CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/06/08

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049797
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 8, 1961

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3.5(c) r/
8 June 1961
Copy No. C s
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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8 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page t)
2. Dominican Republic: Colombia reluctant to join pos-
sible joint action against new regime. (Page ii)
3. Brazil: Argument between Quadros and minister of
war over arrest of opposition leader. (Five iv)
4. Congo: Gizenga offers to negotiate with Leopoldville
over site for reconvening parliament. (Page iv)
5. Zanzibar: Arab extremist leader reiterates opposi-
tion to American space-vehicle tracking installation.
(Page ,v)
6. UAR: Cairo still planning to send military officers
to USSR fnr train ng despite propaganda battle.
(Page v)
7. Arab ministerial conference: Foreign and defense
ministers to discuss joint policy toward Israel.
(Page v)
8. Morocco: Cabinet reorganization leaves absolute
power of King Hassan unchanged: (Page vi)
9. Bolivia: State of siege proclaimed; key Communists
arrested, (Page vi)
10. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page vi)
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Fel
LUANG] PRA ANG
uong Hound, Luang Prabang
SAYABOURY
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THAI LAND
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Forces
41110 GOVERNMENT
4111 KONG LE - PATHET LAO
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
� GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS
510
�TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
610608
STATUTE MILES
100
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Nhommar
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ovannakhet
Pha Lane
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Muong
SAVANNAKH
ong Hoi
Houei
VIETNAM
8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 June 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: LLt. Col. yang Pao, commander of government
1 units at a Dong which were forced to withdraw on the night
of 6-7 June, has establiOed a new command post some seven
miles to the southwest!)
the attacking force has large-
ly expended its ammunition supplies in the successful assault
on Pa Dong. The Meos may thus have a respite in which to
reorganize their defenses in the area.
LAt the 7 June session of the Namone tripartite talks, the
government delegation presented its conditions for an eventual
coalition government. The main point was a demand for the
recognition of the authority of the King, the constitution, and
the national assembly. The Pathet Lao has frequently attacked
the present assembly as being the product of rigged elections
In 1960 conducted under an illegal electoral ordinance.
[In the military subcommittee talks at Namone on 11e 7th,
the Pathet Lao challenged the government's assertion that the
ICC Should be permitted to visit any trouble point in the coun-
try, insisting that its visits should be confined to the forward
points of the opposing forces on Route 13 south of Van Vieng.
After failure to reach agreement on specific points, the sub-
committee merely reported back to the plenary political com-
mittee that the three sides had agreed in principle that the
ICC be permitted to visit certain unspecified points]
Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through
8 June. (Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Dominican Republic - Venezuela - Colombia: President
Lleras Camargo of Colombia, the Latin American President
most closely allied with Venezuelan President Betancourt's
efforts to promote multilateral action against the heirs of
Dominican dictator Trujillo, now apparently feels that Betan-
court is pushing too fast on the issue. Ambassador Briggs,
ow a special mission to Colombia, after conferring at length
on 4 and 5 June with Lleras and his foreign minister, reported
that the Colombian leaders had shared US and Venezuelan
hopes that the extermination of Trujillo might be followed by
a popular, democratically led uprising. However, the failure
of such a movement to develop and the apparent success of
"Ramfis" Trujillo in asserting his control have given Bogota
"serious second thoughts." Colombian leaders doubt that
"Ramfis" will change the old order and they feel that Presi-
dent Balaguer offers little hope of exerting liberal leadership.
The Colombians, however, would nowprefer to assess the in-
ternal Dominican situation further before giving consideration
to tripartite military action with the US and Venezuela.
Betancourt, in 6 June conversations with Ambassador
Stevenson, again urged decisive action through the OAS. Such
action would depend on the report from the special OAS sub-
committee that left for the Dominican Republic on 7 June.
Though Betancourt is confident that the subcommittee will
find evidence of drastic violations of human rights, the cur-
rent thoroughly intimidated state of the Dominican dissidents
and the regime's efforts to put on a good show make this by no
means certain.
Betancourt believes that after the report is received, at
least 14 Latin American governments will support a vote in
the Council of the OAS for intensified economic sanctions and
that the US, Venezuela, and Colombia should then ask for more
severe measures, including military action. If Colombia de-
cides against participating in a military effort, Venezuela will
"go it alone" with the US, he said. He is confident that a show
of military force would be sufficient to bring about the ouster
of "Ramfis" and associates, "because the armed forces do not
want him." Betancourt added that if Balaguer should set up a
8 June 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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joint military-civilian junta, announce a democratic program,
and call on the Trujillo clique to leave, Venezuela would rec=
ognize the new regime. Such recognition would be contrary
to Betancourtis policy unless Balaguer remained as consti-
tutional president. The Venezuelan President repeatedly
stressed the undesirability of unilateral US action.
