CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049780
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 5, 1961

vow �11J1F�JEV1ITC1� 3.3(h)(2)
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3.5(c)
5 May 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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SICRFTNINO
5 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page t)
2. Congo. (Page it)
3. France: Paris to maintain stand on independent nu-
clear force at 8-10 May NATO conference in Oslo.
(Page it)
4. France: Further JAEIC statement on fourth nuclear
test. (Page 'it i)
5. France-Algeria: De Gaulle believes complete army
reorganization needed; plans no cabinet changes at
this time. (Page tii)
6. Communist China: Evidence that Soviet technicians
have not returned to China. (Page iv)
7. India: Food-grain production reaches new high in
1960-1961. (Page tv)
8. Iran: Teachers' strike developing into popular dem-
onstrations against regime. (rage tv)
9. Ghana: Nkrumah extends direct personal control in
recent cabinet and party changes; strengthens more
radical elements. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: Procedures for formally establishing the cease-
fire Trios have not yet been agreed upon. General Phoumi e:/_c67P
has countered Souvanna's proposal that political and military
talks begin in Nam one on 5 May with a suggestion that the
talks be limited to military topics and that they be held in /, 2), 3,
neutral territory just above the Nam Lik.
Pha Lane, about 40 miles east of Savann-akhet, is 7
now in enemy hands. Aside from this development, there has
been little change on the major fronts, although there are con-
tinuing unconfirmed reports of Pathet Lao Qiuerrilila operations
in western Luang Prabang Province. I
1 raoviet airlift operations into Laos continu9
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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WTI
Pointe
NOV
Banana
4
Brazzaville
Kitona
610504 2
Matadi
Luanda
LIBERIA
200
INDIA
800
TUNISIA
3,200
NIGERIA
400
Bangassou
Gemena
Lisala
Scattered_For
MOBUTU
3 ,400
�Coquilhatville
MOBUTU
7, 200
Leopolthille
Thysville
ETHIOPIA
200
Scattered Forces
Bumba
MOBUTU
800
�Boende
Ikela.
.Port Francqui
uluabourg
Bak
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
ET Kasavubu-Mobutu
ri Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
Selected road
�tr� Selected railroad
=Selected airfield
not included)
STATUTE MILES 400
nga
� Bondo
Buta
Luputa
Ake!
Basoko
GIZENGA
7 000
MALAYA
470
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
1,500
tanleyville
Bukavu
Kindu
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
300
INDIA
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
�
Manono
TSHOMBE
7,000
isabethville
NIGERIA
ditel.Jsumbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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Congo: In Elisabethville, remarks by UN officials im-
plyinTimat the UN will not intervene on Tshombe's behalf may
have shaken the initial disposition of Tshombe's lieutenants
to cooperate with the UN. In Coquilhatville, the inconclusive
character of resolutions so far passed without the presence of
representatives of the Gizenga and Tshombe regimes may
stimulate new efforts, particularly by the army, to "encourage"
participation of Elifsabethville and Stanleyville representatives
in the conference.
gthanaian President Nkruman is aiarmed at casualties in-.
curred by Ghanaian troops in a clash with Congo Army forces
at Port Franqui, ancl
unless Ghanaian troops were reinforced
he would withdraw them from the Congo.
Although military operations have lately been on a reduced scale
there is a danger of new violence in northern Katanga, where a
Malayan force plans to disarm an unspecified numper of hostile
Katanga gendarmerie.)
