CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001981
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 12, 1961

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*C�i�KC I
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
12 April 1961
�...� tip y 11 �-�
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
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�Ter-5EeRERF-1011
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OP SECRET
Ame? xwe
LATE ITEM
USSR: From preliminary analysis, it appears that the
Soviets have successfully orbited and recovered a man from
space in Sputnik XI, launched from Tyura Tam at about
0607 GMT (0107 EST), 12 April 1961.
The countdown proceeded smoothly with all Soviet
facilities which had supported previous space events being
identified in the operation.
clearly showed a man who was seen to move his head.
Moscow, made its first official announcement of the launch-
ing about 50 minutes after lift-off and some 50-60 minutes be-
fore recovery. The statement that Sputnik XI weighed about
10,400 pounds taken together with the data on its orbit indi-
cates that the vehicle was similar to five previous Sputniks
identified with the Soviet man-in-space program.
Available data indicate that the capsule landed intact
some 100-110 minutes after launch about midway between
Saratov and Stalingrad and that the astronaut, still in the
capsule about an hour later, was alive and reportin? that he
had "a very big headache."
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A
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12 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Congo: Dayal reportedly to return to Congo; inci-
dents between UN and Congolese forces likely.(page tt)
3. Angola-Cabinda: Native uprisings may occur in
next two or three weeks. (Page it)
4. France-Algeria: De Gaulle takes firm line in
press conference. (Page ti)
5.
6.
Cuba: Further Soviet arms cargo arrives.
(Page tit)
USSR: New gold sales appear normal.
(Page itt)
7. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on
Berlin situation. (Page tv)
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Phong Saly
I.PHONG. S.ALY,
I � Dien Bien Phu
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NEUA
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.
SAYABOURY � r***".XIEN. G KHOUANGA
Muon.ps,sSoui
Phou Khdun
Muong ;Lissy No,Xieng Khouang
,
i,-�Ban Ta Viarig
Thom
. ._r
VIENTIANE Borikhaie
Pak Sane
f����..) Kam Keut y-
'k Sao
Vie.lriane
NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT Forces in
410
4111 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
0
- TRAIL t
C7) ROUTE NUMBER
610412
I k
STATUTE MILES
50 ,100
KHAMMOUANE
Nhommarat
41.02
Thakhek
Sayannakhet
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AY
,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: he government's Muong Kassy operation ap- 3
parently is folding according to an appraisal of available
-
information from that sector by chiefs of American mis-
sions in Laos. Elements of the infantry battalion airlifted,,
north of that 'town on 5 April are reported withdrawing
northward; the government parachute battalion in the same--_,-"-fl'
general area reportedly has broken out of enemy encircle/''
ment but its present location is unknown. The CLLLL
force south of Muong Kassy has received reinforcements -
but thus far has made little forward progress. Ambassador
Brown, noting the considerable government forces com-
mitted to the Muong Kassy operation with scant results,
does not rule out the possibility that General Phoumi might
be maneuvering to create a situation that he would hope
would bring American intervention. The ambassador also
notes that Phoumi and other Laotian Army officers are
pointing increasingly to their lack of reserves and the need
for outside forces. The Australian ambassador has ex-
pressed similar concern, suggesting that Phoumi might
order a Laotian Army withdrawal from Pak Sane or else-
where to bring Pathet Lao forces to the Mekong and thus
seek to force American or SEATO interventiogg
(Backup, Page 1)
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Luanda
610412 2
Leopoldville
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
CONGO
I � �N
LUANDA
r ANGOLA
1 cANZA NORTE
�"�%
r � --. \
CUANZA SUL
BENGUELA
'
�
LUNDA
MALANGE
CABINDA AND
NORTHWESTERN ANGOLA
9
UNCLASSIFIED
190
STATUTE MILES
200
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1. ktardECRE T
Congo: Jjongoiese officials in Leopoldville were told on 13 4
11 April that Hammarskjold plans to send Dayal back to the
Congo as UN representative. The secretary general had
earlier informed Ambassador Stevenson that as a result of
pressure from Nehru, Dayal would return in a week or so.
