CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03007384
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 22, 1961

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22 March 1961
Copy No. C1//
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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22 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page i)
2. Situation in the Congo. (Page i)
3. Korea: Pyongyang offers rice to South Korea in gesture
contrasting shortages in South with economic progress
in North. (Page 'it)
4. Africa: All-African People's Conference to begin in
Cairo tomorrow. (Page it)
5. Rumania: Government reorganization concentrates power
in hands of Gheorghiu-Dej. (Page ti)
6. Bulgaria: Intelligence authorities reportedly have un-
covered "nationalist" opposition element within Bulgarian
Communist party. (Page tti)
7. Ecuador: President Velasco's policies bringing about
sharper division between pro- and anti-Castro elements.
(Page tit)
Ii
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XIENG KHOUANG N.
SAYABOURY Muora Soui Ban Ban
Bjt Ta VianTki
NORTHERN LAOS
=E GOVERNMENT
KONG LE - PATHET LAO
KONG LE - PATHET LAO CONCENTRATIONS
AREA OF ACTION
ROAD
0
__TRAIL t
0 ROUTE NUMBER
O321
50
I I
STATUTE MILES
100
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
,
idiLaos: King Savangl is meeting in Vientiane with the 0 X 'd--(1-2j:,
Bouriarm cabinet, apparently to consider new moves tofi-
end the crisis. Economics Minister Ngon Sananikone has
remarked that a decision must be reached soon 0/0/.
a conversation with Ambassador Thompson on 19 /?"5 1'
March, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov pressed 9 je
hard for a fuller definition of US views regarding a neutal y l? 7
status for Laos and the composition of a broadened Laotian
government. He inquired specifically if the US would agree
to the inclusion of the Pathet Lao in a new government.
Thompson gained the impression that the USSR will insist
on at least some Pathet Lao representation in any. broad-
eneCgovernmeng
LIDetails are lacking on the reported capture by Kong Le -
Pathet Lao forces of Kam Keut and a nearby outpost in Kham-
mouane Province of central Laos, but the loss of these posi-
tions is having an unsettling effect on Lao army plans, and has
caused the postponement of a change of commander to strength-
en the yang Vieng Iron
(Backup, Page (Map)
Congo: Kasavubu, Ileo, and Mobutu apparently are unan- 0 k
imous that UN military forces should not be permitted to
return to the port of Matadi, although they seem willing to
allow the entry of civilian UN personnel and the unloading of -2---PLe
nonmilitary cargoes. The UN Command is maintaining its
conciliatory posture, but the Congolese leaders are nervous
over the increase of UN strength in the Leopoldville area as
Indian units arrive,
Concern in Leopoldville may become more acute as a
result of press reports that Dayal is to return as UN repre-
sentative. aammarskjold apparently expects that Dayal wijjj
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Eeturn to the Congo for a short period in April but will leave
about 1 May. On the other hand, the secretary general told
Ambassador Stevenson on 20 March that he had not discussed
the subject with Dayag
The American consul in Elisabethville believes that a
program of recruiting South Africans for service with Tshombe's
forces is well under way. I
about 70 recruits have arrived so far, apparently
as rep acements for the European "white legion," some of whose
members have been reassigned to Katangan units, while others
have withdrawn. (Backup, Page 3)
(Map)
North Korea - South Korea: Capitalizing on recent exag-
gerated South Korean press reports of widespread food short-
ages, North Korea has offered Seoul about '75,000 tons of milled
rice. This gesture is timed for maximum impact among the
rural population in the South, where grain stocks are at their
annual low point. North Korea, which claimed a record harvest
last year, has repeatedly sought to contrast its economic prog-
ress with that of the South. Seoul has consistently rejected
North Korean offers of relief, in the past as obvious propaganda
gambits. (Backup, Page 4)
Africa: The Third All-African People's Conference (AAPC)--
scheduled to meet in Cairo on 23 March--is likely to be held in
a more extremist atmosphere than those in Accra in 1958 and
Tunis in 1960. Although delegations to the AAPC are nongovern-
mental, the conference receives extensive publicity in Africa,
the Near East, and South Asia. This year the situations in the
Congo, Angola, South Africa, and the Rhodesian Federation will
be the major objects of attack. The Cairo press states that Nasir
will make a major address on the opening day of the conference.
