CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026616
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 4, 1961

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3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
4 March 1961
Copy No. C--40
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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4 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Congo: Belgium takes steps to withdraw milita7
personnel from Katanga.
(Page t)
2. Soviet missile test of 3 March.
(Page t )
3. Britain and France reviewing policy on Communist
China. (Page tt)
4. Communist China negotiating for additional grain
purchases. (Page ii)
5. Poland will supply tool plant and foundry to Cuba.
(Page itt)
6. South Korean Government under pressure from pub-
lic and legislature on status-of-forces agreement.
(Page itt)
7. Morocco: National Union of Popular Forces will press
for establishment of parliamentary democracy � (Page tu)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Congo: Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny has directed
the immediate recall of all Belgian military personnel who
arrived in Katanga after 1 July 1960.
the government
has no information on the identity of BelOan mercenaries
under private contract with the Tshombe government. (The
US consul in Elisabethville warns that wholesale and indis-
criminate withdrawal of the Belgian military cadre�about
230 officers and men--would result in the disintegration of
the Katanga army into lawless unitg:i
the Soviet ambassador had twice seen the Suda-
nese foreign minister but still had not obtained transit visas
for Soviet diplomats to go to Stanleyville. The request for the
visas was submitted in mid-February.
Luluabourg was quiet on 2 March,
with UN forces and Congolese troops cooperating to maintain
order. (Backup, Page 1)
USSR: A test vehicle was launched from Tyura Tam at
about 1400 GMT (0900 EST) on 3 March. Preliminary analy-
sis indicates the vehicle impacted in
the Khabarovsk area--about 1,100 n.m. southwest of the nor-
mal ICBM impact area on the Kamchatka peninsula�after a
flight of some 2,700 n.m. Although determination of the spe-
cific nature of the vehicle must await further information, the
over-all character of the operation suggests an ICBM test in
which the missile suffered a failure in guidance.
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Britain - France - Communist China: rthe American
Embassy in London believes that the Macmillan government
will find it difficult to continue to support the moratorium on
the question of Chinese representation in the UN this year. }-4-
The government assumes that Communist China will inevit-
ably be voted into UN membership this year or soon there-
after, replacing Taiwan in both the General Assembly and jr.j,
Security CounciL In the embassy's view, the Macmillan gov-
ernment further believes that it has become impossible suc-
cessfully to attach any conditions to the seating of Peiping. 4.,,,,A-1)
The embassy concludes that recent public statements by For- ip
eign Secretary Home and others are part of a British initia-
tive designed to secure United States acquiescence to the
shift in seats)
Queried about the French position by the US Embassy in
Paris, a Foreign Ministry official said his government will
probably soon undertake a high-level review of French policy
on diplomatic recognition of Communist China and Chinese
representation in the United Nations. He denied, however,
that any shift in the French position is imminent. In the past,
Peiping's support of the Algerian rebels has been a major stum-
bling block, but Foreign Ministry officials are now considering
whether a French ambassador in Peiping would be useful for
Influencing the representatives of new French-speaking African
states which have recognized Communist China or may do so.
(Backup,
Page 3)
Communist China: Peiping is negotiating additional grain
purchases with Australia, Canada, and Argentina which may
result in new orders for as much as two million tons. The Chi-
nese have already purchased about $200,000,000 worth of food-
stuffs in recent months, including about three million tons of
food grains. Peiping has undertaken a variety of emergency
measures, such as selling silver bullion and securing short-
term credits from Hong Kong banks, to ease the pressure of
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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these purchases on its foreign currency resources. Although
there has been speculation that the USSR has advanced a hard
currency loan to China to cover the emergency grain imports,
there is no reliable evidence that such financial backing has
been arranged. However, Sino-Soviet economic talks, which
�have been under way in Peiping since early February, may re-
sult in an accommodation designed to ease the Chinese balance
of payments with the USSR by rescheduling Peiping's debt re-
payments.
Poland= Cuba: A contract under which Poland will provide
Cuba with a tool plant valued at $1,959,000 was signed on 11
February. The agreement called for a 30-percent down pay-
ment, with the balance payable in 12 semi-annual installments,
probably at 5-percent interest. A similar contract was signed
on 14 February for a steel foundry, worth $1,486,922, calling
for 16 semi-annual payments. Although Poland claims these
agreements are normal commercial transactions, the terms of-
fered could be construed as economic aid by US standards. The
fact that these agreements were made despite repeated US warn-
ings that they could jeopardize Warsaw's chances of receiving
financial aid from the US suggests that Warsaw is under some
pressure to con ritnite fn thp Cnmrminist hincIS economic aid
effort in Cuba. (Backup, Page 5)
South Korea: Pressure stimulated by press and student
groups for a status-of-forces agreement is creating an issue
in South Korea's relations with the United States. The lower
house of the national legislature on 2 March unanimously called
for the "earliest" conclusion of an administrative agreement,
and Prime Minister Chang Myon has been obliged to assure the
public that the government is acting to resolve the issue.
