CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001980
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 11, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001980 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
%or 01C%iiitC I
11 April 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BU LLETI
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LATE ITEM
(Information as of 0600 EST, 11 April)
*USSR: There is no basis
to support rumors rampant in Moscow throughout 10 April of
a successful Soviet man-in-space effort.
intention to impact the vehicle in Kamchatka rather
than to place it in orbit. This event was not accompanied by
activation of tracking and direction finding facilities and search/
recovery aircraft associated with previous life-bearing satel-
lites this year. For these reasons, among others, we also be-
Helve it extremely unlikely that the 9 April launching involved
a sub-orbital manned flight.
Moscow has so far maintained an official silence on the
rumors which apparently originated and gained momentum
within the Moscow press corps--both western and Soviet. Ex-
haustive inquiries by western correspondents have failed to
substantiate the rumors. Leonid Sedov, a Soviet scientist
closely associated with Moscow's space program who is currently
in the US, last evening categorically dismissed as untrue US press
headlines he was shown which alleged that the USSR had or-
bited a man. Sedov had earlier in the day indicated no surprise
when shown initial press releases concerning the rumors, but
declined to comment before consulting the Soviet Embassy in
Washington.
There is evidence
of continuing preparations for a space program launching at-
tempt expected within the next day or two. Reports from west-
ern press services in Moscow that Soviet radio and television
staffers have been placed on a 24-hour alert may be related
to this activity.
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41N
,
8. Guatemala: Return of Communist leaders facili-
tated by President Ydigoras' divide-and-rule
tactics. (Page v)
�
4
2 9. Cuba: Ecuadorean foreign minister turns down Cuban
request for support against US in UN. (Page v)
�
�
11 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Congo: Hammarskjold apparently to continue ne-
gotiating with Leopoldville on UN re-entry into
Matadi. (Page Li)
3. Communist China: Indonesian President Sukarno
may try to act as intermediary for Peiping while
in Washington. (Page it)
4. Portugal: Defense Minister Moniz again demands
reforms in Lisbon's domestic and overseas poli-
cies. (Page tit)
5. USSR: Khrushchev on vacation; probably working
on new party program to be presented at 22nd party
congress. (Page iii)
6. Japan: Prime Minister Ikeda faces growing diffi-
culty in maintaining unified support of the ruling
Liberal-Democratic party. (Page iv)
7. Pakistan: Military regime concerned over student
discontent. (Page iv)
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hong Saly
1PHOIN.G SALY-
LUANG; PRA BANG.
Luang Prabang
SAYABOURY
Pilau Kh un
Muong ikassy
NORTHERN LAOS
41., GOVERNMENT Forces in
411 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
KONG LE- PATHET LAO AREAS
---ROAD
-TRAIL
cj> ROUTE NUMBER
STATUTE MILES
Dien Bien Phu
Sam- Neua
7
SAM NEUA
Xieng /070117,1119;
Ban Ta Viang
� Tha. Thom
Vang Vireng
VIENTIANE � Borikhao:�,.
411 Pak Sane
r �Kam KeutY
����
Lak
Saifr',�
KHAMMOUANE
Vientiane
7
Nhommorat
Savannakhet
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
� Laos: 141 the Pak Sane area, government troops have
been oirared to conduct patrol activity and to improve de-
fensive positions., Government patrols probing enemy loca-
tions a few miles east of Nhommarat on 9 April were firedl
on by an enemy force of unknown strength, supported by /P-d
I.20-mm. mortar_sj
aormer Premier Souvanna Phouma has altered his
Itinerary to include a visit to the US from 18 to 20 April;
originally he was scheduled to be in Moscow from 16 to
20 April, but now will leave there on 1.8 April and return
after visiting Washington?