(Backup, Page 6)
� Rumania: In a move paralleling earlier changes in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia, Rumanian party leader Gheorghe 0
Gheorghiu-Dej has added to his power by assuming the position
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of chief of state in addition to his present post as party first
secretary. His appointment as chairman of the newly formed
17-man Council of State formally empowers him to intervene
directly in all government operations. The personnel changes
associated with the reorganization appear designed to concen-
trate power in'the hands of Dej and those most closely asso-
ciated with him. (Backup, Page 7)
Bulgaria: Long-quiescent "nationalist" elements in the
Bulgari rt have larLErnnnumistiniactive in he last few
months,
Bulgarian intelligence authorities report-
edly uncovered sometime in January an opposition element of
middle-ranking party functionaries centered in Sofia and Plov-
div who were seeking to create pressure within the party for a
change in regime policies. The group hoped to make Bulgarian
policy less subservient to Soviet policies and more responsive
to internal economic and social requirements. Because of the
delicacy of the situation, the regime reportedly does not intend
to exploit the matter by holdine political trials or by taking ex-
treme punitive measures. (Backup, Page 8)
Ecuador: President Velasco's vacillation on policy toward
the Castro regime and relations with�the bloc is contributing to
a sharp division between pro- and anti-Castro elements. This
conflict, which has been accompanied by organized demonstra-
tions and reported plotting on both sides, may jeopardize the
prospects for holding the 11th Inter-American Conference, which
has been frequently postponed since 1959 and is now scheduled
to begin in Quito on 24 May. Indications of an impending shake-
up in the cabinet, which may include removal of Foreign Minis-
ter Chiriboga--leader of the anti-Castro faction in the govern-
ment--suggest that Velasco is leaning toward the pro-Castro
groups and has decided to strengthen his relations with Cuba. If
Velasco moves toward stronger support of the pro-Castro faction,
conservavee1emts are likely to consider action against the
regime. Backup, Page 9)
22 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF
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Situation in Laos
11 his interview with Thompson, Kuznetsov pressed for a
meeting of the International Control Commission (ICC) and the
convening of an international conference on Laos. He argued
that the best solution would be a government under Souvanna
Phouma. Foreign Minister Gromyko, in talks with Secretary
Rusk on 18 March, declined to spell out Soviet views on such
substantive points as a cease-fire, elections, and the status of
the Laotian king and parliament and repeated that it was neces-
sary to begin with an international conferenc9
Ehis unwillingness on the part of Soviet officials to go beyond
procedural matters regarding the ICC and a conference probably
reflects Moscow's belief that any Bloc commitments on the terms
of a political settlement would be premature as long as the mili-
tary situation remains favorable to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao
forces and while the Vientiane government shows signs of In-
creasing readiness to pay a high price for a settlemeny
nited NatOns representative Messinesi in Laos has sug-
gested to Ambassador Brown that with the breakdown of Lao
government talks with Souvanna Phouma, the time had come for
some other means of establishing contact with the Pathet Lao.
His thought is that King Savang should appoint some impartial
figure to contact Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong to get him to
meet with Souvanna and General Phoumi in Phnom Penh to ar-
range a cease-fire, a caretaker government or a new govern-
ment, and some means of providing an international guarantee
of Laos' neutrality. Messinesi feels that Souphannouvong might
be willing if it were pointed out that while the military situation
currently favors the Pathet Lao, the trend might be reversed as
a result of additional American aidcj
[Messinesi did not indicate that he intended to advance this
Idea to the Laotian government, although this is a possibility.
