CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001983
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 14, 1961

Z/ZZZZZ7,777,77//777/44/7/77//77777777777777//77/7/7,/,
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 3.3(h)(2)
1 r %o .a&UICL I
1011,9 ipmt 3.5(c)
14 April 1961
Copy No. C "f)
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
-TOP-SECRET-
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14 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Congo: Katangan tribal leaders attempt to circumscribe
Tshombe.'s power. (Page ti)
3. Portugal: Salazar removes Defense Minister Moniz;
reshuffles cabinet. (Page it)
4. France-Algeria: US Embassy in Paris comments on De
Gaulle's press conference. (Page ti)
5. Communist China - India: Peiping unofficially broaches
possibility of arbitration of border dispute. (Page itt)
6. Japan-Korea: Pyongyang agrees to resumed repatriation
of Koreans in Japan. (Page itt)
7. Afghanistan-Pakistan border situation. (Page iv)
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9,4
4.1
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BURMA
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NAM1THA ;
i'uong Sal I
3
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LUANGI PRA'
Luang Prabang
SAYABOURY
hong Scaly
i
PRONG SALY7
A Dien Bien Phu
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/ Sam N.eu
\ � /SAM NEUA
/ N60"."..
XIENG
Art
-uric
d KHOUANGN
� ,
muo9g Ban
Phou Khoun
Ban Pha Xieng KFLouang
-"v\. Ban Ta Viangi
sang V;:ing oLe....4 Thom
.Tha
VIENTIANE BorikhaneS
Pak Sane
Vientiane
A LA
NORTHERN LAOS
4rip GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
440
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
-.ROAD
--TRAIL ?
O ROUTE NUMBER
610414
50
STATUTE MILES
100
Kam K u
ak Sao
KHAMMTJANE
oNh mArat
L.
Thakhek
9
Sovannakhet
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: Erhe withdrawal cross-country to Luang Prabang
of government paratroop and infantry units from the airhead
north of Muong Kassy has been virtually completed.
-xe�e'
continuing efforts by Kong �
Le - Pathet Lao forces to reduce the government stronghold,' it I "---/
at Ban Pha�about 15 miles southwest of Xieng Kliouang town-
where a mixed force of Lao/Meo troops has long been en- A _
Ad-�`-c.
trenched. No significant military action elsewhere has been
reportelg
Caf-nboata nas issuea a statement suggesting that the pro-
posed international conference on Laos take place in Geneva,
in view of the "extreme urgency" of such a conference, and
"In the face of objections against its being held in Phnom Penh
as proposed by Khrushchev." The statement reiterated Sihanouk's
view that the conference should institute a commission to arrange
and supervise a cease-fire, and then address itself to the ques-
tion of neutralizing Laos. (Backup, Page 1)
(Map)
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Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
NDONESIA
870
Atiuntic
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
INDONESIA
280
,Gemena
Scattered Force
lo
; EQUATEU
tj
Coquilhatville �Boende
-06 EISTI"JTU
3,400
ETHIOPIA
.>
MOBUTU
7,200 Scattered�Forces
EC)POLDVILL
Leopold,/
ysville
MOB UTU
800
Francqui
uluabourg
Bakw
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled
Luanda El Kasavubu-Mobutu
71 Glzenga
1:EM Kalonji
Tshombe.
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
� Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
=Selected airfield
410413 2
[001
0 STATUTE MILES
400
of the Congo
GIZENGA
,000
MALAYA
870
LIBERIA
230 I
ETHIOPIA
ETH10P1
ngolo
NIGERIA
TSHOMBE
7,000
Lake
Alk,ert
NIGERIA
Usumbura
IRELAND I
650
SWEDEN I
650
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Wt9P-SEC-RE-T-
Congo: Tshombe's hegemony in Katanga politics appar-
ently is being challenged by tribal traditionalists led by
Interior Minister Munongo. Under a proposed constitu-
tional amendment published on 12 April and immediately
denounced by Tshomb4 as illegal, most of the president's
executive functions would be transferred to a prime minis-
ter. Mtmongo, who is strongly opposed to Belgians and is
unfriendly to whites in general, is the likely candidate for
the new post. The tribalists dominate the legislature and
are influential in most areas of Katanga, and Tshomb4, who
seems to retain the support of his Belgian military and
civilian advisers, may be faced with a breakup of the tribal
coalition which brought him to power.
