CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001979
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 10, 1961

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%dr acumc 3.5(c)
10 April 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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10 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Lam (Page t)
2. USSR: Test vehicle, probably an ICBM, launched
esterday, apparently failed in flight.
(Page tO
3. Situation in the Congo. (Page it)
4. Belgian cooperation on Congo likely to be determined
by UN action on pending resolution. (Page tt)
5. Kenya: Delay in formation of government invites
violence. (Page tit)
6. USSR and Communist China sign 1961 trade protocol;
Chinese delegation arrives in Moscow to "complete"
economic, scientific, and technical agreement. (Page tit)
El Salvador: Disagreements over reform program
probably caused resignations from ruling directorate.
(Page iv)
VA
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"Phong Saly
1PHONG SALY
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tha Thom
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VIENTIANE BorikhanS�
Sane
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../
Vientiane
NORTHERN LAOS
4ar GOVERNMENT Forces in
KONG LE - PATHET LAO I Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
- � -TRAIL
P 50 100
I
STATUTE MILES.
0 ROUTE NUMBER
610410
k Sao
KHAMMOUANE
�=, �
Nhommarkt
�
TI--iakhek
1
Savannakhet _
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin, in his
recent discussion with UK Ambassador Roberts on Laos,
said that the Western position on Laos now is much closer
to that of the USSR and that it should not be too difficult to
reach agreement. Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi continue to
imply strong objections to any proposal that a formal cease-
fire must precede an international conference, but all have
repeated a Pathet Lao statement that a cease-fire must take
place "simultaneously" with the holding of a conference. In
a summary of the statement, Moscow radio said that the
cease-fire should coincide with the "convocation" of the con-
ference.
Mhe government forces seeking to recapture Muong Kassy
are reported under enemy pressure north of the town; one
column to the south remains stalled on Route 13; another col-
umn moving northward by trail east of the highway is encoun-
tering light oppositiof ) (Page 1) (Map)
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Banana
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kliona
NDONESIA
870
Luanda
tionr
'6i0410 2
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
NDONESIA
280
MOBUTU
.Gemena
Scattered Force
MOBUTU
m
Aketr
�
Coquilhatville
� Boende
ETHIOPIA
Scattered Forces
EOPOLDV1LLE '01
Leopoldv.
ysville
Ikelao.
uluabourg
Bak n
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
7-1 Gizenga
Kalonji
11 Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
- Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
co)
foo
STATUTE'MILES
400
Luputa
GIZENGA
7,000
KALONJI
rhe Congo
ETHIOPIA
Bukavu
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
NIGERIA
TSHOMBE
7,000
Elisab4thville
NIGERIA
500
Usumbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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*USSR: Pi_ test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched
fromr�r--Wra Tam at about 0915 GMT (0415 EST) on 9 April,
and apparently failed in flight shortly thereafter. Delays to-
taling approximately seven hours were noted in the countdown.
the launching was associated with Soviet space program de-
velopments. As in the case of last week's launching of a
probable ICBM on 2 April, however, no facilities associated
with previous space launchings participated in yesterday's shot.
These facilities continue to reflect preparations for a forth-
coming space program event
&sterday's launching Was the seventh test shot this year
of probable ICBMs from Tyura Tam. Three of these were
failures. The total off generally successful Soyiet test ICBM
shots to date,is 32:1
Congo: Hammarskjold told Ambassador Stevenson on 7
April that he feels Tshombe's military operations in northern
ICatanga--which have already resulted in the capture of Manono
and ICabalo�foreshadow intensified civil war in Katanga Prov-
ince unless the UN can promptly establish its authority in the
area. He added that if Tshombe's offensive does not stop soon,/'
his forces will have to be "neutralized." Hammarskjold has
requested that approximately 1,200 Indian troops be airlifted /P
from Dar es Salaam to Kamina within the next few days; their
arrival could provoke violent incidents by Tshombe's supporters. /9>
In Elisabethville. Although military talks between Mobutu and
Stanleyville General Lundula are apparently proceeding as
scheduled, the political conference between Gizenga and repre-
sentatives of the Leopoldville government, scheduled to begin
on 9 April, has been postponed. The Leopoldville emissaries
apparently feared for their safety, and now have suggested that
the conference be held in neutral territory, possibly Addis
Ababa, Backup, Page 3) (Map)
Belgium: Paul
Henri Spaak and his associates are confident a Social Christian -
Socialist government will be formed with Spaak as foreig29
10 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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5_ninister, and that Spook is already thinking of an early visit
to the UN in a move to improve relations over the Congo situa-
tion. Spook is understood to be planning to absorb the Minis-
try of African Affairs into the Foreign Ministry, in the hope of
eliminating a major source of pro-Katanga influence and an
Important channel of undercover dealings with Tshombe.