Commenting on this development, Congolese Foreign Minis- �
ter Bomboko, who has been advocating moderation in Leopold-
ville's dealings with the 17N, told an American official on 11
April that Dayal's return would be marked by a series of in-
cidents between the UN and Congolese forces. He further
asserted that no UN forces would be allowed in Matadi and
that the Indian contingent presently being sea-lifted would be
fired on if it attempted to land ther_c2.7
(Backup, Page 3) (Map)
Angola-Cabinda: Western officials in Cabinda expect this b
Portuguese exclave to be the next target for uprisings by Afri7,t',._tc.,
can nationalists�probably to coincide with General Assembly �
discussions of Lisbon's policies toward its overseas territories. ,,eS
The General Assembly is expected to debate this issue within'71
(
two or three weeks. Cabinda, settled by a relatively small -
number of whites, has an insufficient number of troops--two 11-
all-white companies and one African company--to close its /-1.
frontiers to incursions from its Congo neighbors. In north- /? 3
western Angola armed white civilians are reported still con-
ducting reprisals against natives for alleged participation in
last month's outbreaks there. (Backup,
Page 5) (Map)
*France-Algeria: De Gaulle's remarks on Algeria at his
long-scheduled 11 April press conference will give the rebel
leaders little encouragement that he intends to go any further
toward meeting their conditions for holding negotiations. While
he did not close the door on peace talks, he belittled the in-
fluence of the rebellion and questioned the provisional Algerian
government's ability to take responsible action. In spelling
12 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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out additional details of his views on alternatives for Algeria's
future, De Gaulle made his strongest threats to date designed
to discourage the choice of "chaotic independence" without ties
to France. He may, on the other hand, have sweetened for the
rebels the alternative of association by indicating that it might
involve French aid of varior tvneR in exchange for minority
guarantees and base rights.
Soviet Bloc - Cuba: The Soviet merchant ship Nikolai
Burdenko on 10 April unloaded in the Cuban port of Mariel a
cargo of military goods shipped from the Black Sea port of
Nikolaev. Since mid-December 1960, when the bloc resumed
sizable arms shipments to Cuba after a two-month pause, ten
Soviet ships have delivered arms cargoes to Havana. Total
bloc arms deliveries to Cuba since major shipments began
last September total well over 35,000 tons, plus large num-
bers of military vehicles. Thus far the deliveries have been
limited primarily to land armaments, including medium and
heavy tanks, self-propelled assault guns, field and antiaircraft
artillery, and large quantities of small arms and ammunition.
No additional shipments are known to be en route at present, but
as Cuban military personnel complete training in the bloc--in-
cluding advanced flight courses--additional materiel will nrob-
hlv he delivered
USSR: The USSR is selling gold on the international market
for the first time since October 1960. Sales on the London mar-
ket since 15 March have totaled at least $35,600,000 and may be
as high as $47,600,000. So far, however, they do not appear to
fall outside the general pattern of Soviet gold sales, which meets
the USSR's foreign exchange requirements.
(Backup, Page 6)
12 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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%1RIECRET
CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has noted the following conclusions reached by
Its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation
for the period 7 March 1961 through 10 April 1961:
I- C4 L./
1. We have no indications that the USSR plans to increase 1L4.
tensions over Berlin at this time.
2. There have been no significant developments with re-
gard to access to Berlin and East Berlin during the period
covered by this report.
3. Over the past month the bloc has devoted increased at-
tention to the German and Berlin issues. Soviet propaganda
commentary, statements by high-level East German and Soviet
officials, and the 30 March Warsaw Pact communiqu�ave all
stressed the necessity of concluding a peace treaty and solving
the Berlin problem, but without any suggestion of deadlines.
(Backup, Page 7)
12 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Situation in Laos
Potian politicians, in the uncertain atmosphere in Vien-
tiane pending decisions on a cease-fire and international
conference, continue to propose various formulae for a new
government. This situation has given rise to numerous ru-
mors; there appears to be some substance to one that a rift
is developing between Premier Boun Oum and General Phoumi.
According to Phoumi, Boun Oum--now in Pakse on personal
matters--feels that his own side has let him down by discuss-
ing replacing him as premiH7,
tumors are also circulating concerning the possibility
that Phoumi may make a deal with the Pathet Lao which would
ensure him a position in the government. Phoumies recent ap-
proach to the British ambassador, asking his opinion of a gov-
ernment divided equally among Souvanna Phouma elements, the
Pathet Lao, and Phoumi men, has added fuel to these rumors
Whatever their validity, these rumors are probably further
demoralizing the government in its political and military ef-
forts against the Pathet Lao.]
