CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000189
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 7, 1961

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7 February 1961
Lopy No. L. 78
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TevsEc-RET
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7 February 1961
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS N
1. USSR: Criticism in Soviet press of certain passages in
President's State of the Union message represents no ,1
significant departure from Soviet propaganda line since k
the inauguration. (Page' t) k.
2. USSR: Assignment of presidium member Averky Aristov k..\
as ambassador to Poland appears to be a demotion. (Page 9
3. Laos: Government forces are preparing to put into effect
plans for recapture of Plaine des Jarres. (Page it)
4. Congo: Britain, France, and Belgium now express reser-
vations concerning the neutralization proposals. (Page tt)
5. Burma: General Ne Win has apparently staved off a po-
tential challenge to his control of the army. (Page tit)
6. Iran: The Shah has reportedly issued new instructions to
his prime minister not to be "totally antagonistic" toward
the USSR. (Page ttt)
7. Angola: Portuguese authorities can at present probably
contain any further disorders, but African nationalist
strength is expected to increase. (Page tti)
8. Western Europe: The Common Market leaders meet on
10 February to discuss confederation. (page iv)
9. Brazil: Quadros orders establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and calls for
new evaluation of Brazil's relations with Taiwan, (page iv)
10. Colombia: Pressure from right-wing political groups to
break relations with Cuba. (Page tv)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
� USSR: Moscow's first critical comments on the Pres-
ident's State of the Union message appeared in authoritative
articles in Izvestia and Pravda on 4 and 5 February. Hav-
ing permitted publication of the full text of the address, the
Soviet leaders probably felt those passages dealing with the
bloc and specific East-West issues called for a critical re-
sponse. Both articles contained a general criticism of the 7t)
address for repeating "cold war echoes" and for "failing to
renounce old, worn-out ideas." The main criticism was di-
rected against the defense measures announced by the Pres-
ident and the statements on arms control which Izvestia de-
scribed as avoiding the questions of "effective disarmament."
Both Pravda and Izvestia attacked the statements on the as-
pirations of world Communism and the references to the sit-
uation in Cuba. The articles, however, do not represent a
significant departure from general Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean propaganda since the inauguration, which has main-
tained a cautious and skeptical annronnh thwarrl +bra TTQ
1/4relind.n party issued orders to district newspapers
on 31 January to emphasize "positive" aspects of the address
but "without fostering any' illusions about future American
policy." (Backup, Page 1)
USSR: The assignment of Averky Aristov, a full mem-
ber oTtn�he party presidium since 1957, as ambassador to
Poland deprives him of a place in the Kremlin inner circle.
Although still formally a member of the presidium, Aristov
has lost his key post as Khrushchev's deputy in the central
committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic (RSESR), which
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supervises party affairs in the USSR's largest republic. Com-
pared with some other Soviet republics, the RSFSR had a
satisfactory agricultural year in 1960 and there has been no
Indication of executive failures on Aristov's part. His demo-
tion appears to be the outcome of a competition for authority
among Khrushchev's lieutenants. His removal from the
RSFSR post, in which he has been replaced by a newcomer
to the central command, appears likely both to strengthen
the grip of Frol Kozlov, as Khrushchev's principal party aide
on the RSFSR party organization and to enhance the position
of Dmitry Polyansky, the RSFSR premier.
(Backup, Page 3)
Laos:Lgovernment forces are preparing to put into ef-
fect Fail for the recapture of the PlainP ripq Jarres.
the troois toea
t-vainiiLLeu are aaequate tor their mission.
The Pathet Lao radio has broadcast a statement attrib- cA-
2_,,
uted to the "legal government of the Laotian kingdom" warn-
ing that if the United States and Thailand do not stop their /
"overt armed interference" in Laos, the "government" would.
be "obliged to appeal for help from friendly countries." The
statement, signed by "acting premier" Khamsouk Keola and
others claiming to be acting in behalf of the Souvanna "gov-
ernment" in Xieng Khouang, was dated 2 February, the same
day that Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi an-
nounced in Peiping that his government was prepared to give
aid if requested. (Backup, Page 4)
(Map):3
Cong,o:L13'ritain, France, and Belgium have now expressed
reservations concerning Hammarskjold's recent proposals that
the Congolese Army be neutralized. The British believe that
the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu
and that his position would be undermined if the troops in the
Leopoldville area were disarmed. French and Belgian rep-
resentatives have also stated that the proposal would bej
7 Feb 61
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Getrimental to ICasavubu's legal position, and might result
in the early restoration to power. of Lumumba.