Any contact by Vientiane with the Pathet Lao probably would be
through Former Finance Minister Inpeng, who was designated
by Souvanna Phouma to remain in Phnom Penh to act as contact
point with the Boun Oum government. Souvanna has also saic_17
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ghat he would alter his travel plans 7nd return to Phnom Penh
at any time his presence is needed9
Souvanna, now in India, apparently is counting heavily on
gaining Nehru's key support for the convening of a 14-nation con-
ference on Laos. While the Indian government is convinced that
Souvanna is the only man now capable of bringing together the
opposing factions in Laos, .its position has been all along that the
immediate return of the International Control Commission to Laos
would be the quickest way to quiet the fighting and prepare the way
for national reconciliation. Having met with scant success in this
direction, however, India may well be willing now to accept Mos-
cow's proposal for convening the ICC in New Delhi to prepare
Position Papers for a 14-nation conference that would follow.
it the military picture in Laos, there has been little change
In the situation along the Vientiane - Luang Prabang highway.
These periodic lulls indicate that the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
may be overextending their resources in fighting on widely sepa-
rated fronts. The Lao army's lack of aggressiveness has enabled
the enemy to consolidate each gain and to achieve sufficient logis-
tical buildup to support further advances3
lowever, the efforts of Kong Le - Pathet Lao troops against
government forces in the Tha Thom area in southern Xieng Khouang
Province continue to be hampered severely by Meo guerrilla bands
operating in the enemy's rear are0
the "very
fierce" nature of these guerrillas, ur-
gent appeals for additional troops and weapons from the Plaine des
Sarre s.
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Fr
Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
Luarida
0320
INDIA
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
3,200
MALAYA
210
INDONESIA
MOBUTU
7,200
Leopoldv.
hysville
Mc o
MALAYA
150
Gemena
Scattered fore
U T U
3,400
Fr)lIATELJ
MOB UTU
800
anleyville
.Coquilhatville
�Boende
Scattered Forces
*Now arriving
Approximate area controlled
ET Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshombe
flZi United Nations Forces
Selected road
Selected railroad
�1�Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTE MILES 40,0
I
GHANA
1600
I rrancqui
uluabourg
Bakw
Luputa
MALAYA
400
fRinduN
4CACONIF
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
Elise
ETHIOPIA
IZENGA
NIGERIA
Kongolo
1' Usumbura
--
Albertville -
NIGERIA
1,300
�
Manono
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
4,000
thville
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Situation in the Congo
The white South Africans may be used as a "praetorian
guar for Tshombe and his associates. According to an
earlier report, one of the organizers of the South African unit
asserted that the unit would remain intact. Other recruiters
in South Africa reportedly signed up pilots and ground crews
for the jet aircraft which were shipped into Katanga last month
but have yet to be assembled. Although the South African Gov-
ernment appears sympathetic to Tshombet regime, it may dis-
courage these recruiting efforts in view of its own needs) (
Pierre Mulele, Gizenga's principal representative in Cairo,
summed up his activities Com-
menting on his recent trip to Moscow, Mulele stated, "In general,
our friends are ready to give all material aid and technicians
which we need." Commenting that the aircraft requested by
Gizenga are "at our disposal," he stated that the mission is mak-
ing arrangements with "friendly African countries" to attain "a
rapid and happy solution" to the problem of overflight. Neigh-
boring territories such as Sudan have shown no weakening in
their opposition to the granting of overflight privileges, and coun-
tries such as Ghana and Guinea which might allow bloc aircraft
to stage into the Congo are too far away to permit the shipment
of significant amounts of material assistance.
Mulele also urged Gizenga to "calm General Lundula"�ap-
parently a reflection of reports that Lundula was willing to
negotiate with Leopoldville authorities. He further asserted
that the Cairo mission was sending agents back to the Congo to
subvert the supporters of the Leopoldville regime.
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North Korea Offers Rice to South Korea
Pyongyang's offer of rice to South Korea is the latest in
a series of aid proposals all designed to stir popular agita-
tion for increased North-South contacts apcI foster dissatis-
faction with the Chang Mvon government.