Prince Sihanouk, commenting on the Laotian situation in
a speech before the National Assembly on 10 April, warmly
praised President Kennedy's objective of seeking a genuinely
neutral Laos, but expressed serious doubt as to whether "past
errors" in that country would permit achievement of this goal
at this late date. According to press accounts, Sihanouk's
response to a recent note from Macmillan deplored the fact
that an international conference on Laos--first suggested by
Sihanouk on 1 January--"was on the point of being accepted
only under pressure of military events unfavorable to the
West." Sihanouk reiterated his belief that a conference still
offers the best solution, but under conditions "infinitely more
disadvantageous than the West could reasonably have expected
a few months ago."
North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, and Kong Le all appear
determined to avoid taking any step in negotiations on Laos
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which would lend substance to claims by Phoumi and Boun Oum
that they represent the legitimate government. All take strong
exception to Phoumi and Boun Oum's announced readiness to
"sponsor" a conference of the various Laotian factions in order
to form a united government. The Communists have indicated
that they are agreeable to negotiations with Vientiane repre-
sentatives, but assert that only the "lawful overnment of Sou-
vanna Phouma" can call such a conference.
Airlift operations continue to be scheduled. Three Soviet
IL-14s now en route to North Vietnam from the USSR could
either augment present operations or replace some of the IL-14s
which have been flying almost continuously since early January.
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Bans na*
Brazzaville�
Matadi
Kitona
NDONESIA
870
INDIA
300
SUDAN
acp.
TUNISIA
3,200
NIGERIA
400
NDONESIA
280
� Gemena
Scattered Forces
MOBUTU
3,400
EQUATEU
+Coquilhatville
� Boende
/i
ETHIOPIA
200
r �
MOBUTU I 7200 Scattered Forces
,
EOPO DVILLE
Leo pa Idv.
hysville
>";
.1)uluabourg
Bak
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Luanda 1-7 Kasavubu-Mobutu
11 Gizenga
Kalonji
1111 Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
not included)
100j
- Selected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
610410 2
STATUTE MILES
4010
GIZENGA
7,000
LIBERIA
Lupu a
.1�01.11k
ETHIOPIA
an leyvtlle
ETHIOPI
INDIA
1400,
1 V U
Bu kayo
ngolo
10
NIGERIA
900
TSHOMBE
7,000
lisabethville
-4s
NIGERIA
Usurnbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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Neg70P�SECRET-
Situation in the Congo
Gizenga and his representative in Cairo, Pierre Mulele,
are continuing their efforts to find a channel for furnishing
funds to Stanleyville. On 9 April, Gizenga, answering a 6
April request from Cairo, told Mulele to credit funds to the
account of an individual in Kenya whom he termed "most re-
liab1e!1 asked for the name of such an
individual in order to transfer a "large sum" to the Gizenga
regime. An earlier attempt to send $380,000 to Stanleyville
by courier failed when the courier "lost" the money in Khar-
toum.
Mulele apparently is worried, however, that his influence
in Stanleyville is waning. he expressed
concern that various recent attempts made by Stanleyville to
establish lines of communication abroad appeared to bypass his
office. Gizenga was
growing impatient with Mulele, who has had little success thus
far in securing aid for Stanleyville.
Indecisive maneuvering between Stanleyville and Leopold-
ville apparently is continuing. Telephone contact between lead-
ers in the two capitals is being maintained, but Leopoldville
Provincial President Kamitatu doubts that negotiations will have
proceeded far enough to permit face-to-face talks this week.
The tentative efforts of civil officials to come together appar-
ently were disrupted by Mobutu's journey to northern Congo,
allegedly to negotiate with Gizenga's military aides. The latter,
however, reportedly refuse to act independently of Gizenga.
Gizenga in turn is said to be unwilling to attend in the absence
of Kamitatu, who refuses to attend any conference in which
Mobutu participates.
In Katanga, Tshombe is continuing his harassment of UN
officials, in an effort to halt the apparent UN attempt to blunt
the Katanga military operations around Kabalo. Elisabethville
banks reportedly are no longer honoring UN checks, and Katanga
troops at the Kamina base, where some 1,400 Indian troops are
TOPS
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stationed, are maintaining roadblocks and mining roads in the
area. The UN has reinforced its contingent of Ethiopians at
Kabalo, and a spokesman for the organization said on 10 April
that the UN was in "complete control" of the town.
The UN apparently now is investigating means of airlifting
part of the Indian contingent in Dar es Salaam directly into
Katanga in aircraft under its control. Hammarskjold has about
15 C-54s at his disposal, which could carry 40 troops each
trip.
