CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000177
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 21, 1961

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21 January 1961
CENTRAL
L\TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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4100
21 January 1961
CONTENTS
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
1. Khrushchev speech on world Communist policy,
(Preliminary analysis). (Backup, Page 1)
2. USSR central committee plenum on agriculture.
(Backup, Page 5)
ASIA-AFRICA
3. Situation in Laos. (Backup, Page 7) (Map)
4. Congo: Indications that Moroccan forces will
withdraw from UN operation, (Backup, Page 9) (Map)
5. Current elections in Iran. (No Backup)
6. UAR and exile groups map campaign against
Jordanian monarchy. (Backup, Page 11)
THE WEST
7. Dominican Republic - Venezuela:
New Trujillo plot against Betancourt, (No Backup)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
ii
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*World Communist Policy: Khrushchev's speech of
6 January to a group of Soviet party functionaries,
published in the Soviet party journal Kommunist on 17
January, is a vigorous reaffirmation of Soviet positions
in the Sino-Soviet dispute on world Communist strategy,
including the view that Communism can triumph in the
world without general war, primarily by demonstrating
its economic superiority to capitalism. In effect, Khru-
shchev serves notice to the world Communist movement
that the recent Moscow conference of Communist leaders
has not altered the views of the Soviet party, He avoided,
however, the use of sharp language which could provoke
the Chinese Communists into a revival of polemics. In
terms of Soviet foreign policy, Khrushchev provides
authoritative confirmation of previous indications that
the USSR intends to continue its aggressive anticolonial
line, while at the same time pressing a eamnaien for nego-
tiations with the West at the summit.
(Page 1)
*Soviet Agriculture: The proceedings of the 10-18 Jan-
uary'meeting of the hierarchy of the Soviet party in Moscow,
including a lengthy and sometimes vitriolic speech by Khru-
shchev, confirm that Soviet agriculture has made but little
progress in the last two years and outline in detail Khrushchev's
program for a major effort to solve the USSR's chronic agricul-
tural problems. The proceedings imply an expansion in the
resources devoted to the improvement of agricultural pros-
pects but not in such quantity as to modify the basic orienta-
tion of the economy toward the expansion of heavy industry.
Portions of policies earlier imposed by Khrushchev on Soviet
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agriculture, notably those concerning the "new lands," the
corn-for-fodder program, and the substitution of incen-
tives in place of coercion and Communist enthusiasm as
motivation for the Soviet farmer, have been very forcibly
restated. (Page 5)
ASIA-AFRICA
*Laos: Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces on 20 January are
reportedto have taken Tha Thom, the government's last
Important post in Xieng Khouang Province. Garrison com-
manders had shown little disposition in recent days to make
a strong stand and apparently intend to resort to guerrilla-
type operations. The government troops recently forced out
of Phou Khoun at the junction between the Vientiane- Luang
Prabang road and Route 7 are being reinforced for an early
effort to retake the key junction.
Soviet transports continued airlift operations into Laos
through 20 January and additional flights are scheduled.
(Page 7) (Map)
*Congo: There are indications that the Moroccan Govern-
ment is moving to dissociate itself from the UN Congo opera-
tion. The 3,000-man Moroccan unit in the country reportedly
has beerrdered not to fight against the forces supporting Lu-
mumbatand the Moroccan crown prince recently stated that /At- -
he had undertaken to begin the withdrawal of his forces by 5
February. Harnmarskjold has told US officials that, with Kasa- ii)/
vubu having made public his request for the removal of Dayal, /At ..2_/.2.,
chief UN representative in the Congo, he cannot now appoint a
new representative. Hammarskjold implied, however, that
Dayal's contract would not be renewed when it lapses two months
henc% The situation
along- e border betwee Kivu Province ana nuanda-Urundi re
? -
?
portedly is explosive4 pith Congolese authorities expecting an
�7,1_�()
21 Jan 61
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Imminent Belgian attack. The UN appar-
ently has plans to move the UAR battalion from Equateur to
Kasai Province, but the battalion's commander has objected
to an early move,even by a part of his unit.