!uture Belgian policy depends largely on
UN action on the pending Congo resolution. A tough Indian
draft resolution is scheduled to come to a vote today. A
severe censure would not be accepted by the Belgian public
and, would make Belgian cooperation
with the UN less likelyj
(Backup, Page 5)
Kenya: apveral African leaders in Kenya are concerned
that violence may occur if political factions continue to refuse
to form a government until Jomo Kenyatta�convicted for his
role in Mau Mau activities--is released from detention by
Britain. As a result of the elections last February, Africans
predominate in the legislature for the first time and had been k
expected to fill most executive posts. The leaders fear that
agitators capitalizing on the lack of progress in meeting
economic problems aggravated by the political impasse may
incite disorders among the 80,000 men who have been released
from detention camps. Most of these men have not found jobs.
Meanwhile, the Kenya administration apparently hopes to con-
coct a government from among European, Asian, and minority
African legislators, although such a government would prob-
ably lack popular support and might precipitate nationalist-
inspired disorder (Backup, Page 7)
USSR - Communist China: The Soviet Union and Commu- 0 k
nist China have announced the signing in Moscow on 7 April of
their trade protocol for 1961, which calls for Soviet deliveries of heavy industrial machinery and equipment, petroleum prod-
ucts, and similar exports in return for Chinese supplies of raw 7 /7"
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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materials and light industrial goods. In addition to the trade
protocol, Moscow agreed to "loan" Peiping 500,000 tons of
sugar and to defer for five years repayment of the trade def-
icit accrued by China in 1960.
this deficit came
to about $237,000,000.
The agreements reached so far are only a first step to-
ward the establishment of a new framework for Sino-Soviet
economic relations following the Moscow conference in No-
vember. In view of China's current economic difficulties,
Peiping's negotiators are probably pressing for further Soviet
assistance, which Foreign Minister Chen Yi recently termed
"critical for all of us." A Chinese delegation has arrived in
Moscow to "carry on and complete" the more difficult talks
nrt �111 r�orktirtmin criantifir anti hanhnieal arrrPPment
El Salvador: The resignation on 6 April of two of the
three civilians on El Salvador's ruling civil-military directo-
rate probably stemmed from disagreements over how fast the
government should move in implementing the moderate pro-
gram of social and economic reforms launched last month. A
group of influential young military officers is insisting on more
energetic implementation of reforms,and this may increase op-
position to the program among wealthy businessmen and planta-
tion owners. FA-A extensive cabinet reorganization reportedly is
imminenS) (Backup, Page 9)
10 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Situation in Laos
In addition to insisting that a cease-fire be simultaneous
with the international conference, the Pathet Lao broadcast
of 7 April went on to elaborate on two other "necessary con-
ditions" for a cease-fire. The statement asserted that the
"interested parties" within Laos should work out the actual
ground rules for a cease-fire, and that the cease-fire must
coincide with the ending of "aggression and intervention" by
the US and its "satellites." In connection with the latter
point, the Pathet Lao radio had stated on 6 April that a real
cease-fire could be achieved only when the US had withdrawn
its "military officers, aircraft, armaments, and the aggres-
sive troops of Thailand and Chiang Kai-shek's remnants,"
Pushkin
did not react adversely to the suggested date of 24 April for
convening a conference, but he acknowledged that the funeral
of the late King of Laos, scheduled for the same period, did
present problems which could not be ignored. The Soviet
spokesman also expressed the opinion that the conference
would be rather long and detailed and would not necessarily
require the continuous presence of foreign ministers. How-
ever, he said the ministers should attend the opening of the
conference in order to demonstrate its importance.
[-Political leaders in Vientiane are reportedly giving in-
creased thought to ways of forming a single, reorganized
government to represent Laos at an international conference.
Reports have circulated that government officials are ready
to ask King Savang to head a government composed of former
prime ministers, partly as a means of countering foreign ef-
forts to reinstate Souvanna Phouma as premier. Meanwhile,
government spokesmen have continued to express alarm over
possible further reinforcement of the Pathet Lao with North
Vietnamese units in order to increase the enemy's advantage
in forthcoming negotiat1ons3
(An attacking enemy force estimated at two companies
reportedly was repulsed on 8 April by elements of the govern-
ment paratroop battalion advancing on Muong Kassy from thej
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giortho Although paratroop positions are reported encounter-
ing enemy harassment on three sides, available information
does not indicate that they are seriously threatened. Two
companies have been requested as reinforcements by the
government column stalled south of Muong Kassi4
L--nemy forces south of the Plaine des Jarres are reported
to be Widening a trail for a distance of about 20 miles south-
ward toward Pak Sane from their base at Ban Ta Viang.
a Pathet Lao company is
moving toward the area northwest of Pak Sane with a mission
to sever Route 13 linking that town with Vientiane]
LI'athet Lao forces are also reported to have extended
their control in the Kam Keut - Lak Sao area to about six
miles south of Lak Sao on the road leading to Nhommarat.