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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ETHIOPIA
1,500
Banana
4
INDIA
300
SUDAN
400
Brazzaville�
Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
870
Luanda
610410 2
TUNISIA
3,200
NIGERIA
400
INDONESIA
280
�Gemena
Scattered Force
MOBUTU
3.400
ISa
Bu
Aketr
Burnba
MOB UTU
800
EQUATELJ
�Coquilhatville
� Boende
� me-
MOBUTU
7,200
ETHIOPIA
200
Scattered Forces
EOPOLDVILLE
Leopoldv
ysville
Ikela
Francqui
Basoko
�
GIZENGA
7,000
MALAYA
750
KALON1I
1,500
uluabourg
Bak angA
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
n Gizenga
11 Kalonji
J�jj T.shombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
� Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
loo I
STATUTE MILES
, ,
40,0
Luputa
LIBERIA
230
Sta�n-Feyville
Bukavu
Kin CU
ETHIOPIA
800
Kamina
INDIA
1400
Kongolo
'Kabalo
Alb�ville
INIG6RIA
900.
� -
Manono
TSHOMBE
7,000
Elisabethville
NIGERIA
500
Usumbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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*.e
Congo: Hammarskjold told a group of Western rep-
resentatives on 8 April that Kasavubuts recent letter, which
suggested a phased entry of a UN police unit into Matadi,
was unsatisfactory. He said that Canadian communications
ersonnel, who would be essential to any military movements
hrough the port, would refuse to go back under such an ar-
angement. However, he stated that the Kasavubu reply did
not warrant strong UN action and implied that he hoped to cain
further concessions from the Congolese by negotiatio19
airo will be rebuffed in its attempts to obtain
Sudanese permission to extend the UAR civil air route to Stan-
leyville. A Sudanese official, answering the UAR ambassador's
request for overflight and stopover privileges, reiterated Khar-
toum's position that only UN flights would receive transit rights,
stating that similar requests from Belgium and Czechoslovakia
had been turned down. The UAR request was to be submitted to
the Sudanese Council of Ministers, bu d r es-
simistic over the chances of success.
*The 2,300-man Indian UN contingent destined for Katanga
remains on shipboard off Dar es Salaam pending a decision in
New York concerning its disposition. A UN plan to airlift the
contingent into ICatanga is stymied at present by the unavaila-
bility of aviation fuel in Dar es Salaam and lay the inadermacv of
thP 1nrn1 riinwav irCYNWTTIENTTAT (Man)
k�UMULUEllbr tsrunct - uniteu otates; oflowLng recent LcUKS
with Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi, Indonesian
President Sukarno stated that his visit to the US on 24-25 April
will have a "profound effect" on Peiping's relations with the rest
of the world.
felt it was virtually certain that
ukarno, with the knowledge and approval of Chen Yi, would
bring up with President Kennedy the subject of Peiping's entry)
11 Apr 61
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Tato the UN, ways and means of improving Sino-American
relations, and other similar subject_q
he Chinese Communists would be happy to have Sukarno
argue their case in Washington along lines Chen discussed
during his Indonesian visit. At that time, Chen expressed
regret over the state of Sino-American relations, suggesting
that the sole reason for the impasse was the "hard-boiled"
and inflexible US stand on Taiwan. As he did in a March con-
versation with a Swedish diplomat, Chen implied that the next
move is up to the US. He proposed that the withdrawal of the
US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait "ought not be a dif-
ficult thing," presumably as the first step toward a complete
withdrawal nf ITS qnnnnrt of 1-hP Chin PRP 1\Tation21istq-7
Portugal: Refense Minister Botelho Moniz repeated to
President Thomaz on 5 April the demands he made on 28-29
March to Premier Salazar for immediate reforms in Portuguese
domestic and overseas policies. Salazar has not yet replied to
these demands and,
Moniz will "very soon" send an ultimatum to Thomaz
that unless he pushes Salazar aside the military will take over
the government. The defense minister, who is reported confi-
dent of complete military backing, has thus far not acted as vig-
orously as he had indicated in February;
Moniz now realizes he must follow through or simply
become "another revolutionary-minded general without portfolio
or stature in the country."
