CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000176
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 19, 1961

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Iwo I %./ I� G %i II
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
19 January 1961
Copy No. C 77
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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JANUAIIY 1961
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR prnrincY npw Rnarp vphi le at-
tempt.
USSR--Two candidate members added
to party presidium.
Communist China's short-term indebt-
edness to USSR more than doubled in
past year.
Polish aid to Cuba being held to min-
imum in hope this will help Poland ob-
tain American economic assistance.
ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
Congo--Gizenga emphasizes need of his
forces for military equipment.
Philippine foreign secretary voices
doubts of SEATO effectiveness.
Preliminary negotiations for meeting be-
tween De Gaulle and Ferhat Abbas re-
ported under way.
4
0 Morocco reported refusing to permit
Soviet technicians to accompany gift
aircraft.
THE WEST
0 Armed forces demand that government
curtail Communist and pro-Castro ac-
tivities in El Salvador.
0 Chile ready to approve sale of copper
to USSR.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: Recent developments indicate the USSR is
completing preparations for launching a space vehicle
from Tyura Tam, probably within the next several days.
It appears most likely that this operation will involve an
ttemlit to launch and recover an earth satellite vehicle.
(Page 1)
USSR: The addition of two new candidate members
to the party presidium on 18 January lays the groundwork
for further shake-ups in that ruling party body, possibly
at the 22nd party congress scheduled for October 1961. The
new candidates, 50-year-old Gennady. Voronov, party chief
In Orenburg Oblast--a major grain-producing area�and 46-
year-old Viktor Grishin, Soviet trade union head, are per- 0 <
haps being groomed as replacements for full members whose
tenures may now be insecure. Nikolay Podgorny, presidium
member and Ukrainian party chief, was sharply criticized by
Khrushchev at the plenum for weak leadership of agriculture
and may be on proba,tron for the coming year. The plenum--
one of the longest in recent years--ended with a report on the
November Moscow conference of Communist parties by Mikhail
Suslov, who along with Khrushchev and Kozlov played a dom;
Communist ma R: Chinese short-term indebt-
edness to the USSR has more than doubled in the past year,
,The
year-efidfatiisofthe clearing accounts, which are compar-
able to a balance of payments, reveals that China's debt to
1
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the USSR rose from $145,000,000 at the end of 1959 to $382, -
000,000 at the end of 1960. This sharp rise in China's short-
term indebtedness to the Soviet Union may explain Chinese
efforts in autumn 1960 to cancel some import orders and to
delay negotiations on 1961 trade commitments. China's poor
agricultural year probably has caused considerable difficul-
ties in meeting export commitments, which would add to China's
hninneP-nf-nnymentgdiffir.1i1HPQ vith tha 'MCP
Poland-Cuba: The Polish regime has been reluctant to
become involved in bloc aid to Cuba beyond the minimum re- ---1?-o- k
quired to conform with Soviet policies, mainly because it
hopes to negotiate large amounts of American long-term eco-
nomic aid. Polish handling of other aspects of relations with
Cuba also has differed markedly from the treatment accorded
Havana by the rest of the bloc. Warsaw made a point of not 1
inviting Castro's chief Communist adviser, Che Guevara, for a
state visit during his recent tour of Eastern Europe. High- 1
level Polish officials repeatedly have implied in conversations
1
with American officials that their interests in Cuba are min-
imal, and they have emphasized that they would not shin military goods to Havana.
ti ASIA-AFRICA
,
Laos: Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have gained control 0 ,�
of Phou IChoun, at the junction between the Vientiane - Luang
Prabang road and Route 7 leading eastward toward Xieng (ce-tictc)i
Khouang Provinc_e_..) Forty miles to the south, Pathet Lao coun- 4
terattacks are imperiling consolidation of government control \
in the Vang Vieng area. Fourteen of the 18 Soviet LI-2s have /P.:), ,/
arrived at Hanoi; the remaining four 1Pft Ppinincr Pn route to,lez.tzi-
Hanoi on 19 January. (Page 2) \
(Map). iffis �
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*Congo: Dissident leader Gizenga,
criticizing his Cairo representative for delays in secur-
ing aid deliveries, has ordered him to concentrate on shipments
of military equipment to Stanleyville and to postpone other as-
pects of an extensive plan to buttress the dissident regime which
the representative had proposed earlier. Gizenga seems increas-
ingly apprehensive about the ability of his troops to meet oppos-
ing forces--a fact which may be related to recent orders from�
Stanleyville to Gizenga units in Katanga Province advisine them
tn elms/Mate their positions for the time being.
the town's garrison had been attaciced Dy
commandos!' The unit reported that its gasoline�in short supply
n Gizenga's forces--was "completely exhausted."