There are indications that enemy supply dumps are being
established in the vicinity. of Lak
67he Soviet airlift into Laos continues. The Soviet IL-14
en route to Hanoi from the USSR was scheduled to leave Pei-
ping on 9 Apr i1
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Situation in the Congo
-lammarskjold said that he is coming to the conclusion
that shombe is "simply a criminal and outlaw," and that the
element of force on Tshombe's side in diplomatic bargaining
with the UN must be removed. Hammarskjold believes
Tshombe's recent military moves in northern Katanga were
made to undercut his rival, Jason Sendwe, and to increase
his own prestige so that he could dominate a conference of
Congolese leaders apparently to take place in late April in
Katanga. The danger of spreading the civil war in Katanga
arises from Sendwe's announcement in Leopoldville on 7
April proclaiming himself chief of the Luluaba state and
calling on its people to resist Tshombe's invade]
Kabalo was reported calm on 9 April, with UN troops
holding the railway station and airport. However, there have
been clashes between UN Ethiopian troops and Tshombe's forces
which have resulted in casualties on both sides, and further
violence could occur at any time,
Elsewhere in Katanga, Tshombe's government is remov-
ing restrictive measures against UN troops, but gradually so
as not to lose face with the public. UN troops on 8 April had
water and electricity in all installations, but food supplies
were still low. The UN commander in southern Katanga
stated on 8 April that continuation of the relatively relaxed
attitude depends on events at Kabalo, reaction to the airlift
of Indian troops to Kamina, and the ability of the Swedish
and Irish UN forces to maintain order in Elisabethville.
us a result of last week's transfer of the Irish battalion
to Elisabethville, according to Hammarskjold, the Indian con-
tingent in Kamina is sufficient only to hold the airfield. The
secretary general thinks the arrival of additional well-dis-
ciplined Indian troops in ICamina, where they would be less
than an hour away from Elisabethville, would greatly strengthen
his hand in dealing with Tshombe. The UN commander in
Elisabethville has warned, however, that the appearance og
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NuoV
ffDdian troops in that city would set off bloody encounters be-
tween UN forces and Katangan mobs supported by Tshombd's
troopq
said the black
troops were worthless, since they had no discipline or sense
of tactics and fired in all directions. The Belgian officers
were not much better, as they had little knowledge
of bush fighting and no control over the native troops.
32 white troops actually "took" Manono and then
turned it over to the black soldiers, who massacred women
and children left behind by the defender9
Alione Diakite, named
Mali's ambassador to the Gizenga regime, presented
his letters of credence on 5 April. He is the first diplomat
accredited to Stanleyville to have arrived; others from bloc
and African countries are in contact with Gizenga's Cairo
office.
SECRET-
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vizo9P�SEGRE
Congo Policy, of Probable New Belgian Government
�be general opinion in the Belgian press is that the ap-
pointment of Theo Lefevre, president of the Social Christian
(Catholic) party, to negotiate with leaders of the other parties
means that a Social Christian - Socialist coalition is almost
certain. The Socialist Party Bureau and Socialist leaders have
urged the speedy formation of such a coalition. The Catholic
party, however, is handicapped by the opposition of its right-
wing elements, which were shocked by the violence of the re-
cent Socialist-instigated general strike and are insisting on a
guarantee of law and order as the price of an alliance with the
Socialists. The Liberal party appears willing to enter into
another coalition with the Social Christians, but its sabotage
of numerous socio-economic issues in the last government
have made the party unacceptable to left-wing Catholic labor
elements.]
Ltefevre is faced with the possibility of a split in his party,
no matter which partner he chooses. A tripartite coalition of
all three parties does not appear a likely solution3
(iVIany government leaders fear that advocacy of a bolder
Congo policy would jeopardize the prospects for domestic re-
forms in which the electorate is primarily interested. Any
government, therefore, will have to make a difficult decision
with regard to how far it is willing to compromise on the Congo.