(Backup, Page 3) (Map)
Portugal: The 13 April cabinet changes, and particularly
the removal of Defense Minister Moniz, represent a rejectioni
by Salazar of demands for liberalization of Portugal's internal
and African policies. Moniz was the principal advocate withi
the cabinet of such liberalization. Salazar has taken the de- /7-,
fense portfolio himself, appointed a comparative unknown as
army minister, and promoted to the Overseas Ministry the
previous undersecretary, the 38-year-old Adriano Moreira, fia
a vigorous defender of the government's "stand firm" policies
in Africa. .illazar's move may now provoke a reaction from
Moniz, who recently intimated to US officials that he had the
support of most top officers for his demand that Salazar either
change his policies or face a military takeover)
(Backup, Pagel)
.France=Algeria: The American Embassy in Paris feels
De Gaulle's 11 April press conference posed to the Algerians
the clear alternatives of future friendship with France or a
complete rupture, with independence in any case, and fore=
shadowed the future development of France as a noncolonial
power. The US consul general in Algiers points out that
14 Apr 61
�
DAILY BRIEF ii
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De Gaulle's references to the FLN leaders, while far from
granting them the role of exclusive spokesmen for Algeria,
do attribute to them a "special" responsibility. The consul
general feels that this may be sufficient to bring the FLN to
peace talks with the French. The rebel provisional Algerian
government has not yet commented officially on De Gaulle's
remarks and may be experiencing difficulty in formulating
a response. (Backup, Page 5)
Communist China India:
the possibility of Peiping's
nronosinz arbitration of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute.
U Nu of Burma or Sukarno of
Indone-sia as possible arbitrators, rejected a suggestion that
the idea be broached to Nehru suggesting that Peiping wishes
to keep the matter on an unofficial basis at this tim13 Pei=
ping has never before submitted a political dispute to arbitra=
tion. In the present case, however, the Chinese may see
definite tactical advantages in the move. They probably rea-
son that Nehru, who has consistently refused Chinese offers
to compromise the border dispute, would in all likelihood
reject an arbitration offer. The Indian leader insists that the
border problem has grown out of Chinese aggression. The
Chinese would try to present an Indian rejection as a refusal
to ioin with Peiping in a move to relax tensions in the area.
Japan-Kofea: Repatriation of Korean residents in Japan A--4-/
longer be a major irritant in relations between Japan and ,e,tc_i_z_e_J
to North Korea will resume on 14 April but probably will no
South Korea. The post-Rhee government in Seoul has tended,z 3�
to ignore the repatriation question in negotiations to settle a t_
outstanding problems with Tokyo. Pyongyang suspended the le a
repatriation program last February, presumably because the e
North Koreans were embarrassed by the drop in the number
14 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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CONFIDENTIAL
Kush ha
Farah
Zahedan
Sari Pul
Maimana
Herat
Mazar i
Shorif
AFNISTAI4-
AFGHANISTAN-
PAKISTAN
(PUSHTOON TRIBAL AREA)
PUSHTOON TRIBES
AREA OF GREATEST FRICTION
Roads Railroads
STATUTE MILLS
Stalinaba
Te mez
Pair ithuma
Hil
� Salang Pass
Jai bed
JAMMU
(Status in diinute)
RAW PINDI
La bore
CHINA
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�40P�SECRET
of Koreans seeking repatriation. Pyongyang, however, has
been under pressure to resume the program both from the
Japanese, who want to reduce the size of the troublesome
Korean community in Japan, and from its own front group
in Japan which has warned of a major prestige loss if repa-
triation was not resumed. About 10 percent of the 600,000
Korean residents in Japan have gone to North Korea since
rtk7ogram was initiated in December 1959.
