CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000168
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 5, 1961

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CENTRAL
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BULLETIN
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� 5 JANUARY 1961
I. SPECIAL ITEM
Situation in Laos.
II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
III. ASIA-AFRICA
Turkish cabinet resigns; President Gur-
sel may select new cabinet members with
view to increasing government's populari-
ty in Turkey. 0
Syrian dissidents still plotting to over-
throw UAR regime in Syria with s
includine weanons from Jordan.
Apparently as a reminder to US not to
take Pakistan's cooperation too much for
granted, Pakistani press, probably with
government approval, calls for reduction
in ties with West and improved relations
with bloc.
Burmese General Ne Win reported under
Increasing pressure from army leaders
to resume control of government.
Situation in the Congo.
IV. THE WEST
�French Army attitudes on government's
Algerian policy may hamper any new De
Gaulle initiatives following 6-8 January
referendum.
�Ecuadorean foreign minister has commer-
cial talks with Soviet ambassador in
Washington.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
P
I. SPECIAL ITEM
OK
*Laos: Formal approval of the Boun Oum government
by parliamentary vote on 4 January will probably be viewed d_at_i,
by the Communist bloc as illegal. Souvanna Phouma, who ip
is still in Cambodia, had declared that he would formally
step down as premier if the Boun Oum government were in-
vested by constitutional procedure.
Airlift flights into Laos continued on 4 January with all
ten Soviet IL 14s active. The five Soviet MI-4 helicopters
are scheduled to arrive in Hanoi on 5 January.
Moscow statements dwell on alleged differences among
Western allies over means of solving the crisis in Laos,
While North Vietnam has issued a new appeal for another
Geneva Conference and reactivation of the International Con-
trol Commission
II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
III. ASIA-AFRICA
Turkey: The resignation of Turkey's 18-man cabinet 0 ,e
on 4 January appears to have been pro forma, preparatory ,ce
to the convocation of the new Constituent Assembly on 6 Jan-
uary. Those who resigned will continue in office until a new 1A-6 4.-c4e-cz
cabinet is named from among the members of the new assem-
bly, probably sometime next week. President Gursel may use
this opportunity to increase his popularity among the Turkish
people by selecting ministers who have political influence
rather than primarily professional experience. The two pre-
vious cabinets, made up mainly of technicians, have failed
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� to attract popular support to the new regime. Some of the
key ministers such as Foreign Minister_S2mPv_will prob-
ably remain in the new cabinet. (Page 1)
UAR (Syria)=Jordan: Syrian dissidents are still plot-
ting to overthrow the UAR's regime in Syria and have again
sought support, including weanouR. frnm Tnrelart
Li conspiracy is said to include some of the high-
ranking unit commanders in the Syrian Army and to have
the support of most of the inhabitants of the Jabal Druze.
Amman has asked for more details and promised that aid
will be provided if the nlnt 10 uniiti
�ma s wo o Pakistan's leading
papers, probably approved by the military government, have C)k
called for "gradual disengagement" from Western alliances
and for improved relations with the bloc. While President A2,4-.-(A-11-
Ayub has made it clear that Pakistan remains committed to
its alliance with the US and strongly supported Western posi-
tions during his recent Middle and Far Eastern tours, the
government probably hopes such press comment will serve
as a reminder to the United States that it should not take Pak-
istan's cooperation for granted and increase aid to India at
Pakistan's expense :1 (Page 3)
/2�
Burma: /General Ne Win is under increasing pressure
from army leaders to resume control of the overnment,
Ne Win agrees
MAL� Lne situation in me country "has reached serious propor-
tions" and asserts that Premier Nu's continued misrule might
force him to act "very soon." Meanwhile, Nu is having trouble
in his own Union party. Nu is expected voluntarily to relin-
quish formal leadership of the party at a conference in Feb-
ruary but will continue as the dominant political figure in
Burma. He is planning, however, to back a minority factionT3
5 Jan 61
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REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
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Gemena
Coquilhatville
, Kongolo
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.of the party for party leadership and, should his efforts
fail, he may lose control of his partyq
(Page 4)
Congo: an IL-14
aircraft whicn landed at Liemena on 1 January, ostensibly car-
rying spare parts and welfare supplies for the UAR battalion
in Equateur Province, included money, arms, and presum-
ably, technical personnel for the Gizenga dissidents. Gemena,
about 400 miles northwest of Stanleyville, is the location of
the UAR's Congo battalion
the UN "is not to be notified" of the names of persons aboard
the plane, who were to be described merely as technicians.
