CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02731969
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 27, 1961

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27 March 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'

A
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27 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Situation as of 0400 EST) (Page
2. Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko invites UN to send
technicians to Matadi. (Page ti)
3. New uprisings reported planned in southern Angola and
Cabinda. (Page it)
4. Fighting breaks out between Pakistani military units
and Pushtoon tribes. (Page itt)
5, USSR: Comment on earth satellite launching of 25 March.
(Page tit)
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CHINA
1\I A /\/1 T H A �
Muong Sal
I
LUANG PRA ANG
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Luang Prabang
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SAYABOURY r--." XIENG KHOUANG N,
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e
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Wang Vieng
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VIENTIANE C
' Pak Sane j
NORTHERN LAOS
401. GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
AO
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
X SITE OF C-47 SHOOTDOWN
--ROAD
-TRAIL
0 50
I I
STATUTE MILES
17 ROUTE NUMBER
one
AND
Sam i Neua
AM NEUA
� Kam Keut
�
KHAMMOUANE
Sbvannakhe
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Laos: Moscow's first comment on President Kennedy's
press conference and the present situation in Laos appears )
designed to retain flexibility of action while pressing for /?)
its basic demands. By emphasizing the "urgent" need for an
international conference, but taking no stand on the question
of a prior cease-fire and ICC meeting, Moscow has left itself
free to accept these Western proposals if its proposals on thea-a
composition, timing, and agenda for the international meet- �2,* 4
ing, which are expected to be presented by Gromyko, are ac-,Zz-ec}
cepted by the West. V Ai 6
Although the Chinese Communists have not yet made any
ir 7
comment of their own on the press conference, Peiping has
broadcast a North Vietnamese editorial of 25 March expres--�t4-
sing Hanoi's opposition to a cease-fire before an internationa,Ve,,e,
Conference. The editorial declares that "only a Geneva-typeee
conference or an enlarged conference will be competent to n
settle questions of a cease-fire and reactivation of the Inter-'-`
national Commission in Laos."
The bloc has not yet reported the shooting down of an
American C-47 aircraft over the Plaine des Jarres on 23
Ma reh
the plane burned completely following the crash.
The lone survivor, presumably an assistant army attach�n
Vientiane, is reportedly in a hospital near Xieng Khouang
town with a broken shoulder3 (Backup,
Page 1) (Map)
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Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko has sent a letter to
the UN's acting representative in the Congo, Makki Abbas, ips
inviting the UN to send technicians to Matadi to cooperate
with the port authority in clearing up the backlog of UN sup-
plies there. Bomboko's letter added that the government
could not authorize the return of UN troops to Matadi because
of the feelings of the population. Uimbassador Timberlake
reports that the pile-up of supplies at the port was due to the
failure of the UN to issue shipping instructions. The UN is
reported to have rejected an offer by a local shipping firm
and the port authority to assume joint responsibility for for-
warding UN merchandise to Leopoldville. Timberlake be-
lieves the return of civilians to Matadi would involve a min-
imum risk of incidents. He also believes the climate of
relations between the UN and the Congolese has "changed
radically" since the arrival of Abbas in mid-March but that
Abbas has not yet been able to capitalize on it because of the
expected return of Daya
(Bac
up, Page 3)
Angola: angolan dissident leaders, encouraged by the
respTiFirea the African population to their terrorist cam-
paign in northern Angola, believe they can continue their ac- ,?s
tivities indefinitely, although on a reduced scale,
have been set for these operations:3
southern and 1::)r the Cabindai exnlave hut nn riatAs /? 7/2(
they are planning new uprisi
Lisbon,
aware of the threat of an outbreak in southern Angola, is seek-
ing the cooperation of the South African authorities to control
itators using South-West Africa as a haven,
3
outbreaks would probably be accompanied by addi-
tional demonstrations against Americans in Angola; rumors
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linking local Americans with the terrorism are still being
given wide circulation there. (Backup,
Page 5)
Afghanistan-Pakistan-USSR: Foreign Minister Naim
told Ambassador Byroade on 26 March that "major fighting"
has broken out between Pakistani military units and several
dissident Pushtoon tribes on the Pakistani side of the Afghan-
Pakistani frontier. The action reportedly is taking place in
the same semiautonomous tribal area where clashes occurred
last fall. Pakistani authorities recently have been trying to
suppress localized tribal resistance there�in part Afghan
inspired�and to extend their control over the border areas.