(Backup, Page 7)
Afghanistan-Pakistan: ra.'he Afghan Army is apparently
calling up more reservists as Kabul continues to anticipate
an outbreak of fighting between Pakistani troops and Pushtoon
tribes on the Pakistani side of the border. The Afghans have
thus far been largely unsuccessful in promoting unity among
these tribes to fight Pakistan 7 Earlier Afghan reports of
fighting between Pakistani Government forces and Pushtoon
tribesmen in Bajaur appear to have been exaggerated. Fol-
lowing his recent return from Moscow, Afghan Prime Minis-
ter Daud reiterated his government's intention to give full
support to the tribesmen in their resistance to Pakistan's
military "penetration" of tribal territories.
(Backup, Page 9) (Map)
14 Apr 61
(Briefs continued on following page)
DAILY BRIEF iv
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DAILY BRIEF
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tiOPOP�SE
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Probable Political Developments and the Internal Security
Situation in Colonial Africa South of the Sahara OveritheNext
Few Years. USIB. ME 60/70-61. 11 April 1961.
Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US.
USIB. ME 11-61. 6 April 1961. 0036854.
Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament and Arms
Control: Assessment of the Underlying Motivations and Objec-
tives of the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West
Germany, and Canada. USIB. ME 4-2-61. 6 April 1961.
14 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
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is SECRET Nee
Situation in Laos
Souvanna Phouma, in statements issued during his brief
visit in Belgrade, stressed the geographic necessity for Laos
to follow a policy of neutrality as envisaged by the 1954 Geneva
Agreements. He is quoted as stating that Laos would accept
assistance from any country if no political conditions were at-
tached, and that peaceful competition in aid would be better
than the present situation in which "the blocs clash with arms
in hand." Souvanna arrived in Prague on 13 April, and is
scheduled to arrive in Warsaw today.
g)n the internal Laotian situation, it is im-
portant that a government of national union be formed nror to
the 14-nation conference. As the French see it, Boun
Oum and Souvanna would both resign and the King would call on
Souvanna to form a new government. France could
see no way of keeping the Pathet Lao out of the government but
that they should be prevented from holding Ur fnrpiren affnirs
defense, economic, and interior portfolios.
Souvanna, who prior to his departure from Paris on 11 April
had a number of meetings with high French Government leaders,
had assured the French that he would retain those posts himsely
the Geneva Agreements--un-
der which France was granted the responsibility of training the
Laotian Army and the right to station 5,000 troops in Laos--were
fully adequate to control foreign military aid to Laos.
all arms deliveries should cease with the convening of the
14-nation conferences, and that future army training should be
given only by instructors authorized by the Geneva Agreements.
although this would mean the withdrawal of US mil-
itary personnel, "Western military nresence" would be main-
tained. On economic aid to Laos, France'
SECRET
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tRreferred bilateral arrangements and made clear that the UN
mechanism would not be acceptabl,
Soviet transports continue to be scheduled for flights into
Laos. On 12 April a total of six LI-2s and one IL-14 flew to
Xieng Khouang. Another LI-2 may have flown to an undeter-
mined point in Laos.
The three Soviet IL-14s at Hankow which were ordered to
fly to Hanoi on 12 April were again delayed because of adverse
weather and were rescheduled to continue their flight to North
Vietnam on 13 April.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Situation in the Congo
The proposed changes in the Katanga constitution would
subordinate the executive to the legislature�an obvious ef-
fort to check Tshombe's freewheeling. An earlier resolu-
tion requesting the nomination of a prime minister passed
the lower house by a vote of 34 to 6, and Tshombe's oppo-
nents probably command a similar majority in the Grand
Council of chiefs. Many of these leaders reportedly object
that Tshombe's ministers have voted themselves salary in=
creases without increasing the stipends of the chiefs; most
of them, moreover, apparently oppose Tshombe's alliance
with the Belgians.
Tshombe has rebutted this attack with a plea that strong
executive rule is necessary in view of the threats to Katanga's
independence. He further asserted that the legislature cannot
unilaterally promulgate a constitutional change, since the pres-
ident's approval is necessary as well as that of two thirds of
the lower house.