ranct-NATo: Le_aris apparently inyenas tuipi Ubb sLrlizigiy
its argument for an iiiaependent French nuclear striking force
at the 8-10 May Oslo conference of NATO foreign ministers
and will certainly do so during President Kennedy's visit to
France 31 May - 2 June. The French deputy permanent repre-
sentative to the NAC advised his Foreign Ministry in a 12
April memorandum that French participation with the US and
UK in strategic nuclear planning for the alliance is the only
guarantee that Europe will not be "sacrificed" in a nuclear war,
and that such participation is unlikely unless France acquires
its own striking force. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville,
purportedly reflecting De Gaulle's personal views, told Ambas-
sador Gavin on 19 April that France considered it "unrealistic"
to assume that the US would initiate the use of strategic nu-
clear weapons "merely because Germany or France were be-
ing overrun," and that therefore France could not surrender
its responsibility for national defense "to NATO or anyone
else,23 (Backup,
Page 3)
5 May 61
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' France: 'Rhe Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
(JAETM�ssued the following statement on 4 Mazy:3
1. /The fourth French nuclear test, previously reported in
the JAEIC statement of 25 April 1961, was detected by one
acoustic station and by four electromagnetic stations of the
Atomic Energy Detection System as having occurred at the
Reganne Proving Ground at 0508Z on 25 April 1961, and had a
yield of 1/4-2KT. Radioactive debris from this test was in-
tercepted on 28 April 1961 and a preliminary analysis of this
debris indicated that the French test device utilized plutonium
as the fissionable materiag
2. IA report has been received that the French were test-
ing a prototype device of a weapon planned to be compatible
with the Mirage IV bomber and expected to yield 15 to 17
kilotons. They further reported that the yield was about 1 KT
and that the test was a failurej
3. Pthe Mirage IV bomber can accommodate a weapon
with a diameter of approximately 45 inches and a weight of
3,000-5,000 pounds. If the device tested were intended for
this bomber and failed to give the expected yield, it would in-
dicate that the French weapon development program is lagging
and/or encountering severe design probleaq
France-Al eria: De Gaulle
had been "surprised
and bitterly deceived" by the recent coup attempt in Algeria.
De Gaulle believes a complete reorganization of the French
Army and administrative security services is needed, and
said he is less upset by those who actively opposed him than
by "fence-sitting" officials who waited to see which side would
win out in the crisis. Contrary to numerous press stories, Lyuu
De Gaulle does not anticipate
making changes in nis cabinet at this tim
5.e Gaulle anticipates that negotiations with the Algerian
rebels will begin about 11 or 12 May, but professes pessimism
about the prospects of these negotiations because of divisions
within the rebel leadership. Describing tension among t12:9
5 May 61
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European settlers in Algeria as greater now than ever before,
De Gaulle questioned how long the Moslems will remain calm,
and indicated he feels new outbreaks of terrorism in both Al-
geria and France a5e probabC
n, 4,
CoMmum
hma - Ubbn:
While Sino-
Soviet trade talks were concluded with the signing of the an-
nual trade protocol on 7 April, discussions begun in Febru-
ary involving Soviet long-term assistance and technical aid
for China are still dragging on, and do not appear to be going
smoothly. Technicians are not likely to return unless some
position agreement is reached in these ta
-
India: A bumper rice harvest, combined with an increase
in other food-grain crops, has resulted in a new high in In-
dian food-grain production during 1960-61. While these re-
sults reflect in part New Delhi's strenuous efforts to expand
acreage and yields, the key factor appears to have been gen-
erally favorable weather. The average food-grain production
over the past three years nonetheless represents a gain of
about 42 percent over production a decade ago, thus more than
keeping pace with India's 22 percent population rise during the
same period. (Backup, Page 5)
Iran: The strike of government-employed teachers de-
manding higher pay which started in Tehran on 2 May is snow-
balling into larger popular demonstrations against the regime.
Large crowds were reported on 4 May to be demanding the
resignation of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami, and the army
has been called in to help maintain order. Employees of other
5 May 61
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f
government ministries are considering joining the demon-
strations. Communist sympathizers, who are strong in the
Ministry of Education, will welcome the occasion to harass
the government, although they did not instigate the strike.
*Army and police units are reported very much in evidence.