(Backup, Page 6D
Burma:CGeneral Ne Win appears to have staved off a
potential Eallenge to his control of the Burmese Army. On
3 February, he reportedly accepted the resignation of Brig-
adier Maung Maung, as well as the resignations of several
other senior, officers, and ordered five of Burma's 13 bri-
gade commanders to attach�osts abroad. These actions
would eliminate those who have argued most strongly for a
resumption of military government and against P ' -
ister Nu's policy of rapprochement with Peiping-.1
(Backup, Page 7)
' Iran: he Shah is reported to be discouraged by elec-
tion difficulties, problems in Iranian-Soviet relations, and
egb-jti-'
uncertainty over future American policy toward Iran,..D The
fear of resurgent nationalists has led him to impose almost
complete control over the current parliamentary elections. Iv 3
This in turn has brought an increase in antiregime activity
of nationalist groups. While the Shah has given earlier as-
surances to the United States that he would not make any
significant political concessions to the USSR, he has in-
structed his prime minister not to be "totally antagonistic"
toward the USSR but to find out what the Soviet Union would
be willing to do for Iran'03
(Backup, Page 8)
e t---
*Angola; Although Portuguese authorities in Angola reacted d-'--e-t
quickly and firmly to the outbreaks of nationalist rioting in Lu-,e0-42- _,
anda on 4 and 5 February, disorders and gunfire are reported .A.,----4 7,
to have broken out again early this morning. The government -/P
will probably be able to control the situation, but, despite A.0---1-
heavy government repression, nationalism is likely to be-
come a si nificant force over the next few years.
(Backup, Page 9)
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Western Europe: De Gaulle, Adenauer, and the four
other heads of government of the European Common Market
countries are due to meet in Paris on 10 February to dis-
cuss De Gaulle's plan for a six-nation European "confedera-
tion," and other measures proposed to strengthen Western
European unity. Avowed opposition to the De Gaulle pro-
posals has abated in the last six months, although there is
still concern over De Gaulle's suspected desire to establish
a French-led continent as the basis for advancing French
national interests. A preliminary Adenauer - De Gaulle
meeting is scheduled for 9 February.
(Backup, Page 11)
Brazil: President Quadros has ordered his foreign min-
ister to take immediate steps toward establishing diplomatic
relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; to cancel
the credentials of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplo-
matic representatives, and to initiate an evaluation of Bra-
zil's present relations with Taiwan. Quadros was probably
motivated partly, by a desire to assert his government's in-
dependence in foreign affairs and partly by a desire to con-
ciliate leftist-nationalist groups in anticipation of their dis-
satisfaction with "harsh" economic recovery measures that
may follow. Negotiations with the USSR may also be under
way, as reportedly stated by a member of the Chamber of
Deputies on 3 February. Brazil has long had diplomatic
' with Czechoslovakia and Poland.
(Backup, Page 13)
Colombia: Pressures for a diplomatic break with Cuba
have been increased by a demand of the right-wing faction
of the Conservative party for such action and by charges that
Cuban agitation may be partly responsible for the rising vio-
lence in rural areas. The Colombian Communist party is
reported to be making plans for demonstrations against US
business and diplomatic establishments if Colombia does
break relations with Cuba. (Backup, Page 14)
7 Feb.61
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Soviet Press Criticism of President's State
Of the Union Address
The critical tone of "Observer" articles in Pravda and
Izvestia and of a commentary on the State of the Union mes-
sage by the Soviet weekly Life Abroad probably is designed
to convey the impression that the Soviet leaders believe the
US has failed to respond adequately to their initial overtures
for improving Soviet-American relations. Bloc spokesmen
have taken a similar line in private conversations by stress-
ing that the next move is up to the US. Izvestia comments
that although the President's message reflected a "passing"
awareness of the crucial stage in international relations, the
US must now draw the "appropriate conclusions?' Pravda
cautions, however, against any judgment of US policies on
the basis of the "first steps" and asserts that only "the near
future" will tell whether the new administration intends to
embark on a new course in US foreign policy.