Most Belgians in Katanga believe that Tshombe will weather
this challenge, although one of them told the American consul
in Elisabethville that he thought the Katanga president was "used
up" as a leader. In addition, the Belgians reportedly are uneasy
over the influence which tribalists such as Munongo can wield in
the countryside, where many tribesmen are growing dis
fied with t1e influence Belgium in exerting in Katanga.
-CONFH3E-N-TIAL-
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Salazar Drops Portuguese Defense Minister
In Cabinet Reshuffle
general Manuel Gomes de Araujo, the chief of general
staff of the armed forces, is considered exceptionally loyal
to Salazar, and both he and the new army minister, Brigadier
Mario Silva, are generally regarded as members of the ex-
treme right-wing group of former Defense Minister Santos
Costa. Santos Costa is a bitter rival of Moniz, and Salazar
may intend to return him to the Defense Ministry shortly]
EA further indication that the regime will continue to take
a firm stand against changes in the overseas provinces appears
in a recent statement made by French Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville to Ambassador Elbrick in Lisbon on 8 April. He
said that a long talk with Salazar and Foreign Minister Mathias
revealed no sign of any "give" or new ideas for a solution of
Portugal's African problems. Couve subsequently implied to
US Ambassador Gavin in Paris that Salazar would have to go
before there could be significant changes in Portugal's African
policieg
-S-EeRE-T--
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vase'CONFIDENTIAL
Reactions to De Gaulle's Remarks on Algeria
The US Embassy in Paris notes that De Gaulle carefully
avoided questions of detail and procedure but feels that he has
clarified his general intentions for Algeria once and for all and
has offered the rebels a unique opportunity to come to terms.
In his follow-up provincial speaking tour, De Gaulle declared
on 12 April that he has been and still is offering Algeria peace
and cooperation and said, "Let the other side want this and it
will be done." On 13 April, he made another overture to the
rebels saying, "We want to settle the rebellion by extending
our hand to those who, up to now, have not wished to accept
it, and in such a manner that it will be possible for them to
construct the new Algeria, and for us, if they are willing, to
help them do it."
Although De Gaulle's statements are designed to demon-
strate French willingness to seek a reasonable solution, he is
still a long way from offering to deal with the Provisional Al-
gerian Government on anything resembling a government-to-
government basis. He continues to speak only in terms of
self-determination by all of the Algerian people after a rebel
agreement to stop the fighting. He also threatened that an in-
dependent Algeria not closely associated with France would be
left to face economic chaos and might also have to submit to
partition.
This type of presentation may revive latent discord within
the PAG. The rebels had reached their decision to go to Evian
in the first place by glossing over such long-range problems,
and they were hoping for clarification of a few points of imme-
diate interest to them. The rebels may view De Gaulle's reit-
eration of these positions at this time as an attempt to limit the
scope of negotiations and force a settlement which would provide
for continued French influence. Powerful elements within the
PAG could argue that no basis exists for successful negotiations
within such a context. More moderate elements, however, in
view, of what they consider improved relations with the US and
possibly the UK--a British parliamentary delegation met with
rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas on 10 April, apparently on British
initiative--may consider it unwise to refuse to meet with the
CONFIDENTIAL
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French. The rebels are reportedly continuing attempts to
establish through secret contacts a basis for opening talks.
The early reaction in Algeria to De Gaulle's statements
has been unfavorable. The settler ultras are likely to see in
this week's speeches a full confirmation of their fears that De
Gaulle is renouncing the maintenance of French sovereignty in
Algeria and they will probably step up their bombings and other
"counterterrorist" activities. The Moslem population, which
had been looking toward an early end to hostilities, is disap=
pointed that De Gaulle did not make more specific concessions
to the PAG and fears an adverse effect on prospects for nego-
tiations.
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Korean Repatriation From Japan to North Korea Resumed
The repatriation agreement, concluded in mid-1959, is a
private agreement between the Japanese and North Korean Red
Cross Societies, but has the official backing of both govern-
ments. Tokyo has long sought a means for solving the problem
of its Korean minority, which has a high crime rate and has
required heavy government assistance.