Pyongyang
officials anticipated a wave of South Korean riots over food
shortages in April. These officials, were
convinced that South Korea's economic difficulties will force
eventual reunification of the peninsula on Communist terms]
Last August, North Korean Premier Kim Il-song proposed
a confederation of North and South in which each would keep its
own sovereignty while working out economic and cultural coop-
eration. Kim's speech was followed by an unprecedented prop-
aganda campaign detailing proposed remedies for southern
economic problems. Among these specific proposals have been
offers to rebuild the city of Seoul completely, to construct hous-
ing for 100,000 South Korean families, to build bridges and fac-
tories, and to set up numerous joint North-South committees to
consider scientific and cultural matters.
Annual spring food shortages in South Korea have developed
earlier than usual this year because of typhoon damage to crops
last year. The American Embassy in Seoul, however, reports
after a survey of two of the most affected southern provinces
that grain deficiencies are not as serious as Seoul press ac-
counts suggest. Local officials have indicated they have some
resources and are taking� measures to cope with the problem.
They believe that receipt of anticipated additional supplies of
food will prevent the shortages from becoming critical and pro-
voking serious unrest. One official noted that the uncertainty
generated by inflammatory press reports from Seoul was more
likely to cause discontent than the immediate problems to which
the people are accustomed.
The shortages are more a problem of distribution than of
supply. A gradual release of rice stocks held by speculators
�and the arrival of barley financed by US aid have contributed to
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a slight decline of grain prices in Seoul. In addition the Na-
tional Construction Service program now under way is expected
to help avert a rural crisis by providing employment on public
projects.
Pyongyang's offer, however, is almost certain to stimulate
further the small but vocal minority of South Korean intellec-
tuals and students who are propagating the idea that unification
based on a vague formula of Korean neutralization offers the
only solution to the nation's chronic economic difficulties. The
Chang Myon government is aware of the danger of growing pub-
lic sentiment for some direct contacts with North Korea and has
indicated some willingness to be more flexible in an effort to
convince the public it is doing all that is possible to satisfy de-
sires for unification.
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%old
Third All-African People's Conference
The first AAPC was held in December 1958 at the initia-
tive of Ghana's Nkrumah and provided an opportunity for a
general expression of African desires for independence. At-
tendance totaled about 300, representing approximately 60
nationalist groups from most of Africa's independent nations
and dependent territories. The second meeting at Tunis in
January 1960 was highlighted by harsh criticism of the US and
the European colonial powers and by an implied approval of
violence as a means to win independence. Attendance at the
second conference was less than 150 delegates, representing
political parties and trade unions in 30 states and territories.
At the forthcoming meeting, the independence of still de-
pendent territories will again be the paramount issue, despite
the achievement of that goal by many African states since the
last conference. The number of delegates and the organizations
represented is expected to show a further decline. Delegates
from the Casablanca powers (UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mo-
rocco), however, will probably seek to maintain their pose as
spokesmen for Africa by leading denunciations of the West,
apartheid, and UN ineffectiveness in the Congo. Observers
from Sino-Soviet bloc countries can be expected to attend and
lobby vigorously, especially with delegates from territories
still under European control.
aasir's speech is expected to be more than a routine ad-
dress and may set forth his detailed views on Africa and the
Middle East. 1Nasir
is convinced that American poncy in mese areas Is t.isigned
to "isolate" him. In such a mood, his speech is likely to con
tam many criticisms of the USi
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Rumanian Regime Reorganization
Chivu Stoica has been replaced as premier by Ion
Gheorghe Maurer,who has also been named vice chairman
of the Council of State. Stoica remains one of four party
secretaries and will presumably administer the party's po-
litical apparatus under Dej. Gheorghe Apostol, appointed
first deputy premier, will be the principal executive officer
for government affairs. Gheorghiu-Dej, Stoica, Apostol,
and Maurer have been close associates since the 1930s, and
their political power seems unassailable at the present time.
The remaining two vice chairmen of the new Council of State
are former Foreign Minister Avram Bunaciu and Stefan
Voitec, formerly a deputy premier, who has also been se-
lected president of the National Assembly and will serve as
Gheorghiu-Dej's liaison to that body.