IV. THE WEST
France-Algeria:
lowered army morale since the government's decision to hold
the referendum on its Algerian policy and the pro-rebel Mos-
lem demonstrations during De Gaulle's 9-13 December visit. d
Marshal Juin's open letter explaining why he will vote "no" in
the 6-8 January referendum is having repercussions among. of-
ficers in Algeria. Widespread military disapproval of De Gaulle's
policy will pose a threat to any new initiative he may attempt fol-
lowing the referendum if the over-all majority is slim, and par-
ticularly if there should be a negative result in Algeria:I
sEMinister of State for Algeria Lous Joxe is said to have
commented that "serious troublej
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were
dies ahead in Algeria and there will probably be a major up-
rising just before or during the referendum.
both Moslems
and Europeans in Oran are planning a general strike today--.1
(Page 5)
Ecuador-USSR: Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Jose Chin-
boa
"Yesterday I had the opportunity of discuss-
ing with the Russian ambassador future visits of a commercial A
nature." Chiriboga came to the United States in late December "
to discuss US economic assistance to Ecuador. Ecuador dur-
ing the last month re- tastahli sh pd cwtivP dinlriMatic relations
with Czechoslovakia. (Page 7)
V. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
rA. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the imme-
diate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future.
e,
C. With continuing substantial bloc logistic support,particular-
ly airlift, the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces have achieved a
tactical capability of bringing substantial pressure against
government forces in a number of areas throughout Laos.
In the event of a Pathet Lao move against such major points
as Luang Prabang, Vientiane, or Pak Sane, the Boun Oum
Lgovernment will probably ask for overt outside assistance.
though the bloc probably prefers t a-h7t-Th-e-iaotian con lict
not be expanded beyond its present scale, it apparently is-3
5 Jan 61
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Getermined to maintain such military pressure as is required
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to achieve at a minimum a "neutralized" Laos. The bloc is
probably prepared to increase its military commitments with-
in Laos to the extent required to counter such outside
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The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army, would omit the last two sentences for the fol-
lowing reasons: 1) The content of these two sentences is esti=
mative in nature and thus beyond the purview of the Watch Char-
ter. 2) The statements prejudge conditions which may not ac-
tually arise. 3) There is insufficient intelligence information
to justify the statements made in the next to last sentence, and
there is no intelligence information to support the assertion
t sentence.
he Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, is in agree-
ment that the bloc probably prefers that the Laotian conflict
not be expanded beyond its present scale but does not believe
sufficient evidence exists to warrant the conclusion that the
minimum bloc objective is the achievement of a "neutralized"
Laos. The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, further be-
lieves that the conclusion that the bloc is probably prepared to
increase its military commitments in Laos to the extent re-
quired to counter such outside military support as might be
provided to the Phouzni forces cannot be supported by avail-
able information.
5 Jan 61
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Resignation of Turkish Cabinet Prefaces Convocation
Of Constituent Assembly
The resignation of Turkey's 18-man cabinet on 4 Jan-
uary appears to be pro forma, preliminary to the convoca-
tion of the new Constituent Assembly on 6 January. Despite
rumors in Ankara of a cabinet shake-up, there is no indica-
tion of widespread discord within the government. Finance
Minister Alican resigned on 24 December, ostensibly to gain
political freedom of action but in reality because he disagreed
with the plan of the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU)
to raise military salaries substantially.
The resignation may reflect the concept, not clearly de-
fined in Turkish constitutional law, that a cabinet should re-
sign when a new government is established. Some of those
who resigned, such as Foreign Minister Sarper, Deputy Pre-
mier Ozdilek, and Minister of Defense Ataman, will probably
be included in the new cabinet.
