CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001990
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 22, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 3.3(h)(2)
I 11---4ClialrES-1� Now 3.5(c)
22 April 1961
Lopy No.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETI\
11
-T-OP-SEC RE-T-
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LATE ITEM
)The situation in Algeria as of 0630 EST remains unclear
beyond the fact that a military revolt against De Gaulle's liberal
Algerian policy was launched in Algiers last night. The Paris
government admits the insurrection, but insists this morning
that the "coup" is confined to the city of Algiers. The insurrec
tionists, in a communique signed by four well-known French
generals, claim they control all Algeria and the Sahara. How-
ever, the only military units pablicly identified as supporting
the revolt are the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment
and the predominently Moslem Seventh Regiment�)
The timing of this move against De Gaulle by-inilitary
par sans of "French Algeria" is connected with the widespread
belief that a negotiated settlement involving Algerian independence
was about to be achieved. Although the rebel Provisional Algerian
Government (PAG) refused to initiate public negotiations with the
French government as scheduled at Evian on 7 April--because of De
Gaulle's �refusal to recognize the l'AG's claim to represent all
Algeria--the fact that behind-the-scenes PAG-French talks have
continued has been an open secret. Moreover, De Gaulle's 11 April
press conference--in which he emphasized more clearly than ever
before his intention to negotiate Algerian independence-- appeared
to have dispelled PAG doubts as to his intentions and it was expected
that negotiations would soon be announced. The PAG has not yet
commented on the situation, and will probably take a cautious at-
titude until the picture becomes clearei:-)
The outcome of the insurrection will depend largely on the re-
actioh of the European settlers, Moslems, and other military units
in Algeria, but also on the reactions in France itself. The settlers
and their rightist sympathizers in France are expected to welcome
the coup as a blow to the "abandonment" of Algeria by De Gaulle.
The Moslem population of Algeria, which was reportedly discouraged
by De Gaulle's 11 April press conference because of fear that it
had reduced chances for an early end of hostilities, could react
violently--with or without PAG incitement--to any indications that
the ,French army intends to prolong the
De Gaulle's skillful management of militailT sensibilities and
his irm stand during the January 1960 insurrection in Algiers''
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in which some army paratroop units wavered in their loyalty,
had for some time apparently discouraged active military
plotting against him. The four generals heading the new in-
surrection--retired Army generals Henri Zeller and Raoul
Salan (a former French commander in Algeria), retired
Air Force General Edmond Jouhaud� thid Air. Force General
Ma,urice'Challe (who re Signed early this year from the position
as NATO -commander for Central Europe)--are prominent
largely because of their anti-Gaullist sentiments apd activities.
They are not believed to enjoy widespread support in the armed
services, although much of the French military have sympathized
with their "French Algeria" views. The current insurrection
appears more serious than the settlers' revolt of 1960 in that
this ,time' some army units are overtly opposed to the government,
and thus openly pose the problem of "unity of the army." The
new French Chief of Staff of National Defense, General Jean
Olie, who took office on 1 March, lacks the prestige of his
predecessor, General Paul Ely, who had played a majOr role
in maintaining the armed services' loyalty to De Gaulle:1
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22 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page t)
2. USSR: Test vehicle, probably an ICBM, successfully
launched from Tyura Tam.
(Page it)
3. Angola: Economic breakdown seen if withdrawal of
Europeans from rural areas continues. (Page it)
4. Congo: Tshombet control in Katanga apparently weakens.
(Page ii)
5. Japan - North Korea: Japanese restrictions on trade
with North Korea lifted. (Page tit)
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Phony Saly
IPHOI\IG SALY
Nam Bac �
j yuong Sai i
......�*" / i .\/./ Sam Neua
k ( ....