The government reorganization represents more than a
consolidation of political power. It appears to be a part of
Rumania's first step in the transition from a "people's democ-
racy" to a "socialist republic," an achievement which has
been claimed publicly among European satellites only by
Czechoslovakia. On 5 March, Gheorghiu-Dej announced that
Rumania required a new constitution which would reflect "pro-
found changes," since the present constitution was drafted 12
years ago. On 21 March the recently elected Grand National
Assembly, after approving the government reorganization,
established a committee to draft this new constitution.
In recent years, Rumania has enjoyed political stability
and has maintained the highest economic growth rate of the
bloc. Progress in industrialization and in:the socialization
of the land--83.7 percent of arable land is now in the social-
ist sector--has been continuous in spite of the continuing low
standard of living and problems of low productivity and poor
quality of goods. The regime has adopted an ambitious eco-
nomic plan for 1961.
CONFIDENTIAL
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NOR*1
"Nationalist" Opposition Group Uncovered in Bulgarian
Communist Party
There is potentially wide support for nationalistic policies
both in the Bulgarian party and among the people, but such sym-
pathies have been manifested only occasionally since the purge
of "Titoist" party secretary Traicho Kostov in 1949. he re-
cent manifestation of nationalism has been abetted by disunity
among the Bulgarian leaders. There is some evidence that
even prior to the Moscow conference last fall, the Sino-Soviet
dispute had resulted in differing views at the top levels. Ac-
cording to an unconfirmed report, politburo member Chervenkov
--an advocate of hard-line, "leftist" policies and never in good
favor with Khrushchev�has in recent months stated his dis-
agreement with current Soviet policies and with the way in which
party first secretary Zhivkov implements Soviet directives. He
reportedly has urged Bulgarian "neutrality" in the Sino-Soviet
dispun
The "national" Communists apparently believe a more
flexible approach than that being taken by the regime is needed
if Bulgaria's chronic economic problems are to be resolved.
Although at least the leaders of this group apparently have been
apprehended, sympathy for their positions and agit tion within
the party for reform will probably continue. The need for
agricultural reforms, for example, remains an area of grave
concern to the regime, and the party central committee is
scheduled to meet on 30 March in plenary session to con-
sider the agricultural problem. The foreign trade deficit al-
though reduced during 1960, is also a major problem.
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Dissension in Ecuador Over Policy Toward Cuba
Former Minister of Government Manuel Araujo, a close
friend of Velasco, is reportedly organizing a clandestine group
composed of Communists and leftists to promote a Castro'
style revolution in Ecuador. As the principal spearhead of
the pro-Castro forces, he may have coordinated his plans with
top leaders in Cuba, where he recently spent three weeks.
Araujo has also made a concerted effort to force the resigna-
tion of Chiriboga since late February.
Velasco has not only publicly praised Araujo but has ap-
parently cultivated the good will of Cuban diplomats in Ecuador.
He has recently made various public statements tending to favor
the Castro regime, which is supporting Ecuador in its boundary
dispute with Peru.
The anti-Castro forces, aroused by the leftist drift in
Ecuadorean foreign policy, have petitioned for a break in rela-
tions with Cuba. Some moderates, under the leadership of
former President Ponce, have been considering plans for the
ouster of Velasco, which might receive some support from both
retired and active officers of the predominantly anti-Castro
armed forces.
some key officers exerted pressure on Velasco last
ecem er to obtain the resignation of Araujo. Although the gov-
ernment adopted a cordial attitude toward Soviet Ambassador
to Mexico Bazykin during his unofficial visit to Ecuador from
7 to 12 March, the public was hostile and anti-Communist groups
managed to launch some anti-Soviet demonstrations despite an
official ban on such activities.
Other threats to the success of the 11th Inter-American Con-
ference are the prospect that Castro will attend and that Ecuador
will insist on� discussing its boundary dispute with Peru. This
issue may touch off violent demonstrations.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Depnrtment of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investibation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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