of six Americans and seven others in down-
town San Salvador on 19 June 1985.
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Bodies of American victims gunned down at
sidewalk cafe in San Salvador, June 1985.
� On 31 May 1984, 28 people were wounded and at
least four killed�including one US correspon-
dent�when a bomb exploded at a news conference
called by Eden Pastora. Nicaraguan sponsorship is
suspected because Sandinista radio announced the
composition of the explosive device several hours
before Costa Rican authorities had even determined
its nature, let alone announced it publicly.
Managua has become increasingly sensitive to US
charges linking Nicaragua to terrorism, and the US
publicity probably has prompted the Sandinistas to be
more discreet in their training of foreigners. In fact,
during the past eight months, activity has decreased
dramatically at one Nicaraguan paramilitary camp
where Salvadoran guerrillas reportedly were trained.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Since 1979 the Nicaraguan Government has provided
safehaven and training to several Latin American
guerrilla groups that engage in terrorist operations.
Nicaraguan support has included allowing such
groups access to communications centers, safehouses,
military supplies, and training courses. El Salvador
and Honduras have been the primary targets of
Nicaraguan-sponsored violence, but Costa Rican, Co-
lombian, and Guatemalan insurgents reportedly also
have received support from Managua. Nicaragua also
has had contacts with Italy's Red Brigades and the
Basque Fatherland and Liberty
There is no evidence that the West European terror-
ists who reportedly received training from the Sandi-
nistas have returned to their countries to commit
terrorist acts. In fact, some former trainees may now
be serving in the Nicaraguan armed forces.
foreign trainees gain
combat experience in Sandinista units, and Italian
authorities believe that at least five Red Brigades
members became instructors in the Nicaraguan
Army.
15
North Korea
North Korea in 1985 continued its reduced involve-
ment with international terrorist and extremist groups
in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa. We
have recorded no North Korean�sponsored terrorist
incidents since the October 1983 bombing in Rangoon
directed against the South Korean President.
P'yongyang maintains ties to a variety of foreign
extremist groups, however, by providing training and
funding and by supplying weapons. North Korea
currently has training missions in 16 Third World
countries, although most are for conventional military
or security training. North Korea also is active in the
gray arms market, one element in the circuitous route
by which terrorists and radical states clandestinely
acquire weapons.
South Korea remains the primary target of North
Korean�sponsored terrorism, and P'yongyang may
again become active in its quest to destabilize Seoul.
North Korea could seize upon an upcoming opportu-
nity to direct terrorism against South Korea in 1986:
the Asian Games that will take place in Seoul this
fall.
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc
Moscow continues to support various "national libera-
tion groups"�such as the Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization and the African National Congress with
the knowledge that some of the persons they have
--Tzp-srefet__
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
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trained have later committed terrorist acts. The Sovi-
ets and their allies provide most of their support
indirectly, however, by selling arms on the interna-
tional gray arms market and to Third World clients
who resell or give the weapons to terrorist users.
Moscow apparently does not restrict the end use of
these weapons. In contrast to Iran, Syria, and Libya,
we have no evidence of the Soviets' directly planning
or orchestrating terrorist acts by Middle Eastern,
West European, or Latin American groups
The Soviet Union and its East European allies provide
arms directly, however, to a variety of Palestinian
groups. Although the majority of weapons sold by the
Bloc to the Palestinians have never been employed in
terrorist acts, Palestinian terrorists use the man-
portable infantry weapons in particular:
� Markings found on the Kalashnikov assault rifles
recovered after the December 1985 massacres at the
Rome and Vienna airports indicate that the weap-
ons were made in the Soviet Union, Poland, and
Bulgaria.
� Handgrenades recovered after the airport attacks
and at least two other recent terrorist attacks
attributed to Abu Nidal were all manufactured in
Bulgaria.
� The weapons employed in the unsuccessful April
attack on a Jordanian airliner in Athens by Abu
Nidal was an RPG-75�the Czechoslovak version of
the RPG-18.
� Silencers manufactured by Czechoslovakia and suit-
able for use with various small-caliber pistols have
been recovered from Palestinian fighters in Leba-
non.
The Soviets' influence over their Bloc allies gives
Moscow the leverage to elicit Bloc support for radical
and revolutionary groups. In general, our information
on Bloc support to terrorism provides extensive evi-
dence of indirect support and only scattered informa-
tion about direct involvement.
�113p�Segzet._
S( 00409/86
East European countries' involvement in terrorism
varies, with Bulgaria playing the most active role.
Sofia has provided weapons and political support to
various Palestinian groups, including the radical Abu
Nidal faction. A variety of reports point to the
presence of terrorist training facilities in Bulgaria,
where Palestinians, in particular, reportedly receive
instruction in the use of tactical infantry weapons,
artillery, and weapons. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hun-
gary, and Romania appear to play a less active role
supporting the Soviets. Yugoslavia was the first state
to offer initial safehaven to Abu Abbas, the Palestine
Liberation Front leader who planned the Achille
Lauro hijacking, even providing the airc
Abbas was flown to safety out of Rome.
The location of the Eastern Bloc renders it a useful
safehaven and way station for terrorists traveling
between Western Europe and the Middle East. We do
not know the extent to which these governments
directly support terrorist-related activities, but we
believe that, at a minimum, they maintain surveil-
lance on suspected terrorists.
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