CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000190
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: February 8, 1961

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
*I � I %or arunci__
8 February 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
80
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
"I tOP-SECRft
z A
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
TOPRET
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793,794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
SE
(b)(3)
8 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1, Laos:
2. Congo: Kasavubu opposes enlarging the mandate of the
UN forces in the Congo. (Page t)
3. India: New Delhi has reportedly purchased_____
engine IL-14 transport aircraft from USSR. age
twin-
)
4. Turkey: Soviet ambassador arns government
leaders that Soviet-American relations are improving
rapidly. and Turkey may soon be "outside the club." (Page it)
5. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
ituation. (Page tit)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
P I
teg � *. '
Mang PA do 4 ��.1"-"`--3
\
- r �
H +IA . Muong Sate-
g
Li LUANG
\17
II
�ma
nu
10208
.Udon Then,
THAILAND
LAOS
B FEBRUARY 1961
Governinimi forces
G ivernntlit
Antigovernment
Antigovernment romenirati ns
Kong Le ll'athet Lao forces
7 Main route number
---- Road
� Trail
A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
0 25
}.5/,1 '
0 25 50
50 7,5 50 Miles
715 100 Kilometers
&me 26716 5-58
Nt MO AN
ARCATION UNE
SOUTf-/
A AVANE
c(f.1
Akiar4 Ube., nt,�
Worm Cnareret �
Lic
C A M BO DI A
F,`Stung Treng
amen ore not nern.,san
by th;
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
' qui9
(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos:
Hanoi on Vrebruary broadcast a recent interview with
�Kong Le in which he expressed his thanks for aid from "the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries!' This is the sec-
ond recent public reference to Soviet assistance for pro-
Communist forces in Laos. On 2 February, Chen Yi, Com-
munist China's foreign minister, commented that Soviet
"support" was a "righteous action!' Chen Yi's remark may
have been intended to Justify his own offer of Chinese Com-
munist support= "If the lawful government of Laos headed
Rniivninna Phatima" asks for it.
' Congo: Lpresident Kasavubu and Foreign minister Isom
h -
boko have expressed strong opposition to any plan which
would enlarge the mandate of the UN force in the Congo.
They reportedly believe that such a move would infringe
on the Congo's sovereignty and feel that a UN attempt to
neutralize the Congolese Army would interfere with their
planned operation against Kivu Province' which Bomboko
stated was imminent, At the UN, Soviet delegate Zor2.1.9
--SEGREZ
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
%NO SECR,F.
reiterated Moscow's position that elimination of Belgian in-
luence and the release of Lumumba were prerequisites for
a solution of the situation in the Congo. He opposed a neu-
tralization of the troops supRorting Lumumba until these
conditions had been fulfilled. t Stepped-up political and mil-
itary activity in Leopoldville- is coinciding with indications
that Katanga may take a more strongly separatist line under
the influence of Tshombet new French military adviser, who
stated on 4 February that he believed a unified .Congo state is
unrealizable.
(Backup, Page 1)
India-USSR: ew Delhi's determination to build up its
airlift capability in the Himalayan frontier regions appar-
entlyLakil led Indian officials to arrange for the purchase of
Soviet IL-14 (Crate) transports.
These twin-engine piston transports will apparently
supplement theTC-119 "Flying Boxcars" andA14-12
(Cub) turboprop transports purchased last year from the
United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Like the
AN-12s, which� are scheduled to arrive in India before April,
the IL-14s are probably being purchased at bargai7 nriee
and for rupees rather than hard foreign currency:is
USSR-Turkey: jAs part of Moscow's effort to induce the
Turkish Governmen to adopt a friendlier policy, toward the
USSR, the Soviet ambassador has been warning Turk-
ish leaders that Soviet-American relations are improving very
rapidly to a point where agreement might be reached which
would leave Turkey "outside the club." The ambassador also de-
livered a note on 3 February inquiring if reports in the local)
8 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
11
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
(b)(3)
IrIS SEt+Ce.;.k
ess that NATO IRBM bases are being constructed in Tur-
key are correct. The note reaffirmed the USSR's desire for
,"good neighborly relations" and warned against any steps
that might draw Turkey into "dangerous ventures." Soviet
iiiplomats employed similar tactics following Khrushchev's
t4risit to the US in 1959, accusing smaller NATO countries,
"new
Greece and Turkey, of being out of step with the
.'new trend" in Ea,st-West relationi:!