The Japanese failed, however, in efforts to persuade
President Syngman Rhees government that the program was
based on humanitarian principles and would be entirely volun-
tary. Rhee reacted by severing trade with Japan and breaking
off negotiations for an over-all settlement of Japanese - South
Korean differences. With the ouster of the Rhee regime and
the actual implementation of the program, official and public
outrage in South Korea subsided. The Chang Myon government
opposes the program in principle, but in practice has tended to
ignore it. Despite the friendlier atmosphere in negotiations be-
tween Tokyo and Seoul in the post-Rhee period, however, major
differences on issues other than the repatriation problem have
prevented substantive progress.
More than 54,000 Koreans have been sent from Japan to
North Korea aboard the two repatriation ships made available
by the USSR. There is now a backlog of 17,000 applications for
repatriation, but many Koreans are likely to renege before de-
parture time, and it is doubtful that the sailings, resuming on
14 April, will reach the previous average of 1,000 repatriates
weekly.
E3yongyang has apparently experienced difficulty in reset-
tling repatriates, who find living conditions in North Korea less
appealing than advertised by Chosen Soren, the Korean Commu-
nist front in Japan. There are reports that dissatisfied repa-
triates have refused to accept job assignments and have openly
criticized the Communist regime. Many have written to rela-
tives and friends in Japan of shortages in daily necessities and
warned them not to apply for repatriation. Pyongyang has im-
posed strict censorship on all mail, but elaborate private codes)
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%we -SteRET--- %NIS
[have been devised and reports on conditions continue to
trickle oug
Registration for sailings fell off sharply late last fall
and Pyongyang suspended the program in early February,
using its concern over a "flu epidemic" as an excuse. Chosen
Soren, working diligently to build up a backlog of repatriates,
has warned Pyongyang that North Korean prestige will suffer
in the Japanese Korean community unless the program is speed-
ily resumed.
Despite a labor shortage in North Korea, repatriation has
undoubtedly lost much of its political and economic appeal to
Pyongyang. The regime has probably come to view the disaf-
fected repatriates as an increasing liability, and probably would
like to find a way to discontinue the program if it could do so
without damaging North Korean prestige among Koreans in Japan.
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SECRET No'
Afghan Preparations on the Pakistani Border
Kabul wants any fighting in the Bajaur area to appear to
be Pushtoon tribal resistance against Pakistani Government
oppression, although it is apparently giving covert assistance
to dissident tribal elements there. The Afghans fear strong
Pakistani counteraction and probably do not plan to se
ily identifiable Afghan units into Pakistani territory.
The Afghan Army, however, has apparently prepared some
of its regular units for guerrilla operations in Pushtoon tribal
territory in Pakistan by equipping them with British-made
weapons.
the local commander was ordered to distribute new, presumably
Soviet-made, machine guns and to collect the Vickers light
machine guns and send them to Kabul. On 7 March the provin-
cial army headquarters responsible for the Afghan border region
near Bajaur informed Kabul of shortages of Vickers heavy ma-
chine guns and of mortars.
British weapons in the hands of Afghan Army units stationed
along the Pakistani border opposite Bajaur.
The Afghan army uniform factory in Kabul has already
manufactured 10,000 sets of tribal-type clothing, apparently
for use by Afghan soldiers disguised as tribal irregulars. If
Kabul is able to stimulate major fighting in the Bajaur region
of Pakistan and decides to send these troops across the border
to help tribesmen fighting Pakistani Government forces, the use
of tribal clothing and the absence of Soviet-made weapons will
make it harder to distinguish between Afghan soldiers and gen-
uine tribal irregulars.
Top Pakistani officials remain confident of their ability to
crush any Afghan incursion; they are holding their forces 15 to
20 miles from the border in the hope that this will encourage the
Afghans first to penetrate deeply into Pakistan, giving Pakistan
grounds for strong counteraction.
SECRET
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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