CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026617
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 8, 1961

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8 March 1961
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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8 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in the Congo. (Rage t)
2. Laos: Vientiane troops in Phou Khoun road junction
area withdraw in face of aggressive probing actions
by Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. (Rge t)
3. France-Algeria. (Page tt)
4. Morocco: New King may press for early relin-
quishment of US military bases. (Page ti)
5.
UALI: Nasir invited to Mexico in September.
(Fage ttt)
6. Conclusions of Special USIB subcommittee on Berlin
Situation. Page tit)
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Banana Matadi
'Kona
Luanda
31594 D
INDONESIA
1,150
MOB UTU
7,200
ET 5.1F'
Leopoldville
Thysville
MALAYA
150
Gemena
1`5
Scattered Force _
MOBUTU
2,700
MORUTU
E01_ LATEUR
Coquilhatville �Boende
Scattered Forces
VU 1 E,
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasayubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Elj Tshombe
United Nations Forces
-Selected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTE MILES
Ike la
uluabourg
Bakw
400
Luputa
MOROC,G()
IRELAND
655
Buta
Ake] ORiEN
.0pala
Lodja
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
1,800
GIZENGA
7,000
NIGERIA
Kongolo
Albertville
NIGERIA
SWEDEN
680
TSHOMB
Elisa hyille
�Usurnbura
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Congo: Gizenga's statement of 7 March to an American
correspondent that he does not plan to attend the Tananarive
conference appears confirmed
With-
out Giienga's participation, the only significant result of the
conference probably will be a slight strengthening of the ties
between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. jn Leopoldville,
American and UN officials believe that there is little time re-
maining before inflation gets completely out of control, with
the consequent possibility of disorders in the hitherto quiescent
civilian population. Ambassador Timberlake reports that For-
eign Minister Bomboko and the UN commander, General McKeown,
met on 5 March and agreed on a number of measures to reduce
tensions between Congolese and UN troops, particularly in Ma-
tadi. Hammarskjold admitted to Ambassador Stevenson on 6
March that Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative in the Congo,
was unable to communicate with any Congolese leaders and in-
dicated that Dayal would not return to the Congo after his trip
to New York for "consultations" which is scheduled to take place
In a few days)
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
1,1}i)u
*Laos: (Information available as of 0400 EST) Vientiane's js,t
forcegTEMe Phou Khoun road junction area withdrew in the face
of aggressive probing actions initiated by Kong Le - Pathet Lao
forces on 6 and 7 March. Indications are that the enemy forces
had not planned a major attack, but were quick to capitalize on
the government's hasty withdrawal and may have gained at least
temporary control of the Phou IChoun road junction. General
Phoumi is making urgent plans to regain the lost ground, but the
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flgverninent forces
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Mere rerognieed by the U.S. Government.
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8 Mar 61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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reversal on this main front could have a serious impact on the
over-all morale of the Laotian Army, and points up the inade-
quacx of the army's leadership and lack of will to fight
an a recent discussion of the Laotian crisis with Ambas-
sador Trimble in Phnom Penh, Souvanna Phourna suggested a
course of action which he felt would obviate the need for an in-
ternational conference, provided both East and West agreed to
guarantee Laos' neutrality. Souvanna said he would submit� his
own resignation if the King replaced the Boun Oum government
with a caretaker government composed of civil servants which
would be responsible for preparing general elections. The elec-
tions would be supervised by an international commission, and
the countryside disarmed, except for police. Souvanna made it
clear, however, that he believes the eventual establishment of
a government of national union,. including the Pathet Lao, is es-
sential for Laos. Meanwhile, General Phoumi reports that he
will go to Phnom Penh on 9 March to confer with SouvannaD
(Backup, Page 2)
(Map)
*France-Algeria:CProspects for negotiations between the
French and the Algerian rebels now seem to depend on whether
agreement on a cease-fire can be reached. Premier Debre's
office has denied a 7 March press report citing sources close
to the government to the effect that a truce had been agreed on.