These forces have the capability of maintaining order, but the
degree of their loyalty to the government is uncertain. A
repetition of the violence which has already caused the deaths
of two teachers would further alienate the already considerable
body of moderate opinion, which is turning against the Shah.
packup, Page 6)
Ghana: Changes in government and party positions an-
nounc-iffIri Accra on 1 and 2 May represent the latest in a
series of moves by Nkrumah aimed at extending his direct
personal control over virtually all key governmental func- /�.
3-/xt 7Ri
tions and over the apparatus of the ruling Convention Peo-
ple's party. The changes apparently are motivated largely
by domestic considerations--especially Nkrumah's dissatis
faction over the pace at which Ghana's development programs
are being implemented--but also reflect frustrations he has
encountered in his pan-African policies. The cabinet re-
shuffle has weakened the regime's "old guard," and appears
to have strengthened younger and more radical elements,
many of whom are impressed by the social and economic
experiences of Communist countries.
(Backup, Page 7)
5 May 61
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Laos
a.lie political situation in Vientiane is becoming more un-
stable as a result of widespread disgruntlement within the gov-
ermental structure over the bleak military and political outlook.
Ambassador Brown, reports there is increasing dissatisfaction
among the armed forces and the National Assembly with the
Boun Oum Phoumi leadership. There is talk in local polit-
ical circles of a possible move by the deputies to bring about,
a change in the government when the assembly reconvenes on
11 May. Sihanouk's report that King Savang was planning a
shake-up on that date stemmed from a misunderstanding of
Savang's remark that the formation of a new government might
be discussed when the assembly reconvenes,
irSihanouk has notified the British and Soviet ambassadors
in hrTom Penh of his intent to stay away from the Geneva con-
ference. He is described as being in a highly emotional state,
feeling that he was insulted during his visit to Luang Prabang
and accused by King Sayan in so many words of meddling in
Laos' affairs. Sihanouk's agitation also reflects his serious
concern over .Cambodia's welfare as a result of Communist
gains in Lao_si
the 14-nation
conference on Laos e pos pone a wee or e days.
further time
would allow both Sihanouk and Kin Savang to be persuaded of
the value of the conference. L more time was also
needed to coordinate Western pc)sIno1s. In Bangkok, Thai For-
eign Minister Thanat Khoman has expressed the view that the
opening date of the conference will have to be postponed to enable
the ICC sufficient time to do its work and report to the co-
chairma9
North Vietnam announced on 4 May that its delegation to
the 14-nation conference had been appointed and would be led
by Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem.
the Chinese
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Communists are planning to send a sizable delegation.
three TU404's would fly from Moscow to Pei-
ping on 5 May and that these aircraft would be used by the
Chinese delegation to the conference in Geneva. A fourth TU-
104 is being held in reserve for the Chinese. While the Chi-
nese probably will not fill these airplanes to capacity, each
TU-104 is capable of carrying at least 75 passengers
/resident Diem and South Vietnamese military leaders,
at a 3 May meeting in Saigon, are reported to have decided
to form a task force of three infantry battalions and position
them on the Vietnamese-Lao border at Route 9 for possible
intervention in Laos. Some Vietnamese military elements in
civilian clothing have previously entered Laos to help repel
thP Communist forces
since Com-
.,
munist incursions into southern Laos osed a grave threat to
South Vietnam, the Diem government must take immediate
countermeasures. These included the possible dispatch of
Vietnamese troops into Laos along Route 9 as far west as
Muong Phine. this was the recommen-
dation of General Don, Vietnamese army commander of the
Second Military Region just below the 17th paralltg
rdeneral Phoumi is reported to have asked South Vietnam
on 1 May for help in stabilizing the situation in the Tchepone
area. As of 4 May, the former Laotian garrison at Tchepone
was still holding a defensive perimeter two miles southeast of
the town. At a minimum, Diem probably feels that the situa-
tion in Laos is sufficiently threatening to require troops on
the frontier to guard against rInggihl P Cnrnmunisf .ncursions
into Vietnamese territory-.7
5 May 61
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France Renewing Arguthents for Independent Nuclear Force
