CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03186012
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 31, 1961

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31 March 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN-
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31 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Warsaw Pact communiqu�(Page i)
3. Congo: Contacts between Leopoldville and Stan-
leyville; sea-lift of Indian troops now scheduled
to begin 1 April. (Page tt)
4. Sino- Soviet economic talks, probably concerned
with Soviet aid, may have hit snag. (Page it)
5.
USSR: At least 16 Soviet scientific research
ships currently operating in various areas.
(Page tit)
6. Israel-France: Paris reportedly agrees to pro-
vide aid for military inchicitrial �velopment in
Israel. (Page tit)
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Dien Bien Phu
/
NAM1THA (""'
�
I .�"*.�:,.-�
Muong Sal Nam Bac 14,
LUANG: PRA
Luang Prabang
SAYABOURY
NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT Forces in
4OP KONG LE - PATHET LAO I Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
0
� � TRAIL I
0 ROUTE NUMBER
10331 2
50
STATUTE MILES
�
Sam Neua
(1
LANG
SAM
XIENG KHOUANG\
Muon Nam des Ban Ban
�) Soul
Jarres
Xieng Khouan
VIENTIANE
Pak Sane
Vientiane
Kam Keut
ak
KHAMM�UANE
Thakhek
avannakhet
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
31 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Situation in Laos:rv_iPntianeAsreaclirw�mdthc oncern
to unconfirmed reports of a
Pathet Lao drive developing earea-and to
the south, designed to divide the country at Thakhek, on the J
Mekong River below Vientiane. So far, US military sources
have tended to discount such reports, although they believe ,A)
company-size guerrilla units with some Viet Minh advisers
are operating in the area.1
the Soviet reply to
the British proposals on Laos would be "generally favorable."
Remarks made by the Soviet ambassador in Paris to Sou-
vanna Phourna provide a further indication that Moscow will
not agree unconditionally to the UK proposa13 (
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
�
*Warsaw Pact Meeting: The communiqu�ssued by the
Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow on 30 March was cast in a
moderate tone and confined largely to routine generalities,
suggesting that it is intended as a gesture of restraint. The
communiqu�ontains only a passing reference to Laos along
with the Congo, Algeria, Angola, and Cuba as examples of
areas where the "imperialists" have resorted to "direct mil-
itary strength" in an effort to check the "growing liberation
movement" in Asia, Africa,and Latin America. Since the
Warsaw Pact meeting appears to have been timed to provide
a demonstration of bloc strength and solidarity in the event
of any decisions by the SEATO conference to increase mili-
tary assistance to the Laotian Government, the omission of
any warning addressed specifically to the Laotian situation
probably is designed to appear responsive to the moderate
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PIA
Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Rona
INDONESIA
300
Luanda
1,0331
INDIA
1711
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
MALAYA
210
INDONESIA
MOBUTU
7,200
Leopoldvi le
ysville
public of the Congo
MALAYA
150
� emena
Sc ttered
�Coquilhatville
at.
Scati.treci orces
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshombe
DTI United Nations Forces
- Selected road
Selected railroad
*T"Selected airfield
4,� Katangan moves against Manono
STATUTE MILES 400
� Boende
Aketi
13psok9,-
MALAYA
400
nleyville
e,
Francqui KALONJI
1,500
L luabourg LIBERIA
Bak nga 230 ETHIOP
Luputa
MOROCC
Kamina
u av
NIGERIA
500
ongolo
Albertville
NIGERIA
1,300
.Mono
Usurnbura
Piana Mwanga
Mitwaba
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
7,000
hville
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at:.' tement on Laos contained in the SEATO communiqu�The
Moscow communiqu�oncludes on a conciliatory note by ex-
pressing the bloc's readiness at any time to "support the im-
plementation of the widest measures coordinated with other
states" to secure peace and security. The only substantive
issue raised by the communiqu�s a reaffirmation that a Ger-
man peace treaty and creation of a free city in West Berlin
remain "extremely necessary."