(Backup, Page
USSR: Khrushchev left Moscow on 8 April for a vacation
on the Black Sea coast--his first since early last November. He
was prevented by a heavy schedule, including the Moscow con-
ference of world Communist leaders and his extensive tour of
agricultural troublespots, from taking his customary midwinter
rest. Although he has shown some signs of fatigue in recent
11 Apr 61
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months, the Soviet premier's health has apparently been
reasonably good since a brief attack of flu last December.
Khrushchev indicated earlier that he intended to set
aside most of his vacation time for work on the new party
program--an outline of long-range Soviet goals and strategy
to be presented to the '22nd party congress in October. He
will probably not return to the Soviet capital much before
the opening of May Day ceremonies and will thus have spent
more than lialf of the first four months of the year away from
the center.
( e.
Japan: Prime Minister Ikeda faces growing difficulty in
maintaining unified support of the ruling Liberal-Democratic �4-
�party as faction leaders begin maneuvering to improve their
positions to influence the selection of new party officers ex- 6
pected in July. Ikeda will probably reshuffle his cabinet at -17.:1,)�,..pi
that time in an effort to consolidate the support of party lead-' _
ers for his programs. Ikeda's term as party president extendso-Li'LL:).,,'
until July 1962, and his tenure as prime minister is not ex- A,. ,1-'91-
pected to be challenged this spring. However, his ability
deal firmly with controversial issues and the longer range
stability of his government will depend on the control he es-
tablishes in the next few months. Liberal-Democratic faction _z_e2�A-L
leaders, relatively cooperative with Ikeda since the November
election, have begun questioning his positions on relations
with Communist China, domestic economic development, and
settlement for economic aid received from the US during the
postwar occupation. Faction leader Ichiro Kono is visiting
New York and Washington between 8 and 16 April "assessing
American attitudes on the China issue." Other Ikeda rivals
have planned trips abroad to increase their retieeandto
avoid eclipse by Ikeda's visit to the US in June.
(Backup, Page 4)
Pakistan: The Pakistani military regime is concerned
over signs of growing discontent. Karachi police have again
11 Apr 61
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clashed with college students demonstrating against the sen-
tencing of eight student leaders by a military court for foment-
ing a riot in late February. This student unrest is apparently
symptomatic of more widespread dissatisfaction over the re-
gime's failure to make more rapid progress in implementing
promised reforms, particularly regarding return to constitu-
tional government. President Ayub has postponed his plans to
visit Australia in May and is touring the country to rouse sup-
port for his government's programs. (Back-
up, Page 6)
Guatemala: For the first time since the fall of the pro-
Communist Arbenz regime in 1954, most top leaders of the
Guatemalan Labor (Communist) party are back in the country,
actively reorganizing their party and strengthening their influ-
ence in labor groups and front organizations. Their operations
have been facilitated by President Ydigorast divide-and-rule
tactics which have weakened the opposition Revolutionary party,
the Communists' most powerful political adversary. Ydigoras
has maintained the stability of his conservative regime in large
part by such maneuvers, and his avowed anti-Communist stand
has not prevented him from occasionally working with the Com-
munists when he thought he could use them. (Backup,
Page 7)
Ecuador-Cuba: Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Chiriboga,
in a note to Cuba, in effect rejected the Cuban view that the
Organization of American States is an ineffective body for deal-
ing with Cuba's current complaint against the United States in \-
the UN General Assembly. In his note, Chiriboga said that, while
"recognizing that the OAS is not perfect," Ecuador continues to
adhere to the principles of the inter-American system. He added
that the OAS was established to resolve hemisphere problems.
This formal diplomatic note of Chiriboga, a leader of the anti-
Castro faction in the Ecuadorean Government, may not, however,
reflect the present views of President Velasco, who has followed
an equivocal policy toward the Castro regime.
