CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000184
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 30, 1961

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30 January 1961
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CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
30 January 1961
1. Situation in Laos. (Page i)
2. Response to Hammarskjold's request for troops
to replace those being withdrawn from Congo has
been reserved. )(Page t)
3. Poland interprets November Communist manifesto
as endorsement of its right to determine internal
policies. (Page it)
4. Italy: Threat to Fanfani government increased by
alliance of Christian Democrats and Socialists in
Milan. (Page tit)
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5. Portugal warns that US refusal to intercept Santa
Maria could lead to "most grave consequences for
US-Portuguese relations"; Quadros favors Galvao.
(Page tit)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
30 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: El: he crisis in Laos may be further complicat- 1:1 is(
ed by the reported entry of at least part of the Chinese
Nationalist irregular force which has been retreating in
the face of a Burmese Army offensive. Chinese National-
ist authorities on Taiwan appear willing to cooperate with.-. 3 44 5
Laotian authorities in attempting to keep the irregulars
confined to enclaves just a few miles from the frontier. withDatl
Burma; however, the irregulars are not always responsive �
to Taipei and may penetrate deeper into Laos. Peiping
could use activity by the Chinese Nationalists in Laos as
a pretext for intervention-3
Edenera,1 Phoumi's efforts to advance the timetable of
his projected offensive against the Plaine des Jarres are
apparently being impeded by terrain difficulties and logis-
tics problems. The progress of the column moving from
ivluong Kassy to the enemy held junction of Routes 7 and
13 is said to be hampered by fallen trees, blown-up bridg-
es,, '
es, and other obstacles_placed in the way of its advance by
retreating enemy forcesL3
x-Premier Souvanna Phouma in Phnom Penh appears
increasingly disposed to accept the invitation of the Pathet
Lao - Kong Le forces to come to Xieng Khouang to head a
crnararn ryi (ant in onnosition to the Boun Oum regime.
va.nna has already agreea aria plans to ieuve Lur ^Len
ang shortly.
(Backup, Page 1) (Map`
Sou-
Khou-
Congo:EResponse to Harnmarskjold's request to van-
us countries countries for troops to replace those being
rawn from the UN Command has been reserved.
N
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Nif I Li ("Kt
Nehru has
iniormea tiammarskiold of his distress over the progres-
sively deteriorating situation, and has said that unless
clearer UN policy emerges it will be difficult for India
to increase its Congo contingent.
The Sudanese foreign minister, although reiterat-
ing his government's support of the UN effort, fears that
because of heavy withdrawals of UN troops,the Sudan
might soon find itself almost alone among African states
in the Congo, and his government has no desire to become
involved in a civil war "next door." The Lualaba state pro-
claimed at Manono by pro-Stanleyville forces on 9 January
Is rapidly setting up a provincial administration among
Balubas opposed to Katanga President Tshombe. This or-
ganization may soon permit Balubas and Congo army forces
to make attacks against the mining complexes and railroads
of south Katanga,2 In Leopoldville, President Kasavubuis
opening speech to the preparatory political conference was
well received, but the conferees have not yet begun real ne-
gotiations.H""--
(15acitup Page 5)
Poland: Party First Secretary Gomulka., in his speech
to the central committee plenum on 20-21 January, inter-
preted the manifesto of the November 1960 conference of
Communist parties in Moscow as an endorsement of the
Polish party's right to determine its own internal policies.
At the same time, Gomulka was careful to stress his sup-
port for Soviet foreign policy, indicating that he did not feel
this would preclude good relations with the West. (SECRET)
(Backup, Page 8)
30 Jan 61
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ii
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IN
Italy: The threat to Premier Fanfani's Christian
Democratic government has been sharply increased by
the alliance formed by the Christian Democrats and the
Socialists to administer the city of Milan. The right-
wing Liberal party has reacted strongly and may with-
draw support from Fanfani if this alliance extends to
the provincial government. The Liberals fear that the
Milan alliance opens the way to a national government
relying on Socialist support, which they may feel they
can block if they f9ree early national elections by over-
throwing Fanfani. , j (Backup, Page 10)
Santa Maria: The outgoing government in Brazil, 6 k
greatly disturbed over US actions in the Santa Maria in-
cident, has informed Washington that the ship will be 4
seized if it enters a Brazilian port. However, Pres- 3
ident-elect Janio Quadros, who will be inaugurated on
31 January, has told newsmen that Galva� is an old
friend and that he would not "hand over his ship" to the
Portuguese Government. CA Portuguese Foreign Minis-
try spokesman told Ambassador Elbrick that the US re-
fusal to intercept the ship could lead to "most grave con-
sequences for US-Portuguese relations?' While the im-
mediate stability of the Salazar regime has not been af-
fected, widespread domestic press and radio coverage has
renewed awareness of the Portuguese public that the re-
gime has active opposition, and suspicion has been aroused
that the government is not so 7nfident as it says of the
loyalty of Portuguese Africa(
30 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in Laos
E'Ex-Premier Souvanna Phouma appears to be on
the verge of going over openly to the side of the Pathet
Lao - Kong Le forces in Laos0
he has agreed
to a proposal brought to him by Pathet leader Phoumi
Vongvichit to return to Laos to assume leadership of a
government in opposition to the Boun Oum government.