The Chinese Communists were represented by their am-
bassador to Moscow. This is the first time that observers
representing Communist China at a Warsaw Pact meeting
were not special high-ranking officials from Peiping. On four
of the past five occasions, the Chinese were represented by
officials of politburo rank. In addition, the communiqu�isted
no representative from North Vietnam. It is not clear whether
� these departures from past practice reflect current policy differ-
pne.AR hntween Moscow and Peiping
Congo: dIncoordinated and so far inconclusive contacts
between officials of the Leopoldville and Stanleyville regimes
apparently are continuing. Several leaders in Orientale, in-
cluding Gizenga, are reported to have been in correspondence
with Leopoldville, often without the knowledge of their associ-
tes. Mobutu announced on 29 March that some of his officers
were meeting with representatives of General Lundula in the
northern part of the country. This suggests there is at least
a possibility that some form of modus vivendi may still be
worked out between the Stanleyville and Leopoldville leader,
The sea-lift of 2,300 Indian troops is now scheduled to
begin on 1 April, even though the situation at Matadi is still
unresolved. The Indians will arrive off West Africa about 20
April. If at that time Matadi is still closed to military traf-
fic, they are to off-load at Lagos, Nigeria, from which point
they will be airlifted into the Congo. (Back-
up, Page 3) (Map)
k
USSR - Communist China: According to a brief Chinese
Communist press announcement,the Soviet delegation which
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has been holding "preliminary discussions" on economic rela-
tions between the two countries, left Peiping for Mongolia on
27 March. No mention was made of the outcome of the talks
or of plans for additional negotiations, although it had been
announced earlier that the preliminary phase would be followed
by further talks in Moscow. This suggests that these negotia-
tions, which were probably concerned with Soviet aid to China,
have hit a snag. (Backup, Page 5)
USSR: A high number of Soviet scientific research ships
--at least 16--are currently operating in waters throughout
the world, including the north and south Atlantic, the mid-
Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Antarctic, and the Gulf of Alas-
ka. These ships are carrying on the USSR's extensive oceano=
graphic research program,which has expanded rapidly during
the past decade and which now far exceeds that of any other
nation in both numbers of research ships and scope. The So-
viet effort has important economic, scientific,and military
applications. An example of military interest in research op-
erations was noted in late February and early March when the
USSR's leading authority on the military applications of under-
water sound research personally directed nnprAtions by two
new research shins in the south Atlantic.
Israel-France:
France has agreed to execute
"five plans," to be completed in two years, as part of a ten-
year program for military industrial development in Israel.
This agreement was reportedly worked out by an Israeli mil-
itary mission recently in Paris. The agreement calls for
construction and equipping of a chemical factory, an electro-
metallurgical laboratory, a factory for "isotopes," a central
military rese rch laboratory, and an artillery and rocket
factory. Although the report is inaccurate in some of its de-
tails and may be sensationalized, it probably reflects a new
development in Franco-Israeli military cooperation which
31 Mar 61
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eventually would provide Israel with facilities for increasin
and centralizing its military industrial activities.
(Backup, Page 6)
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia: Conditions Affecting
Internal Development and International Orientation, Stability
of the Governments in the Area, and Probable Effects of Com-
munist Gains in LaosanLSouth Vietnam. U. S. I. B. NIE 50-
61. 28 March 1961.
