CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - SITUATION IN THE CONGO

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06541067
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: March 24, 1961

NP.
24 March 1961
Copy No. C is
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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Situation in the Congo
Nammarskjold told Western UN delegates on 22 March
that UN forces will run out of supplies if the port of Matadi
is not reopened within one week. He believes that uninter-
rupted transit through Matadi can be assured only by the
presence of a small UN force in the port area. Efforts by
Hammarskjold's personal representative, Makki Abbas, to
obtain permission from the Ileo government for UN re-entry
have not met with success, and unless a favorable decision
can be obtained within the next few days, Hammarskj old sees
no alternative but to bring the whole question of the UN ef-
fort in the Congo once more before the Security Council.
Hammarskjold is well aware that it
is unlikely the Security Council will issue more positive direc-
tives on the Congo at this time but he will ask for council action
because he is "fed up with bearing full responsibility himself.ilA
/1 UN troop commander General McKeown is now under orders
to proceed from Leopoldville to Matadi with 200 Tunisian soldiers
with the objective of taking control of warehouse and other facili-
ties. Troops are instructed to use force only in self-defense,
"if stopped and fired upon.11
Mobutu stated on 20 March that "blood would flow" if the
UN attempted to retake Matadi, and he is reported to have
warned Congolese officials on 22 March that it would be impos-
sible for him to prevent Congolese troops from resisting with
force such UN action. He expressed the fear that his troops
would turn against their commanders and government officials
as well if they were ordered not to resist. In the past, however,
Congolese troops have often refused to stand up to a determined
military unit.
(Jasavubu apparently is exploring the possibility of a peace-
ful UN return to Matadi during his current visit to the region,
and Ileo that a solution
could be found, although he could not predict when the "people"
of the city would permit a re-entry_ The Congolese are likely
to regard the UN initiative as an ultimatum which disregards
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their recent efforts at conciliation following Dayal's departure,
a development which would reverse the recent trend toward
improved relations between the Leopoldville regime and the
UN Command.
the Union Miniere had ways of
bringing pressure on Tshombe to reach an agreement with
Kasavubu, "if it really wanted to,"
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Peiping has given a somewhat less than satisfactory response
to Gizenga's requests for aid and the naming of a Chinese ambas-
sador to Stanlevville.
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Last fall the Chinese Communists extended a 52,800,000 monetary
grant to Lumumba supporters. Chou accepted the appointment of
a Congolese ambassador but said transportation difficulties ruled
out the sending of a Chinese ambassador to Stanleyville at this
time.
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