Souvanna reportedly stated that he would soon fly to
Xieng Khouang, where the pro-Communists have set
up a provincial administration and whi h they may claim
as a temporary national Laotian capital.
The Sino-Soviet bloc has consistently maintained that
the Souvanna government remains the legal government of
Laos. This assertion, made both to provide a rationale
for the Soviet airlift and to limit international support for
the Boun Oum government, would become considerably
more plausible were Souvanna to throw in his lot with the
Pathet Lao - Kong Le combine.
Phourni Vongvichit left Phnom Penh on 27 January
aboard a Soviet IL-14 accompanied by some of the more
leftist inclined of Souvanna's entourage. The most note-
worthy of these was former National Assembly President
Pheng Pongsavan, who last fall was the primary force be-
hind the creation in Vientiane of the Communist-influenced
Peace and Neutrality ,Committee. There are already indi-
cations that this front group may be revived as a propaganda
vehicle. A broadcast on 28 January by the clandestine "Ra-
dio of the Laotian Kingdom" stated that an "expanded" ses-
sion of the committee had been held that day in Xieng Khou-
ang; among the participants were Souvanna's half-brother,
Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong, Kong Le, Pheng
Pongsavan, and Quinim Pholsena, Souvanna's information
minister. Another broadcast stated that Kong Le has been
named chairman of the recently created "Laotian National
Military Committee," described as "the supreme joint
command of the legal government forces and the Pathet Lao
fighting units."
[-The USSR apparently intends to delay its reply to the
British proposal� of 21 January that the International Contron
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%me �1-111-i-
ommission (ICC) take preliminary soundings, through
its Indian chairman, to determine whether it could per-
nrai role in Laos.
Soviet Deputy For-
eign Minister Kuznetsov has n Ica ed that the USSR's
reply would be delayed for a while. He pointed out that
� London had taken .from 22 December to 21 January to re-
ply to the Soviet proposal for reactivating the ICC and
reconvening the Geneva.Conference:I
The bloc leaders evidently believe time is working
to their advantage in Laos. Their delaying tactics are
� designed to provide the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces an
opportunity to exploit their recent military successes and
to secure control of as much territory as possible before
international negotiations get underway.
The Communists are also seeking to prevent any in-
ternational scrutiny of their airlift activities. The Polish
delegation on the ICC for Vietnam engineered a postpone-
ment of a meeting of the commission scheduled for 27 Jan-
uary in Saigon in order to avoid a discussion of the airlift
to Laos. The chief Polish member pleaded "illness," and
the alternate Polish delegate suddenly departed for Hanoi.
The Canadian delegation told the Indian chairman of the ICC
for Vietnam that these Polish tactics represent a blatant at-
tempt to frustrate ICC activities, and he requested that this
situation be "brought to the attention" of the cochairmen of
the 1954 Geneva Conference�the USSR and Britain,
tin a further international complication, sources on Tai-
wan state that Chinese Nationalist irregular forces have en-
tered Laos at three points as the result of Burmese military
pressure on the other side of the Mekong River frontier. The
irregulars reportedly plan to establish new headquarters in
Laos, following the loss on 27 January of their main base
area in Burma, Keng Lap. Laotian authorities have called
upon the irregulars not to move more than a few miles into
Laos. Taiwan's security chief Chiang Ching-Iwo professed
to agree with the Laotians that Communist China might use
the irregulars' presence as a pretext for action in Laos]
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30 JANUARY 1961
IV Government forces
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DEMARCATION LINE
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Chence, Chiang reportedly considers Laos to be only a
temporary haven. Nevertheless, the Laotians are un-
able to prevent the irregulars from moving farther into
Laos.
_J
Burmese Army leaders deny that Chinese Commu-
nist elements have participated in the present phase of
the offensive against the irregulars. However, since
25 January three Chinese Communist military air trans-
ports have flown from Kunming to an airfield in southern
Yunnan Province not far from the area of earlier Chinese
Communist attacks on the irregulars in Burma. Prior to
early January, flights into this area were infrequent. A
nonstop flight of "first aid plasm" wns made from Pei
to Kunming on 27 January.