There have been recentindications, however, particularly in
connection with the De Gaulle - Bourguiba talks, that such an
agreement may be in the making. It would remove the last ma-
jor obstacle to direct political negotiations on an Algerian set-
tlement; (Backup,
Page 4)
co iL
Morocco: G_Cing Hassan II has apparently convinced him- 62.,/,-2)
self that the country has rallied around him and is showing no A-e-s-ti
indication of compromising with the demands of the leftis""t
DAILY BMEF ii
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6:atonal Union of Popular Forces for an elected constituent
assembly. There is indirect evidence that the new King is
considering the abolition of all political parties, possibly as
a maneuver to put pressure on the National Union, The King
also is endeavoring to capitalize on the unilateral French de-
cision made before his father's death to accelerate the closing
of five out of six air training schools in Morocco. Hassan is
likely to ask that the United States accelerate the relinquish-
ment of its bases, which is now scheduled to be completed in
196E (Backup,
Page 0)
Latin America - UAR�
resident Lopez Mateos "could receive President
Nasir" on a state visit between 4 and 8 September. Nasir has
also received invitations from Cuba and Venezuela and might
use the trip to visit other Latin American countries, particu-
larly Brazil. In January, President Quadros was said to be
interested in meeting with Tito, Nasir, and Nehru. Yugoslavia
has already accepted a Brazilian invitation for Tito to visit there
later in the year. Nasir may hope that his trip to Latin America
will nrecent an ormortimitv to viRit the United States
CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by
its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for
the period 7 February 1961 through 6 March 1961.
1. We are still in an interim period during which the USSR
Is intent on reaching an assessment of the new US administration
8 Mar 61
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and the possibilities of negotiating with the West on major is-
sues. Therefore, the USSR is unlikely to increase tensions
over Berlin at this time. However, should the Soviet leaders
at any time during this period calculate that additional pres-
sure would bring the West more quickly to high-level negotia-
tions with the USSR, they may increase the threat of unilateral
action in an� effort to expedite talks.
2. The Soviet memorandum of 17 February to Bonn, pub-
lished by the USSR on 4 March, was intended to remind the
West that the USSR still insists on an early solution of the Ber-
lin situation through negotiations. The memorandum reinforced
Khrushchev's earlier assertions that the USSR could not
agree to postponing discussions beyond the West German elec-
tions set for this September.
3. The East Germans have somewhat relaxed their imple-
mentation of controls of the Berlin intersector boundary without
altering their claims of sovereignty in this regard.
4. While maintaining trade with the West at the level of
previous years, East Germany has initiated some of the long-
range moves necessary to make its economy independent of
Western imports and thereby depri of this leverage
in future negotiations over Berlin.
8 Mar 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in the Congo
EHammarskjold stated that Makki Abbas of Sudan would
immediately be installed as the UN's acting representative in
the Congo and that Dayal would leave "this week." Continuing
tension in Matadi apparently has postponed Dayal's departure.
He continues to hold himself aloof from the Congolese;
cently he failed to turn up at a meeting with Foreign Minister
Bomboko, reportedly for fear that Bomboko "might make a
political attack on him .'D
LHammarskjold also plans to set up a Congo planning and
advisory group within the UN secretariat, composed exclusively
of Africans and Asians, Within a few weeks he hopes to send to
the Congo as his permanent representative either Adnan Pachachi
of Iraq or Robert Gardiner of Ghana, both of whom would be mem-
bers of the proposed group:)
According to the American Embassy in Leopoldville, the UN
Command has failed to provide leadership in the economic field
as a result of its preoccupation with political questions, coupled
with Dayal's ignorance of economic factors and his tactic of with-
holding budgetary support as a means of pressuring the Leopold-
ville government. Moreover, foreign aid furnished so far has
suffered from a lack of coordination as well as from inefficiency
and venality on the part of Congolese officials. UN financial ex-
perts in Leopoldville believe that the establishment of a flexible
fund under UN control is the only way to salvage the economic
situation, which apparently has not resulted in popular outbreaks
so far only because most of the population is not dependent on the
money economy. However, the population in Leopoldville, where
most of the working force is unemployed, is vulnerable to infla-
tion in basic commodities, and the UN economists believe out-
breaks will occur when the price spiral takes hold.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Situation in Laos
Souv nna.
