CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000185
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 31, 1961

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31 January 1961
Copy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos: Since mid-December the USSR has airlifted
an estimated total of 1,115 tons of sunnlies and
equipment into Laos. 'Page i)
2. Congo: Nasir expresses willingness to give Gizenga
all possible aid, but comnlains of Sudan's refusal to
permit transit. (Page i)
3. High Chinese Communist officials reiterate Peiping's
opposition to "two-Chinas� solution for Taiwan. (Page ti)
4. Japan interested in improved relations and more
trade with Communist China. (Page tit)
5. Republic of Mali agrees to diplomatic relations with
Mongolia. (Page tit)
6. The six-month-old Republic of Cyprus faces growing
economic and political problems; strength of local
Communist party continues to increase. (Page itt)
7. New Brazilian cabinet has generally conservative
complexion. (Page iv)
Ii
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
31 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
r Laos: taoviet airdrops have been reported in support
f pro-Communist Laotian forces at the Phou Khoun iunc-
ion of Route 7 and Route 13;(
Government troops are coritinuing their movement from
the north and south toward this strategic junction. Soviet
airlift operations into Laos continue to be scheduled through
30 January. The US Air Force estimates that since mid-
December 500 Soviet IL-14 sorties have been flown into Laos, -7)6_,
carrying an estimated total of 1,115 tons of supplies and equip-
mIztnt
Corn-
,zy
munist China this month has made available $8,750,000 in US
currency for support of the pro-Communist Laotian forces.
The allocation of these funds despite China's own pressing
need for foreign exchange with which to finance grain imports
points up the importance Peiping attaches to the Laotian crisis.
(Backup,
Page 1) (Map)
*Congo: Mobutu's troops, which had penetrated to within 100
miles of s tanleyville, have, according to press reports, been
repulsed by pro- Lumumba forces at Basoko. There are, how-
ever, increasing indications that Gizenga's forces may be short
of supplies.
c12--
Nasir
suggests Gizenga may have to take more arms from Mobutu's
soldiers. ) TASS announced on 30 Jan-
uary that the USSR has requested President Abboud to permit
the Soviets to send food and medicine through the Sudan into
pro- Lumumba portions of the Congo.
In Brussels, the Belgian foreign minister has reportedly
won cabinet approval to enforce a law forbidding Belgian cit-
izens to serve in or recruit for foreign armies, which could
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Republic of the Congo
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31 JANUARY 1961
UNCLASSIFIED
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lessen overt Belgian assistance to Katanga President
Tshombe. Unconfirmed reports state that Tshombe has
purchased seven twin jet trainers from France, ak_t the
UN, members of the UK delegation indicated on 27 Jan-
uary that they favor the early establishment of a new
Congolese government, and are prepared to accept Lu-
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1/40 Vii1111Uillb viwuna: 1...ommunist China's leaders have
seized a number oi opportunities to register anew their
unyielding opposition to any "two Chinas" solution for the
problem of Taiwan. Both Chou �En-lai and Chen Yi, the
regime's top foreign policy officials, used recent press
interviews to emphasize Peininiylg hoQiiiitr to such an ar-
rangement. other Chinese
leaders, in off-the-record comment, have been underlin-
ing the same point. This flurry of expressed opposition
may reflect a growing concern in Peiping over the possi-
bility that world sentiment is developing in favor of solv-
ing the Taiwan problem by giving some sort of separate
international status to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan.
By re-emphasizing their antipathy to such a solution--
which is shared by Taipei--the Chinese Communists seem
to be trying to head off efforts in this direction.
The authorities in Peiping regard the US as the prime
mover behind the "two Chinas" solution and have insisted
that the US must withdraw military support from Chiang
Kai-shek before any improvement of Sino-US relations
could take place. The Chinese Communists also insist
they will not change their stand in exchange for UN mem-
bership. They have refused to sit in any international
gathering along with Chiang's representatives and for this
reason have already withdrawn from several, such as the
UN-supported International Law Association
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Japan - Communist China: Prime Minister Ikeda's
statement in a policy speech to the Diet on 30 January
that his government will seek improved relations with
Communist China this year reflects an effort to appear
flexible on this issue. This will lend encouragement to
recent steps which have been taken in� both countries to
end the impasse which has obtained since trade was
broken off in May 1958. However, Ikeda indicated that
a rapprochement must not affect existing conditions in
the Far East. Japan is concerned over its vulnerability
to international economic conditions, and its primary ob-
jective is increased trade; Peiping's motivation is prin-
cipally political. Ikeda's stipulation that Tokyo cannot
extend formal recognition to Communist China unless
there is greater international acceptance of Peiping, how-
ever, reveals one of his principal problems�how to satis-
fy growing pressures within Japan for friendly ties with the
China mainland without ieonardizing Japan's relations with
the United States. (Backup, Page 4)
of
Mongolia-Mali: Mongolia and the Republic of Mali
have agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the am-
bassadorial level, according to press reports from Ulan
Bator on 25 January. Mali is the fifth nation to recognize
Mongolia in the past year, following Guinea, Cambodia,
Nepal, and Cuba. India, Burma, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, ok
and all Communist bloc countries also maintain diplomatic
relations with Mongolia. Like the "other Asian Communist
regimes, Mongolia is particularly eager to gain recogni-
tion from the new African republics and Asian neutrals
who might be expected to support its bid for UN member-
ship. Mali's agreement to diplomatic ties with Mongolia
provides an indication that Mali's "positive neutraliqm" may
be taking on a Dro-bloc flavor.