The Social Christians lost heavily in the 19 March elections to
small extremist parties largely on this issue, and they are less
inclined than Spaak and the Socialists to meet the UN demands
for further disengagement in the Congo. Reforms in this di-
rection will be fought by powerful industrial interests like the
Union Miniere, the right-wing press, and possibly the royal
family, whose influence in Congo affairs has always been ex-
tensive. Moreover, many Belgians in the Congo will continue
to act in a manner that will complicate the efforts of any govern-
ment to reach a satisfactory solutiopj
Hammarskjold's personal representative has been havinly
:LriF SE C' T
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Na0
[difficulties with the Belgian authorities in his negotiations in
Brussels on the removal of Belgian military personnel from
the Congo, and he has recommended "strong pressure" on
Belgium and its allies to facilitiate his mission. It is possible,
however, that the Indian draft resolution on the Congo, which
calls for the withdrawal within 21 days of all Belgians who hold
major military or political posts, will be moderated somewhat.
I oKyo on 1Apru instructea its UN aeiegate to abstain
from voting on the resolution because it is "too extreme and
impractical.' 1)
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CONPIDENTIALI __
Delay in Formation ot uovernment in is.enya-i-nvites Violence
[iis a result of the legislative elections held in February
and the later supplementary balloting by the Legislative Coun-
cil for 12 "national" members�four from each of the African,
European, and Asian groups= =the two leading African national-
ist parties have 35 seats in the 65-member legislature. The
Kenya African National Union� (KANU), with 20 seats the larger
group, is led by its general secretary Mboya and its president
Gichuru. The chief opposition group to KANU is the Kenya
African Democratic Union (KADU), led by Ronald Ngala. It
has 15 seats and represents minority tribal groups]
L-In neither party can the leaders control their legislative
representatives; KANU is particularly faction-ridden. Mboya
is challenged by American-educated Julius Kiano as well as
by pro-leftist Oginga Odinga, Several KANU members are re-
ported dissatisfied with their party's rigid stand on the Ken-
yatta issue and would probably break away and cooperate with
KADU if the latter were successful in forming a government or
if the governor made some face-saving compromise on Ken-
yatta-4
LkADU leaders appear more willing to cooperate with the
governor in forming a government, provided the party does
not lose its popular backing thereby and provided some KANU
members participate. Ronald Ngala is visiting London in an
effort to obtain some $60,000,000 in grant aid for the resettle-
ment of Africans in the former White Highlands. At the recent
All African People's Conference in Cairo he sought nationalist
support by attacking the United States for colonialist policie_ij
KANU's attitude threatens to cause increasing difficulties
for London. Mboya recently told American officials that he saw
"no way out" unless Kenyatta were released. Even then, how=
ever, KANU would form a government only with the intention of
demanding a new constitutional conference in the near future
with Kenyatta in attendance. Mboya now demands Kenya's inde-
pendence in 1961; neighboring Tanganiyka is scheduled to
become independent on 26 December 196.17
turitain remains opposed to releasing Kenyatta, although it
has expressed its willingness to do so as soon as a Keny_aj.
CONFIDENTIAL
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5overnment is formed and functioning well. On his recent visit
to Kenya, Colonial Secretary Macleod gave his full support to
anwarrinr Rpnison f r his policy regarding Kenyatta-.1
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%sow �sEeRE-T--
Changes in Salvadoran Government
The two civilians resigned because of their opposition to
rapid implementation of reform measures. The directorate
will continue operating with its three remaining members,
hanges reportedly will be made in all ministries except
defense, interior, and labor. The US Embassy at San Salvador
believes the prospective appointees were chosen because they
represented diverse groupings and thus would have a broad ap-
peal. One of them, Miranda Lupone, whose appointment as
foreign minister appears almost definite, is known to champion
"reform by decree," including nationalization of the Central
Bank
Junior army officers believe reforms are not being im-
plemented fast enough because most cabinet ministers are too
much under the obstructive influence of wealthy businessmen
and landowners. Most of the wealthy class became at least
temporarily convinced of the necessity for reforms to improve
the lot of the lower classes after an alarming upsurge of Com-
munist and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador between the coup
in October 1960 and the one that brought the directorate to
power last January. Many of the landowners began to change
their minds, however, after the implementation of the first
reforms, which included a forced reduction of rent for low-
income housing and a paid day of rest on Sundays for agricul-
tural workers. Coffee growers reacted to the Sunday rest law
by dismissing large numbers of workers, and the Communists
are reported working to exploit the resulting peasant discontent.
The government warned violators that the reforms are in
line with recommendations agreed to by 18 Latin American
governments at Bogota, Colombia, last year, and that the army
will be on the peasants' side in the event of any "social explo-
sion."
The rapidly diminishing influence of the upper class in the
government and the prospects of having the schedule for the
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implementation of social reforms timed by the army's junior
� officers increase the probability that some wealthy Salva-
dorans will resort to bribery and subsidized violence in an
effort to frustrate the reforms and, if possible, to bring down
the government.
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Nftd N�110/'
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
=97ME'ffhfth-
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