(Backup, Page 8)
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DAILY BRIEF
fr TOP SECR
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Situation in Laos
General Phoumi, despite his recent allusions to the need
for a political settlement of the Laotian crisis, apparently re-
mains convinced that military action is the only way to prevent
a Communist takeover. He recently told an American Embassy
official that he was fighting a last-ditch battle to keep his "tough"
policy alive. He expressed the belief that the Laotian Army,
"properly armed" and with the aid of American and Thai troops
to offset North Vietnamese forces in Laos, could bring about a
decisive military victory which would restore popular confidence
in Vientiane.
At odds with Phoumi's appraisal
the cautious
and defensive-minded attitude of the Laotian Government.
he government forces are remaining vig-
ilant, "aespite me weakness of our positions, which makes it
seem advisable for us, for our part, to begin to cease hostilities."
a 10 April conversation with Ambassador Thompson,
Gromyko repeated the line Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin
had taken with the UK ambassador in an earlier discussion of
the British proposals on Laos. Gromyko remarked that the USSR
hoped to have a reply to the proposals very soon. He said he was
sure that the Laos problem could be satisfactorily settled if the
US carried out its announced principles toward Laos. Gromyko
remarked that he had the impression that things were calmer in
Laos now but urged that it was most important that no action be
taken to disturb the situation-)
A French Foreign Ministry official on 7 April outlined his
government's preliminary thinking on matters to be dealt with
at a conference on Laos. He sees the main problem in the in=
ternational sphere to be finding means of guaranteeing a status
for Laos giving it unity, independence, and neutrality. France
favors doing this through a unilateral declaration, as advocated
by Souvanna Phouma, rather than with a multilateral document
which would provide too many opportunities for outside inter-
ference. The French spokesman said he envisages that the future
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Laos would have regular diplomatic relations with Peiping
and Hanoi as well as with other participants of the confer-
ence.
Paris believes that the Geneva framework is desirable
for handling military assistance and suggested bilateral ar-
rangements for dealing with economic aid. Regarding Lao-
tian internal affairs, France supports the formation, before
the conference opens if possible, of a Government of National
Unity headed by Souvanna Phouma.
ricwiet transports flew at least 20 sorties into Laos on
8 April, 10 of which were to the Nam Bac area. The follow-
ing day only one Soviet IL 14 was noted in flight to Xieng
Khouang, probably because of poor weather conditions. On
10 April, 13 flights were scheduled to Xieng Khouang:/
TOP SECRET
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Portuguese Defense Minister Pressing President to Install
New Cabinet
a3lresident Thomaz, who had been informed by Salazar of
the latter's meeting with Moniz on 28-29 March, reportedly
has not reacted to the demands put to him by Moniz on 5 April
for extensive policy changes.
Moniz' next step will be to send a trusted emissary to
intorm Thomaz that the army means business and that he must
use his presidential authority to replace the prime minister,
after explaining to Salazar that a military takeover is the al-
ternative to retirement. There is some reason to believe that
this emissary has already talked with Thomaz without result.]
Moniz and the military would reportedly back a new cab-
inet named by Thomaz. It would have to be broadly based to
include various factions within the government. Marcell�
Caetano, former minister of the presidency, is mentioned as
a successor to Salazar, as is Finance Minister Antonio Pinto
Barbosa. Moniz, however, is not optimistic of action from
Thomaz, who was hand-picked by Salazar as party candidate
for the presidency in June 1958J
I Moniz has on previous occasions failed to follow through
on demands for policy changes. In mid-February he is said
to have given Salazar a virtual ultimatum that if the govern-
ment did not undertake socio-economic reforms in the African
provinces before the UN General Assembly reconvened on 7
March, the Defense Ministry would "take the matter into its
own hands.'.9
It is possible that Salazar may try to forestall further
moves on the part of Moniz by a cabinet reshuffle. A "remodel-
ing" reportedly was under consideration in mid-March for the
latter part of the month and was then postponed until after French
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's visit to Lisbon on 8 April.
the National Union, which
is the only legal political party, the international security police
(PIDE), and the rightist National Front, considered as a backer
of former Defense Minister Santos Costa, expect to profit by
changes and might react unfavorably if their interests suffered
significantly.