South Koreans consider that the lack of an agreement der-
ogates their sovereignty, particularly because Japan has a
status-of-forces pact. In addition, public sensitivities have
been sharpened by the belief that recent economic measures
�
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DAILY BRIEF
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Ca revised foreign exchange rate, certain features of the new
aid agreement, and increased utility rates--were adopted at
the behest of the United �Statesp
(Backup, Page 6)
Morocco:aormer Premier Abdallah Ibrahim, a leader of
the left-wing National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), has
indicated his organization will give King Hassan II "some two
weeks" to initiate steps leading toward the establishment of a
parliamentary democracy .D One such step would be to set a
date for the election of a national assembly to draft a consti-
tution. Ibrahim indicated that the left would "hit the King hard"
on his first "misstell" and stated that such opposition "could go
as far as civil war!'
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Situkion in the Congo
/The US consul in Elisabethville believes that as many as
250 Belgian mercenaries are integrated into Katanga army
units with the full support of the Katanga government, and
would be difficult to deport. Any deportation order would have
to be enforced by the UN Command, with adequate strength
to quell possible armed resistance
The military cadre officers are members of the Belgian
Army, and could be ordered by the Belgian Government to
leave Katanga. However, reluctance to leave 10,000 Belgians
in Katanga at the mercy of an undisciplined native army will
probably cause the Belgian Government to proceed slow137-.3
iThere are probably 40 important official Belgian civilian
advisers distributed among the Katanga government ministries,
as opposed to Belgian adventurers. The American consul feels
that loss of the official advisers would paralyze the Katanga
government. The US Embassy in Leopoldville reports that the
Leopoldville provincial and central governments include 400 or
500 Belgians and that their withdrawal would drastically reduce
operations_3
paris would almost certainly refuse, as it has
since UN operations in the Congo began last year, to pay its
share of the costs. France continues to dis=
approve of UN operations in the Congo, France
had wished to reach a common US-UK=French position on the
Congo, but the United States had not cooperated
EDuring the week ending 26 February, commentaries broad-
cast by Peiping on the Congo exceeded the number devoted to
any international event in the past five years. Communist China,
which in contrast to the USSR has opposed the UN's role in the
Congo from the start, on .3 March endorsed Khrushchev's pro=
posal to replace the UN operation in the Congo by a commission
of African states. Obviously referring to Afro-Asian sponsorship
of the 21 February Security Council resolution to strengthen the
UN's hand, Peiping warned against "unrealistic illusions" about 3
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ale UN a7 long as it is "under the manipulation of the United
States.1
ossibly as the result of a power struggle, Gizenga has
confined Anicet Kashamura, who until last week ran Kivu
� Province. Although press reports from Stanleyville assert
that Kashamura is still a member of the Stanleyville govern-
ment, he was
under house arrest on 1 March, at which time he contacted
the UAR representative with a view to sending his children to
Cairo. The UAR representative "dismissed him courteousej
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%me CONFIDENTIAL
Western Positions on Communist China and the UN
lThe Macmillan government's public position remains as
stated by Lord Home in the House of Lords on 8 February.
He argued that despite Peiping's lack of credentials as a
peace-loving government, "the facts of international life re-
quire that Communist China should be seated in the United
Nations." He added that Britain had supported the morato-
rium only because the choice had been "between the admis-
sion of Communist China and the breakup of the United Na-
tions. So long as that was the choice there was only one
answer.