The Ankara Home Service announced on 4 January that the
cabinet had submitted its resignation in order to permit Pres-
ident Gursel full freedom of action "at a time when our dem-
ocratic development has entered a new stage. . . " The for-
mer cabinet ministers will continue in office pending the for-
mation of a new cabinet. The CNU may have prompted the
resignations to clear the way for broader political represen-
tation in an effort to win popular support. The two previous
cabinets were made up primarily of technicians who lacked
both political appeal and political comprehension. President
Gursel may also hope to promote his own political future by
selecting men who are more loyal to him. The new appointees
may indicate the political leanings of the CNU; some of the sug-
gested ministers are strong supporters of the Republican Peo-
ple's party (RPP).
Preparations continue for the meeting of the Constituent
Assembly. Several prominent figures have been selected,
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including the leaders of the two main parties, several former
deputies, and at least two former cabinet ministers. The
RPP is rumored to have strong support in the nonpolitical
groups to be represented. In a move probably designed to gain
added support from the minorities and attract international
good will for the regime, Gursel has included in his personal
selections representatives of the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish
minorities. Nonetheless, there continue to be undercurrents of
resistance and potential unrest throughout the country.
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Pakistan Taking More Independent Position
Gn recent editorials probably approved by the military
government, two leading Pakistani papers have called for
Pakistan's "gradual disengagement from the role of a com-
mitted nation" and for improved relations with the bloc.
President Ayub has recently expressed concern over the
flow of news articles that the United States would concen-
trate its aid on India, adding that Pakistani reaction to these
stories was a problem for his government. The military re-
gime probably hopes the recent editorials will serve as a
warning to the incoming American administration that it
should not take Pakistan's cooperation for granted and in-
crease aid to India at Pakistan's expense.'3
CPresident Ayub has made it clear that Pakistan remains
committed to its alliance with the United States and strongly
supported Western positions during his recent Middle and Far
Eastern tours. During his visit to Cairo in early November,
Ayub reportedly told newsmen who asked for his views on non-
alignment: "I don't understand positive neutralism. You should
ask President Nasir; he's the expert on neutralism." In Tokyo
In mid-December Ayub told reporters that Pakistan stood ready
to send troops to Laos if SEATO decided to intervene there-.3
CWhile Pakistan plans no basic change in its commitments,
It has moved to make a show of independence in its foreign pol-
icy, starting with its decision in the summer of 1959 to adopt a
tougher line toward Afghanistan. Pakistan's current negotia-
tions with the USSR for oil-exploration assistance are part of
its more recent efforts to improve relations with Moscow.
Rawalpindi probably considers Moscow's silence on the Sep-
tember border clashes with Afghanistan north of the Khyber
Pass an encouraging sign. In addition, Ayub apparently hopes
to persuade other Afro-Asian nations that it has a "flexible"
foreign policy.
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Burmese
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�5ECRET�Thie
CSenior Burmese Army officers, long discontented with
administrative deterioration under Prime Minister Nu have
obtained assurances from General Ne Win that he intends to
do something about it.
Ne Win told his colleagues that if the lack of govern-
ment discipline continued, "the army would have to act very
soon." , an army takeover
may occur in February or March
[Since Nu resumed the office of prime minister last
April, Ne Win has opposed persistent demands from his army
subordinates for a return to army rule, insisting that the
elected civilian government be given an opportunity to prove
its worth. It now appears, however, that the continued de-
cline of law and order in the country and the deterioration
of the economy since he resigned the prime ministership are
convincing Ne Win that he should resume office. He told his
staff and brigade commanders that he had hoped the present
leaders would "step up the pace of managing the government,
but they were too busy fighting among themselves," and he
reportedly added, "The' Burmese people have again shown
that they are not ready for democracy and self-rule.