31 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Nvirer-
Situation in Laos
EPreliminary accounts of a 29 March cabinet meeting in
Vientiane indicate that while unhappiness was expressed over
Vientiane's weak position in any political settlement because
of its military disadvantage, no decision was taken to oppose
a negotiated settlement/
"2,000 North Vietnamese
� troops" at Kham Keut, and a heavy mortar battalion and ar-
tillery battery at Lak Sao, to the east. Reports from Ameri-
can military sources indicate that the enemy is employing
only company-size guerrilla units in this area with some
North Vietnamese advisers,D
the
Soviet ambassador in Paris said the USSR, as co-cnirman
of the Geneva conference, could not order a cease-fire and
suggested that this was something Souvanna should do as
"head" of the Laotian Government. Souvanna has stated that
the Soviet ambassador responded favorably to his view that
reactivation of the ICC should precede a cease-fire in order
to ensure that the cease-fire is observed and foreign inter-
vention is terminated. In view of the bloc's apparent desire
to avoid a commitment to a formal cessation of hostilities
prior to an international conference, the Soviet leaders may
see a strong advantage in adopting Souvanna's position in their
reply to the British note �a position which corresponds to the
Soviet proposal of 18 February that a preliminary meeting of
the ICC be held in New Delhi before the international confer-
ence opens.
[The generally moderate tone of Soviet propaganda on
Laos, following the publication of the Pravda "Observer" arti-
cle on 27 March, provides additional evidence of Moscow's
desire to avoid exacerbating the situation at the present time.
The Warsaw Pact communique of 30 March contained only a
passim reference to Lao6,3
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�Awsoi
iDuring Souvanna's current "private " visit to London, the
British are planning to give him red-carpet treatment, includ-
ing dinner with the foreign secretary. London's long-standing
support for Souvanna is based on the belief that he can maneuver
for the support of both left and right from a neutral position.
The British will stress the importance of not jeopardizing this
neutrality by commitments to the Soviets during his subsequent
Moscow visit.�
_
Soviet transports continued to be scheduled for airlift
operations into Laos through 31 March. Three Soviet LI-2
transports flew on 29 March to a recently reactivated airfield
about 50 miles northeast of Hanoi. Three more were sched-
uled there on 30 March.
the 1L-18 now en route to Haiphong
from Moscow refuel "since Hanoi has no gasoline." Since the
IL-18 is a turboprop aircraft using jet fuel,
this particular aircraft did not
arrive in North Vietnam in need of jet fuel, which is apparently not
available there. The level of airlift activity into Laos does not
indicate a shortage of aviation gasoline used by the IL-14s and
LI-2s.
At least one of the two Soviet AN-12s scheduled for North
Vietnam arrived in Peiping on 30 March and is scheduled to con-
tinue to Hanoi on 31 March. The sentence in the Central Intelligence
Bulletin of 30 March referring to flights of these aircraft should
have read "from the USSR into North Vietnam."
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Situation in the Congo
The meeting announced by Mobutu may be the one referred
to
Pcontacts between Leopoldville and Stanleyville officers were
taking place in a town near Aketi and that the local civilian ad-
ministrator had been excluded. These efforts by Mobutu re-
portedly have Kasavubu's blessing; however, many of the feelers
which have been put out from Stanleyville appear to be attempts
by Congolese leaders acting as individuals to make their peace
with the opposite side.
The Leopoldville government's announcement that the next
meeting of Congolese leaders will be held on 5 April at Kamina,
near a concentration of UN troops, apparently is a further at-
tempt to initiate official contacts with the Gizenga regime. Gi-
zenga might agree to attend such a gathering if his security
were guaranteed by the UN; however, his regime still insists
publicly that a convening of parliament and elections under UN
supervision are a. orereauisite for a reconciliation with the op-
posing regimes.
Gizenga is becoming dis-
illusioned with his Cairo mission, whose leader, Pierre Mulele,
has been trying to halt the drift toward rapprochement between
Leopoldville and Stanleyville. The most recent cause for dissat-
isfaction is the alleged theft in Khartoum of $380,000 which was
being sent by courier to Stanleyville to pay Gizenga's troops.
Gizenga apparently is becoming increasingly annoyed with Mulele,
who has been sending him wordy. vague reports but has so far
produced no results.