8 June 61
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411111
Pointe
Noire
Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
619519
LIBERIA
INDIA
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
g
Gemena
Scattered Forces
MOBUTU
Bangassou
EQUATEU
Coquilhatville
MOBUTU
7,200 Scattered Forces
EOPO DVILLE
Leopoldv.
ysville
MOBUTU
800
� Boende
Francqui
uluabourg
Bakw
GHANA
1.600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Luanda 1-1 Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonp
Tshombe
rl United Nations Forces (Service Forces
Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
STATUTE MILES
40,0
ETHIOPIA
1,500
Vonga
Bondo
Aketi
leyville
GIZENGA
7,000
MALAYA,
900
KAONJI
A I Kongolo
K b lo
Albertville
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
500
INDIA
INDIA
NIGERIA
600
�Manono
TSHOMBE
7,000
Elisabethville
NIGERIA
..trysurnbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
870
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kird
Brazil: President Quadros has directed Minister of War
Odilio Denys to arrest Marshal Lott, defeated candidate in
the 1.960 presidential election, for granting a press interview
on his political views. Denys is resisting the order because
Lott insists he had not intended his remarks for publication
and Lott's arrest would bring on a political-military crisis.
Quadros' hostility to Lott has undoubtedly been intensified by
remarks derogatory to Quadros reported in the interview
such as, "I would not want to be minister to this peasant. "
The military are unlikely to attempt to overthrow the Quadros
administration at this time, but the arrest of Lott would add
to the dissatisfaction in the officer corps caused by Quadros'
transfers and reassignments of officers associated with..the
previous administration. (Backup, Page 3)
Congo: Gizenga's 6 June announcement that he is willing
to negotiate with Leopoldville and the UN over the site for a
reconvened parliament probably stems from misgivings con-
cerning his isolation from the mainstream of Congo events,
together with doubts regarding the long-term prospects for
his regime. He probably also hopes to embarrass the Leo-
poldville regime by contrasting his moderate stand with that
of Kasavubu, who so far has refused to consider any site but
Leopoldville. He probably will try to delay the actual opening
of parliament in the hope of adding to his bloc of supporters.
A late May estimate of parliamentary strengths by the Amer-
ican Embassy indicates that at that time he had a substantial
minority position. to which he may be able to add by bribes
and persuasion.
a Yugoslav
aircraft, ostensibly on a Red Cross mission, arrived in Stan-
leyville from Cairo on 5 June apparently after landing in
Khartoum. It was scheduled to return from Stanleyville on 7
June. The aircraft was to pick up the children of various Stan-
leyville Mures.
however, this was to
be a "pretext" to bring goods of an unspecified nature covertly
to Gizenga. This is the first known occasion that an aircraft
8 June 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Zanzibar: Me previously repartea reinforcement of woopF.
in this British protectorate has led to an uneasy truce between
the Africans and Arabs. Observers are concerned, however,
�that when the Arabs recover from the shock of the African at-
tack, they will attempt retaliation. The British Resident states
that he has no indications yet of "Communist troublemakers or
property damage directed against Europeans," but he plans to
place police patrols in rural areas and said he would try to pro- cic
vide protection for the American space-vehicle tracking proj-
ect.. Meanwhile, Ali Muhsin, the Arab extremist leader in the
new coalition government, has reiterated his strong denuncia-
tion of the American Project Mercury installation by publicly
saying, "We are determined to oppose this unless America can
convince Russia and China of the innocence of the projecel
(Backup, Page 4)
USSR-UAR:
the current propaganda exchanges between
Moscow and Cairo apparently are not affecting implementation
of the agreements providing for military collaboration between
the two countries, a list of a contingent
of 311 UAR military officers and tec moans whom the UAR
plans to send to the USSR for training. About half the group
are from ground forces units, including 35 officers who will
receive training at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow.
Fifteen naval officers are among the trainees, as well as 130
air force personnel, including 20 fighter pilots and 8 bomber
pilots. Soviet military deliveries to the UAR this year under
new arms agreements concluded in 1960 have included T-54
� tanks, artillery, motor vehicles, and MIG-19 supersonic jet
fighters.
ArabifV.IinisterM Conference: Arab foreign ministers .or
and defense ministers will meet in Cairo on 10 June to discuss
joint policy regarding Israel's nuclear development program,
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its plans for diverting Jordan River waters, Jewish immigra-
tion into Israel, and the Palestine refugee question. The con-
ference, which follows a meeting of Arab military commanders
in late April, is part of a stepped-up effort during the past few
months to achieve greater Arab unity, particularly on issues in-
volving Israel. Because of inter-Arab differences, however,
the conference is unlikely to result in firm agreement on coor-
dinated plans.
