CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03179294
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 4, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C03179294 3.5(c)
41, I %or
3.3(h)(2)
4 January 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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4 JANUARY 1961
I. SPECIAL ITEM
Situation in Laos.
II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
III. ASIA-AFRICA
Cambodian Prince Sihanouk reportedly
"overwhelmed" by recent visit to Com-
munist China; may tighten Cambodian
ties with bloc.
Iraqi foreign relations line criticizes
Western attitudes as forcing Arabs
toward closer ties with Sino-Soviet bloc.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
I. SPECIAL ITEM
*The Situation in Laos: 'he military situ
Khouang Province is obscure.
the reoccupation of Xien
ers dropped nearby on 1 Januar in general
the Pathet Lao advance has been stalled. Hanoi radio, how=
ever, asserts that Xieng Khouang town is still in Pathet Lao',
hands. Meanwhile, government troops north of Vientiane
are reported preparing to attack yang Vieng, site of the Kong
Le - Pathet Lao build-up prior to their drive eastward to-
ward Xieng Khouang. It is not clear how many antigovern-
ment troops remain at yang Vieng, an area considered by
Western observers to be highly defensible)
The National Assembly has convened in Vientiane to give
belated approval to the provisional government of Prince
Boun Oum. Such action would bring the Boun Oum govern-
ment's creation into full conformity with normal constitution-
al recognition. Moscow has quickly attacked the assembly
session as a device to give a "semblance of legality" to the
Boun Oum regime.
A summary version of an article appearing in the New
Year's edition of Red Flag, the major theoretical journal
of the Chinese Communist party, apparently addressing it-
self to Laos, implies that local wars can be contained when
the bloc is victorious but that if the West "gets what it wants,"
local wars may become world war. Peiping, however, does
not pledge itself to any specific course of action in the present
case of Laos. North Vietnam has termed latest US military
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BURMA
CHINA
NAMTHA
Non'
ong Saly
PHO G SAL?
%
LUANG PR
me1(.00g
ANG
uang Praba
�Dien Bien Phu
Ban Ban*
Plaine des
K h loeunagng
Janes ^
XIENG KHOUANG
Sam Neua
SAM NEUA
NORTH VIETNAM
U0fIg Peun
� Nong Het
4 yang Vieng
VIENTIANE
Vientian
THAILAND
Selected roads
STATUTE MILES 100
UNCLASSIFIED
31439
iPak Sane
-5"
0
KHAMMOUANE
Savannakhe
CAMBODIA
SAVANNAKHET
CHINA
GULF OF TONKIN
SARAVANE
Pakse
CHA PASSAK
S TH
VIET
ATTOREU
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moves in the Pacific as "brazen acts of provocation."
The airlift into Laos by Soviet IL-14s continued through
3 January with ten aircraft making at least 12 but possibly 15
sorties. Six Soviet transports were re-
ported on the Xieng IChouan airfield on 2 January, accord-
ing to a Laotian intercept.
Photos
e area
considerable development
of the area has taken place since the Communists gained con-
trol on 28 September. Warehouse-type buildings have been
constructed, and 35 vehicles were noted in the area.;)
2'14- tO'n'irniastt-61Iiink:?rinc-e s6olg�t--d
Dverwhelmed" by his reception in ommunist China that,
he may move
uamPoala into closer ties with the bloc, and with Peiping in
particular, to the ultimate exclusion of the West. It is doubt-
ful that Sihanouk would intentionally compromise Cambodia's
neutral position, but
reports that tne uninese reception and the amount
of aid pledged to Cambodia have brought the prince "into utmost
4 Jan 61
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DAILY BRIEF
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sympathy with the Chinese Communists
signed no military agreements with the
reiterated Communist China's intention
aid in the ei_reiltc.aggrcoj,ye attas1
5
bloc, Mao Tse-tung
to enme to Cambodia's
--aitlough Cambodia
ArieV Trielraqi Government is developing a ioreign re14.- K
tions line paralleling that of Nasir in its emphasis that West-
ern attitudes are forcing the Arabs toward closer association ,cuit.,tt
with Sino-Soviet bloc policy. Reports that Israel, with Frenchao.3
assistance, is constructing an atomic bomb have intensified 1', .4
,
Iraqi anti-Western sentiment. In the past few days even Iraq's) (e1/4_
relatively pro-Western foreign minister has made unprecedent-
edly strong and specific attacks on the United States regarding
the Congo and Algerian issues. (Page 1)
4 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF lii
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Growing Arab Resentment Toward Western Powers
Iraq, like the UAR, is developing a foreign policy line
which emphasizes that Western attitudes on such issues as
Algeria, the Congo, and Israeli nuclear progress are forc-
ing the Arabs into closer association with Sino-Soviet bloc
policies. In the past few days even Iraq's relatively pro-
Western foreign minister has made unprecedentedly strong
specific and public attacks on the United States.
Prime Minister Qasim has declared that if France and
"other imperialist states" are determined to help Israel ob-
tain atomic weapons, it will mean "the perpetuation of ag-
gression on our homeland for many decades!' The Iraqi press
and radio have intensified their attacks on the Western powers
and have called upon all Arab League states to institute
an im,-
itical and economic boycott of France.
In late December the UAR made an attempt to stimulate
a significant direct Iraqi economic move a ainst the French.
Cairo ordered that
articles be planted in the Beirut press attacking Qasim for fail-
ing to nationalize France's 23.75-bercent share of the Iraq Pe-
troleum Company.
A similar but less vehement reaction has been evident in
other Arab states. Saudi press coverage has been heavy and
generally in line with the UAR position. Prime Minister Tal-
huni of Jordan has talked of "freezing differences" with the
UAR and other Arab states in order to join a united front in
the face of "the new Israeli threat." The Sudanese Government,
which still differs sharply with the UAR and Iraq on policy to-
ward the Congo, on 31 December severed diplomatic relations
with France following the third French nuclear test in the Sahara.
A meeting of Arab League foreign ministers has tentatively
been scheduled for 15 January in Beirut to discuss these world
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4 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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problems. It is likely to be characterized by an unusual
measure of agreement on a strong anti-Western line.
The chiefs of the Arab missions in Washington
have decided to recommend to their governments that the
issue of Israel's erection of an atomic reactor capable of
producing atomic weapons be presented to the Securit
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.
4 Jan 61
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
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NOV
N."
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
� The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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