INTELLIGENCE REPORT LEADERS OF COMMUNIST CHINA II. LIN PIAO

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Nixon Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06928150
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: February 23, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2022
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971

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-Secret
EO 13526 3.3(h)(2)
EO 13526 6.2(d)
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
LEADERS OF COMMUNIST CHINA
II. UN Piao
�Secret-
CR R 71 5.2
July 1971
G 2
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PREFACE
This report is the second in a series of
in-depth biographic studies of Communist China's
top leaders
I _ )The series will fill a gap in our bio-
graphical coverage of China's senior leadership
and is launched in anticipation of future leader-
ship changes.
The additional length of these reports over
our conventional product is primarily attributable
to the inclusion of more background information
and speculative comment than is our usual custom.
Our aim is not to take firm positions on matters
of great intelligence interest but to present the
available facts--as well as some of the differing
views of China specialists on these leaders.
This report was prepared by the Central Reference
Service and was coordinated within CIA as
appropriate.
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BIOGRAPHIC BRIEF
The enigmatic Lin Piao, Mao's favorite
general and the youngest of the ex-marshals in
the fading old guard of the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), has been Mao's chosen heir apparent
for 5 years. He was confirmed by the Ninth
CCP Congress in April 1969 as Mao's successor,
replacing Liu Shao-chli.
Born in a revolutionary-minded environment,
Lin matured rapidly as a field general in the
1930's until dealt the severe handicap of
recurring ill health following a serious wound
in 1938. He mastered his condition sufficiently
to reconfirm his towering reputation as a field
captain in the military campaigns that preceded
the 1949 takeover.
In partial retirement during much of the
1950's, Lin was yet a powerful regional figure
and rose quietly in national influence. He
emerged at the end of the decade as Mao's counter-
weight to party politicians, and he gave his full
support to Mao's recent struggle for control of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), using the PLA
as the principal tool in the Cultural Revolution
years of 1965-69.
His wife,
Yeh Ch'un, sits on the Politburo and helps manage
his work load.
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Vice Chairman, Chinese
Communist Party; Vice
Chairman, Politburo;
Principal Vice Chairman,
Military Affairs Com-
mission; Minister of
National Defense
Lin Piao, Mao Tse-
tung's favorite general
the commander of China's
military forces, and
Mao's designated politi-
cal heir, has a strong
record but uncertain
prospects. After 1959,
when Mao ended former
Defense Minister Pleng
Te-huai's career, Lin
made the People's Liberation ALmy (PLA) a model
for nationwide emulation. His ideological prepara-
tion of the aimed forces, in retrospect, appears to
have been a deliberate effort instigated by Mao to
exploit a rejuvenated PLA under Lin as the major
instrument for combating those domestic foes that
Mao believed were opposing him.
Lin's status derives primarily from Ma s favor,
but it is supported by an apparently effective work-
ing relationship with Premier Chou En-lai and by
Lin's important political positions.
LIN Piao
(2651/1753)
Despite Lin's rapid rise to prominence since
1959, he remains one of the least known of China's
leaders and is difficult to assess. In his posture
Lin must take account of Mao's innate jealousy, and
it is understandable that Lin's present image is a
pallid one. It remains to be seen whether he will
be capable of stepping out in his own right after
Mao's demise. He seems devoid of charisma, but the
frail and bumbling picture sometimes reported is an
over-simplified caricature. He has worked for over
30 years under partial physical disability, and
he clearly combines great inner strength with his
recognized talent.
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Lin is an able military tactician, strategist,
politician and administrator. He controls the
military establishment through the Military Commis-
sion of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Lin has
systematically placed military men personally loyal
to him in many key central and regional party and
government posts. During the Cultural Revolution,
however, his treatment of the PLA was, by Western
standards of intraorganizational loyalty, repre-
hensible, and the resentments kindled then could
impede his succession.
Despite Mao's accolade, and despite his own
organizational skill, Lin's prospects for a smooth
succession to Mao are uncertain. Besides having
poor health, he does not take a very positive role
in running the country. His public association
with some of Mao's extreme policies may also have
cost Lin appreciable military and civilian support
since 1960, and especially since 1966.