The propaganda pattern developed by the USSR and the
European satellites since the inauguration features relatively
factual coverage of statements by US officials, some indica-
tions of optimism over future Soviet-American relations, and
a generally skeptical over-all tone. This combination reflects
the conflicting pressures on the Soviet leaders to create a fa-
vorable climate for the advancement of their objectives through
negotiations with the West, on the one hand, and to maintain
bloc unity on the other, by avoiding an overly favorable esti-
mate of US intentions which might intensify the dispute with
the Chinese Communists. Such an approach suggests that Mos-
cow will continue to take a conciliatory position on the official
level in such matters as the release of the RB-47 crew mem-
bers and the agreement to postpone the resumption of talks on
banning nuclear tests. At the same time, the Soviet leaders
will probably feel compelled to respond critically to statements
by US officials on the bloc's international posture and on spe-
cific East-West issues. In contrast to the Izvestia editorial of
4 February, the Soviet note on the same date, agreeing to a
postponement of the Geneva talks, omitted the standard Soviet
position that the USSR preferred to expedite matters and was
agreeing only as a concession to the US. Instead Moscow noted
the US desire to reach a successful conclusion to the talks.
The continued caution in commenting on the new TTS aehninis-
tration
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�bwil SECRET %ad
district newspapers to stress the President's ref-
erences to disarmament and coexistence, but called atten-
tion, "in contrast to these positive tendencies," to the Pres-
ident's statements on US defense policy, his alleged disap-
proval of "peoples' fighting for their independence," and
his "interpretation of the freedom of the East European
countries as the hope of American policy." The commis-
sion commented that the President's line on Eastern Europe
"would signify the practical continuation� of a policy which
could offset the favorable beginning of a relaxation of ten-
Sions on the part of the United States."
Sala.
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�airl CONFIDENTIAL
� Soviet Party Leader Demoted
Averky Aristov as early as October 1952 had worked
his way into the inner party circle around Stalin, but he
lost out in the shake-up in March 1953 following Stalin's
death and was exiled to a remote provincial post. He was
recalled to Moscow in 1955 as a party secretary and in
June 1957, when Khrushchev won his victory over Malen-
kov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, was again made a member
of the ruling party presidium. By December 1958 he had
become Khrushchev's only deputy on the important party
Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian Republic), which supervises
party affairs in the Soviet Union's largest republic. In the
May 1960 reshuffle of the Soviet top leadership Aristov, in
what now appears to have been a prelude to his current de-
motion, was relieved as party secretary "to devote full time
to his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau."
� Aristov continued active in RSFSR affairs through last
fall, and the RSFSR was credited at the recent party central
committee plenum with relative success in the agricultural
field as compared with other republics. There have been no
signs of dissatisfaction with his work on the RSFSR Bureau.
His demotion to the post of ambassador in Warsaw ap-
pears to be the outcome of competition among IChrushchev's
lieutenants. The removal of Aristov from Moscow appears
to strengthen the authority of party secretary Frol Kozlov,
apparently marked to succeed Khrushchev in the event of the
latter's death or disability, and to give RSFSR Premier Dmitry
Polyansky a dominant voice in that republic's affairs. Polyan-
sky has been increasingly in the public eye, visiting the prov-
inces and acting as principal spokesman for the republic, and
he may have resented sharing authority with Aristov.
Gennady Voronov, one of the new candidate members
elected to the party presidium at the central committee ple-
num in January, replaced Aristov as deputy chairman of the
RSFSR Bureau. As a newcomer, he probably will be in no
position to challenge Polyansky's authority in the RSFSR.
Petr Abrasimov, who had been ambassador to Warsaw
since September. 1957, was recalled last week. On his
farewell visit he told US Ambassador Beam that he was re-
turning to a ministerial job or to "party workided
that his successor had not been chosen.
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,EBRIJARY 1961
Government forces
Government
Antigovernment
Antigovernment concentrations
Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces
Main route number
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Trail
Chinese Nationalist Irregulars
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DEMARCATION LINE
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Situation in Laos
The Pathet Lao radio announced on 4 February that the
"legal (Souvanna Phouma) government" and the Pathet Lao had
established a joint "administrative committee" for Luang Pra-
bang Province. This brings to three the number of provinces
nominally under "joint" administration by elements claiming
to be acting in behalf of the Souvanna "government" and the
Pathet Lao. Sam Neua Province has been under Pathet Lao
control since last September, and a coalition provincial gov-
ernment was established in Xieng Khouang last month, short-
ly after the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces captured the Plaine
des Jarres and Xieng Khouang town.