The 17 January transfer of deposed premier Lumumba from
Leopoldville Province to Elisabethville in Katanga Province sug-
gests that Tshombe and Mobutu may be increasing their coopera-
tion under pressure of continuing Gizenga successes. It seems
probable that Lumumba will be used as an object of negotiation
at the forthcoming round-table conference of Congolese leaders,
now scheduled for 15 February in Elisabethville. However, the
American consul in Elisabethville believes that Lumumba may not
survive his imprisonment there. Meanwhile Tshombe, who has
previously indicated concern over the trustworthiness of many
tribal groups in Elisabethville, has staged a large-scale security
sweep of dissidents '
�
Philippine Foreign secretary Serrano nas ex-
pressed his concern to an American Embassy official over what
he termed the weakening of the SEATO alliance by the attitude of
the British and French, particularly toward the Laotian crisis.
He said that one reason for calling a conference of foreign min-
isters of South Vietnam, Nationalist China, South Korea, and t120
19 Jan 61
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ty insisting that Morocco accept Soviet pilots and technicians
on a long-term basis. Moscow may, however, urge the Moroc-
� c ersonneLms_tryiaermiti to assemble ad test the aircraft.
DHE,VEST
El Salvador: The Salvadoran armed forces evidently pre-
sented the provisional government with an ultimatum on 16 Jan-
uary demanding the immediate curtailment of Communist and
pro-Castro activity in El Salvador. The government has appar-
ently, at least for the moment, succumbed to the military pres-
sure. Defense Minister Castillo Navarrete, who was reported
earlier in the week to have army backing for a coup if necessary
to quell the Communists, told American Embassy officers on 17
January that he and a number of other officers had spent most of
the previous day talking with the ruling junta on measures for con-
trolling the Communists. On 17 January, the junta issued a
strong public warning that it is prepared to counter Communist
activity. It also announced the recall of the Salvadoran ambas-
sador in Havana. (Page 7)
Chile-USSR: The conservative Alessandri government is
reported about ready to approve the sale to the Soviet Union of
60,000 tons of semifinished copper products annually over the
next five years. This is about 10 percent of Chile's total produc-
tion. Copper is usually in short supply within the bloc, and Chile
has not made any direct copper sale to the Soviet Union in recent
years. (Page 9)
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. CNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions .in the imme-
diate futur_O
B. aTo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies
19 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF
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Cr areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate
future.)
C. EThe Sino-Soviet bloc support for the Communist forces
in Laos continues unabated and there are indications
that it will increase. Continuing Communist attacks
from the Xieng Khouang area threaten to divide and
weaken the Royal Laotian Army forces. With its mil-
itary position deteriorating, the Boun Oum Phoumi
government is increasingly likely to seek outside mil-
itary assistanc!/
D. rather developments affording increased opportunities
for exploitation by the Communist bloc: The pro-Lu-
mumba regime in Stanleyville is apparently meeting with
success both in its political and military activity in the
Congo and is pushing ahead with arrangements for ma-
terial aid and increased diplomatic support from the
radical nationalist African states and the bloc. Despite
evidence of attempts by anti- Lumumba leaders to sub-
merge their own differences, the political situation of
the Leopoldville group is still deterinratince'l
19 Jan 61
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Philippines, which opened in Manila on 18 January, was the
apparent inability of SEATO to act in the Laotian crisis.