A widespread tribal uprising within Pakistan probably would
draw active support from related tribal groups on the Afghan
side. (Backup, Page 7) (Map)
*USSR: The experience gained by the USSR with its large
satellite payload recoveries has probably given the Russians
a scientific and technological base and confidence level suf-
ficient for them to attempt a manned recovery from orbit in
their next launching. It is believed such an attempt will b e
made prior to the middle of April, when the Sibir Pacific ships
will need to return to port
Preliminary analysis in Washington
has not yet provided a
firm answer as to the identity of the biological payload.
an undetermined ob-
ject apparently encased in a transparent dome-shaped con-
tainer.
While it has not been possible to
confirm or deny the Soviet statement that a dog was a passen-
ger, on balance it is believed the statement is valid.
The Sputnik IX and X operations were similar in many as-
pects. The Sputnik X operation was supported by three Sibirs
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In the Pacific and probably by three other ships in the Atlantic.
The use of the Sibirs in this ESV recovery program probably
Indicates that Sputnik X was the dress rehearsal for a manned
experiment.
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Situation in Laos -(Situation as of 0400 EST)
Moscow has consistently avoided committing itself on
whether an international conference would have to net be-
fore a cease-fire could become operative. It has at various
times called for reactivation of the International Control
Commission for Laos, but has always specified that this body
could not resume its activities in Laos without new directives
from a conference. On 22 March, however, Moscow broad-
cast without comment Souvannah Phouma's suggestion that a
cease-fire could be arranged by the ICC pending the convo-
cation of an international conference.
The Pravda article maintains this careful avoidance of
the question of timing, while heavily emphasizing the dangers
of international conflict through the "intervention" of SEATO
and the United States and the consequent urgency of an inter-
national conference. By driving home the point that it has
long favored a conference, Moscow has put itself in position
to claim that the convocation of a conference and a cessation
of hostilities is a consequence of its initiatives and another
example of the ability of the "Socialist camp" to prevent "ag-
gression" by the imperialists.
Accompanying its charges that SEATO members are pre-
paring for direct military action in Laos, Pravda warns that
"peace-loving countries will not remain indifferent" to direct
intervention by SEATO which could lead to "far reaching con-
sequences," A more explicit threat has been made in the
presence of US Ambassador Ravndal in Prague by the Czech
Deputy Foreign Minister. Responding to a remark from the
Indian Ambassador, the Czech stated: "If the United States
Invades Laos, members of the Warsaw Pact have decided to
enter Laos in return."
Peiping has not yet commented on President Kennedy's
press conference on Laos, although, the Chinese Communists
have broadcast a substantial account of his remarks. Peiping's
last comment suggesting its disapproval of a cease-fire be-
fore an international conference is convened was contained in
a People's Daily article of 23 March. Since then there have
be-erimilThliig-that its attitude remains the same. The first
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negative reaction to such a cease-fire appeared in an edi-
torial on 25 March in the North Vietnamese newspaper,
Nhan Dan. The paper accuses the US of putting the "cart
before the horse" in order to gain time to strengthen "rebel"
forces. Peiping has reported this editorial without adding
comments of its own.
[The King and General Phoumi have reacted favorably to
latest Western moves toward a peaceful settlement of the
Laotian crisis. Both, however, expressed concern that Laos'
problems would be subordinated to other world issues in a
14-nation conference. Phoumi had reservations about a re-
turn of the International Control Commission to Laos on
the grounds that this would effectively prevent Western aid to
the Laotian Army, while bloc supply of the Pathet Lao would
go uncheckeg
Rumors in Vientiane that the city is in imminent danger
of attack were probably circulated by Communists. The de-
parture of the King, prime minister, and Phoumi to attend a
long-scheduled national ceremony in Savannakhgt may have
strengthened the rumors. The royal party will remain there
until 28 March. The credibility attributed to these rumors by
the populace is indicative of the low morale in Vientiane. Since
1 March about 200 troops have deserted in the areji.
The military situation north and south of the Phou Khoun
junction of Routes 7 and 13 is relatively unchanged. The enemy
maintains his hold on the southern approach to the Plaine des
Jarres and is exerting pressure on government troops at Tha
Thom.
attacic on lila mom scneauiea ior zo iviarcn was be-
ing successfully resisted,
aive companies of Laotian Army troops under the com-
mand of Colonel Kham Ouane Boupha are reportedly en route
from Phong Saly to join army forces at the outpost of Muong Sal
in Luang Prabang Province. Since the Kong Le coup, this com-
mander has maintained a precarious "neutrality" between all
factions in the crisis and has entered into at least informal
working relations with Pathet Lao troops who control most of/
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&hong Saly. Preliminary reports indicate that Kham Ouane's
move was precipitated by fears the Pathet Lao were about to
arrest hirn-.)