has stressed
the urgency for a political settlement in Laos. Souvanna
told them that judging from the reception he had received
from the people during his visit to northern Laos he felt
the Communists could still be kept from dominating the
situation, but that time was growing short. He claimed
Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong--his half-brother�had
agreed with him that Laos should follow a policy of "Cam-
bodian-type s0c1a11sm.15
rSouvanna said his visit to North Vietnam had gone
well, and that he was pleased by the atmosphere he had
found in Hanoi. He claimed that Premier Pham Van Dong
and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap had told him that
North Vietnam and Communist China were content to see
"true neutrality" re-established in Laos, and that the
bloc's strong reaction against the United States had been
caused by "sure information" of American plans to devel-
op rocket-launching facilities in central Lao-iti
While Souvanna continues to be sanguine of his ability
to cbntrol the Communists, he seems to feel it necessary to
try to retain freedom of action,
on his return from a world tour, which he plans
to start this week end, he might establish himself in Phong
Saly. This province is largely controlled by Laotian forces
under Colonel Khammouane--a local strongman and sup-
porter of Souvanna Phouma--who apparently has succeeded
so far in getting the Communitt-supported Pathet Lao
forces to respect his "middle position.'
CBefore his recent trip to North Vietnam and Laos, Sou-
vanna made a similar proposal for a caretaker government.
He m y have discussed aspects of this plan with his Commu-
nist hosts and possibly found them receptive to the idea of
a general election as long as some supervisOry schem
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Gould be employed to ensure sizable Pathet Lao representa-
tion in the government and in the National Assembly)
the only feasible solution to the
Laotian crisis lies in an international conference which
would lead to the partition of the country "following the In-
dochina pattern." Bloc governments, however, have never
acknowledged partition as a possible basis for a Laotian
settlement. The bloc position is and probably will continue
to be that an international conference must be called before
any commission can be sent to Lao)
CCambodian officials, including Sihanouk, are inclicatinel
rowing anxiety over developments in Laos, and have
xpressed doubt as to whether Souvanna can still
the situation from the Communists.
Sihanouk now believes Souvanna has gone over to the
Pathet Lao side; Son Sann, personal adviser to Sihanouk on
foreign affairs, has expressed the same view
5-Soviet transports continue to be scheduled for airlift
operations into Laos. Since the arrival on 22 February of a
Soviet AN-12 at Hanoi, two others have flown to North Viet-
nam. The one which arrived at Hanoi on 22 February re-
portedly crashed and is apparently still there. One of the
last two to arrive has returned to the USSR and the third is
at Haiphong scheduled for Canton.
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Prospects for French-Algerian Negotiations
De Gaulle, ever since his pre-referendum speeches in
December, has been blurring his previous insistence on a
cease-fire as a precondition for negotiationsoale implied to
Bourguiba during their 27 February talk that there would be
no preconditions for talks, and Bourguiba conveyed this im-
pression to Abbas. The rebel leaders, however, were report-
edly confused whan a subsequent "authoritative" statement
from Paris reversed this position. Tunisian Information Min-
ister Masmoudi has alleged that members of Premier Debre's
entourage also made statements�published abroad, but not in
France--that a cease-fire must precede negotiations. Tuni-
sian officials, and probably the PAG, are said to have regarded
this as an attempt by "ultras" around Debre to jeopardize the
commencement of negotiations.
following discussions last
week between rebel premier Ferhat Abbas, Bourguiba, and
a high French official representing De Gaulle, the PAG agreed
to a cease-fire and would soon appoint representatives to dis-
cuss its implementation with the French. On 6 March Abdel-
kader Chanderli, PAG "delegate" to the UN, told US officials
in Washington that the PAG had proposed to the French that
both sides simply agree at the beginning of negotiations to stop
fighting, without entering into any formal agreemeni-.)
ourguiba had told De Gaulle that commencement of direct
French-PAG negotiations could not safely be delayed much
longer and should start by 20 March. Chanderli, however,
asserted, that Abbas and De
Gaulle will not meet until lower level--but official and formal--
negotiations have made substantial progres
Within Algeria, there are diverse elements on both sides
still capable of precipitating incidents that could either prevent
formal negotiations from beginning or jeopardize their success
once begun. De Gaulle is reported to have said that he could
scarcely imagine his reaction, if, while seated at a conference
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table with Abbas, an aide were to hand him a note saying that
French children had just been killed in Algeria by rebel ter-
rorists.