L
Cyprus: Economic anct political problems are multi- f) t
plying or the government of the Independent Republic of
31 Jan 61
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Cyprus. A three-year drought has seriously reduced
grain production, while general economic stagnation
since the proclamation of the republic in August 1960
has led to widespread unemployment An ably led Com-
munist party continues to increase its strength, and the
Communist-dominated labor federation remains the only
effective labor organization on the island. According to
the US Embassy in Nicosia, President Makariosi party
is weakened by lack of organization, and some former
EOICA underground fighters are turning against his mod-
erate leadership. Disputes over implementation of the
six-month-old Cyprus settlement continue to foster dis-
trust and ill will between the Greek Cypriot majority and
Turkish Cypriot minority. (Backup,
Page 6)
*Brazil: Ja,nio Quadros, who becomes president today,
has announced a cabinet which US Ambassador Cabot char-
acterizes as chosen largely with a view, to ensuring polit-
ical support in congress but including unusually able men
in several key posts. The pro-US foreign minister,- desig-
nate, Afonso Arinos, has been chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Finance Minister - Desig-
nate Mariani, who will shortly be faced with a balance-of-
payments crisis, is a strong personality capable of pushing
needed economic reforms. The cabinet is generally con-
servative, and some pro-Quadros circles have criticized
It as too conservative to accomnithh the changes in Brazil-
ian policy which they look for. (Backup,
Page 8)
31 Jan 61
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Situation in Laos
.EVurther strain has been placed on Laotian-French
relations by the Boun Oum government's notice to French
Ambassador Falaize on 29 January that Lao army units
would shortly take over "required" portions of the French
base at Seno, including the airstrip and related facilities.
The note stated that Seno henceforth would be considered a
Laotian base, although French troops might still be sta-
tioned there. The French, who had parried earlier Lao-
tian notes on Seno by assuring that the matter was under
consideration in Paris, have been taken aback by the ab-
ruptness of the Boun Oum government's action. The French
counselor in Vientiane has claimed that the move is a viola-
tion of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Laos--which specified
Seno as a French base--and has speculated that France might
call for reconvening the Geneva conference in prot!sti
'ate Seno military base, located a few miles outside
Savannakhet in south central Laos, has the best airfield in
Laos in addition to important ground installations. The 1954
Geneva agreement authorized the French to maintain garri-
son forces totaling 3,500 troops to be stationed at Seno and
at another base which never was activated. An additional
1,500 French troops were authorized in Laos for training
purposes. Although France has never maintained Seno at
much more than caretaker strength�the present garrison
numbers about 300--retention of this base under French au-
thority is of potential strategic value to SEATO. The vari-
ous governments in Vientiane, however, have regarded French
control of the base an affront to Lao sovereignty, and the
present Laotian administration seems convinced that the
French, far from providing protection for Laos, are in open
sympathy with the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces]
_ the IL-14 drops
at Phou Khoun stated that the cargo appeared to be heavy
and that a large number of open parachutes were discernible
on the ground. the concentration as the heavi-
est observed since the Soviet air drops in support of the Kong
Le - Pathet Lao takeover of the Plaine des Jarres on 1 Jan-
uary. This report would seem to bear out the expectations 20
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31 JANUARY 1961
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[Laotian military officials that the enemy would make a strong
stand at the crossroads. A government column of approximate-
ly 1,300 men coming from the north is said to be within about
ten miles of Phou Khoun. To the south, the government force
proceeding from Muong Kassv is apparently cautiously making
�wav ard the junction3
The second of the two Soviet AN-12s which arrived at
Canton on 28 January flew to Haiphong ndreturnedto Canton
on the morning of 30 January. It appears that in large meas-
ure the ability of the pro-Communist forces to maintain the
initiative in ground operations has been the result of airlift
operations. Although North Vietnamese .nd, indirectly, Chi-
nese Communist transports have been involved on a relatively
small scale, the airlift has been primarily directed, support-
ed, and carried out by the USSR.