[Britain's grudging support of the moratorium has come
under increasingly heavy fire from the Labor opposition,
from many Conservative MPs, and from public opinion gen-
erally. Noting that the policy conflicts with Britain's 11-
year-old recognition of Peiping, where a charg�s main-
tained, the government's critics find the issue a most pop-
ular one on which to belabor American Far Eastern policy
and to charge British subservience to Washington. The
British preoccupation with achieving a disarmament agree-
ment provides powerful support for the argument that Com-
munist China's isolation from the international community
should be reduced. British officials tend to believe that
bringing Peiping into contact with pacifying influences in the
UN might lessen the chances of an attack on Taiwan or other
areas. The British also desire to get more closely in step
with African and Asian members of the Commonwealth,
whose leaders will participate in the prime ministers' meet-
tings opening in London on Wednesday, 8 March
The American Embassy, as a result of its detailed ex-
amination of the British position, concludes that the British
have anticipated that the new US administration might make
some changes in US China policy, and want to appear to have
influenced Washington rather than to have followed "obediently"
behind3
he French Foreign Ministry official in charge of Chinese
affairs stated on 21 February that the British attitude as stated)
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Cby Lord Home was unlikely to change the French Government's
opposition to seating Peiping. He indicated, however, that
Paris was going to restudy the question. He himself believed
that the situation within the UN was changing, although he felt
that Communist China would probably spoil its own chances of
admission by demanding unacceptable preconditions:)
g)fficial circles in Paris apparently feel that the British
experience in recognizing Communist China has been disap-
pointing and that there is little likelihood of a major expan-
sion of trade possibilities. If at some future date De Gaulle
decides that to recognize Peiping would give France an advan-
tage in its over-all power position, he would face no serious
domestic opposition to doing so. Propaganda activity in sup-
port of Communist China is being stepped up in France. The
Sino-French Friendship Society reportedly feels that its cam-
paign in favor of official recognition of Communist China and
its admission to the United Nations has made enough progress
to warrant extending its drive into the French provinces. The
New China News Agency also plans increased activity in
France. The prominent Paris weekly L' Express, which has
hitherto concentrated on criticizing the Algerian war, is run-
ning a series of pro-Peiping articles by the non-Communist
leftist political leader Francois Mitterrand about his visit to
China and his interview with Mao Tse-tung-7-s
COther countries are reconsidering their position. The
new Quadros administration recently announced that Brazil
will support inclusion of the Chinese representation question
on the UN General Assembly agenda at its next session.
Malayan Premier Rahman, according to an unconfirmed re-
port, plans to vote for the admission of Communist China
next September. While Canada is reviewing its support of the
moratorium, a preliminary paper on the subject contains no
recommendation for a change in position
[Taipei retained its seat in the UN last fall by the slimmest
margin since 1951; 42 members supported the moratorium, 34
voted again t nd 22-- 1 ri an ndAsian staine�
CONFIDENTIAL
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Poland Signs Aid Contracts With Cuba
Polish diplomats were reminded by US officials in Jan-
uary and February that under the Mutual Security Appropria-
tions Act of 1961 the US will refuse to grant assistance to any
country that provides economic or military aid to the Castro
regime. At the same time the US asked for information which
would confirm or deny reports that Poland plans to grant eco-
nomic aid to Cuba.
Polish officials have made clear that they do not feel obli-
gated to explain their trade with Cuba to the US, and have in-
timated that some regime leaders objected to the American
questioning. Nevertheless, a deputy minister of foreign trade
allowed US Embassy personnel in Warsaw to scrutinize com-
modity lists that purported to "explain" Poland's trade with
Cuba. These lists, however, contained no information on the
extent or� terms of trade, and did not in fact constitute a reply
to the American inquiry.
Both in Warsaw and Washington, Polish diplomats and
trade representatives have attempted to confuse the issue by
stressing that the extent of Polish trade with Cuba will be very
small--some estimates ranging as low as $1,000,000 annually.
However, despite a record 1960 sugar beet crop, Poland has
already contracted for the purchase of $4,000,000 worth of
Cuban sugar, and extensive negotiations are going on in other
fields. An agreement was reached in December 1960 that
Polish-Cuban trade for 1961 would total $44,000,000.
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Soiith Koreans Demand Status-of-Forces Agreement
e resolution passed by the lower house of the South
Korean Assembly on 2 March called for a status-of-forces
agreement "in which the legal status of United States armed
forces stationed in Korea will be provided for, as promised
in the joint communique issued by both governments on 8
August 1953." The Rhee government repeatedly emphasized
its desire for such an agreement, and on this issue polit-
ically conscious Koreans support their government now as
they did then-0-)
nationwide signature campaign is under way, and leaf-
lets being distributed in the cities by various organizations
urge conclusion of an agreement. Several demonstrations
have recently emphasized the status-of-forces issue, and ed-
itorial comment has been extensive. The chief opposition
party advocates early, conclusion of an agreement, and Chang
Myon has indicated his ruling party will adopt a similar posi-
tion. Chang maintains that since there has been no fighting
for nearly eight years, the public will not swallow the argu-
ment that the "state of war" justifies special treatment of
South KoreaD
Cpolitical dissatisfaction this year has been aggravated by
economic conditions and the early depletion in the southern
provinces of winter food stocks. Consumer prices have risen
sharply since the first of the year. Grain shortages in urban
areas, the result of hoarding by speculators, and projected
increases in transportation and power rates are expected to
compound the inflationary rise and increase public restiveness)
CGovernment spokesmen have attempted to discredit public
agitation by linking it to Communist-motivated "impure ele-
ments." Although there is no firm evidence to support the gov-
ernmentb charges, such unrest provides an opportunity fot
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CEommunist subversive activity.
the National Police have been alerted to seek out subver-
sive agitators and be prepared to put down possible large-
scale antigovernment demonstrations:j
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*41.1
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investibation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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