'aere were indications last year that De Gaulle intended
to "wait for a new US administration" before renewing his de-
mands for US nuclear assistance and tripartite strategy and
policy coordination. He reopened one of these subjects in his
11 April press conference when, after reiterating his familiar
argument against integration of French forces in NATO, he
sharpened his long-standing demand for tripartite Western
policy and strategy coordination in terms of the "necessity to
thoroughly clarify the question of the use of nuclear armaments
of both Western powers who possess them2'
trie Gaulle's views were elaborated on 19 April by Couve
de Murville, who told Gavin that he thinks "NATO"--and im-
plicitly a variety of related problems--will be the first item
of interest in the forthcoming talks between the French and
US presidents. According to Couve, NATO is unrealistic as
now conceived, particularly as regards the strategy of US
nuclear retaliation to save Europe from being overrun by the
Soviets. He said De Gaulle believes that in any major Soviet
attack Germany would be overrun and the "battle of Europe"
decided in France. Couve stated that the West would neces-
sarily use tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces but
would not use strategic weapons against the USSR unless the
latter first used them against the US. Therefore France has
concluded that "warfare under NATO auspices" would result
in the total destruction of western Europe. With this pros-
pect, Couve said any nation is "extremely reluctant" to give
responsibility for its own defense to anyone else, such as
SAC EU13.7
ambassador Finletter reported on 3 May that he had been
shown copies of French deputy permanent representative
Jurgensen's memorandum in connection with the latter's sum-
mary of what he expects to be the French position on military
matters at the Oslo conference. The memorandum's discus-
sion of the need for and ways of maintaining strategic nuclear
weapons in Europe described the idea of a multilateral NATO
deterrent as "not necessary," asserted that purely maritime
deployment of missiles is unsatisfactory, and argued that
therefore "possession by France on its territory of its own
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&clear strike force is in the interest of all western Europe."
The memorandum concluded that France must either "go it
alone" to acquire its own strike force, or must receive from
the US technical cooperation, both nuclear and missile, sim-
ilar to that given the UK. The memorandum hinted that if
this were provided, France's position in NATO would be more
cooperativg
Lin view of past French performance at North Atlantic
Pact sessions during periods of De Gaulle's efforts to assert
France's claims to a special position with the US and UK in
NATO, the French may criticize and stall in Oslo conference
discussions �primarily with the idea of laying the groundwork
for De Gaulle's talks with President Kennedy in Paris.
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CONFIDENTIAL Nai
Indian Food-Grain Production at New Highs for 1960-61
As a result, government food-grain stockpiles now amount
to nearly 3,000,000 long tons, the highest level since independ-
ence was attained in 1947. The program to build up these
stockpiles as a buffer against adverse weather in future years
is being aided substantially by New Delhi's purchases of Amer-
ican surplus agricultural commodities under the PL-480 pro-
gram.
The improved food supply situation will help the ruling
Congress party, facing elections in Orissa State next month
and nationally early in 1962. In addition, it will help the ca-
reer of Food and Agriculture Minister S. K. Patil, an ener-
getic Bombay politician who originally shied away from the job
because of the possible hazards to his ambitions. While he
now is in a position to capitalize on agriculture's successes
and has strengthened his party position by assuming several
key responsibilities for the 1962 elections, he must accelerate
the pace of food-grain production during the next five years.
The Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) calls for an addi-
tional increase in food-grain production--by more than 31 per-
cent over this year's 76,000,000 long tons�largely through im-
provement of techniques and extensive production and use of
chemical fertilizers. This food program is at the heart of the
Third Plan, and the importance of achieving its goals is em-
phasized by the fact that India's population--now about 438,000,-
000�has already exceeded the level expected for 1966 made
by Indian planners during preparation of the Second Five-Year
Plan in 1955.