Tshombe's troops planned to attack the airport at Manono on 30
March. The white officer in charge of this operation reported-
ly contended that his force was too small to accomplish its ob-
jective, but he nevertheless planned to go ahead. In this opera-
tion, African troops allegedly were to lead the advance with the
South Africans backing them up from behind. The Katangla)
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EiniMary leaders reportedly believed that this plan of opera-
tion would be more successful than the earlier vrocedure of
integrating whites into African un1t_s3,
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Sino-Soviet Economic Negotiations May Have Hit Snag
The Soviet economic delegation headed by Vice Chairman
of the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Arkhipov
and also a trade delegation headed by Vice Minister of For-
eign Trade Kumykin arrived in Peiping on 8 February for
separate meetings with the Chinese. When the trade delega=
tion left to return to Moscow on 2 March, a "press commu-
niqu4" was issued both in Peiping and Moscow stating that
negotiations had proceeded smoothly and a satisfactory agree-
ment had been reached. At a banquet in honor of the departing
trade delegation, Chou En-lai toasted the "success already'
achieved" and Foreign Minister Chen Yi expressed confidence
that the economic discussions would be equally successful.
The general theme of economic talks as opposed to the
trade negotiations was long-term Soviet economic assistance
for China's industrialization program, the status of which was
called into question with the departure of Soviet technicians
in August 1960. The discussions in Peiping probably centered
on rescheduling Soviet deliveries of capital equipment, a
possible resumption of some Soviet technical assistance, and
other aspects of Soviet aid disrupted during the past eight
months. While the continuation of these economic talks well
beyond the completion date of preliminary trade talks may be
only a reflection of the detailed substantive work involved,
the absence of comment such as that which followed the trade
talks would seem to imply that difficulties arose during the
past month.
The trade talks have entered the final phase of negotia-
tions in Moscow on the 1961 agreements. Recent informa-
tion on deliveries of Soviet petroleum to China reveals that
the quota for April is at an all-time high, exceeding the high
level of deliveries in this same month last year. This sug-
gests that at least the petroleum protocol in the 1961 trade
agreement has been concluded and is being implemented.
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France Reportedly Will Provide Israel With Military Indus-
trial Facilities
The machinery and equipment for the "five Plans" will
cost $6,400,000,
posed electrome At the pro-
posed laboratory, all material to be
used for military purposes will be inspected. The plant for
"isotopes" reportedly will produce "spare parts" for Israel's
nuclear reactor--an illogical function for such a factory--as
well as supplies and equipment for handling, controlling, and
measuring radioactivity. The description of the intended pur-
pose of the military research laboratory is also erronPours in
its details. The arms factory, manufacture heavy, medium, and light gun barrels, as well
as French-designed anti-tank rorkpfq in anprirrinnno with au-
thorization from France.
{yrael already is the largest and most efficient producer
of arms in the Middle East. Its munitions industry has grown
from a small clandestine operation during the British Mandate
in Palestine to a highly flexible, government-controlled com-
plex which has made the country almost sell-sufficient in light
armaments. As the variety of military goods manufactured
has broadened to include more complex and specialized items,
there have become available for export outdated types of weap-
ons and ammunition. Earnings from export sales of small
arms and ammunition have offset to some extent expenditures
of foreign exchange for the heavy arms and aircraft Israel has
procured abroad. West Germany, which along with France has
supplied Israel with military good
importer of Israeli light arms. West
German purchases have include -mm. submachine guni.)
The Israelis also have sold locally manufactured arms to
the newly independent states of Africa, in competition with the
UAR, as part of their effort to develop political and economic
relations. For these sales, liberal credit terms are extended
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to the recipient state. In the recent case of Mali, which is
also acquiring weapons from the UAR, the terms amounted
virtually to a gift.
srael also has ordered 40 Mirage III jet fighters from
France, but apparently has not yet received any of the air-
craft. These advanced jets, which have been in production
for only a few months, are si nerior to the Missi n MIG-19s
the UAR recently acquiredD
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�411109' CONFIDENTIAL Noe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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