General Phoumi states that the two-pronged advance
from1he north and the south, on Phou Khoun, which com-
mands the junction of Routes 'land 13, is being delayed
mainly, by physical obstacles--fallen trees, rocks, and
other impediments presumably left by the retreating en-
emy. forces. A 20-truck convoy of reinforcements for the
enemy position at Phou Khoun may by now have reached
there from the Plaine des Jarres. Elsewhere in the fight-
ing, a two-battalion enemy force is reported probing gov-
ern7nt defenses at Muong Sal to the north of Lnanre ra-
bang.
stepped -up Pathet Lao activity in Attopeu,
me country's southernmost province, and the government
may soon send reinforcements, which it can ill spare, to
the area. There appears to have b een little change over
the week end in the Tha Thom area in southern Xieng Khou-
ang Province. although Ph urni still expects heavy fighting
there.
The two Soviet AN-12s arrived in Canton on 28 January.
One continued on to Haiphong but returned to Canton a few
hours later, presumably after. unloading. The second AN-12
apparently remains at Canton. Airlift flights into Laos con-
tinue to be scheduled.
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%of 1U1- 3L1-111., 1
the IL-14s had
been armed evidence
that the airlift was continuing effectively and that enemy
forces were dispersing supplies received to the extent
that no worthwhile supply dumps have been detected. How-
ever, the Pathet Lao are practicing cover and concealment
against air observations. Although no Communist combat
aircraft were observed, several airfields were noted un-
dergoing improvement.
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Situation in the Congo
CHammarskjold has asked India, Sudan, and Iraq,
among other countries, to furnish replacements for the
more than 5,000 troops the UN Command may lose as
the result of planned or threatened withdrawals of con-
tingents from neutralist nations. So far the response has
been unenthusiastic, owing partly to a general disillusion-
ment with the UN's Congo operations
rTrieliari PrirnA Minister Ne ru
feels that the progressive-
ly deteriorating situation amounts almost to disintegration.
He has replied to Hammarskjold that the behavior of Mobu-
tu's forces and the "shocking" treatment of Lumumba have
aroused much resentment, while the more or less passive
attitude of the UN has created an impression of ineffective-
ness. Nehru feels that more tension would be created were
India to replace troops withdrawn for policy reasons by the
"Casablanca powers"--Morocco, Guinea, the UAR, and
Ghana--and that unless a clearer UN policy emerges, it
would be difficult for India to justify increasi ono
forces beyond the specialist units now there.
COther reports indicate that Nehru believes that UN pol-
icy should include withdrawal of all Belgian military elements,
disarming of "private armies" including Mobutu's, early re-
call of parlia ent, and the supplying of all aid to the Congo
through the UN.
The. Sudanese foreign minister fears that unless the UN
and the Western governments "do something" quickly in the
Congo, the situation will deteriorate to the point where the
Sudan would be faced with a de facto Communist-supported
government on its border. Speaking to an American Embas-
sy official on 26 January, he said that in view of the heavy
troop withdrawals from the Congo�principally by the UAR
and Morocco--the Sudan might soon find itself almost the
only African nation with a force there. Its position would theij
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Cbe indefensible, he added, as his government had no de-
sire to have its army involved in a civil war in an adjoin-
ing c0untry7}
ahe foreign minister vigorously denied reports that
trucks from the Sudan had entered the Congo with arms
for Lurninnba, and asserted that President Abboud re-
mained adamant against any transit of the Sudan in sup-
nort of Gizenga's regime0
some supplies are
reachinp� Orientale Province by road and air through the
smiqn
El'he autonomous Lualaba state, proclaimed in the
northern Katanga town of Almon� by pro-Stanleyville
forces on 9 January, appears to be developing into a
serious threat to the Katanga government- of President
Tshombe". As this regime becomes entrenched--its pro-
vincial administration is reportedly already collecting
taxes�the F3aluba tribesmen hostile to Tshombe, to-
gether with Congolese Army units loyal to Stanleyville,
will be in a position to launch attacks against the mining
complex and railroads which are economically vital to
southern Kata,nga.. Offensive action by Tshornbe't forces,
now being strengthened by Belgian aid, may soon be or-
ganized to combat his threatD
On 27 January some 200 delegates met in the first ple-
nary session of a conference called by Kasavubu to prepare
for a later round-table conference of all Congolese leaders.
The US Embassy stated that the delegates were reportedly
satisfied with the progress of the first meeting and are
hopeful of achieving some concrete results. This hope ap-
pears unrealistic, however, since none of Liiinumba's sub-
nnrtPrS are attending the conference.
the pro- Lumumba Iorces mere
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were on the defensive because of a shortage of arms and
ammunition0 the transporta-
tion situation was bad because of shortages of vehicles,
gasoline, and spare parts.