LUANGIPR A A N G
N..(AM N E U A
Luang Prabang 1 ' -
' ";',..-.,-.� X I EN G
SAYABOURY 13 Paine desK H 0 U A N G N.
i\AL"DnP. S�U 1 'arres- an' Ban
-1..,
Phou Khoun
Xieng Khouan
KasiI
�-)Ban Pha
v Mei Ban Ta Viang
Tha Thorn
any V4!,eng
VIENTIANE
Borikha4
J4Pak Sane
Vieatiane
Kam Keu
LakSarn
KHAMM UANE:
9
NORTHERN LAOS
ago GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
- ROAD
0
� -TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
50
111111
STATUTE MILES
\ihommara
Thakhek Mahaxay
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Laos: Souvanna Phouma claims that the start of a cease-
fire iriaos-a possible reference to the beginning of negotia-
tions with the Pathet Lao--will coincide with his return to Laos,
presumably to Xieng Khouang, possibly on 25 or 26 April. He
appears confident that the Pathet Lao will be cooperative and
feels that cessation of hostilities can be arranged within a few
days after an appeal by the Geneva cochairmen. @romyko, on
20 April, told British Ambassador Roberts that the USSR and UK
"should aim" for issuancP of such an annpal nn 29 Anrin
a representative from Phong Saly to 'partici-
pate on central committee for cease-fire'
aouvanna told the Canadian ambassador in Moscow that his
half brother, Prince Souphannouvong, had come to Moscow at
his request and that they had discussed problems connected with
a cease-fire. Souvanna was optimistic over chances for putting
together a coalition government before an international confer-
ence on Laos is convened, and said he thought he could prevent
the Pathets from using their position in the government to take
over control of the country, although "time was running out for
establishing a ba7is for preventing thip.'7
No bloc airlift flights into Laos have been scheduled for 22
April. However, there are indications that supplies are being
airlifted to the Vinh and Dong Hoi areas of southern North Viet-
nam, from where they enlild be trucked into central and southern
Laos. (Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Pointe
Noire
Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
6104201
Luanda
INDIA
SUDAN
200
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
INDONESIA
44 MC)1320 U0TU ScattereYfocces
ublic of the Congo
� Gemena
Scattered _force
3,400
MOBUTU
MOBUTU
800
ETHIOPIA
200 Ikela
LEO PO LDVI LLE
Leopoldv
ysville
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
FT Gizenga
Kalorni
EMI Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
- Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
=Selected airfield,
Francqui
luabourg
Bakw
00
STATUTE MILES
40,0
' GIZENGA
Luputa
MALAYA
470
ETHIOPIA
1,500
anleyville
KIVU
Bukavu
ETHIOPIA
500
MALAYA
400
INDIA
go lb
,
a le
t lbertville
. NIGERIA
.900.
NIGERIA
Usumbura
IRELAND
. 650
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SWEDEN
650
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USSR: fA test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched
from�TFaa am at about 0226 GMT on 21 Anril (2126 EST
on 20 April). Preliminary analysis
indicates that the test vehicle successfully reached the usual
impact area on the Kamchatka Peninsula. This is the tenth
test shot this year of probable ICBMs from Tyura Tam. Four
of these were failures. The total of zenerallv successful test
ICBM launchings to date is 34-.1
Angola: Rebels in northern Angola are able to move at
will through large areas of the countryside. The Portuguese
are continuing their military build-up. The American consul
in Luanda believes that the government's repressive measures
are driving increasing numbers of Africans into rebellion. He
feels that unless terrorist activity in the area can be contained C)
in the next few weeks, most of the European-operated coffee
plantations will be abandoned and almost all of this year's coffee
crop will be lost. Withdrawal of Europeans from rural areas
could lead to an economic breakdown, which would cause in-
creased unrest among Europeans as well as amon elements
of the African population at present still loyal.