Soviet transports continue flights into Laos. On 23 March
eight IL-14s and at least two but possibly five LI-2s flew from
Hanoi to Xieng Khouang. Additional flights were scheduled for
26 March, The North Vietnamese are apparently trainine
Pathet Lao communications personnel in Hanoi.
"they were scheduled for
training at Hanoi but might have stopped at Khang Khay for
preliminary training."
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The Situation in the Congo
In Stanleyville, Gizenga told a press correspondent that
his regime was based on positive neutralism and would ac-
cept unconditional aid from any source. He said, however,
that practically nothing had been forthcoming and that of the
20 countries which had recognized his government, only ten
had done so in writing. He added that his government would
respect present and future foreign investments, and claimed
his troops would be willing to surrender their arms to the UN
if this would lead to "republican legality." He disclaimed being
a Marxist, saying that he had never studied Marxism and that
although he had visited Moscow as recently as 1960, he had
spent more time in Western capitals and had twice been to the
United States.
UAR military representatives in Stanleyville,
complained to Cairo of difficul-
ties in working with Gizengat forces. The representatives
said that in addition to linguistic problems encountered"because we
did not know French," they almost became embroiled in a
fight with Gizenga's troops when the weapons arrived in Aketi
"because they imagined we were spies, in spite of the fact
that it was they themselves who got the weapons. They wanted
to hold Major Samir as a hostage until they were sure." More-
over, the mission was unable to effect an adequate training
program for Gizenga's troops. It could not find officer material
to train in the use of UAR-supplied weapons and also encountered
delays in recruiting noncommissioned officer trainees and in dis-
tributing weapons. The mission also complained of the lack of
discipline on the part of the Congolese during a trip to recon-
noiter the air-drop zone--a trip that should have taken two days
but took five--and of a lack of appreciation for its efforts by
"anyone but Gizenga and some of the ministers." In contrast,
"because her broadcasts are heard here;' there was a growing
appreciation for Ghana. Finally, the representatives complained
of inadequate food and medical facilities and the harshness of
conditions generally.
The Malayan UN commander in Kindu has been able to es-
tablish contact with the "Leopard men" in southwestern Kivu
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Province. This secret group, founded six months ago by
Lumumba, is supposedly anti-Christian and anti-white but
now is "running out of steam," and its members are willing
to return to their homelands in northern Katanga.
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The Situation in Angola
The recent outbreaks in northern Angola were instigated
p-y six Angolans trained by the Tunisian UN contingent in the
ongo, The six en-
tered Angola clandestinely just before the outbreaks and each
directed a campaign of terror in a specific regionj
5:.he Tunisian Government, is
backing the Angolan People's Union (UPA), led by Holden
Roberto, an organization which opposes the more extreme
ro-Communist Angolan dissident group based in Guinea,
unisian representatives are said to have told UPA leaders
hat Tunisia and the other Afro-Asian countries would find it
difficult to support their objectives in the United Nations unless
the UPA took action to make Angola an issue for world atten-
tio,E)
alresident Bourguiba is reported to have congratulated
Roberto, who stopped in Tunis after a recent visit to UN head-
quarters, on the success of the uprising. He advised Roberto
to form a "committee of national liberation," rather than a
government-in-exile, because few countries would be ready
to recognize an exile government. Tunisian Foreign Secretary
Mokaddem is reported to have promised Roberto that Tunisia
would provide rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and medical
supplies, and Bourguiba's Neo-Destour party has assigned an
expert to act as an adviser on guerrilla warfare tactics and po-
litical organization. The Tunisians have also offered to assist
the formation of an Angolan trade unio19
The Lisbon Foreign Ministry,
described the Por-
tuguese in southern Angola as "somewhat tense because there
have been numerous purchases of crude weapons (chains, etc.)."
the governor of Angola had received
threatening letters from "Portuguese negro" refugees in the
frontier area of South-West Africa. The South African Govern-
ment had previously arrested similar agitators.