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Japanese Prime Minister Faces Political Test
Ikeda has hoped since coming to power last July to avoid
controversial issues at least until late 1961. However, fac-
tion leaders within the LDP as well as the opposition Social-
ists are maneuvering to force him to come to grips shortly
with major issues.
Ck_eLiberal-Democratic party (LDP) official has
called the China question "perhaps the most critica pro em
facing Ikeda." LDP leaders agree that the issue--particularly
the questions of a government-to-government trade agreement
and admission of Communist China to the UN--is more politi-
cal than economic, particularly since poor economic conditions
in mainland China have decreased the interest of large Japa.-
nese industries in the Chinese market. However, some of
Ikeda's conservative rivals may try to improve their own po-
litical positions by appealing to small producers still inter-
ested in trade with the mainland and by exploiting the popular
desire for an independent Japanese policy toward Peiping.
These leaders have predicted that the US will change its China
policy and have emphasized that alignment with Washington
has alienated Japan from the increasingly influential Afro-
Asian b3
Tokyo is reported ready to begin negotiations on Japan's
obliga ions for postwar aid soon after Ambassador Reischauer
arrives in mid-April. The US has asked Japan to repay about
$650,000,000 of the $2,000,000,000 in assistance providedbetween
1945 and 1952 under the Government and Relief in Occupied
Areas program. Many conservatives as well as the Socialists
oppose repayment, on grounds that the Japanese believed the
aid was a grant rather than a loan. The Japanese press re-
ported on 6 April that Finance Minister Mizuta hopes to hold
repayments below $500,000,000--a figure $50,000,000 below
Japan's lowest informal offer. Such reports may strengthen
public support for those who oppose any settlement and thus
hamper Ikeda's ability to negotiate a compromise satisfactory
to the US
By trying to prevent the re-emergence of the two major
intra-party coalitions that characterized Prime Minister
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Kishi's administrations, Ikeda has tried to minimize the fac-
tionalism within the LDP that helped topple Kishi last spring.
He has included representatives of all major factions in his
cabinet, but his own advisers are divided over continuing
this policy.
Three of the eight faction leaders constitute the chief
threat to Ikeda's leadership. Eisaku Sato, former finance
minister and Kishi's brother, has supported Ikeda so far but
now believes he himself has the best chance to take Ikeda's
place as the next prime minister. His continued support
and participation in the new cabinet will depend on his assess-
ment of prospects for Ikeda's tenure.
1.iseo Miki, a former minister of trade and industry,
aspires to the position of foreign or finance minister in the
new cabinet but has said he will not participate unless Ikeda
gives "serious attention" to the China question. He is a
liberal whom Kishi has characterized as "the most dangerous
man in the party" and the leader least committed to the US-
Japanese relationship]
Ichiro Kono, perennial troublemaker for prime ministers,
has frequently advocated closer relations with Peiping and
Moscow. Kono has been lying low since an abortive attempt
to form a new conservativelsrty last August and has privately
pledged to support Ikeda. � real purpose, however, could
be to split the LDP and emerge as the architect of a new con-
servative parly3
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CONFIDENTIAL

Pakistani Military Regime Concerned Over
Growing Discontent
The Ayub regime for some time has not displayed the
energy of its early months following the army takeover in
1958. There have been no "milestones of progress" since
the Indus waters settlement with India in September 1960.
Furthermore, the government seems to have relaxed its ef-
forts to generate public support for its policies.
In recent months the government has tolerated more press
criticism, and some newspapers appear to have been discreetly
encouraged to question Pakistan's basic foreign policy of align-
ment with the West. In late February, student demonstrations
condemning Lumumba's assassination and anti-Moslem riots in
India were tolerated, but these got out of hand and ended in
clashes with the police. Pakistani authorities are now trying
to reassert firm control without sparking further clashes.