Stressing his belief that any indication that the US was waver-
ing in its firm positions would have wide repercussions in
the area, Serrano asserted that there is considerable Asian
disappointment with SEATO and that continuation of the pres-
ent trend might force the Philippines to reappraise it SEATO
policies. (Page 4)
*France-Algeria:
De Gaulle and rebel premier Ferhat
Abbas have agreed in principle to meet, and that negotiations
are now under way to determine when and where--perhaps in
the first week of March in a French city other than Paris. De
Gaulle would consider his demand that various Algerian ten-
dencies be represented would be met by the inclusion of the
chief of a rival nationalist group in preliminary negotiations
only:1 In Tunis, a member of the rebel government assert-
ed the rebels have no desire to allow formalities to stand in the
way of opening negotiations and are considering measures to
reassure French settlers that their interests would be respect-
ed in an Algerian republic. _9nle members of De Gaulle's en-
tourage feel that Premier Debre may break with De Gaulle over
the decision to enter into full negotiationq
(Page 5)
Morocco-USSR: rilorocco and the Soviet Union are report-
ed in disagreement as to the terms for delivery of the 14 jet
aircraft which, according to a 15 November Moroccan commu-
nique, are a gift of the USSR.
King Mohamed V has refused to accept the 3 nie
Soviet technicians which Moscow insists shall accompany these
planes. Both the King and the crown prince have told the Amer-
ican ambassador that Soviet military pilots and technicians would
not be accepted in Morocco. The USSR probably would not risk
jeopardizing the political benefits of the gift of these aircra..19
19 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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USSR
Recent developments indicate that the USSR is completing
preparations for launching a space vehicle from Tyura Tam,
probably within the next several days. It appears most likely
that this operation will involve an attempt to launch and re-
cover an earth satellite vehicle (ESV).
Missile range instrumentation ships, which have previ-
ously operated in connection with Soviet missile tests in the
Pacific, are now in positions similar to those assumed for the
space-related activities in September and October 1960. This
disposition suggests that the USSR will again undertake to
achieve the objectives of the launches on 10 and 14 October
when the vehicles failed to orbit. In view of the Soviet record
with Sputnik recoveries in 1960--one success and two failures--
it is not believed that an ESV operation now would involve a hu-
man passenger.
The recent departure from Conakry and movement into the
Gulf of Guinea of the Soviet ship Dolinsk, which has been cir-
cumstantially associated with several recent ESV launchings,
may also indicate impending operations. The Dolinsk is in a
position, not far from its location at the time of these earlier
operations, which is suitable for the monitoring of certain space
orbits.
The Soviet high-frequency direction-finding organization
KRUG is now conducting exercises of the type noted in past sat-
ellite-recovery operations to test its canabilities to locate the
re-entry cansule
TQF SECRET
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19 JANUARY 1961
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The Situation in Laos
LaLovernment forces on 17/18 January withdrew from Phou
Khoun, which commands the vital junction between the Vien-
tiane - Luang Prabang road and Route 7 leading eastward
toward Xieng Khouang Province, following an artillery-sup-
ported attack by Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. As in most
engagements in recent weeks, artillery fire from enemy 105-mm.
howitzers and mortars apparently was the decisive factor in the
loss of Phou Khoun. General Phoumi will probably send rein-
forcements to the area in an effort to retake this important po-
sition, control of which is the key both to any government drive
eastward against the Plaine des Jarres and to the defense of
Luang Prabang and Vientiane against attacks by the strong Kong
Le - Pathet Lao force in the Plaine des Jarres are2.21
Forty miles to the south, Pathet Lao counterattacks are
making it difficult for government forces to consolidate their
control over the yang Vieng area. Even if government troops
should clear this area and resume their advance northward,
they must proceed through territory in which the Pathet Lao
have always been strong before they can join in an attempt to
retake Phou Khoun,
In Xieng Khouang Province government commanders in the
Tha Thom area, judging by their statements to the press, seem
resigned to fighting a war of guerrilla attrition against what they
describe as numerically superior antigovernment forces. Al-
though Tha Thom still appears to be in government hands, the
local commanders give little indication of being prepared to make
a strong defensive stand there.
Fourteen of the 18 Soviet LI-2s have arrived at Hanoi; the
remaining four departed from Peiping en route to Hanoi on
19 January. The arrival of the last contingent of 4 LI-2s will
bring to at least 37 the number of Soviet aircraft in North Viet-
nam. These will include 18 LI-2s, 10 IL-14s, 5 MI-4 helicop-
ters, and 4--possibly 5--MI-1 helicopters. The North Vietnamese
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are operating 4 IL-14s, 3 IL-2s, 4 AN-2s, and 2 MI-4 hel-
icopters. Seven sorties by Soviet IL-14s from Hanoi into
Laos were confirmed on 17 January,
t he USSR was obliged to
deal with two fronts in Laos.tlieWeston one side and the
Chinese on the other. ;he northern border
off Laos was impossible to control and that the USSR itself
could not be sure of what is goine on there.