(Page 9) (Map)
*Iran: The Shah, faced by chronic financial difficulties
and persistent nationalist opposition, is trying to strengthen
his position with a new round of rigged parliamentary elec-
tions, now about 20.4percent completed. The elections started
in rural areas about a week ago and are scheduled for Tehran
about the first of February. The Shah apparently has hoped
that the elections, besides fulfilling constitutional requirements,
would produce a favorable impression on the United States, on
which he continues to rely for financial help. Although the Shah
will obtain a reasonably, docile parliament, the electoral meth-
ods and the disorders which may still result from them, particu-
larly in Tehran, will maintain the breach between the Shah and
the people, and the possibility of a coup against him continues.
In an effort to moderate Soviet propaganda the Shah plans
to send a "good-will" mission to Moscow in March. Khru-
shchev accepted the mission in principle on 8 January. Iran=
Ian Foreign Ministry officials feel, however, that the USSR will
continue to press for a prior agreement on some points which
could be announced in Moscow on the occasion of the visit. The
USSR's aim is a political accommodation which would at least
begin to weaken Iran's ties with the West, but the Shah insists
he will agree to nothing which would compromise Iran's obliga-
finnA to thp Central Treaty Orcrani7atinn and thp TTnitpd Statps
UAR-Jordan: Prominent Jordanian exiles in the UAR and
UAR officials, including Nasir, have agreed during recent dis-
cussions in Cairo that inherent dissatisfaction within Jordan should et)
be supported and exploited with the aim of eventually overthrow-
ing the Jordanian monarchy and "freeing" Jordan from Western
control, according to a fairly reliable source. Abdullah Rimawi,
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former Jordanian minister of state for foreign affairs, and
All Abu Nuwar, former chief of the Jordanian general staff,
reportedly are to continue efforts to develop separate capa-
bilities for revolutionary action in Jordan--Rimawi among
civilian, especially Baathist party, elements and Nuwar among
Jordanian army personnel. Meanwhile, Jordanian agents have
t resumed terrorist activities in Syria similar to those which fol-
lowed the asTsgination of Jorrian'an Prime Minister Majalli
last August.
[
(Page 11)
THE WEST
Dominican Republic - Venezuela: Trujillo is reported as
"impatient and upset" because a plan to assassinate President
Betancourt of Venezuela had not had "results" several days ago.
There is other strong evidence that Trujillo's specialist in clan-
destine operations has been concocting another attempt against
the Venezuelan Government or against Betancourt personally.
The Venezuelan Government has been concerned since Novem-
ber over evidence of renewed plotting by Venezuelan exiles in
the Dominican Republic, which supported an abortive uprising
of dissident Venezuelan military officers last April and the as-
sassination effort against Betancourt in June. Any further at-
tempt against the Betancourt government by Truiillo could pro-
voke armed retaliation by Venezuela.
21 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Khrushchev Speech on World Communist Policy (Prelim-
inary Analysis)
Most of Khrushchev's 6 January speech to a group of
Communist party functionaries--the full text of which is now
available in the current Kommunist--is devoted to a confident
reaffirmation of Soviet positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute on
world Communist strategy. Reporting on the November 1960
conference of 81 Communist parties, Khrushchev in effect
notifies the rank and file of the world Communist movement--
more clearly than did the often equivocal declaration produced
by the conference�that Soviet global strategy is sufficiently
"militant" and that Moscow has not b een pushed by Peiping any
further than it wishes to go. Khrushchev clearly intends this
speech to stand as the definitive interpretation of Soviet policy
following the conference, complementing the short and formal
resolution on the conference passed by the central committee
on 18 January.
The Balance of Power. The Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy
has centered on the assessment of the balance of power between
the bloc and the West and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom.
In reaffirming his rejection of Chinese positions, Khrushchev
begins from the proposition that two facts must be recognized:
that the bloc is becoming the "decisive factor" in world affairs,
but also that the West still has "great strength." Under the cir-
cumstances the bloc cannot undertake the extremely militant
revolutionary program which Peiping advocates, but it can con-
tinue to make steady and substantial gains.