Positions
Lin's titular rise in China's central government
began in 1954, when he became a Vice Premier of the
State Council. In 1955 he attained membership on
the Politburo. He has been a Vice Chairman of the
CCP Central Committee (CCP-CC) since May 1958, when
he was elevated to the inner circle by appointment
to the Politburo Standing Committee. In September
1959 he became Minister of National Defense and
senior vice chairman of the CCP Military Commission.
With his rise to his present stature as Mao's heir
in 1966, he also became the sole Vice Chairman of
the CCP-CC (the other four vice-chairmanships were
eliminated) and the senior Vice Premier of the State
Council. In 1969 Lin was reelected Vice Chairman
of both the CCP-CC and the Politburo at the Ninth
Congress of the CCP and was also reelected to the
Politburo Standing Committee.
With Mao and Chou En-lai Lin dominates the
Politburo through the Standing Committee. He and
Mao dominate military affairs through the Military
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Commission and its "administrative unit." The
Commission, a panel, and the unit, a secretariat,
are bodies through which Lin can control and
direct military matters to any needed extent.
Early Life
Lin Piao (born Lin Yu-jung 2651/3022/1369)
was born on 5 December 1907 in Liuchiawan, Huang-
kang Hsien, Hupeh Province. He was the second of
four sons. Possibly two of his brothers were
involved in early revolutionary activity. Three
were cadres after 1938; one survives and now works
in a tuberculosis hospital in Tientsin. His
father was a petty landowner, the proprietor of a
small felt factory, which failed, and in later
years a purser on a river steamer.
Lin was nurtured under strong revolutionary
influences in his family. Maturing in stirring
times and in a revolutionary hotbed, he was intro-
duced to Communism by a cousin. This man, Lin
Yu-nan, was 20 years Lin's senior and a founder
of the "Hupeh Communist Group." Lin Yu-nan was
in the USSR in 1917, and in 1920 he organized a
Communist Party group in Lin Piao's natal village.
After primary schooling, Lin studied at his
cousin's Chunhsin School at Patouwan from 1919 to
1921. For the next 4 years he attended the Kung-
chin Middle School in Wuchang (now part of Wuhan).
Both schools were centers of Communist indoctrina-
tion.
At some time during his student days Lin
joined the Kuomintang. At the age of 17, he was
much influenced by the May 30th Movement of 1925,
and he went to Shanghai as a delegate to a congress
of the communistic China National Students' Fede-
ration. There he joined Socialist Youth and later
its successor, the Communist Youth League. In
1925 he went to Canton to enter the Whampoa Mili-
tary Academy. At Whampoa he came under the
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influence of Chou En-lai, the school's real
political director in the usual absence of the
Kuomintang (KMT) figure to whom Chou was nominally
deputy. In 1926, when KMT members had to resign
if they had Communist affiliations, Lin left the
KMT and overtly joined the CCP.
Lin participated in the Northern Expedition
of 1926 as a probationary platoon and company
commander. He was involved in the 1 August 1927
mutiny against the Nationalists in Nanchang,
Kiangsi Province, when the PLA was "born" and
endured its first defeat. Under Chu Te, his
principal patron and still a Politburo member,
Lin quickly became a battalion commander in the
4th Red Army, which was organized after Chu and
Mao joined forces in April 1928.
Lin succeeded Chu Te in command of the 4th
Red Army in 1930 and in command of the 1st Red
Army Group in 1932. He had gained the confidence
of Mao and Chu while still junior to other top
commanders, and his reputation as an able tactical
commander began to grow.
As a field general Lin emerged from the
shadow of Chu Te after the Long March of 1934-35,
when he and Chou En-lai, under Mao and Pleng Te-
huai, Mao's senior general on that trip, were in
the vanguard group. At Yenan Lin was given com-
mand of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route
Army in the reorganized Chinese Communist Armed
Forces.
After June 1936 Lin headed the Eighth Route
Army's cadre school, usually known until 1945 as
the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Military and
Political University (Kangta).