[here have been persistent reports of dissension with-
in Nu's Union party and indications that he cannot control its
actions. Nu considered the party
poorly organized, with many "wrong" people in power. A
national party conference is scheduled for February, at which
time a showdown for party control is possible. Nu intends to
step down from the party presidency, but will remain the dom-
inant political figure in Burma. However, he is backing the mi-
nority faction against Union party Secretary General Kyaw Dun,
a political hack whose party role was the immediate cause of
the 1958 breakup of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League.
Should Nu lose this struggle, his organizational backing and
control of the government may disintegrate completely. There
has been one report suggesting that because of the dissension
within his party. Nu would welcome the arm
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*we
.1JULUEWIcLL1116 y .I.V/VrcLW r'oses Threat to De Gaulle's
Algerian Policy
lowered army
morale since the government's decision to hold the 6-8 Jan-
uary referendum on its Algerian policy and since the pro-
rebel Moslem demonstrations during De Gaulle's 9-13 De-
cember visit. The air force is described as similarly af-
fected, though to a lesser degree. The unity of the army is
reportedly endangered by cleavages between junior officers
and older generals and by differences between various units.
The recent open letter by Marshal Alphonse Juin, France's
highest ranking military figure, explaining why he will vote
"no" in the referendum has reportedly stimulated "consider=
able thought" among French officers in Algeria. Repercus-
sions of the Juin letter have also occurred among the military
in France itself, where 16 reserve army generals who had
previously held high commands in North Africa= including
former chief of staff Guillaume--have publicly endorsed Juin%
appeal in even more vehement terms:3
CWidesprea,d military, disapproval of De Gaulle's policy
will pose a threat to any new initiative he may attempt fol-
lowing the referendum. De Gaulle expects to gain about a
65-percent majority in France; a narrower over=all major-
ity or especially a negative result in Algeria would serve to
stiffen military opposition to a new offer to negotiate with the
rebel government. Extensive Moslem abstention, as ordered
by the rebel Algerian government, or further pro-rebel dem-
onstrations in Algeria would probably also be interpreted by
many French officers as evidence of the failure of De Gaulle's
policy and of the impossibility of keeping an independent Al-
geria from rebel domination
(Meanwhile, there are signs that some French officers
now feel Algeria is lost to France and the West and are adopt-
ing attitudes of bitter resignation or indifference. If such sen-
timent spreads, it will probably lower the army's efficiency in)
--SEGREZ-
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Controlling settler and Moslem extremists after the referen-
dum. Minister of State for Algeria Louis Joxe is said to have
commented that "serious trouble"
lies ahead in Algeria and that there will probably be a major
uprising just before or during the referendum.]
both Moslems
ana Luroneans in Oran are n1 nning a ctiznperal Cl+rilrea
--SEC-RE-T-
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Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Reports Meeting
With Soviet Ambassador
Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Jose Chirihnfra
on the previous day he had had "the opportunity
of discussing with the Russian ambassador future visits of a
commercial nature." Chiriboga arrived in the United States
in late December to discuss US economic assistance to Ecua-
dor and the Eleventh Inter-American Conference which is
scheduled to be held in Quito this year.
Ecuador has indicated increased interest in relations
with the Soviet bloc in the past six months. The conserva-
tive Ponce administration which preceded the incumbent
administration of President Velasco permitted the Czech=
oslovak minister to Brazil to be accredited also to Quito last
summer. Ecuadorean-Czech relations had been inactive since
the closure of the Czech legation in Quito in 1957. Under the
Velasco regime, the leftist minister of education traveled to
Prague where he entered into a preliminary agreement to pur-
chase about $630,000 in technical equipment for schools and
received a Czech offer to provide a $10,000,000 credit. The
contract for technical equipment has now been signed, accord-
ing to a press report of late December. Ecuadorean represent-
atives have recently talked with Frantisek Mares, key figure
in Czech arms deals, about the exchange of Czech small arms
for Ecuadorean cacao, cuador
has given Czechoslovakia permission to reopen its legation in
Quito, and a Czech rep esentative WAR Rehelciuled to arrive
there on 27 December.
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Igoe CONFIDENTIAL *se
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
�The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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