�efftNFIDENTIAL-
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�sEeRET- Nome
Demonsi4 ciLLUIlb 1,11 Cd.D /II ainvilaat,y
khe present demonstrations are more serious than those
following the rigged parliamentary elections earlier in the
year�demonstrations which had been confined almost en-
tirely to university students and attracted little public sup-
port. The strike has been planned for some time and cli-
maxes a period of increasing teacher activity which has in-
cluded peaceful one-day strikes in Tehran and the provinces.
Prime mover in the teachers' activities has been Mohammad
Derakhshesh, chairman of the "Licentiates Society," who was
arrested on 1 May in an attempt to head off the strike. He
has since been released. The standard teacher's salary is
about $40 per month, little better than that of many common
laborers. The government budget for this year provides for
an additional $4,400,000 to raise salaries by 10 to 15 percent,
but the demonstrators now are demanding an even greater in-
crease. A probable further complication is Derakhshesh's
desire to demonstrate his influence with the teachers. His
rival for leadership of the teachers, who was government-
sponsored, was elected to parliame1.2g
rale schools and the bazaar are closed and there are
rumors that employees of the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Health, as well as bus and taxi drivers, may join
the strike. The antigovernment National Front is reported to
be debating whether or not to throw its support to the strikers.
The National Front will have an opportunity to turn out in force
on 5 May to attend the commemoration services being held on
the 40th day after the death of former Prime Minister Mos-
sadeq's finance minister,/
IThe army, unlike the police, is not trained in riot con-
trol, and further large demonstrations could lead to more
bloodshed. However, the willingness of the army to fire on
the demonstrators has not been tested; if it refuses, this would
probably mark the beginning of a precipitous decline in the
prestige and influence of the Sha_113
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CONFIDENTIAL Nad
Nkrumah Widens Personal Role in Ghana
President Nkrumah, who was endowed with far-reaching
executive authority under the republican constitution Ghana
adopted last July, announced in mid-February that he planned
to take over the secretary generalship of the Convention Peo-
ple's party (CPP) as of 1 May. al. the same speech he ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the "ideological deficiencies" of
many of his supporters and promised to strengthen the mech-
anism of the CPP)
Nkrumah's wider purpose and his dissatisfaction with in-
creasing intra-party bickering were brought into clearer focus
early last month in a major policy address calling for tighter
party discipline and the complete subordination under the CPP
of Ghana's labor, farmers, cooperative and women's organiza-
tion. At the same time, he demanded that members of parlia-
ment must either liquidate their private investments or resign,
and pledged, in unprecedentedly forceful fashion, to root out
the traditional evil of official corruption. In subsequent pub-
lic statements on 18 April and 1 May, Nkrumah announced
modifications in the government's structure and innovations
in the party apparatus--such as directing regional administra-
tive officers to act also as regional party secretaries�increas-
ing his own direct influence over the regime. He described his
campaign as a move to "put our house in order" in anticipation
of new phases of the pan-African movement abroad and the
"industrial and technical revolution" at home.
The American Embassy in Accra reports that these initi-
atives by Nkrumah have sharply accentuated differences in out-
look among ministers, and other party and government lead-
ers. This was particularly apparent during the week preceding
the announcement of the new government when a group com-
posed primarily of early Nkrumah supporters, many of whom,
such as Finance Minister Gbedemah and Agriculture Minister
Botsio, have acquired substantial personal holdings, waged a
better struggle against the radicals. The absence of any
dramatic personnel changes in the new cabinet indicates that
the older leaders apparently succeeded in forcing Nkrumah to
forego, at least temporarily, the sweeping changes which seemed
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CONFIDENTIAL
to have been in the offing. Nevertheless, both Gbedemah and
Botsio have had their powers curtailed while former Minister
of Social Welfare Quaidoo, who attacked the party and indirect-
ly Nkrumah in parliament on 25 April, has been dropped from
the cabinet entirely. The left wing's representation, mean-
while, has been strengthened by the inclusion of former CPP
secretary general Adamafio as minister of state for presidential
affairs.
CONFIDENTIAL
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k..11 V A .1.11.011.11V .L
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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