It was better for the United States to have the USSR than
the Chinese Communists "on the other side of the interven-
tion game.-'3
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Filipinos Con'Imkned Over Inadequacy of SEAT'
iihilippine Foreign ..Viinitter Serrano haikexpressed deep
concern to an American Embassy officer over the weakening
of the SEATO alliance, which he tends to blame on British and
French attitudes, particularly with regard to the Laotian crisis.
According to Serrano, his principal reasons for calling the con-
ference of foreign ministers from South Korea, South Vietnam,
and Nationalist China, which opened in Manila on 18 January,
were SEATO's apparent inability to act in the Laotian situation
and the need to exchange views with non-Communist neighbors
and to indicate support for the American position)
Reiterating firm Philippine support for the role now played
by the United States in the Far East, Serrano emphasized his
fear that any indications of wavering would have wide repercus-
sions. He expressed the belief that the British and French were
motivated by a desire to reduce their own commitments toward
SEATO and weaken American influence in the area.by encourag-
ing neutralism. He also voiced fear that Pakistan might be waver-
ing in its attitude toward SEATO. Serrano asserted that a
continuation of the present trend in the organization might force
the Philippines to reappraise its policy toward SEAT]
Serrano has indicated a long-standing desire to forge closer
ties with non-Communist Asian neighbors within the framework
of firm American defense commitments in the area. Although
Serrano may be partly motivated by his desire to gain personal
political credit for Philippine initiatives, there have been sev-
eral previous efforts to organize top-level consultations, sparked
partly by the desire of South Korea and Nationalist China for
greater regional anti-Communist unity. Neither Thailand, which
shares current Philippine disillusionment with SEATO, nor Pak-
istan accepted invitations to the Manila meeting, but Serrano ap-
parently envisages subsequent bilateral talks with those govern-
ments and with Malaya.
/American ambassador Johnson in Bangkok reports SEATO
morale to be "at low ebb," and fears that the organization may
be "fatally discredited" unless it can soon persuade its Asian mem-
bers that it is able to take some meaningful action with regard to
the Laotian crisis.
19 Jan 61
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Negotiations for Meeting of De Gaulle With Ferhat Abbas
Reported Under Way
.xximediately after the 6-8 January referendum
vote on his Algerian policy, De Gaulle issued instructions
that steps be taken immediately�through well-established
links between the French Government and the Provisional
Algerian Government (PAG)--to pave the way for direct nego-
tiations between himself and rebel representatives. De Gaulle's
willingness in principle to meet PAG premier Ferhat Abbas
was conveyed to the rebels, and Abbas agreed. Negotiations
are now under way to determine the time and place. De Gaulle,
who waived his preference for Paris, offered to meet Abbas
"anywhere in French territory" but balked at Abbas' insistence
on Geneva. Within the French President's official staff it is es-
timated that meetings would begin during the first week of March.
Consideration is also being given to inviting to the proposed
meeting Mohammed Ben Bella�the rebel deputy premier whom
the French captured and imprisoned five years ago--and Messali
Hadj, leader of the moderate and rival Algerian Nationalist Move-
ment, who resides in France under police protection. Members
of De Gaulle's staff foresee difficulty, however, in inducing the
PAG to accept Messali. The French do not intend that Ben Bella
and Messali should be present at more than the preliminary and
final sessioljs
Rebel Minister of Information Yazid told the US Embassy in
Tunis on 17 January that the PAG is willing to meet French rep-
resentatives without any preconditions or agenda.
Yazid asserted that the PAG had no desire to let formalities
stand in the way of opening negotiations, and was considering
means of reassuring French residents in Algeria that their in-
terests would be respected in an Algerian republic. The pro-
visional government probably feels that its position has been
strengthened by the willingness of Algerian Moslems to accord
it open support and by the massive abstention by urban Moslems
in the recent referendum.
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IWO
a I.