Questions of War. Khrushchev reiterates his contention that
the bloc's strength deters the West from general war and that it
increasingly deters the West from local wars, such as Western
military action against an anti-Western regime like Castro's. He
rejects the argument, which,the Chinese reportedly have made
that general war with the West will be necessary for
a Communist global triumph. In this connection, he reaffirms
his belief that long-term economic competition with the West will
be "decisive," that the USSR will move ahead of the United States
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in per capita industrial production in or about 1970, and that
"to win time in this contest (for both economic and military
power) is now the main thing." In supporting his claims for
progress Khrushchev redrew selected comparisons between
the Soviet and US economies to support his prediction that
Soviet industrial production, although only 30 percent of the
US in 1955 and 60 percent in 1960, will exceed the US in 1965.
The Soviet leader reaffirms Moscow's view--which Pei-
ping disputes�that the consequences of general war could be
disastrous for the bloc as well as the West. He also reaffirms
that the USSR is ordinarily opposed to local wars owing to the
danger of their expansion, a risk which Peiping minimizes. As
for one category of local wars however, i. e. "liberation" wars
such as the current Algerian rebellion, Khrushchev states his
view (in this case, in agreement with Peiping) that such wars
are indeed inevitable so long as imperialism exists, and he
affirms that the bloc will give aid to "liberation" forces.
The speech reinforces earlier indications that Moscow will
pursue a more aggressive program in all "colonial" area,s�
among which Khrushchev specifies Algeria, the Congo, and Laos.
However, the speech evades the question--on which the Chinese
have charged Khrushchev with timidity�of whether bloc support
to "liberation" forces will go so far as to risk military clashes
with the West. Similarly, in distinguishing a fourth category of
wars, "national uprisings" such as Castro's, and in stating his
expectation of and favor for such uprisings, Khrushchev declares
that such wars must not become wars between states but evades
the question of what risks the bloc will take.
Coexistence and Negotiations. Khrushchev reiterates his
adherence to the concept of "peaceful coexistence"--that is com-
petition and conflict with the West by all means short of delib-
erate engagement in war between states. The Chinese have ar-
gued this militant interpretation of "coexist-
ence" impedes the "struggle" with the West.
On East-West relations Khrushchev reaffirms his belief in
the existence of elements in the West who are interested in peace,
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and he asserts that it is necessary to "strive for negotiations
and agreements" with the West and to develop personal con-
tacts with Western statesmen �a line which Peiping has de-
� rided. He makes it clear that the German and Berlinquestions
remain the cardinal issues in negotiations with the West. His
threat to conclude a separate treaty with East Germany car-
ries forward his recent private effort to create a certain sense
of urgency on this issue without precipitating a crisis.
Other Tactics. Khrushchev defends at length his policy of
wooing the nationalist leaders of underdeveloped countries, even
at the cost of sacrificing the local Communist parties there. The
Chinese have accused him of exaggerating the importance of the
neutralists (e. g. Nehru, Nasir, Sukarno), and they have urged
less Soviet aid and more of an effort to bring these leaders down.
Khrushchev seems willing to move a little faster toward making
pro-Soviet "national democracies" (e. g. Cuba) of the neutral na-
tionsy but still not as fast as Peiping wishes.
45 for the tactics of Communist parties in the West, Khru-
shchev reaffirms a gradualist program for these parties, envis-
aging lengthy preparation through "democratic" movements
for eventual revolution. �The Chinese have argued that "revolu-
tionary situations" exist today in Western Europe and should be
exploited.
Discipline of the Movement. In the latter part of his speech,
Khrushchev� discusses the question of the discipline of the world
Communist movement, which all along has been the underlying
issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev insists that the
"unity" of the movement is of "foremost importance," and he
reiterates that the Soviet party recognizes the "equality" of other
parties and does not regard itself as the "center" of the move-
ment. He follows this, however, by making clear that the Soviet
party does indeed wish to be regarded as the principal party and
as the spokesman for the bloc, and he in effect advises the other
parties to get rid of those who sympathize more with Peiping than
with Moscow. Several parties at the November conference had
supported the Chinese on some issues, and many other parties
were neutral or split.
