CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/24
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03172680
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U
Document Page Count:
16
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August 14, 2020
Document Release Date:
August 27, 2020
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Publication Date:
April 24, 1961
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%IT ZIMMG I
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Nall
24 April 1961
Copy No. C c.q '1
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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V /
24 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. French military insurgent control spreading. (Page t)
2. Situation in the Congo. (Page VI)
3. Situation in Laos. (Page it)
4. Cuba: Swiss Embassy in Havana believes situation
graver than can be seen from outside. (Page ti)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*France: (Information (Information as of 0430 EST) French military 0 k
insurgent control has been extended to most of Algeria and
government fears that the insurrection will spread to metro-
politan France have increased. a. relatively small insurgent/4,27
force could seize the centers of power in Paris and there is?i,/
doubt that regular security and police forces in France could4�
be relied on for active opposition to French army unitQ The
government's claim on 23 April that a paratroop attack on Par'ci
from Algeria was imminent and its arming of some civilian ("7
volunteer defenders were probably intended primarily to galf
vanize public sentiment against the insurrection and demonstrt j9 �
to the army De Gaulle's widespread popular backing. Never-
the less. an early army move against Paris remains possib
307o
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P (zing Sa I y
IPHONG SALY es3/4;
" vor
.....4Dien Bien Phu
/
s
4
NAM%ITHA �* \'
% I
Nam Bac I -%
/!Auong Sai
S1 Neual
LUANG1PRABANG� (-(
AM NEUA
Luang Prabang
4/-?
X I E
:KHOUtnNG
-MuOn) - Ban
SAYABOURY
NORTHERN LAOS
-1
GOVERNMENT Forces n
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
41110 i
KONG
LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
--TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
9i610424 2
50
. 1
STATUTE MILES
ou Khoun
.-)Ban Phalk
v Mg%
100
I
?Cieng Khouan
Ban Ta.Viang
Tha Thom
Vang Vieng -
Borikhaa$,,
Pak Sane .3
VIENTIANE
Vientiane
Kam Keut
k &in
t
1 KHAMM UANE
Nhommar t
,..
Thnkhek
tAahaxayi ,
S'avannakhet
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tiks
�if,- � A
�.7
ii
Congo: In the follow-up constitutional talks which are
scheduled to begin today at Coquilhatville in Equateur Prov-
ince, President Kasavubu and Congolese factions represented
in the Leopoldville government appear determined to press
Tshombe to agree to a tighter federal structure for the Congo
than envisaged at Tananarive, c_rshombe's personal position
has weakened significantly since the March conference, and
he is also under increasing pressure from Brussels to adopt
a less provocative attitude toward the UN Representatives
of the Stanleyville regime are not expected to attend the
Co uilhatville talks.
(Page 3) (Map)
Laos: akhe government stronghold of Vang Vieng on Route
13 hTsTheen taken by Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. Vang
fall followed a well-coordinated enemy offensive both north and/4"
south of Phou Khoun junction. Government troops to the north -
of Phou Khoun fell back initially but, according to subsequent
reports, rallied to retake their lost positionq /P4i �cit,
ahe Soviet request that the issuance of a cease-fire appealle,_/
invitations to a conference, and an approach to Nehru on reacti-4/ h7'
vating the ICC be delayed until today apparently was intended to
give Chinese leaders time to talk with Souvanna Phouma, who
arrived in Peiping on 22 Aprilg
The scheduling of Soviet transports for flights into Laos
was resumed on 23 April. No airlift sorties into Laos were
noted on 22 April. (Page 5) (Map)
Cuba: The Swiss Embassy in Havana has reported that a 6
large part of the population there is armed and in a fanatical
mood and that massacres could occur if passions continued to2,1
/pot �
rise. A number of American citizens have sought Swiss pro-
tection, and the Swiss are consulting the Canadian and Britis
ambassadors on the possibility of negotiating the Americans'
evacuation. The report, passed to the US Embassy in Berna.
on 22 April, noted that the situation in Cuba is graver than canZ.,
24 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
1. TOP SECRET
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5/
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be seen from outside. Several hundred American citizens
elected to remain in Cuba after the United States severed di
lomatic relations with the Castro regime last January.
1
Unconfirmed reports received by the Swiss Embassy in
Havana state that the Cuban Government has arrested about
20,000 persons, I
authorities in Camaguey Province alone had seized
5,000 people, including 43 priests. A growing number of Latin
American chiefs of state, including the presidents of Mexico
and Venezuela, are urging the Castro government to treat its
political prisoners with clemency.
Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy on 22 April re-
ferred to the US presence there "against the clearly expressed
wish of the Cuban people and government." This is probably
Intended to suggest that the USSR would support any Cuban de-
mand that the US relinquish its base at Guantanamo.
24 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Noe
French Military Revolt Spreads
CA11 regular communications with Algeria were out 22-
23 April, but a member of Debre's personal staff admitted
on 23 April that only two enclaves near Oran--an army base
at Tlemcen and the large naval base at Mers-el-kebir--re-
main outside insurgent control. Admiral Querville, French
naval commander in the Mediterranean, is reported to be in
sympathy with the insurgent leaders, but he is not thought to
have turned the Mers-el-kebir base over to them. The list
of units which the insurgents claim as actively adhering to the
revolt total about a quarter of total army strength in Algeria
and appears to include practically all the units which have been
engaged in active operations'D
Several key military personnel in Algeria including the
Air Force Commander General Bigot have apparently joined
the revolt. Army General Jean-Marie Gouraud, the Constan-
tine Army Corps commander, is quoted by Algiers radio as
having turned all units under his command over to the in-
surgents. General Andre Petit, deputy Saharan commander,
is reported openly participating on the side of the insurgents.
Some of the colonels who participated in previous extremist
activity against the government slipped back to Algeria in time
to join the rising. General Salan, the only one of the four
coup leaders not in Algeria when it was first launched, has
reportedly reached Algiers from Spain.
There is at present no specific evidence of political in-
volvement in the insurrection, aeefveral reports state that
Challe and the other military lea ers claim that they want
only to force De Gaulle to modify his Algerian policy but,
if forced to depose him, would install a government com-
posed of rightist political figures. Most often mentioned for
high government posts are former Gaullist Jacques Soustelle,
ex-Premier Georges Bidault, and several rightist Socialist
leaders who favor French retention of Algeria. The military
reportedly would limit themselves to a few key cabinet posts:,-)
In France, a number of high ranking officers are reported
in sympathy with the insurgents, but at present none has openly
identified himself with Algiers. Both General Olie, the Chief
of Staff for National Defense and Louis Joxe, Minister for Al-
gerian Affairs, have reportedly urged De Gaulle to move
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Neal
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%NO
cautiously against the revolt as a result of their brief visit to
Algeria. De Gaulle, however, appears determined to main-
tain his uncompromising stand against the insurgent leaders
and the government has reportedly started planning a block-
ade of Algeria. a government official has estimated
that Algeria could hold out for 15 days on its present stocks.-3
Immediate concern in Paris, however, has focused on the
possibility of a paratroop invasion from Algeria, where there
is probably sufficient air transport for this purpose. air
Force General Andre Puget, acting Chief of Staff for National
Defense, said that 5000 men could take
the key government ministries. Puget said he felt there would
be no violent public reaction to such a move and that neither
military nor security forces in France wodld oppose iti3
It was probably to guard against such a rapid takeover,
as well as for psychological reasons, that the Ministry of
Interior announced the issuing of arms to civilian volunteers.
The volunteers were urged to ready themselves for action
against a paratroop attack. Representatives of nearly all
major parties rallied to the government although Interior
officials reportedly tried to limit arms distribution to known
members of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic. The
apparent success of these first attempts by De Gaulle to con-
solidate his vast but amorphous public support probably more
than offsets the risks inherent in the creation of a "citizen's
army.
it
Meanwhile communist leaders have issued calls to other
leftist groups urging unity of action in demonstrations against
the insurrection. The free trade unions have thus far, however,
been reluctant to do more than make similar, but separate,
strike calls. A one-hour stoppage throughout France has been
called by the major unions for 11 EST today.
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re,
Pointe
Noih-rs
1
Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
NDONESIA
870
619424
Luanda
INDIA
300
TUNISIA
3.200
NIGERIA
400
IN
280
MOBUTU
720O
�
Leopoldvi
ysville
ic of the Congo
.Gemena
Scattered _Forces_
MOBUTU
Scattered Forces
DVILLE-
:sal Aket
MOBUP:rujil'b:ajBaso_ko
800
�Boende
Ikela.