Morocco: The cabinet reorganization of 2 June, which has
been pending since Hassan II became King in February, involved
no fundamental change in the complexion of the regime or in the
status of Hassan as absolute monarch. The conservative Istiqlal
party, whose president for the first time has accepted a post in
the cabinet, has strongly endorsed the reorganization. The
leftist opposition has labeled it a "continuation of the experiment
with royal government which had already proven to be a failure."
We do not expect that the leftists will take action at this time,
however, against Hassan. (Backup, Page 6)
*Bolivia: The proclamation of a nationwide state of siege on
7 June tends to confirm earlier reports that President Paz Estens-
soro was planning a fake coup to justify arrests of opposition ele-
ments. The government has asserted that the Communists are
attempting to seize power. Key Communist labor leaders in
Catavi, location of Bolivia's largest tin mine, are among those
arrested. Paz probably anticipates that this will facilitate
implementation of the US-sponsored mine rehabilitation nrozram
scheduled Fn hPain in party Tilly
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
A. No change from last week.
B. No change from last week.
C. Except for the capture of Pa Dong by the Communists in
Laos, there have been no significant developments in that
8 June 61
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country, in South Korea, or in Iran to change the main
points of our recent conclusions on these countries. Spe-
cifically:
In Laos, the Communists are continuing to delay im-
plementation of an effective cease-fire in order to ob-
tain political concessions;
In South Korea, the new regime remains unstable,
with relationships between its military command and
the UNC still untested;
In Iran, the continuing success or failure of the Amini
government remains in question.
8 June 61
DAILY BRIEF
vii
YV7
Wi
A
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Name
The Situation in Laos
the defending Meo
units put up stiff resistance before withdrawing from their
positions.
the Meos' front lines were out o;
ammunition but that their officers would not allow them to re-
the joint attack force
warning that if fresh supplies
will be unable to continue the
treat.
was also short of ammunition,
were not brought up soon, "we
attack."
"mopping up was not yet complete," and repeated the request
for ammunition. Complaining of lack of support, the Kong
Le commander added that "both the rear lines and the front
lines have to do a little work. We are doing our best to bring
off a victory, but the enemy is resisting strongly." The
enemy's shortage of ammunition may have been a major fac-
tor behind the Meos' apparent ability to withdraw relatively
intact to their new positions some miles to the west and
southwest of Pa Dong.
Col. Khammouane, the pro - Sou-
vanna Phouma commander who has maintained an uneasy co-
existence with the Pathet Lao in Phong Saly Province,
had reached agreement with the
Pathet Lao on certain problems, including the establishment of
a joint operations committee and apparently the division of the
province into zones of respective responsibility for the two
sides. such agreement as
was reached was still somewhat tentatirve and will require fur-
ther negotiations.
CSouvanna Phouma's daughter, Princess Moun, and another
member of the Souvanna delegation told an American official
in Zurich that the main reason they had come to Zurich was to
escape momentarily the pervasive influence of the Chinese Com-
munist delegation at Geneva. They stated that they see the Rus-
sians at Geneva only rarely. Other points of interest emerging
from their three-hour conversation was the assertion of their
intent to ask Souvanna to send delegation leader Quinim Pholsena7
RETt
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[home on the grounds that he was a Pathet Lao "stooge"; their
conviction that Souvanna and Khammouane were still inde-
pendent; and their belief that national elections in Laos would
have to be postponed long enough to permit formation of a
_ina-Qq_mart_v_t_a_counterao flak Sat)
Peiping continues to accuse the US of stalling at the
Geneva conference. In describing the 6 June session, it said
that Britain and France entered into substantive discussions,
while the US only repeated its "wholly unjustifiable" demands
for an effective cease-fire. Peiping labels the Western-
backed French proposal for an ICC with sweeping investiga-
tive powers an encroachment on Laotian sovereignty and a
"big step backward" from the 1954 Geneva agreements. The
Chinese Communists maintain that the two Soviet proposals
should be the only items for conference consideration.
Bloc airlift-associated activity for 6 June involved only
three sorties, two by a Soviet transport and one by a DRV air-
craft. No flights into Laos were noted, however. On 6 June
another Soviet IL-i4 left Moscow for Hanoi.
this plane is to con-
duct aerial photo survey work at Hanoi.
this aircraft will be used in Laos.
-SEC-RE-T
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It is possible that
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Political Military Crisis Threatened in Brazil
A weekly Brazilian news magazine on 5 June published
an interview in which Marshal Lott reaffirmed his denuncia-
tion of "tyrant" Fidel Castro and called Quadros "this lover
of Castro," declared himself against the proposed establish-
ment of a defense ministry on the grounds that it would create
interservice friction, and attacked Quadros for authoritarian-
ism. The interview was granted several weeks ago but not
published because of Lott's insistence that he had not intended
his remarks for publication. Decision to print apparently fol-
lowed an argument between Lott and the magazine over the
substance of his comments.