� Khrushchev in conclusion addresses himself directly to the
Chinese, whom elsewhere in the speech he condemns (without
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naming them) for persistent "dogmatism and sectarianism,"
i. e. rigidity and obstructionism. He reminds the Chinese
that Sino-Soviet "unity" is necessary to "disappoint" and con-
found their common enemies. Here and elsewhere he indirect-
ly admits that the Moscow conference did not resolve Sino-
Soviet differences and may actually have made them worse.
Moscow has continued to criticize the Chinese "leap forward"
and commune programs, has almost certainly continued to re-
sist Chinese requests for nuclear weapons, and has evidently
maintained its economic pressure on Peiping.
Although following the conference the two parties were
reportedly to discuss the return of Soviet technicians all of
whom were withdrawn last summer, with serious conseauences
for Peiping's program of economic development
as of early January none of the techni-
cians had returned to China.
Khrushchey's speech does not suggest, however, that there
will be a break between the Soviet and Chinese parties. The
prospect is for more frequent meetings of the two parties and
other major Communist parties. In these meetings the Soviet
party will probably continue to command a majority, but the
Chinese will have enough support to keep Khrushchev on the de-
fensive about his strategy. For example, Ithrushchey will be
under pressure from Peiping and others to take a hard line in any
summit talks, and, if he fails to achieve substantial gains, he
will be open to charges of having slowed down world Communist
momentum for nothing.
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SIO104CONFIDENTIAL
Y4010'
USSR Central Committee Plenum on Agriculture
Proceedings of the USSR central committee plenum on
agriculture which met 10-18 January in Moscow confirm that
Soviet agriculture has made little progress toward achieving
the 70-percent increase in output called for by the Seven-
Year Plan (1959-63). Agricultural production in 1960, as in
1959, remains below that of the 1958 base year of the plan.
According to the resolution adopted by the plenum, in-
vestment in agriculture is to be increased to "make up for
lost time." Programs were outlined for increasing the farm
machinery pool, expanding irrigation, and increasing the pro-
duction of mineral fertilizers--all requiring substantial amounts
of additional capital. The amount of increase was not disclosed,
but an earlier report suggested that it may be as much as 15
percent greater than originally scheduled under the plan, a sig-
nificant increase, though small in terms of the total investment
program which overwhelmingly favors heavy industrial develop-
ment.
The role of the Ministry of Agriculture is to change. Until
now the ministry was responsible for the entire agricultural op-
eration--about 6,500 state farms,,which are state enterprises
similar in operation to industrial 'enterprises, and over 50,000
collective farms, which are profit-sharing enterprises operated
on state lands and under state supervision. Under the new set-
up the ministry was charged with improving agricultural re-
search and its application and the training of agricultural per-
sonnel, The extent to which the ministry is to be divested of
its administrative role is not yet known.
A new agency is to be created to supply farms with indus-
trial products and to maintain farm equipment. Khrushchev described
the agency as an association with a hierarchical administration
composed of representatives at each level from the republics
down to the farms themselves intended to give the farms a
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greater say in the kind of agricultural supplies to be pro-
vided by industry.
� The system through which the regime procures agricul-
tural products for state use is to be reorganized. This is
intended to give the state better control over sales at the lo-
cal levels and to do away with such practices as the purchase
by farms at state-sale outlets of products which were then
sold back to the state as part of the farm's production quota.
The proceedings of the plenum suggest that the regime
intends to increase its pressure on farmers' markets, the
last principal vestiges of free enterprise in the USSR.
While the administrative measures should improve the
efficiency of Soviet agriculture, the efficacy of Ithrushchev's
program in fostering renewed agricultural growth will depend
primarily on the size of the additional resources and the speed
with which they are made available.
Khrushchev repeatedly reaffirmed many of his pet agri-
cultural measures. These included programs to increase
drastically the area sown to corn, cultivation of the marginal
lands of Central Asia and Western Siberia�the "new lands"
program�and the emphasis on material incentives as moti-
vation for the Soviet farmer in place of earlier emphasis on
Communist enthusiasm and coercion.