uluabourg
Bak n
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Fl Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
[2:3 Kalonji
Tshombe
En United Nations Forces (Service Forces
- Selected road not included)
--1-37:Selected railroad
=Selected airfield
STATUTE MILES 400
I I I
MALAYA
470
LIBERIA
Luputa
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
400
INDIA
Lake
Albert
NIGERIA
500
Usumbura
Lake
irwka
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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"-LEL,/ 4.-4.2.11-JCs A
NINP1
Situation in the Congo
aatangat President Tshombe is showing increasing
anxiety over the official Belgian attitude toward his regime
as the new government of the Social Christian (Catholic) and
Socialist parties prepares to take over in Brussels, prob-
ably this week. Long unhappy over Belgium's failure to give
him unqualified backing, he now apparently fears that Brus-
sels is moving toward closer support of the Leopoldville gov-
ernment at Katangat expense:1\
Tshombe
would be greatly disturbed by Belgium's resumption
of full diplomatic relations with the central government Dis-
cussions on this matter now are man advanced stage and, ac-
cording to the Belgian counselor in Washington, will probably
bear fruit before mid-June. Tshombe in effect accused Brus-
sels of planning to "stab him in the back" and threatened to
follow the advice of anti-Belgian members of his regime, some
of whom reportedly are pressing for the replacement of Belgian
advisers with French nationals)
the new government headed by Prime
Minister Lefevre would attempt to nudge Tshombe toward closer
alignment with Leopoldville while supporting long-term policies
designed to enable the central government ultimately to exercise
its authority over Katanga. At the same time, Brussels will
try to avoid precipitating Tshombe's downfall since Belgian of-
ficials are convinced that chaos and disorder would result
Early measures being contemplated include withdrawal of cer-
tain key Belgian advisers and the appointment of a more ener-
getic consul general in Elisabethvilles2-1
t.Paul Henri Spook, who is expected to be the new Belgian
foreign minister, has already indicated he intends to exercise
tighter control over Belgian activities in the Congo by absorb-
ing the Ministry of African Affairs into the Foreign Ministry. He -?
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Creportedly also hopes to force Belgian firms with holdings in
the Congo to cooperate in channeling all Belgian aid and financial
support through the central government in Leopoldville
Neanwhile, the Sudanese UN contingent, originally totaling
394 men, has returned to Khartoum. The withdrawal was or
earlylagt month after Sudanese troops were forced out of
Matadi by Mobutu's elements of the Congolese Army. However,
the Sudan, while critical of the UN's handling of the Matadi inci-
dent, continues to support the over-all UN effort in the Congo.
Sudanese officials have indicated that after a suitable period a
new and better trained unit would be assigned to the UN opera-
tion')
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v.re loaf
Situation in Laos
_Government troops that withdrew from yang Vieng shortly
after midnight of 22 April, after being under heavy enemy at-
tack all day, now are moving southward. Stocks of POL and
ammunition were destroyed prior to the withdrawal. Vientiane
is sending several companies of troops northward to reinforce
defensive positions some distance, south of yang Vien
LA government rout north of Phou Khoun junction on 22
April apparently was forestalled only by the commander's threat
to turn his artillery on his own men if they fell back farther.
Government troops in this area now are planning a diversionary
attack to assist the forces withdrawing southward from Vang Vieng-0-)
Luang Prabang Province and southern Nam Tha Province,
increased enemy military activity was apparent on 21 April. These
probing actions, although possibly only a temporary show of force,
may presage more widespread enemy activity in these areas in
the near future. Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are also continu-
ing their pressure on government troops south of the Plaine des
Jarres. In the Thakhek area of central Laos, no recent change
in the military situation has been reported
(After Soviet officials had agreed with the British ambassador
to issue on 22 April a cease-fire appeal, invitations to a confer-
ence, and an approach to Nehru on reactivating the ICC, Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin requested that action be deferred
until 24 April, ostensibly to give the USSR additional time to in-
form interested posts-.)
The communique issued on 22 April at the end of Souvanna's
visit to Moscow noted that "real conditions now exist to normalize
the situation in Laos." The general line the USSR will take in the
forthcoming negotiations was foreshadowed in the statement that
both "governments" agreed that a political settlement should be
based on the Geneva Agreements of 1954; the Vientiane agree-
ments of 1956-57, which governed the "integration" of the Pathet
Lao into the Laotian government and armed forces; and the joint
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V.A...4
NW"
statement by Souvanna and Neo Leo Hak Sat leader Prince
Souphannouvong of November 1960, which outlined the prin-
ciples of a neutral policy for Laos.
The communique also expressed the USSR's readiness to
extend economic and technical assistance to Laos and announced
that Moscow will build a hosral and a radio station in Laos as
a gift to the Laotian people. In a talk with the Canadian am-
bassador in Moscow, Souvanna confirmed that the USSR had
promised economic aid_3
The USSR also won Souvanna's endorsement of Soviet po-
sitions on peaceful coexistence, Cuba, disarmament, liquida-
tion of colonialism, and the admission of Communist China to
the United Nations.
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V JP .1 LAE-, JUI27
,Naror Neie
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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v.,/ ei7/7,07zrzzizzz,