Lin is given possibly unmerited credit for a
successful ambush of part of the Japanese 5th
Division in September 1937 at Pinghsingkuan, the
principal point of entry to Shansi from Hopeh.
At least two visitors to Yensn gained the impres-
sion that credit for the battlefield victory
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really belonged to Nieh
Jung-chen, Lin's deputy
commander.
Many of the military
men who were later named
to key PLA posts served
under Lin during the now
semilegendary, "heroic"
Yenan days extending from
1935 to 1945.
The Wartime Years
In early 1938 Lin
received an incapacitating
wound that forced him to
depart for the USSR for
treatment. He therefore
missed the "Hundred Regi-
ments" campaign of 1940.
This climactic offensive involved over 400,000
men in 115 regiments and lasted 108 days. Lin's
deputy, Nieh Jung-chen, supposedly furnished 47
regiments from the area under his command, but
certain units formerly under Lin's direct command
did not participate.
ADDRESSING TRAINEES AT YENAN
C. 1937
Returning to Yenan from the USSR in 1941 or
1942, Lin assisted Mao in the 1942 Rectification
Campaign directed against Mao's inner party oppo-
sition. Late in the year he was assigned to the
light but essential duty of liaison service with
the Chinese Nationalists in Chungking in associ-
ation with Chou En-lai. One of their tasks was
to negotiate preliminary proposals for military
collaboration with the Chinese Nationalists. Lin
returned to Yenan after July 1943 to resume the
Kangta command and help direct the training of
troops. After V-J Day the Communists moved into
Manchuria in advance of the Nationalists. Lin
assumed overall command of the Northeast Military
District and of the Northeast Democratic United
Army in October 1945. Lin's growing forces com-
pleted the occupation of Manchuria and the elim-
ination of Nationalist resistance by the end of
1948.
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Lin then led his forces, reorganized in late
1948 into the PLA 4th Field Army, in the victorious
1949 sweep to China's southern frontiers. During
this period Lin served as commander of the Central
China Military District and as first secretary of
the Central China Bureau of the CCP, while remain-
ing commander of the 4th Field Army.
The 1950's
Troops drawn mostly from the 4th Field Army,
Lin's command, spearheaded the Chinese entry into
the Korean War late in 1950.
claimed that it was Lin who directed
PLA operations in Korea from 26 November 1950
until January or February 1951, but the regime
itself has never commented on Lin's role, if any,
in the Korean conflict, and he was probably not
present.
When the national regime was established in
1949, Lin immediately became a member of two
interim organs--the Central People's Government
Council and the People's Revolutionary Military
Council; he became a vice chairman of the latter
body in 1951.
In October 1949 Lin was appointed chairman
of the Central-South Military and Administrative
Committee; he remained chairman of the Central-
South Administrative Committee, which succeeded
it in 1953. He was also commander of the Central-
South Military District from 1949 to 1954 and
first secretary of the Central-South Bureau of
the CCP from July 1950 to 1954. He remained
commander of the 4th Field Army until its reorga-
nization in 1954.
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Lin replaced P'eng Te-huai as Minister of
Defense in September 1959. Since then Lin has
attempted to articulate Mao's desires--at the
price of many fine military managers lost
through purge.
The 1960's
After Soviet military advisers left in mid-
1960, the CCP-CC Military Affairs Committee, at
an enlarged meeting in September-October, endorsed
Lin Piao's platform of the "Four Firsts"--abstract
theses that identify the four primary working
contexts in which, under the influence of Mao's
thought, politicization should mature. In terms
of increasing specificity, these phases of
activity are said to shift from the general human
situation to political activity, next to ideolo-
gical awareness, and finally to the application
of the "living idea," i.e., the ability to put
Mao's thought to work in solving day-to-day prob-
lems.
Also emphasized and subsequently linked with
the methods of Lin Piao was the somewhat older
"Five-Good Soldier" movement to cultivate indi-
viduals who would be "both Red and expert" and
who would be above the sort of "professionalism"
that chooses to be expert before being "Red" and
neglects political activity.