The USSR began the airlift in early December at the re-
quest of Souvanna Phouma, then premier of the Laotian Gov-
ernment. Between 4 and 13 December, five Soviet 1L-14
transports flew 69 sorties to Vientiane, delivering gasoline
and oil nd foodstuffs, and--beginning about 10 December--
105-mm. howitzers, 120-mm, mortars, and other unidenti-
fied cargo. Recently the airlift capability has been substan-
tially augmented by the introduction of eighteen Soviet LI-2
transports and at least nine Soviet helicopters--five MI-4s
and four MI-7s. In addition, Soviet AN-12 heavy four-engined
turboprop transports have made 12 flights to South China and
North Vietnam from the USSR in three separate operations--
the most recent of which is still in progress.
The ten Soviet IL-14s have been flying most of the sorties
into Laos, a large share of which have been airdrop missions.
The Soviet MI-4 medium cargo helicopters app rently have op-
erated principally within North Vietnam and in short-h ul small
cargo resupply missions in the Laotian border area. The eight-
een LI-2s which arrived in North Vietnam in mid-Janu,..try have
been engaged in shuttle flights between Hanoi and Haiphong and
may be flying into Laos, although this is unconfirmed.
The tonnage of supplies estimated to h ve been airlifted
to the pro-Communists in Laos during the p st six weeks
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TOP SECRET Noe
appears to be substantially in excess of that required to
sustain the current level of military operations. It is likely
that caches of supplies vital to the conduct of guerrilla war-
fare are being built up, thus indicating that the bloc is pre-
ared to prolong military operations in Laos.
�Ter�SE-C-RE-T
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CONFIDENTIAL Nisof
Japan Seeks Closer Relations With Communist China
Japanese Prime Minister. Hayato Ikeda believes that
the China question will be Japan's foremost international
problem in 1961. Although apparently developing a pro-
gram to promote friendlier ties with Communist China,
the prime minister has stipulated that formal recognition
must await a "general adjustment of East-West relations."
In May 1958, after gradually improving relations had
led to a total trade level of approximately $120,000,000 in
1957, the Kishi government refused to grant official sanc-
tion for the Chinese Communists to fly their national flag
over a proposed trade mission in Tokyo. Peiping retal-
iated by breaking off trade relations, including several
long-term contracts for exchanging Chinese industrial
raw materials for Japanese industrial machinery and prod-
ucts, and refused to resume them unless Japan made polit-
ical concessions.
In recent months, both Tokyo and Peiping have relaxed
their positions without, however, making substantive con-
cessions. Following the resignation of the Kishi government
last July, Peiping lifted its total ban on trade with Japan to
permit the export of small quantities of highly specialized
foodstuffs desired by the Japanese, in the apparent hope of
stimulating pressures for the new Ikeda government to honor
the "three principles" Peiping still insists on. These are:
ending Japan's hostile policy toward China; noncollaboration
with the "US plot to create two Chinas"; and severance of re-
lations with Taiwan and recognition of Communist China.
Subsequently, there have been exchanges of various labor,
economic, and nonofficial political missions, and in the past
six weeks the Chinese have inquired about an exchange of "im-
portant goods"--Japanese steel, heavy machinery, and ves-
sels, for Chinese soybeans, pig iron, and coal. These in-
quiries are probably intended to encourage Japanese elements
interested in trade with the mainland to step up their pressures
on Ikeda for concessions. That the basic Chinese motivation
continues to be political is suggested by Peiping's refusal in
mid-January to discuss Ikeda's proposal for postal, meteoro-
logical, and other technical agreements unless a Japanese
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL I�we'
cabinet minister is dispatched to Peiping for the pur-
pose.
Recent US measures to conserve dollars have
aroused new concern in Japan about its need for ex-
panded export markets to maintain the present stand-
ard of living for a growing population. In addition,
Tokyo is reviewing its position on the question of UN
membership for Communist China in order not to be-
d frm the roAs
CONFIDENTIAL
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111111t1 CONFIDENTIAL
Cyprus Faces Economic and Political Problems
The Cyprus government, under the leadership of Greek
Cypriot President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot Vice Presi-
dent Fazil Kuchuk, continues to look to the West for friendship
and guidance, but growing problems appear to be undermining
its popular support.