rkish Foreign Minister Sarper has described Premier
Oursel as "furious' at the Soviet ambassador's action but he
Also expressed some apprehension over the possible reaction
to the latest
ft ft officials in the
iovernmelg
'(Backup, Page 4
CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached
by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situa-
tion for the period 17 January 1961 through .6 February 1961.
1. We are currently in an interim period during which
the USSR is intent on reaching an assessment of the new US
administration and the possibilities of negotiating with the
West on major issues. Therefore, for the next few months
the USSR is unlikely to increase tensions over Berlin. How-
ever, should the Soviet leaders at any time during this period
estimate that additional pressure would be calculated to bring
the West more quickly to high-level negotiations with the USSR,
they may increase the threat of unilateral action in an effort to
expedite talks.
2. The East German control practices on the Berlin in-
tersector boundary havefl not softened to the extent that West
8 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
gEeRF.,1 (b)(3)\
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 (b)(V
SECtik.k.
Qermany had been led to expect as part of the price for rein-
stituting the Interzonal Trade agreements. However, the
West German Economic Ministry is "still not unhopeful" that
action will occur soon in accord with earlier assurances.
3. There are indications that East Germany has begun
on some of the necessary long-range moves in an effort to
malte its economy independent of Western imports and thereby
deprive the West of this leverage in future negotiations over
Berlin.
8 Feb 81
DAILY BRIEF
iv
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
CrictilErT
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
vt00
The Situation in the Congo
President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister 130MDOKO, in
a conversation with the American charg�n Leopoldville on
6February, expressed the belief that events are moving in
their favor in the political and military fields and that a
neutralization of the Congolese Army would reverse this trend.
They also reportedly feel that the UN would use any addition-
al powers to the disadvantage of their government and might
eventually impose a trusteeship over the Congo. The charg�
comments that Kasavubu is unlikely to consent to such a pro-
gram so long as he feels time is on his side.!
C"&cording to Bomboko, an attempt by the UN to bring the
Congolese Army under its control would thwart the Leopold-
ville government's plans to mount a military operation against
Kivu Province within ten days. Bomboko and Kasavubu ap-
parently believe that their chances for regaining control of
eastern Congo are fairly good as a result of disaffection among
Gizenga's troops. At the same time, Kasavubu stated that
Congolese officials were attempting to form a "provisional"
government which could be installed immediately.)
Hammarskjold has scoffed at Western concern for Kasa-
vubus position, stating that the Congolese President "has no
prestige." He continues to believe that a military solution to
the Congolese situation is impossible, and he reportedly feels
that Mobutu and Bomboko are too closely tied to Belgium to
have any future in the Congo. Hammarskjold feels that if they
are removed, Kasavubu can be persuaded to form a constitu-
tional government.)
viet UN representative Zorin told Ambassador Stevenson
on 6 February that the UN would not be able to deal with troops
which are subject to colonial domination�presumably a refer-
ence to Mobutu's and Tshombe's forces--in the same manner
as those which support the "legitimate government." He ques-
tioned whether the latter would lay down their arms until Lu-
mamba is released and parliament is reconvened. Zorin also
reiterated the Soviet charge that Hammarskjold has failed to
carry out previous Security Council mandatesT!