At the beginning of 1961 the Military Commis-
sion also promulgated Lin Piao's criteria of "Four
Goods" for judging the political and military
effectiveness of basic-level units. These formu-
las have been relentlessly developed and inflated
as touchstones of Lin Piao's reinvigoration of the
PLA, beginning with a "rectification campaign" in
1960-61.
Despite Lin's having increased PLA combat
effectiveness after 1960, the notion that an army
exists to fight has, overall, lost ground in favor
of the idea that the PLA is the instrument of
ongoing revolution and political reconstruction.
Lin's position on soldierly preparedness, however,
has not necessarily been nonprofessional. Lin has
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always stressed improved training in basic skills
for individuals and for small units, and under
him the Military Commission ordered the reduction
of large-scale military exercises. Lin's philoso-
phy emphasizes the creation of a well-conditioned
soldier, flexible in both the political and tech-
nical dimensions, and adaptable to new demands.
For such a soldier, presumably, retraining is
continual and partially self-directed.
The politicization process in the PLA began to
take on important domestic political overtones in
1962 when Mao set out to recapture the CCP, intend-
ing to use the PLA as the instrument. During the
year and a half that followed, the regime was more
preoccupied by foreign affairs and by the efforts
of Liu Shao-chli's old CCP machine to regain the
initiative than with matters in which Lin Piao was
overtly involved. Lin abolished ranks in the PLA
in 1965. This reduced the authority vested in
professional officers by rank apart from assignment
and greatly simplified politically motivated per-
sonnel changes. The propaganda buildup of the PLA
as a political model gained great strength in that
year.
The Cultural Revolution
"On People's War," a lengthy article ascribed
to Lin and published in September 1965 at the out-
set of the Cultural Revolution, reiterated many
Maoist positions and placed them in long-term
context. Lin seemingly challenged the nuclear
centers of the non-Communist world with envelopment
through spreading revolution, but in failing to
commit China to anything beyond encouragement, he
reinforced Mao's basically inward-looking perspec-
tive on China's place in the world political
community.
In step with Mao when the Cultural Revolution
was launched in early November 1955, Lin issued a
directive to the PLA on 15 November on its work
for 1966. Lin called for a political mobilization
of the PLA, emphasizing the use of Mao's thought,
the "Four Firsts," hard political work at the
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company level, and energetic promotion and train-
ing programs. This was followed in January 1966
by a PLA political work conference to implement
the directive. In late March Lin gave his support
to a critical report by Chiang Ch'ing on the PIA
political condition and put himself behind both
an impending PLA purge and the use of the PLA to
support the Cultural Revolution in China. In
early August 1966, just before a series of Red
Guard rallies began, Lin launched the internal
purge of the PLA but largely spared the lower-
level line organizations.
ADDRESSING A CULTURAL REVOLUTION RALLY, AUGUST 1966. L TO R: KIANG SHENG,
CHIANG CH'ING, CHOU EN-LAI, LIN PIAO AND MAO TSE-TUNG.
Lin's most significant single contribution
to the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was to lead,
on Mao's behalf, in eliminating Pieng Chen, the
leader of the Cultural Revolution's first phase.
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Spearheading Mao's plan after Pleng was purged,
Lin then supported Mao's second Cultural Revolu-
tion Group, a new and radicalized body, which
enlarged the campaign and undertook an all-out
attack on the CCP. When the Eighth CCP-CC Plenum
met in August 1966 Lin emerged as the leading
radical and heir apparent.
For Lin, the months between August 1966 and
April 1969 encompassed both intense activity and
at least one reported bout of illness, in early
1967. He spoke at four of the eight great rallies
(the other four had no speeches), held between 18
August and 26 November 1967, that launched the Red
Guards on their destruction of the old CCP.
Lin enforced the assignments laid on the PLA
in the first half of 1967. These tasks included
implementation of a 23 January order to end
spreading chaos caused by confrontations involving
PLA forces on both sides; strong participation in
the three-way alliance system for establishing
revolutionary committees in the provinces; and
application of the system of military control com-
mittees at all trouble points in the economy and
government under PLA officers. An order of early
April to the PLA to accept responsibility for
keeping order without using force was ineffectual.