Phong Saly Province may be the next to receive an "admin-
istrative committee" in the continuing elaboration by the Kong
Le - Pathet Lao forces of the legal and administrative mantle
with which they are cloaking their drive to gain control of Laos.
Colonel Khamouane, the provincial strong man of Phong Saly,
has been sitting on the fence in the struggle between the Kong
Le - Pathet Lao forces and the Boun Oum government, but he
may be induced to throw in his lot with the antigovernment
movement�particularly now that the Souvanna "government"
in Xieng Khouang has been given more apparent substance
with the designation of Khamsouk Keola as "acting premier."
The Boun Oum government's symbolic take-over of the
French-held Seno base near Sa,vannakhet apparently proceeded
without incident,dlespite prior indications that clashes might
arise between the French garrison there and Laotian Army
elements3 Although the French offered no resistance to Vien-
tiane's action, Paris refuses to recognize the legality of the
move; Send's status may become the subject of protracted
negotiations between Laos and France. French Ambassador
Falaize has acted with restraint in the face of General Phou-
mi's various anti-French moves in the past six weeks; how-
ever, feelings are becoming increasingly bitter between Vien-
tiane government officials and local French, and incidents
could occur at any time.
� Soviet airlift operations into Laos continue to be sched-
uled. CA recently recovered shell casingl
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vaoi
Gndicates that the Pathet Lao are in possession of Soviet 85-
mm. guns. The casing, recovered at Phou Khoun by a US
PEO adviser on 4 February, had Russian markings and was
tentatively identified as an 85-mm. high-velocity type. This
Is the first indication that the Pathet Lao have been supplied
with this weapon, although they are known to have 105-mm.
artillery pieces and 120-mm. mortar
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�fteri =LAC, Ago'
Conga Situation
LA British Foreign Office official has indicated that Brit-
ain has some reservations concerning the recent United
States initiative in the Congo. The American Embassy in
London believes that the British will ask for a further re-
view of the proposals before they are willing to support them.
Representatives of the French and Belgian governments have
also raised questions concerning the plan.3
CThe British believe that the military situation in the
Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would
be compromised by a neutralization of the Congolese forces,
as the United States plan suggests. Moreover, they question
whether Kasavubu will accept the plan and doubt that many
UN members would be willing to make the necessary sacri-
fices to carry it out if it is accepted. They reportedly favor
a more gradual approach to the problem, waiting to bring
forward the proposals at least until the end of February, when
the UN's conciliation commission is scheduled to publish its
report. The commission, which is now completing its inves-
tigations in the Congo, is expected to make a report generally
favorable to Kasavubu and the moderates-3
Nehru, in a conversation with the US ambassador in New
Dellif, welcomed the new plan and expressed complete agree-
ment with many of its elements. He reiterated, however, his
belief that political prisoners, including Lumumba, should be
released earlier than new proposals envisak-e3
Meanwhile, Mobutu appears to be planning a military op-
eration against Gizenga's forces. He stated recently that he
had reports of disaffection among Gizenga's troops in eastern
Kivu Province and that he was ready to move into the area in
the near future. Preparations for the move apparently are be-
ing made with the assistance of Mobutu's Belgian military ad-
visers. However, any operation will be hampered by logistics
difficulties and by the unreliability of Mobutu's troops.