Quadros had previously indicated his intention to imple-
ment the policy of some years' standing which prohibits mil-
itary figures from commenting on political matters. Lott is
drawing pay as a member of the reserve. Earlier in Quadros'
administration a reserve officer was disciplined, with War
Minister Denys' consent, for making political comments. The
arrest of the titular leader of the opposition on such grounds
could stimulate congressional factions friendly to him to work
toward impeachment of Quadros.
Arrest of Lott would increase unrest among high-ranking
military officers who were ousted from key posts by the Quadros
administration. These officers apparently drew up an unsigned
manifesto presented to Congress by an opposition deputy on 6
June. The manifesto appeals to Quadros to eliminate discrim-
ination in military appointments and is critical of the economic
austerity program, but it does not endorse Lott's criticism of
Brazil's present Cuban policy.
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Situation in Zanzibar
[The death toll in the rioting following the legislative elec-
tions of 1 June has approached 65. The great majority of the
casualties were Arabs living in a heavily African section of
Zanzibar town. Some 300 persons have been wounded and
over 700 jailed. The British civil secretary has admitted in
a press conference that the situation not only in Zanzibar town
but throughout the islands is "unsatisfactory." Despite the
prospect of election disturbances, the police were unprepared
for large-scale violence. By 6 June, British authorities had
flown in some 800 troops and 700 police from Kenya and Tan-
ganyikaj
IA coalition government has been formed under the nominal
leadership of Sheik Muhamed Shamte--president of the small
Zanzibar and Pemba P_eople's party--but Ali Muhsin, the leader
of the Communist-infiltrated Zanzibar Nationalist party, is
the real power:3
[Ali Muhsin, who has had close ties with Cairo, appears
primarily interested in protecting the traditional dominance
of the Arab minority of 50,000 among Zanzibar's 300,000
people�many of them recent African immigrants from the
mainland. The Arabs are the most advanced of the protec-
torate's racial groups and are trying to entrench themselves
in the civil service, police force, and other positions of in-
fluence:7
[Ali Muhsin has already declared that Zanzibar must be=
come an independent republic before he will even discuss a
possible federation with the East African mainland territories.
He has strongly denounced alleged efforts by both Kenyan and
Tanganyikan African leaders to interfere in Zanzibar's elec-
tion, and since the election he has stated that his new govern-
ment will take strong measures to control African immigra-
tion from the mainland and might expel voteless Africans al-
ready on the island. At that time he was scathing in his de-
nunciation of Nyerere's government in Tanganyika, claiming
it was "subject to neo-colonialist domination of West Germany, -1
Israel, and the Catholic Church." Ali Muhsin has also indicated_ j
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that Zanzibar would probably not remain within the Common-
wealth after independencej
[Although Ali Muhsin appears favorably inclined toward
Communism, the ZNP's general secretary, Abdul Rahman
Mohamed (Babu), is believed to have been the major influ-
ence in moving his party toward acceptance of Communist
influence_:1
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Moroccan Government
Hassan, who continues to serve as his own premier in an
essentially conservative political coalition, has solidified his
position to some extent by eliminating from the cabinet sev-
eral of the ministers who have differed most strongly with his
policies. The addition of representatives from several minor
political parties and the lack of a leader within the cabinet
around whom potential dissidents could rally will further in-
hibit any real challenge to Hassan's policies.
The King has named no deputy premier, but his unpopular
aide, Ahmed Reda Guethra, probably will continue to act as
the King's deputy as well as function as minister of interior and
agriculture.
By failing to name a foreign minister and by distributing
responsibility for various aspects of foreign affairs to several
ministers of state, Hassan has created a situation which prom-
ises even greater confusion in the conduct of Morocco's foreign
relations.
The leftist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) will
continue to be the major opposition to this government and to
Hassan personally. The UNFP's membership is centered in
coastal cities such as Casablanca and Rabat and is drawn
largely from organized labor, intellectuals, and students. The
large number of UNFP supporters within the civil service may
be able to exercise an influence over routine governmental op-
erations.
The main question at issue between the UNFP and the King
is the establishment of a constitutional regime. The King is
committed to the December 1962 deadline set by his father for
the promulgation of a constitutional regime, and he is likely to
come under increasing pressure to honor this commitment both
from the left and from many conservatives who are as anxious
to attain this objective as is the UNFP. The King, however, is
-CONFIDENTIAL
-
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CONFIDENTIAL
unlikely to agree to a constitution which seriously diminishes
his authority.
The King probably now hopes to embark on economic and
social development programs. Substantial progress seems
unlikely in light of his record of erratic conduct of affairs and
his tendency to substitute eloquence for action.
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE PRESIDEN)"�' Nrol
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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