(Backup, Page 3)
Congo: President Tshombe's control of Katanga appears
more precarious than at any time since the Congo's independ-
ence. The American consulate in Elisabethville reports that
anti-Tshombe. sentiment is rising among the local population,
and that demonstrations--stemming from economic grievances
as well as resentment against Tshombe's Belgian advisers�
may take place at any time. Tshombe has in large measure
rescinded his boycott against UN troops, but animosity between
the Katanga government remains strong.
(Backup, Page 4) (Map)
22 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
0
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Japan-Korea: Jhe Japanese Government has lifted restric-r----'1'6 g/
tions on trade with North Korea. A Japanese Foreign Ministry 4-Z4H r
official told the US Embassy that Japan could not continue to be l
the only free world country, other than the United States, to mafii- -
tain such restrictions. North Korea has sought to have these re
strictions lifted for some time, and Pyongyang's propaganda has jx,
claimed that trade could be expanded considerably if Tokyo woup,4�,,,,
agree to exchange�preferably on a long-term basis--certain
high-priority industrial equipment for North Korean iron ore.
South Korea instructed �
Foreign Minister Chong, now attending the UN General Assem
bly session in New York, to seek US pressure on JaparS
(Backup, Page 5)
22 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in Laos
rp_ouvanna Phouma suggests that negotiations between rep-
resentatives of the opposing sides in Laos should be held at
Xieng nouang, the location of his rump government Vien-
tiane is unlikely to accept this site, since acceptance would
probably be portrayed by Communist propaganda as surrender
to the "lawful government of Laos.")
Souvanna left Moscow for Peiping on 21 April and is sched-
uled to arrive in Hanoi on 25 April. Presumably he will visit
Xieng Khouang from there and then go to Luang Prabang for
the late King's funeral, 1Ie hopes to be able to visit the US in
early May before a conference on Laos is held3
The US Mission at Geneva has learned that a representa-
tive of the USSR's permanent delegation there has requested
reservations for a 50-man delegation to participate in a con-
ference on Laos at the "beginning of May." The Soviet official,
in response to an inquiry regarding the level of Soviet repre-
sentation, replied that it would be "the same as at the disarma-
ment conference." Although the Soviet Union, in its 16 April
aide-memoire, said that it assumed the conference would be
conducted at the foreign ministers' level, Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Pushkin had indicated to the UK ambassador on 5 April
that the continuous presence of foreign ministers at the confer-
ence would be unnecessary. He said, however, that they should
attend the opening of the conference to mark its importance.
Meanwhile, a proposal by Prince Sihanouk that the confer-
ence on Laos be postponed to 12 May appears to be meeting with
general East-West approval.
aiorth of Luang Prabang, a Pathet Lao company skirmished
with government troops near Muong Sal on 20 April. According
to the American army attach�who visited Muong Sai on 18 April,
the local Lao army commanders appeared dispirited and were
convinced that an enemy attack was imminent. There were small-
scale clashes at several other points in Luane Prabang Province
on 21 April, govern-
ment forces on Route 13 north of the Phou Khoun road junction
were under "heavy attack" earlier today. In central Lao/
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aovernment forces have advanced about 18 miles east from
Thakhek along Route 12 without contacting the enemy. Two
Thai 105-mm. howitzer batteries have arrived in Savanna-
khet, plans call for moving one battery to Thakhek and holding
the other in reservq
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Situation in Angola
The area of the current disturbances is the source of
most of the coffee crop, which accounted for more than a
third of Angola's export earnings in 1960 and is the princi-
pal dollar earner for Portugal. Considerable coffee is
still on hand from previous crops as a result of Portugal's
commitments to the International Coffee Agreement, but an
American official�whose company recently shut down all
its oil exploration activities in the Cabinda exclave as a re-
sult of the unrest--believes the economy will run down as
soon as these stocks are exhausted...
The uncertainty over Angola's future is causing concern
in Lisbon over the stability of the escudo. Serious economic
deterioration in Angola might threaten the stability of the
Salazar regime.