i_Colonel Roger Trinquier, the French officer who report-
edly is to become the chief of Tshombd's Katanga armed forces,
REZ
8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
"CrMan LIFT'
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
NIS '11111104
Gald a press conference on 4 February that a unified Congo
state is unrealizable. Pressure from Trinquier, whom previ-
ous reports had linked with separatist members of Tshombd's
government, may weaken Tshombd's willingness to maintain
his present tenuous contacts with Leopoldville and make it
even more difficult to brine ICatanaa into a fricipratpd Comm
state2
8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
"ZricqacT
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
Indian Purchase of Soviet IL-14 Transports
(9bjections by Indian military leaders to the purchase of
Soviet equipment appear to have been overruled recently by
economic factors, especially the gradually worsening foreign
exchange position, coupled with New Delhi's desire to dem-
onstrate its cordial relations with Moscow as a hedge against
Peiping in the. .Sino-Indian border dispute. These same fac-
tors, plus the desire for a high-altitude capability, led New
Delhi to seek MI-4 (Hound) helicopters from the Soviet Union
in late 1960. The failure of the demonstrator on its first
proving flights in the Ladakh area has apparently stalled fur-
ther negotiations for helicopter23
he reported purchase of IL-14s reflects also the Defense
Minxstry's desire to relieve the mounting pressure on its fleet
of aging C-47 (Dakota) transports, which have borne the brunt
of New Delhi's logistic support of road-building crews and mili-
tary forces in the sensitive and remote Indo-Tibetan frontier
region.
The IL-14 is capable of operating at altitudes some 7,000-
8,000 feet higher and carries about 2,000 pounds more cargo than
the C-47. The USSR has substantial numbers of IL-14s in
civil air service, but they are expected to be largely replaced
by the newer, higher performance TU-124 and AN-24. Nearly
100 of, these aircraft have been furnished by the bloc to non-
bloc countries. The purchase of IL-14s will provide New Delhi
with a stopgap aircraft until it decides on a more suitable C-47
replacement to be manufactured in India. The cabinet is now
considering prototypes designed by Lockheed and AVRO, a
British firm.i
(b)(3)
L
8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
n v.+ rri
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
141md
Spviet Attitude Toward Turkey
ance the overthrow of the Menderes regime last May,
the USSR has maintained a cautious but friendly attitude to-
� ward the Gursel government and sought to encourage the
Turkish leaders to adopt a more independent foreign policy.
Khrushchev invited General Gursel to make the trip to Mos-
cow which had been scheduled for last July by his predeces-
� sor but Gursel refused. While expressing disappointment
that the new regime was not going to return to Ataturk's policy
of neutrality but was planning to remain in NATO and CENTO,
Khrushchev indicated there was no reason why Soviet-Turkish
relations could not be gradually improved.
aoviet officials on a number of occasions have offered
Turkey economic aid, including credits of up to $500,000,000.
In a talk with Turkish Foreign Minister rper in New York
last October, Khrushchev reiterated offers of Soviet assistance
and asserted that Turkey's membership in Western alliances
is not a major obstacle to better relations. He suggested that
the two countries establish a demilitarized zone along their
common frontier by withdrawing their forces "several hundred
kilometers," and observed that the Black Sea could be turned
into a "sea of peace." Shortly thereafter, the Soviet ambassa-
dor in Ankar4 told a key Turkish government figure that the
USSR is willing to demonstrate its good will toward Turkey by
reducing its Black Sea Fleet and naval installations in the
area and by guaranteeing to respect the present Soviet-Turkish
borderj
ame members of the ruling military Committee of Na-
tional Unity reportedly favor accepting economic aid from, and
improving relations with, the Soviet bloc, but such action would
run counter to popular feeling in Turkey. Both Gursel and
Sarper are committed to maintenance of Turkey's eloce lies
with the WeEI9
et�iziEr
8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
*eel
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CO JAL
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
oxy, trz,z/ xi/ z�i (zrzrzrz rzwzrzrzrzt
Tv0i3W" 4
4Apprio ecl or Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190
.\\\\\\\\\\\\\N\
1\\\* \ik4
Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190