In this difficult period, the stress on
"politics in command," a purge of numerous senior
officers in December 1966 and January 1967, and
the later necessity of giving PLA support to radi-
cal forces had the effect of deepening the gap
between politically minded officers and those more
professional officers concerned with military
problems.
The Wuhan Incident of 20 July 1967, a regional
commander's reaction against the Peking radicals,
was a turning point that sobered the regime. Lin
had no choice but to replace the commander. Lin
temporarily joined the inflamed radicals in taking
a stand against imputed sedition in the PLA. A
violent but short-lived campaign, initiated to
"drag out the rascals" throughout the PLA, became
a divisive threat to PLA integrity, generating
deep reactions.
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In August, as Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife, was
restrained from further support of the extreme
leftists, Lin shifted his position to support of
the PLA and authorized PLA suppression of local
turmoil. On 9 August, in his most significant
speech of the year, Lin reemphasized the necessity
for the disruptions that had occurred but supported
imposition of orderly and firm PLA control over
mass organizations through better guidance from
the center.
In the ensuing half year, Lin's political
posture appeared to change as the regional PLA
commanders came to greater prominence at the
expense of weakening radicalism at the center.
For instance, Huang Yung-sheng, commander of the
Canton Military Region, replaced Acting Chief of
Staff Yang Ch'eng-wu when the latter was purged
in March 1968. Haw Lin figured politically in
Yang's removal is not known. Yang's sudden
political demise and seeming abandonment by Lin,
to whom he had been considered fully loyal, is
still unexplained.
As Lin's first decade as chief of the PLA drew
to a close in 1969, it was apparent that the PLA
had changed drastically. Lin had converted it
from the conventionalized force it had become during
the 1950's into a politically alert, lower-keyed
professional body, without abandoning the goal of
modernization. In making it a revolutionary army
again, he also had purged it twice. As Mao's
ranking party soldier he had successfully supported
the elimination of former Chief of State Liu Shao-
chli, and he had helped dismantle the civil CCP
apparatus and replace it with a militant, Maoistic
regime reminiscent of the armies of "liberation"
of the pre-1949 period.
In April 1969 Lin's stature as Mao's new
successor was confirmed, after 32 months' advance
notice, by being written into the new CCP Constitu-
tion promulgated at the Ninth Congress. He is also
named three times in the 1970 draft of a proposed
new State Constitution for the People's Republic of
China. Article 2 of this document calls him Mao's
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"close comrade-in-arms and successor and the
deputy commander of all the armies of the whole
country."
The Ninth Party Congress also confirmed Lin's
stature on the five-man Politburo Standing Committee
that had run the Cultural Revolution. The Military
Commission, as reconstructed in 1967, apparently
continued without change. Its makeup is only
partly apparent; the principal known parts of the
commission apparatus appear to be under Lin's
control.
Recent Activity
Not enough is known about Lin's recent activity
to permit useful speculation on what it means in
political terms, but his activity patterns are
partially known from official Chinese sources.
Necessary public activities for Lin Piao
include the annual rallies in Peking on I May and
1 October and any very large special rallies. He
attends major caucuses, such as Central Committee
plenums (e.g., October 1968, May 1969 and August
1970) and enlarged Politburo meetings (e.g, May
1969). His speeches at such gatherings may or
may not be published. Occasional unconfirmed
reports indicate that he travels. He may have
made personal inspections in southwestern China
in December 1968 and in the Chenpao Island area
of Manchuria in March 1969.
Lin's few private meetings that are reported
are generally diplomatic- or military-related.
He has audiences with selected foreign visitors,
favoring countries that are China's clients. For
instance, in May 1970 he received Le Duan chief
of the Vietnam Worker's Party.
Lin's visibility decreased suddenly following
the Ninth CCP Congress and its follow-on confer-
ences in April and May 1969. Between 1 January
1967 and 1 June 1969 Lin was relatively active,
being physically in evidence for about 16 months,
and out of sight for only about 13. Thereafter,
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except for a few single or closely grouped appear-
ances, Lin was withdrawn from the public eye from
1 June 1969 to I May 1971.
Two Views of Lin Piao's Prosyec s
Lin's stature is rooted in Mao's confidence
in him, and qualified observers disagree on the
strength of his power base in the national mili-
tary establishment. Outside the capital he depends
partly on the projection of his great strength in
Peking and partly on the loyalty of the PLA to Mao,
to country, and to Lin as its commander.