Luanda
warned Lisbon that the local security forces were inadequate to
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Nisor
cope with demonstrations like that against the American Con-
sulate. The clinic of the local Evan-
gelical Mission, which has an American as titular director,
although most of its personnel are foreign, was sacked by a
mob on 24 March.
Portugal itself, the government-controlled press is
reported to have called for a demonstration in downtown
Lisbon today to protest recent international criticism of
Portugal. Right wing elements led by the National Front re-
portedly plan to turn the demonstration into a march on the
US Embassy, and, according to press reports, thousands of
handbills calling for such action have already been distributed
in the cityj
opinion in some
regime circles is beginning to turn against the government,
however, as a result of the Angolan situation and many persons
are criticizing the government for not having taken measures
some time ago that would have avoided the present difficulties.
A report is said to be circulating among regime supporters that
two unidentified army generals have told Premier Salazar that
Portuguese policy toward Africa must be radically changed.
On 23 March the undersecretary of the Overseas Ministry told
the American Embassy in Lisbon that for the past six months,
the government had been actively studying far-reaching reforms
in all sectors of the overseas provincesl
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grem4
USSR
Stalinaba
Mazar
Shard
Ts maz
Pull Khumn
Salang Pass
halal
Fort Sande
CHINA
JAMMU
//KASHMIR
(Status in dispute)
RAW PINDI
ob Lahore
,
PAkISTA
CONFIDENTIAL
Rush ha
Zahedan
Herat
Sad Pal
Maimana
AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN
(PUSHTOON TRIBAL AREA)
PUSHTOON TRIBES
11111 AREA OF GREATEST FRICTION
Roads �4�I�I- Railroads
STATUTE MILES 300
INDIA
CHINA
,olisofgdu.s,
31638
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Fighting Breaks Out in Pakistan Near Afghan Border
Guerrilla fighters from three of the major Bajauri tribes--
the Salarzai, Utman Khel, and Mamund�reportedly have been
engaged against Pakistani troops since 24 March. If this resist-
ance continues, the powerful Mohmand tribe may join its neigh-
bors. Other Pushtoon tribes, such as the Wazirs, might also
lend their support and further extend the area of fighting. All
the tribes, whose area extends on both sides of the border,
want to remain relatively free of government control and resent
Pakistani Government moves since last September to strengthen
control over Bajaur. If the present fighting should become wide-
spread, it would so deepen the antagonism between these tribes
and Pakistan that the latter would be forced to suspend its ef-
forts to bring the Pushtoon tribes all along the frontier under
its administrative control.
The fighting in Bajaur follows recent moves by Afghanistan
to strengthen its regular forces at the border opposite the area.
In discussing this build-up with the American Army attach�n
Karachi, the director of Pakistan's joint military intelligence
said that the Pakistani Army would actually welcome the chance
to defeat Afghan intruders again--whether tribal irregulars or
Afghan Army units�and reiterated his government's determina-
tion to use whatever force is necessary to maintain its position
in Bajaur.
Kabul, fearful of strong Pakistani counteraction, probably
does not plan to send readily identifiable Afghan forces across
the border. While it may be giving covert assistance in the form
of arms and tribal "volunteers," the Afghan Government wants
the fighting to appear to involve only the "oppressed" Pushtoon
tribesmen on the Pakistani side of the line and the Pakistani
Government.
Afghanistan would like to bring the matter before the United
Nations to generate international pressure on Pakistan to nego-
tiate the status of the Pushtoon tribes living in Pakistan. Kabul,
however, probably calculates that open Afghan intervention would
merely strengthen the Pakistani case in the eyes of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly.
The USSR probably would not be happy to see the Pushtoonistan
issue come to a head again at this time. Moscow has made a
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small but impressive beginning toward achieving .a more favor-
able position in Pakistan. Support for Afghanistan, however,
would result in a decline in this position.
Khrushchev is on record in support of the Afghan position
on Pushtoonistan, and in the event of a military clash between
the Afghans and Pakistanis, it is probable that the USSR would
feel that it had to give increasing propaganda support to Afghan-
istan.
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�C�ENWIDENTIAL
Noe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary Of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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