Cgeveral members of De Gaulle's entourage reportedly have
reservations as to his approach. Their apprehensions are shared
by leaders of the recently outlawed rightist Front for French Al-
geria, by certain senior army elements, and by some members
of the Delegation General in Algiers. These groups fear that
the PAG, feeling that Paris will try to present a negotiated set-
tlement as a rebel capitulation, will take countermeasures to
convert it into a ,rebel victory. They argue that this could be
done by resumption of intensive terrorism and by a rebel offen-
sive from non-Algerian bases, once De Gaulle gets too involved
in negotiations to withdraw. Within De Gaulle's staff it is con-
sidered probable that Premier Debrg may object so vigorously
to full negotiations with the rebels that he will resign or be re-
moved from office.
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Salvadoran Junta Under Military Pressure Announces
Anti-Communist Measures
The Salvadoran armed forces evidently presented the pro-
visional six-man civil-military junta with an ultimatum on 16
January demanding the immediate curtailment of Communist
and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador. The junta apparently
has yielded, at least for the moment, to the military pressure.
Col. Castillo Navarrete, the minister of defense, who was re-
ported earlier this week to have army backing for a coup if
necessary to quell the Communists, told US Embassy officers
on 17 January that he and a number of other officers had spent
16 hours with the junta the previous day discussing measures
for controlling the Communists.
On 17 January, the junta issued a strong public warning
that it is prepared to counter Communist activity. Col. Cas-
tillo Navarrete told the US officials that a series of decrees will
be issued soon providing legal basis for taking action�including
jail sentences�against extremist and subversive activity. The
junta already has announced the recall of its ambassador in
Havana. No decision to sever relations completely at this time
was made, according to Col. Castillo Navarrete, since that ac-
tion could best be realized through joint action within the Organ-
ization of American States.
Although Castillo Navarrete expressed criticism last month
of US assistance programs in Latin America and told a group of
American officials that his government intended to replace US
advisers to the National Police Force with Chileans or Italians
or both, he stated on the 17th that he had decided after reconsid-
eration that US experts were needed and that his government
would soon request US assistance for the security forces.
The junta will probably encounter difficulties, however, in
carrying out its anti-Communist measures. The pro-Communist
and Castro sympathizers who have already deeply infiltrated the
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provisional government at all levels have demonstrated adept-
ness in legal maneuvering to achieve their ends; they are also
likely to organize student protest demonstrations. If the junta
is unable to control the extremists, the armed forces may oust
the junta and set up a totally military regime to rule until elec-
tions can be held.
-SEGRE-T--
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Chile May Approve Sale of Copper to USSR
The conservative Chilean government headed by President
Jorge Alessandri appears ready to approve a five-year con-
tract for annual sales to the USSR of 60,000 tons of semifin-
ished copper products--about 10 percent of Chile's total pro-
duction. The price is to be no lower than the London Metals
Exchange monthly settlement figure for the month in which
shipment is made. Payments are to be made in US dollars
or convertible sterling. The contract will be subject to
yearly renewal by the Chilean Government.
Chile has not accepted past Soviet or Chinese Communist
offers to take copper, partly at least because past offers in-
volved barter arrangements. In addition, about 90 percent of
its copper comes from US-owned mining companies. This
offer, however, seems more likely to be accepted for several
reasons. World copper prices have declined steadily since
last October, and Chile badly needs to increase its supply of
dollars and foreign exchange. A sale of 60,000 tons is worth
about $35 million at present London Metals Exchange prices
--a sum almost equal to Chile's $40 million balance-of-pay-
ments deficit in 1960. With congressional elections only six
weeks away, leftist political leaders would exploit a refusal
to sell copper, which accounts for about 60 percent of Chile's
foreign exchange and over 50 percent of its tax revenue.
Furthermore, the USSR has recently increased its efforts
to formalize commercial relations with Chile, in order to
obtain an additional source of copper, which usually is in
short supply in the bloc. However, Chile has not heretofore
made any direct sale of copper to the USSR Bloc countries
have bought some Chilean copper through West Germany. In
recent years trade with the USSR has accounted for less than
one percent of Chile's total trade. Chile has no diplomatic
relations with the bloc, but Czech and Hungarian trade mis-
sions are in Santiago.
CONFIDENTIAL
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%09 CONFIDENTIAL viano
'THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United-States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000176
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000176