The Algerian National Liberation Army is estimated at
approximately 10,000 men within Algeria and is dispersed into
small bands difficult to control. Rebel terrorists, who have
acted semi-independently throughout the rebellion, may con-
sider that the Tunis-based PAG does not represent their in-
terests. There are also indications that the outlawed Algerian
Communist party now may be in a position to foment terrorism
designed to disrupt negotiations. Well-armed, die-hard Euro-
pean settlers are not now considered capable of threatening De
Gaulle's government without military support--which has seemed
increasingly unlikely. They could, however, especially in view
of the Moslem-European rift evident since the December riots,
create spectacular incidents which would antagonize the
and cause its leaders to question De Gaulle's good faith.
-"SECRET
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table with Abbas, an aide were to hand him a note saying that
French children had just been killed in Algeria by rebel ter-
rorists.
The Algerian National Liberation Army is estimated at
approximately 10,V00 men within Algeria and is dispersed into
small bands diffidult to control. Rebel terrorists, who have
acted semi-independently throughout the rebellion, may con-
sider that the Tunis-based PAG does not represent their in-
terests. There are also indications that the outlawed Algerian
Communist party now may be in a position to foment terrorism
designed to disrupt negotiations. Well-armed, die-hard Euro-
pean settlers are not now considered capable of threatening De
Gaulle's government without military support--which has seemed
increasingly unlikely. They could, however, especially in view
of the Moslem-.European rift evident since the December riots,
create spectacular incidents which would antagonize the PAG
and cause its leaders to question De Gaulle's good faith.
-SECRET--
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�SErettEcr�
Moroccan Political Situation
CKing Hassan II appears not to have made any progress
toward the formation of a broadly based government of na-
tional union and may have abandoned further moves in that
direction for the present. However, he is continuing his ef-
forts to ensure military control throughout the country. The
intelligence chief of the Moroccan Army has informed the
American military attache in Rabat that the territorial reor-
ganization of the army, under way since 1959, has been ac-
complished and the country divided into five military regions,
each commanded by an officer with a regional staff. The King's
younger brother, Prince Abdallah, may replace Hassan as
chief of staff, and General Ben Hamou Kettani, who recently
commanded the Moroccan troops in the Congo, may continue
operational control of the army-3
[Meanwhile, political maneuvering among various groups
and factions continues. A three .sided division of opinion has
developed within the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP).
An extremist faction headed by Labor Union Secretary General
Mahjoub Ben Seddik wants the UNFP to demand dissolution of
the rival right-wing labor group and abrogation of the decree
issued last October permitting the creation of other unions. A
second faction led by former Premier Alxlallah Ibrahim and self-
exiled Mehdi Ben Barka continues to insist on the early election
of a national constituent assembly, while a third group, led by
resistance leaders Abderrahman Youssefi and Mohamed el-Basri,
favors reconciliation with the conservative Istiqlal party from
which the UNFP split in 195971
CThe Istiqlal party, on the other hand, fearful that it may be
outdistanced by the UNFP's more dynamic program and leaders,
may be seeking an alliance with the tribal-based Popular Move-
ment and the small but well-entrenched Constitutional Demo-
cratic party, both of which along with Istiqlal are represented
in the present government
dstiqlal seized on Hassan's 5 March announcement of a "new
victory" in securing accelerated French evacuation to reiterate]
--SEC-REr-
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ItEr
Cyarious demands, including the "liquidation of American bases"
prior to the end of 1963 in order to achieve complete French
evacuation-:1
{French Ambassador Seydoux indicated to US officials on
6 March that France may attempt to remain at Kenitra for "an-
other year or so." are
reported to consider me recent transfer of some puu rench
military personnel from France's recently dissolved headquar-
ters in Rabat to Kenitra as seeking sanctuary in the "American-
controlled" base in an effort to keen the evacuation issue alive>
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-441.11!
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi'gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Di rector
CONFIDENTIAL
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