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Disorders Expected in Cabinda
The Leopoldville-based Angola People's Union (UPA),
believed responsible for organizing the recent clashes in
Angola, probably also is planning uprisings in Cabinda. Con-
ditions in the exclave are particularly suitable for nationalist
activities. In addition to being inadequately defended, Ca-
binda's difficult terrain is even more suitable for guerrilla
warfare than that of northwestern Angola. Close tribal ties
exist between the natives of the exclave and those of the for-
mer French Congo, and some government officials in
Brazzaville are known to be sympathetic to nationalistic
aspirations in Cabinda.
Moreover, the exclave offers a convenient location for
the establishment on Portuguese soil of a native "govern-
ment in exile" from which to carry out a campaign to
"liberate" all Portuguese overseas territories.
three nationalist
organizations were planning a Conference of the Peoples
of the Portuguese Colonies from 14 to 16 April in Casa-
blanca to outline such a campaign.
The governor general of Angola indicated
that the
situation in the disturpect nortnern region remains tense,
with certain areas "practically in a state of alarm." He
added that the situation would continue to get worse as
long as insufficient forces were available to "calm the
population and guarantee immediate repression of any
rebellion which might arise."
Armed white civilians in these areas are reported taking
the law into their own hands by punishing natives after
forcing them to admit participation in plots against whites.
On 10 April the governor general warned the inhabitants
of Luanda--for the second time in 48 hours--that he would
impose a curfew unless calm returned to the capital. The
second warning followed a clash which involved natives,
police, and probably white civilians and which resulted in
the death of several natives and the arrest of 30 others.
4-012�SEGRE
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USSR Resumes Gold Sales
total So-
viet sales in London of $35,600,000 worth of gold between 15
and 23 March. Two shipments through Paris totaling about
$12,000,000, which were reported by the press in early April,
may be part of or in addition to these sales.
During 1960 the USSR sold about $107,000,000 worth of
gold in LOndon between May and October and then abruptly
withdrew from the market during the international "gold rush"
last fall. Moscow was apparently reluctant to sell gold since
such sales might have eased the strain on the dollar. It ap-
parently also believed that the new US administration would be
forced to raise the price of gold. The resumption of sales was
apparently motivated by the increased stabilization of the gold
market, repeated denials by the US Government of any inten-
tion to change the price of gold, and the balance-of-payments
pressure on Moscow caused by its sustained import drive.
Persistent reports that the USSR is supplying Communist
China with foreign exchange to ease its difficult economic sit-
uation remain unconfirmed, and so far the amounts involved
in these sales suggest that they are to be used only for Soviet
foreign exchange requirements.
1E-eftE-T
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Nowe-eONFf0Efff-htt,
Possible Soviet Proposals on Berlin and Germany
Moscow, in support of a call for new
negotiations on Berlin and Germany, may advance further
proposals broadening the standard Soviet call for a German
peace treaty and free city status for West Berlin by incor-
porating earlier East German schemes.
that Moscow may endorse
previous East German plans for a nonaggression pact be-
tween the two Germanys, a phased approach to disarmament
in Germany similar to the Rapacki plan, and the formation of an
all-German confederative council and a peace treaty commis-
sion--all of which were included in the plan proposed by
party leader Ulbricht in February 1960. The Bonn Foreign
Ministry is convinced that this report published in the Frank-
furt paper on 30 March was in fact inspired by the Soviet Em-
bassy. The Frankfurt paper was used _
in November 1958 to leak the Soviet proposal for a free city
before the USSR officially presented the plan to the Western
powers.
the USSR was considering the timing of a new diplo-
matic initiative on Berlin. Further confirmation of a possible
Soviet offer along these lines was contained in Ulbricht's pub-
lic statement on 1 April that his proposals were discussed
"In detail" at Moscow.
The bloc's increased attention to the German and Berlin
issues since the publication on 4 March of the Soviet memoran-
dum to Bonn also suggests that the USSR is preparing further
diplomatic moves on Berlin, Moscow's reference in that mem-
orandum to an interim agreement on Berlin was the first such
public reference since before the Paris summit, and Ulbricht
in his speech to the East German central committee plenum in
CONFIDENTIAL
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INSCONFIDENTIAL
mid-March called for a solution in the "spirit of the Soviet
memorandum." He also listed a number of initial measures
for a Berlin solution, which appear intended as part of any
interim agreement. The revival, well in advance of any nego-
tiations, of the concept of an interim solution suggests that it
will remain a principal element in any new package proposal.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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