Rising prices of basic commodities, following the lifting
of price controls on such items as cotton and wheat, are also
generating discontent. There is growing impatience with the
slow progress being made in putting the local government coun-
cils, elected in January 1960, to work. The intelligentsia, in-
cluding students, lawyers, and journalists, have been looking
forward to a return to the promised "constitutional" government
and have become increasingly frustrated by the delays in publish-
ing the report of the Constitutional Commission, now due in
April.
President Ayub probably remains Pakistan's most popular
figure, but in recent months he has been absent from the country
on trips to Europe and the Far East. His decision not to go to
Australia suggests he feels it necessary to exploit his popularity
to bolster the regime's standing.
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Guatemalan President's Tactics Indirectly Benefit Communists
Ydigoras, now midway in his six-year term, has survived
almost constant plotting from both right and left by manipulation
of his opponents�distributing graft and favors and maneuvering
them into fighting among themselves. In so doing, he has weak-
ened the opposition Revolutionary party (PR), a strong, moderate
leftist and anti-Communist party and the only political group
with at least some degree of mass support. Ydigoras, now ben-
efiting from a gradual economic upturn, is in a relatively strong
domestic position at the present time.
The Communists, who probably regard the PR as their most
potent adversary, are active in several competing leftist splinter
parties at least partially fostered by Ydigoras. The weakening
of the PR and its capable leader Mario Mendez Montenegro serves
not only Ydigoras' principal goal�staying in power--but also the
Communist objective of regaining control of the strong and wide-
spread leftist-nationalist movement that formed the political base
of the pro-Communist Arbenz regime of 1951-1954. Ydigoras
maintains that his legal powers to control Communist activities
have recently been weakened by Congress' watering down of anti-
subversive legislation he had submitted to it.
Former President Arbenz, now the honored guest of the
Castro regime in Cuba, is reliably reported to maintain contact
with his partisans in Guatemala, though he is generally dis-
credited among most non-Communist Guatemalans. Ydigoras
is one of Castro's chief targets in Latin America. The Cuban
premier has repeated' accused him of aiding Cuban "counter-
revolutionaries?'
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Cuba's Complaint Against the US in the UN General Assembly
The US delegation in New York reported on 5 April that it
seemed likely that the Latin American states are prepared to
vote against any Afro-Asian resolution on Cuba "which goes
too far" and that these states in any event would consult with
the United States before co-sponsoring or attempting to amend
any milder resolution that may be introduced)
However, the Ecuadorean Government,
informed its UN representative that after the US-Cuban situa-
tion "is perfectly clarified, it is certain we can co-sponsor
the Afro-Asian plan provided Mexico or some other important
Latin American country subscribes to it."
at seems unlikely that any major Latin American coun-
try would co-sponsor such a resolution at this time. However,
Brazilian President Quadros, in a memorandum to his acting
foreign minister, stated that Brazil would consider on its own
merits any proposal presented in the UN on the US-Cuban prob-
lem.
Ecuadorean President Velasco has vacillated on policy to-
ward Cuba, which is openly backing Ecuador in its boundary
dispute with Peru. The Cuban issue has led to sharp division
between pro- and anti-Castro political groups in Ecua
provoked Chiriboga's threat to resign in early March.
Cuba's efforts to induce one of the more radical Africa*
states to sponsor a draft resolution on its complaint against
the US in the UN General Assembly have met with opposition
from the UAR.
"it is
illogical that one nation would submit a complaint which con-
cerns another. Rather, a sounder course would be for Cuba' to
submit its complaint. Otherwise, its argument will be weak-
ened." However, the UAR and other members of the Afro-
Asian bloc would probably support the draft resolution being
circulated by Indonesia which calls for bilateral discussions
between the United States and Cuba to settle their differences.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investibation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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