The recent arrival of the first relief shipment of some
50,000 tons of wheat and barley from the US, supplied under
Title II of PL-480, received favorable publicity but is recog-
nized locally as only a stopgap measure in alleviating shortages
caused by the prolonged drought. The government, unable to
find markets for Cypriot raisins in the West, concluded a bar-
ter agreement with the USSR in early December under which
the Soviet Union will take 8,000 tons of raisins in exchange for
cement, lumber, and other products. Tourism--which was
anticipated before independence as a source of foreign exchange
--has not come up to expectations.
In the Greek Cypriot community, Makarios retains much
of his great popularity, but his own political party, the Patri-
otic Front, suffers from a dearth of second-echelon leaders.
The well-organized Communist-dominated Regenerative Party
of the Working People (AKEL), which probably can count on
the support of 35 percent of the electorate, continues to gain
followers. At present, its leaders appear content to follow a
program of "peaceful coexistence" with the Patriotic Front
while developing new support from the government's inevitable
errors. The Communists have been further strengthened by
the recent arrival of the first Soviet ambassador to Cyprus,
who is in a position to give guidance to local party leaders.
The situation in organized labor is deteriorating. The
Communist-led pan-Cyprian Federation of Labor (PEO) is
growing more powerful, while the anti-Communist federation
--never a real competitor to PEO- -apparently is on the verge
of dissolution. Unless action is taken soon to reorganize the
right-wing union, the Communists will dominate the entire
Greek Cypriot labor movement.
Makarios also faces increasing competition from a group
of former members of EOICA, the underground organization
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�1111.� CONFIDENTIAL ird
against the British, and others who, disillusioned with the
Cyprus settlement, have renewed the call for "enosis"--union
of the island with Greece. Occasional acts of terrorism ap-
pear traceable to fanatics among this group.
The Turkish Cypriot minority has exhibited signs of a
developing cleavage between the moderates, who follow the
leadership of Kuchuk, and those who favor a more militant
defense of Turkish minority rights. Recent actions of the pro-
enosis Greeks have resulted in uneasiness among the Turks and
a widespread insistence that the Cyprus agreements be carried
out "to the letter." The newspapers supported by each commu-
nity on the island have adopted highly critical attitudes toward
the actions of the other community, and the spirit of mutual
toleration between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was evi-
dent at the time independence was proclaimed, seems to be dis-
appearing.
CO
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Nevi
The New Brazilian Administration
Janio Quadros maintained complete silence regard-
ing his future government during his three-month visit
to Europe after the presidential elections of 3 October,
and only on 29 January announced his cabinet appointments.
The choices reflect a variety of considerations, including
Individual abilities and past association with Quadros, as
well as geographical factors and the new President's lack of for-
mal ties with any of the several parties of his sponsoring
coalition,
Besides Finance Minister Mariani and Foreign Minis=
ter Arinos, the outstanding personalities in the cabinet are
probably Labor Minister Francisco Carlos de Castro Neves
and War Minister Odylia Denys. The new labor minister
was Quadros' secretary of government in Sao Paulo and is
one of the shrewdest politicians in Quadros' entourage. Mar-
shal Denys was war minister in the Kubitschek administra-
tion and was asked to continue in the same post.
Denys reportedly agreed to stay on after Quadros prom-
ised him a free hand in removing from the armed forces cer-
tain officers he considered unreliable, including pro-Commu-
nists and Communist party members. One of Quadros' cam-
paign pledges was to legalize the Communist party--which
supported the administration candidate, General Lott, in the
October elections--but this pledge would not preclude his
support for stronger anti-Communist measures if it suited
his purposes.
Initial reaction to the cabinet selections among the pro-
quadros press in Rio de Janeiro has been one of strong crit-
icism, with the cabinet termed mediocre, ultraconservative,
and incapable of bringing the renovation and regeneration that
Quadros supporters had anticipated. Indicative of the radical
line some pro-Quadros factions expect of the new President is
on what is looked for in the
way of foreign policy. Quadros' pro-
posals for a "bold new policy" will be published shortly after
hi q inammratinn in an annrnnyinns newqnanPr artielP written by
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Actions proposed in this article
allegedly will include: establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with the USSR; a call for "understanding" instead
of condemnation of the Cuban revolution; and an expres-
sion of hope for better Latin American relations with
Washington, but with an insistence that the nature of these
relations must be changed.
Quadros will also call
for a conference of all nations interested in studying the
problems of the underdeveloped nations, inviting countries
from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, as well as from
Latin America.
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eTHE.PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman,. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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