Nationalists, most of them Communist oriented, from
Portuguese territories in Asia and Africa have been meeting
in Casablanca. The final resolution, adopted on 20 April,
announced that an organization will be set up in Morocco to
coordinate the activities of the various anti-Portuguese
groups. This organization appareAtly will supersede the
Conakry-based Revolutionary Front for the Independence
of the Portuguese Territories (FRAIN), which recently has
been weakened by factionalism and by an inability to obtain
international publicity. Holden Roberto's Angola People's
Union (UPA), which reportedly triggered the current
outbreak, is not affiliated with the new Morocco-based
organization.
The movement of additional troops from Portugal to
Angola is continuing, both by air and by sea. More than
12,000 troops, of whom more than 4,000 are white, are
now stationed in the province. Approximately 35,000
army troops remain in metropolitan Portugal. In addition,
about 8,000 troops. the bulk of them native, are stationed
in Mozambique.
-GONFIDENT-f-AL--
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Tshombe's Position Deteriorating in Katanga
Tshombets regime is threatened by a combination of
UN hostility and fading popular support. He has rejected
demands of his recalcitrant legislature that he share his
executive power with a premier, but it is doubtful that he
can continue his one-man rule indefinitely, aided only by
Belgian advisers.
Tshombes rule in northern Katanga has long been
threatened by hostile Baluba tribesmen, but until recently
he appeared to enjoy the support of most non-Baluba groups
in the south. Lately, however, there has been an increas-
ing reaction to Tshombe's extensive reliance on Belgians and
his employment of South African mercenaries in the ICatangan
armed forces. Popular dissatisfaction with prevailing low
wage levels has stimulated resentment against the Belgians,
who are felt to have monopolized highly paid positions.
Tshombe's difficulties are compounded by his bad rela-
tions with the UN, which recently airlifted Indian troops into
Katanga, One UN official predicted on 20 April that "a show-
down" between the UN and Tshombe was rapidly approaching.
A Belgian adviser to the Leopoldville government has
opined that Tshombd has become a liability for the Belgians
and that Brussels would take a "hard line" with him. Belgians
in Elisabethville reportedly are apprehensive concerning their
future there in view of renewed UN efforts to secure the with-
drawal of foreign advisers.
-GONFIDENTIAL-
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Japan Lifts Restrictions on North Korean Trade
aince 1955, Japanese trade with North Korea has been con-
ducted indirectly, principally through Hong Kong. The higher
transportation costs of this triangular trade have served to
limit the exchange of goods, particularly of bulk cargoes, such
as iron ore, coal, and minerals, which account for most of
North Korea's exports. North Korean - Japanese trade totaled
about $7,000,000 in 1960.
okyo has now placed this trade on a direct basis and in
effect has abolished the compulsory barter requirement--the
exchange of goods of equal value in each transaction--and sub-
stituted cash settlement. Hedging against possible US and
South Korean reaction, however, Japan has required case-by-
case approval for each trade contract concluded with North
Korean interest&
'dile Japanese Goyernment's action probably is in response
to a request by the Japan - North Korea Trade Association in
Tokyo. This organization in January negotiated an agreement
reportedly providing for the purchase of North Korean indus-
trial raw materials valued at $14,000,000, and for the sale of
Japanese products--bearings, bars� wire rope, auto-
mobile and tractor tires, wheat, and light manufacturing
t--amounting to $42,000,001/
Foreign
Minister Chong to support his representations to US officials
by arguing that the Japanese move is a violation of a 1950 UN
resolUtion against aid to North Korea and that it "will impede
the progress" of negotiations between Tikvo and Seoul for
over-all settlement of their differences
[Because of its own stake in maintaining commercial ties
with Japan, the South Korean Government is continuing prep-
arations_ for signing a new trade agreement with Toky_?)
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Lijowever, reaction in South Korea could be sufficiently severe
to force the Chang 11/1yon government to abandon this course in
favor of a tougher policy toward Japajg
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%we CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investrgation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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