Much depends on Huang Yung-sheng, the PLA
Chief of Staff, who now seems to stand sixth in
the regime. Huang's long record of service under
and near Lin is impressive. Yet when Huang came
to the General Staff it was as an ex-regional
commander and not necessarily as Lin's prot4g4.
If Huang should be elevated to the Politburo
Standing Committee, the influence of regional
commanders might well gain strength at the center
at Lin's expense.
In one view, therefore Lin is a weak choice
for the succession because he lacks adequate
support in the PLA at regional and provincial
levels. He antagonized many military profession-
als during the Cultural Revolution and bore down
heavily, often unreasonably, on the regional
commanders until after the 1967-68 winter of Mao-
study for high-level military cadres in Peking.
Another view sees Lin as strong through having
emerged from the Cultural Revolution with the PLA
still united in its loyalty to Mao, and with its
commanders united in acceptance of Lin's leader-
ship. In this view Lin's strength is based on his
personal relationships. These bonds result more
in influence than in direct control, possibly
because Lin, like Mao, requires loyal lieutenants
to be capable of acting independently for unpredic-
table lengths of time during which he is unavailable.
Physical Condition
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Lin's 1936 wound was apparently in the region
of the chest. His 3 years of treatment in the
USSR were followed by light duty from 1941 to 1945.
His next period of active command was from 1945
to 1949. Lin is thought to have again been ailing
in 1952-54, a time when others seemed to be carry-
ing his burden, and during the rest of the 1950's
his appearances were extraordinarily few, quite
possibly for health reasons. In 1962 there was
a 2-month bout of hospitalization, and he was out
of action at least once during the Cultural Revo-
lution.
Personality and Style
Opinions of Lin vary 'de
y�
In one perspective, Lin is a master politician;
in another, he is the soldier's soldier. Uncer�
tainty persists because he has kept himself with-
drawn and semilegendary. In the past there have
been moments of proud assertiveness, but now, like
Mao, he keeps observers guessing. In his leader-
ship style of recent years he has suppressed flair.
His style is characterized by brief appearances
with limited exposure; infrequent public pronounce-
ments intended to be hailed, capsulized, and
propagandized; unpredictable timing; restraint in
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public attack on newtargets; and long, unex-
plained absences of variable duration. Speculation
inspired by Lin's public absences has in the past
proved so unreliable that it has virtually ceased.
Lin's austere way of life is seemingly devoid
of pleasures, and he has a public image of intense
preoccupation with serious concerns.
Lin's military style was characteristically
aggressive, imaginative and dramatic, supported
by exemplary thoroughness in preparation and
planning. Lin is a believer in full readiness,
flexibility in commitment of forces, incidental
dissimulation as needed, and judicious readiness
to disengage and retreat. Further, he is not
restricted to one scale of magnitude: He can
visualize both the building of general success
out of small successes and the complex marshalling
of field armies; his ability to grasp or to dis-
count detail cannot therefore be disregarded in
evaluatina his political and managerial talent.
concludes:
From Lin we should therefore expect long
periods of deceptive inactivity; followed
by lightning moves in specific directions
using all the force at his disposal;
followed either by consolidation or quick
retreat; followed, finally, by a further
period of waiting and planning.
Lin has
his cont
limited
Family
traveled abroad only to the USSR, an
Lin is currently married to Yeh Ch'iin, who was
first identified by Chinese Communist media as his
e in January 1967. He was previously married
to Liu Hsi-ming, by whom he has a son and a daugh-
ter. He apparently also has teenage daughters
from one of the marriages.
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Yeh Ch'un heads Lin's staff office and has
been a political power in her own right since
attaining membership on the PLA Cultural Revolu-
tion Group in January 1967 and on the Politburo
in April 1969.
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�Secret-
Secret
Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C06928150