It was questioned dailyyby; local officials about the ar-
rival of Russian supplies. These officials have known for
a longtime, that such surolies would be "droroed from huge
tranntinrt air(' aft;i r
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SECRET
- Poland
Gomulka used the 20-21 January central committee
plenum of the Polish Communist party to reassure the
people that he interpreted the manifesto of the November
1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow as an
� endorsement of the Polish party's right to determine its
own internal policies, including the relative freedom for
� individuals which has characterized the Gomulka period
In Poland. Gomulka, who has relied on Khrushchev for
support since 1958, was careful to stress his support of
the Soviet foreign policy line, indicating his belief that
this would not stand in the way of good relations with the
West.
The Polish leader is hampered by the fact that his par-
ty has little popular support and that many of its members
are opportunists rather than dedicated Communists. He has
felt it necessary to rely, on party militants who, while ef-
fective as administrators, are opposed to his liberal inter-
nal policies. The regime's avoidance of terror as an instru-
ment of policy has permitted leading intellectuals and tech-
nologists to be safely aloof from politics, and the masses to
remain openly apathetic or opposed to Communism, although
all concerned apparently believe that there is no feasible al-
ternative to Gomulka.
The regime's gradual encroachments on Roman Catholic
influence are most recently illustrated by educational meas-
ures substituting the study of Communist ideology for the
study of religion and the humanities. This violation of a 1957
modus vivendi between church and state is bound to increase
tensions and will add to the uneasiness already caused by the
conflict over questions of birth control and confiscatory taxes
on church property.
In the economic field, individual farmers, who constitute
over 52 percent of the population, fear that force will eventu-
ally be used to collectivize agriculture, but they continue to
resist "voluntary" membership in the regime's farm coopera-
tives. The urban standard of living--particularly regarding
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housing and food--has not met the expectations raised
by the Polish Communists, and the prospect is for con-
tinued austerity, at least until 1.964 to hel ay for
rapid expansion of heavy industry.
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CONFIDENTIAL iiaid
Italian Government's Tenure Increasingly Threatened
The local elections in Italy. last November failed to
give the four-party coalition supporting Premier Fan-
fani's all - Christian Democratic government a majority
in such key cities as Milan, Genoa, Florence, Venice,
and Rome. The Christian Democrats are hampered in
seeking allies outside the national coalition to form city
administrations because their Social Democratic and
Republican partners object to alliances with the Mon-
archists on the right, while their Liberal allies oppose
ties to the Nenni Socialists on the left.
A minority city government's greatest weakness is
the necessity to muster an absolute majority on the mu-
nicipal budget. The only alternative, a .Rome appointed
commissioner to take� the place of mayor and governing
board, is a highly unpopular solution which was tried in
Venice, Genoa, and Florence before the last elections,
and apparently lost the Christian Democrats some votes.
Socialist leader Nenni had originally indicated that
he would participate in the Milan city administration only
if the Socialists were also accepted in the government of
Milan Province. The national coalition parties have suf-
ficient seats to form the provincial administration,Cand
Christian Democratic party Secretary Aldo Moro report-
edly would rather have a commissioner appointed for
Milan Province than risk a coalition including the Social-
ists because he is convinced that Liberal party leader
Giovanni Malagodi would then bring Fanfani down. While
the Christian Democratic leaders in the province are sym-
pathetic to the Socialists, they may not press the issue be-
cause Socialist leader Nenni does not want a crisis now
The Liberals threaten to repeat the policy they fol-
lowed in January 1960, when they caused a lengthy cabinet
crisis by withdrawing support from the government because
they feared Socialist backing was in prospect. The current
coalition resulted after Communist-led riots brought about
the downfall of an interim cabinet dependent on neo-Fascist
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" support. When Fanfani was invested, the Socialists
abstained instead of following their usual practice of
joining the Communists in opposition during a vote of
confidence.
The Liberals expect that, when the Socialist party
congress is held from 16 to 19 March, Nenni will have
to have some quid pro quo to justify to his party's left
wing his move away from the Communists. The Lib-
erals may decide to dump Fanfani before March in or-
der to discredit Nenni by blocking local alliances between
Socialists and Christian Democrats. A repetition of the
protracted cabinet crisis of 1960 would jeopardize the
Italian parliamentary system, and if early elections re-
sulted the Christian Democrats would probably suffer
and the Communists gain.
�CONFIDENTIAL
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���� NV � M.A.' Ir. A& .E1
111111
THE PRESIDENT
The ViCe President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman,' The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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