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%ftio' toed
.Burme,se Army Shake-up
Lin his purge of senior officers in the Burmese Army,
Ne Win considered the advantages accruing to Burma through
the Sino-Burmese border demarcation to outweigh the liabil-
ities imposed by Nu's ineffectual administration and rapproche-
ment with Peiping. Some of these officers were his strongest
supporters during his 18-month military government. Brig-
adier Aurig Shwe, commander of the southern military region,
is one of Ne Win's proteges and has been considered a counter-
weight to the political and military ambitions of Deputy Chief
of Staff Brigadier Aung Gyi. Colonel Tun Sein, although not
considered a policy maker, has been one of Burma's most ef-
fective field commanders and administrators. Brigadier Mating
Maung, whose resignation was announced earlier, has been one
of Ne Win's closest advisers. All others ousted have held re-
sponsible army commands:3
Ne Win
acted on information that the officers involved, other than
Maung Maung, were planning to oust him from command and
to stage a coup d'etat during the current commanding officers'
conference. As has been his practice where the integrity and
unity of the army are at stake, Ne Win acted with finality and
the affected officers have little hope of appeal:3
ENe Win's army shake-up does not rule out the possibility
of an eventual military move against U Nu. Ne Win's patience
with the civilian government has been reported wearing thin
and, when the border demarcation is completed, he may ac-
tually oust Nu. He probably would not take such action, how-
ever, unless he was convinced of popular support for the move:3
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Nage
Iran -Ma Improve Relations With USSR
The Shah feels that there has been some change in Soviet
policy toward Iran and that Tehran now should take a more
moderate attitude toward the USSR. Prime Minister %aril-
Ernarni will head a good-will mission to Moscow, probably
In April. The Rah has been anxious to end the barrage of
hostile Soviet propaganda which, after a four-month lull, has
intensified in recent weeks. The propaganda, keyed to cor-
ruption in the current Iranian parliamentary elections, prob-
ably has found a wide and sympathetic audience in urban areag13
(Nationalist groups, long quiet, have made a display of
strength in protest against the rigged elections. Progovern-
ment groups, on the other hand, have attracted little popular
Interest. Antigovernment demonstrations by students drew
large crowds at the university in Tehran, and on 5 February
the students succeeded in closing the bazaar. Classes have
now been suspended at the university. Demonstrations are
drawing fewer participants in the face of strong, but so far
apparently bloodless, police action}
[The government's official line is that the nationalist ac-
tivity is Communist inspired. The extent of Communist par-
ticipation is unclear, but the more extreme nationalists are
probably cooperating with lopal Communists. Sbarif-Emami
has deplored the fact that extremist elements gained the
upper hand and that the moderates, whom he was encourag-
ing, refused to take any part in the elections. He hopes to
be able to control nationalist activity by normal police methods,
but the Shah has ordered the army to take action if the police
appear to be wavering. The army, untrained in riot control,
might unwittingly precipitate a clash that would give the na-
tionalists martyrs for their cause
[The Shah frequently alternates between periods of confi-
dence and depression. Basically weak and insecure, he has
attempted in recent years to imitate his father's strong ap-
proach. In these periods of uncertainty he is apt to make a
rash move similar to that of two years ago when the Soviet
Union was invited to discuss a nci)naggression paPt3
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Ito
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Disorders in Angola
Authorities in Lisbon attribute the disorders in Angola
to the "subversive plan" of General Delgado and Enrique
Galvao,
that pamphlets of the Iberian Liberation Movement were
found on some of the 100-odd Africans taking part in the as-
sault on central police headquarters, the civil jail, and the
military jail. the attackers were armed with pistols
and managed to take possession of two machine guns belong-
ing to the police as well. Three Europeans involved in the
disturbances were believed captured.
Official allegations of Communist involvement remain
unsubstantiated. ) The Communist-influ-
enced Movement of the People for the Liberation of Angola
--one of the two known Angolan nationalist movements�ap-
parently had no such plans as of 28 January. On that date
its office in Leopoldville queried headquarters in Conakry
about the organization's position in the Santa Maria affair
and an measures in connection with Angola.
Nationalists in Angola probably hoped to capitalize on
the world publicity concerning the Santa Maria incident and
the presence of a dozen foreign journalists in Luanda to dram-
atize resistance to Portuguese rule. These disorders have
been the most serious to occur in recent years in Angola,
but opposition to the Portuguese is unlikely to be effective
unless it is supported by significant elements of the military
and police. Portugal has been reinforcing its troops in the
province since the Congo's independence last summer, and
now has about 10.000 army troops and several thousand po-
lice , there.
Most African agitation has occurred along the northern
border, where as recently as 27 January, according to the
governor general's report to the overseas minister in Lisbon,
natives were claiming allegiance to President Kasavubu of
the Congo and might have to be subdued by force. The Angola
administration has also been trying to curtail the smuggling
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'eed Nary
of arms from Congo sources across this northern border.
Such smuggling is probably now being carried out on a lim-
ited basis but might in the future become a significant factor
in the development of Angolan nationalism.