CONFIDENTIAL
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LAOS
21 JANUARY 1961
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Situation in Laos
or--� With the apparent capture on 20 January of Tha Thom--
the government's last strongpoint in Xieng Khouang Province--
the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have completed the disrup-
tion of Laotian Army General Phoumies planned operation to
retake the strategic Plaine des Jarres. Phoumi's plan had
called for government troops to advance north from Tha Thom
simultaneously with a drive east along Route 7 from the junc-
tion at Phou Khoun, which antigovernment forces seized on
17 January.
Phoumi hopes to retake the junction soon, with the aid of
reinforcements now arriving in the area, but the antigovern-
ment forces retain the initiative. The dispersal of the govern-
ment's forces in the Tha Thom area puts Kong Le and Pathet
Lao in position for a choice of actions--to move south against
Pak Sane outflanking Vientiane or to regroup for a drive in
strength westward along Route 7 for a possible attack on Luang
Prabang or on the government columns advancing north from
yang Vieng.
The antigovernment forces are keeping the Laotian Army
off, balance by a buildup of other potential striking forces north
of Luang Prabang and in southern Laos. Following the fall two
weeks ago of a government blocking position 55 miles north of
Luang Prabang, reports have been received that the attacking
force of about 700 Pathet Lao are maneuverine for a possible
assault on the royal capital. Meanwhile, I
a marked in-
crease in antigovernment guerrilla activity in the south. Lao-
tian Army headquarters announced on 19 January that Commu-
nist bloc transports are air-dropping supplies to Pathet Lao
forces in Saravane Province near the South Vietnamese border,
but this has not been confirmed.
The serious morale problem among government troops in
the face of the deteriorating military situation is reflected in the
refusal by the Tha Thom garrison to make a determined stand as
ordered. Under the circumstances, the government commander
in the Tha Thom area is turning to harassing tactics, using prin-
cipally some 1,500 Meo tribesmen who are adept at guerrilla
warfare but are poorly armed and equipped.
Soviet IL-14 transports continued to airlift supplies into
Laos on 20 January and additional flights are scheduled. Since
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the airlift of military supplies to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao
forces began on 13 December, Soviet transports have flown
about 216 confirmed sorties into Laos, Most of these sorties
have been to the Yang Vieng area and more recently to the
Xieng Khouang area. Most of the eighteen Soviet LI-2s which
arrived in North Vietnam from the USSR during the past sev-
eral days are now at Haiphong. Soviet aircraft in North Viet-
nam now include 10 IL-14s (similar to the Conv 18
rfaimirto the C-47), and 5 MI-4 helicopters.
A recent unconfirmed report indicates
are now armed.
there were about 120 North Viet-
namese�mostly artillerymen�with the Kong Le forces defend-
ing the area but that they had withdrawn prior to the attack on
Vang Vieng by Phoumi's forces. Military equipment captured
from the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces at yang Vieng included
artillery and munitions with Soviet markings and medical sup-
plies from Bulgaria. Although there is ample evidence that
significant numbers of North Vietnamese personnel�mostly
artillerymen, technicians, and probably combat advisers�and
Communist bloc military equipment havebeen supplied to the
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces, there is still no evidence that
regular units of the North Vietnamese Army are operating in
Laos.
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Brazzaville
Luanda
Atlantic
Ocean
Republic of the Congo
�Gemena
StanleyvIlle
Coquilhatville
Lake
Albert
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21 JANUARY 1961
UNCLASSIFIED
STATUT! MILES ,
Port Francqui
Luluabour;
Luput
40,0
31534
Bakwanga
.Kamina
Kongolo
Albertville
Manono
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Eflsabethville
Lake
Tanganyika
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Situation in the Congo
There are indications that the Moroccan Government,
whose 3,000 troops constitute the largest national compo-
nent of the 20,000-man UN force in the Congo, is moving
to dissociate itself from the UN operation. Moroccans re-
portedly have been ordered not to fight against the forces
supporting Lumumbarand Crown Prince Moulay Hassan,
chief of staff of the Bro-roccan Army, told the American
charge in Rabat on 17 January that he had recently under-
taken to begin the withdrawal of his forces by 5 February.
Hammarskjold told American officials on 19 January that
Morocco had officially asked for the repatriation of 2,000
of its troops and implied that he thought Ghana and the UAR
might follow the Moroccan lead/
Dlammarskjold also stated that public pressure has made
it impossible to replace Rajeshwar Dayal, his personal rep-
resentative in the Congo. However, Dayal's contract expires
in two months, and Hammarskjold implied there would be no
attempt to renew it. He stated that it would be ex
ficult to find a renlacement accentabie to all sides.
The situation along the border between Kivu Province and
the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi reportedly is ex-
plosive. Congolese authorities have sealed off the border,
stranding 800 Europeans. The Congolese apparently expect
a Belgian military incursion to rescue the whites; on 18 Jan-
uary the head of the provincial government, who is loyal to
Gizenga, told a border post to "take position for the eventual
attack by paracommandos." Atrocities by Congolese troops
seem to be increasing, despite efforts by some arhorities to
bring the army under control.
the UN has plans
well developed to transfer part of the UAR battalion from Equa-
teur to Kasai Provinc!
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a member of the high command in Leopoldville told the battalion
commander that the entire unit might eventually be transferred.
The commander objected to the proposal that part of the battalion
be sent to Kasai in the near future, stating that this would cre-
ate "administrative nroblems:'
protesting the transfer of Lumumba to Elisabethville
and reiterating the need for speedy bloc and UAR aid to his re-
gime. Gizenga charged that a,force of 500 Belgians had already
invaded Kivu and that Tshombe, Mobutu, and Kalonji were pro-
posing a "military conference"--presumably a reference to the
February round-table conference in Elisabethville--whose pur-
pose would be to plan the overthrow of the Gizenga government.
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AR Encouraging Development of Revolutionary Capabilities
In Jordan
Abdullah Rimawi, former Jordanian minister of state for
foreign affairs, and All Abu Nuwar, former chief of the Jor-
danian general staff, returned to Damascus from Cairo on
5 January after spending "about six weeks arranging further
plans" for activities against Jordan, according to a fairly re-
liable source. Throughout their discussions with UAR officials,
including Nasir, there was general agreement that dissatisfac-
tion within Jordan should be exploited with the aim of eventually
overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy and "freeing" the coun-
try from Western control. Rimawi and Nuwar, who fled to Syria
after the abortive pro-Nasir coup in Jordan in 1957, reportedly
are to continue efforts to develop separate capabilities for rev-
olutionary action in Jordan�Rimawi among civilian elements and
Nuwar among Jordanian Army personnel.
Close contacts allegedly are being maintained between Rimawi,
a former leader of the Baath (Socialist) party in Jordan, and Jor-
danian Baathist groups loyal to him. Reorganization of Rimawi's
group in Jordan�which he claims is progressing satisfactorily--
is being countered by activities in Jordan of the Baath party's
pan-Arab leadership under Michel Aflaq in Beirut, which expelled
Rimawi and generally opposes his aims and activities. Rimawi is
said to believe, however, that the influence in Jordan of "the Aflaq
group" is declining, no mention of the status of Nu-
war's efforts among .orcianian military personnel.
Rimawi reportedly complained that Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, the
UAR Minister of Interior for the Syrian Region, has made things
as difficult as possible for him and Nuwar. Rimawi said Sarraj
had separate plans regarding Jordan and could not be trusted.
Jordanian agents, meanwhile, have resumed the kind of ter-
rorist activities in Syria--bombings and other. sabotage--which
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marked the period following the assassination of Jordanian
Prime Minister Majalli last August. Lebanese authorities
deported seven Jordanians on 17 January and later arrested
24 others, along with 14 Syrians, on suspicion of engaging in
such activities from Lebanese territory.
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Nue CONFIDENTIAL '440e
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIALT
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Fm."
;0$1
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