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%Ilsod drA-rtr, New
Common Market Leaders Prepare to Discuss
"European Confederation
e Gaulle's plan for a European "confederation" was
first advanced to Adenauer in mid-1960 and has been the
subject of numerous bilateral exchanges since. The plan
has never been committed to writing, but in general it calls
for the establishment of ministerial-level committees to pro-
mote six-nation cooperation in political, cultural, economic,
and defense affairs, probably to be serviced by a permanent
political secretariat. In addition, there would be periodic
meetings of heads of government
When initially proposed, the plan evoked strong opposi-
tion rom most of the other EEC countries, partly on the
grounds that it would weaken the supranational powers of ex-
isting European Community institutions and would involve a
major departure from the eventual goal of a federally organ-
ized Europe. This opposition has moderated considerably
In recent months, however, partly because of apparent as-
surances from De Gaulle that the EEC would not be weakened,
and partly because even ardent federalists like Jean Monnet
have come to feel that confederation is at present the only
feasible approach to political unity. Others evidently also
feel that if the Six accepts parts of De Gaulle's plan, he might
be persuaded to agree to simultaneous steps to strengthen
Community institutions-;\
Continuing opposition was demonstrated, however, in a
Dutch request on 31 January that the US issue a "strong state-
ment" prior to the 10 February meeting in "support of NATO."
The Dutch expect De Gaulle to argue that the US will "inevi-
tably leave the Continent" and will accordingly press for "for-
malization of political consultations among the Six"--which,
the Dutch feel, will be "divisive in NATO
_he 10 February meeting was initially scheduled for 5
December but postponed because of Adenauer's illness. The
private meeting between Adenauer and De Gaulle on the pre-
ceding day is expected to set the tone of the plenary talks,
and the Dutch believe Adenauer will join in urging definite
action at the 10 February session. While there is dout...9
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NIS SCA.;KM. ymisof
jhat concrete decisions will be reached, the concept of fre-
quent top-level meetings of the Six may be endorsed and some
kind of committee set up to prepare a detailed agreement.
From this could emerge serious discussions of various ap-
proaches to closer political ties in the Community to match
the degree of economic integraion which is rapidly being
achieve413
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*iv" TOIVIDENT-1-A-L�
Brazilian President Orders Expansion of Relations With
Soviet Bloc
During his election campaign Brazilian President Janio
Quadros promised to expand trade and diplomatic relations
with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Brazil maintains diplomatic re-
lations only with Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose lega-
tions were raised to embassies shortly before President
Kubitschek's term expired. In his acceptance speech on 31
January, Foreign Minister Arinos stated that Brazil intends
to "establish diplomatic and commercial relations with all
states of the world that desire pacific interchange with us,
with respect for our juridical and social organization....
This orientation cannot and ought not to be interpreted as
directed against anyone."
There has been growing speculation that Brazil would
renew diplomatic relations with the USSR--which Brazil
broke in 1947. Vice President Goulart may have discussed
the matter when he visited Moscow unofficially in December
1960. Direct trade with the USSR was initiated last year
after the two countries signed a trade agreement in Decem-
ber 1959. Trade with the Soviet bloc amounted to 4 percent
of Brazil's total trade in 1959 and by 31 August 1960 had
reached 5. 3 percent. Former President Kubitschek's devel-
opment program attracted considerable interest within the
bloc, and the eventual fulfillment of outstanding contracts
for industrial and other goods may increase bloc participa-
tion in Brazil's trade.
�eefsiFfEtENTIAL-
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`Pr
Colombia Ma reak Relations With Cuba
Colombian-Cuban relations have been strained for over
six months, and the two countries do not now exchange am-
bassadors. President Alberto Lleras may be forced to a
formal break of diplomatic relations in the near future be-
,use of increasing pressure from both factions of the Con-
servative party and a majority of thel Liberal party, as well
as from the right and moderate press, business circles,
and Colombia's influential labor organization, the Confed-
eration of Colombian Workers,
President Lleras, who is a former secretary general
of the OAS, apparently opposes such action since he fears
it might jeopardize Colombia's chance to mediate or lead
In solving the Cuban problem and because he prefers multi-
lateral action0
armed
banditry has increased greatly and that "It Is thought there
has been intervention by Castro agents,," Previously reported
intervention includes dissemination of Cuban and Communist
propaganda, smuggling arms to sympathetic guerrilla bands,
and training pro-Castro Colombians in guerrilla warfare
tactics.
Rural violence�springing mainly from a complex of agrar-
ian grievances, regional rivalries, and sharp party antago-
nisms�has cost the lives of over 250,000 people in the past
13 years--over 2,600 last year. Its recent upward swing is
Increasing tension at local levels between the political parties
which make up the National Front coalition government.
Latin American nations which have either broken or sus-
pended relations with Cuba are Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Paraguay. The status of
Cuban - El Salvadoran relations is not clear.
TOP SECRET
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.-dl S it& iL
11111110i *111110
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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:/ "4('13