CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001968
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 13, 1961

Wow.
13 March 1961
Copy No. C 77
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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13 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Thompson.
(Page t)
2. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
3. Congolese reportedly believe Indian troops are coming
to enforce "Dayal's plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo."
(Page it)
4. Angola: Portuguese officials try to conceal heavy native
reas_ualtir in recent military operations.
Page it)
5. Brandt's visit: SPD position paper discusses Bonn's role
in Western relations with Soviet bloc. (Page it)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
USSR: an his conversation with Ambassador Thompson
on 9-Wrch, Khrushchev raised the Berlin and German ques-
tion and stated his desire not to worsen but to improve US-
Soviet relations. He refrained from proposing resumption of
negotiations or setting a deadline for action, but did reiterate
his warning that the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty
with East Germany if the wartime allies did not agree to a
treaty with both German statei-D
LOn the disarmament issue, Khrushchev again tied Soviet
agreement to general disarmament with the proposal to reor-
ganize the UN secretariat, and used the Congo sit
stress repeatedly the need for revision of the U1sQ
(Backup,
*Laos: Vientiane representatives and Souvanna Phouma
are expected to meet this week to discuss details of the gen-
eral program announced by General Phoumi and Souvanna in
their talks at Phnom Penh. Souvanna's departure from Phnom
Penh on a world tour is still scheduled for 15 March.
Moscow characterized the Phnom Penh discussions as a
diplomatic defeat for the Phoumi forces and emphasized that
Souvanna stood firm on the need to convene an international
conference to settle the Laotian problem. Both Peiping and k
Hanoi have indicated that they are interested in the vaguely
worded communique' only as a departure point for propagan-
dizing the deteriorating position of the Boun Oum regime.
gong Le Pathet Lao forces in both the Phou Khoun and
Muong Kassy sectors apparently are consolidating their posi-
tions. Their patrols continue to maintain contact with govern-
ment force (Backup, Page 4)
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Congo: he expected arrival of the first contingent
of Inaia's troops on 16 March will confront the UN with its
next big hurdle in the Congo, according to Ambassador Tim-
berlake. He feels that there is widespread belief among the
Congolese that India's troops are coming to enforce "Dayal's ,41
plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo,"] /
LXhrushchev, in his recent talk with Ambassador Thomp-
son, showed little interest in the possibilities of a Congo set-
tlement and used the occasion to reiterate Soviet charges of
the ineffectiveness of the UN policies in the Congo.
(Backup, Page 6)
Angola:
in one recent military
operation at least 243 natives were killed, 90 wounded, and /7'
30 taken prisoner. The governor general saw problems in -/-/)
minimizing the number of casualties, since the size of the op-P
eration was known in Angola but "the actual number would in=
hate the case in the eyes of international opinion." He sug-
gested, "perhaps we could avoid mentioning numbers, saying
that they were not high but that they are not known for certain,
because the natives gathered their dead and fled with them. If
you consider it advisable or necessary to indicate the numbers,
then I suggest 14 dead natives in order to minimize the case."
(Meanwhile, the leading non-Communist nationalist organ-
ization in Angola is planning to launch a terrorist campaign on
he night of 14 March in an effort to convince the Security
ouncil that discontent is growing in that Portuguese territoryD.
(Backup, Page 8)
Berlin: an analysis of Soviet policy prepared at Mayor
Brand's request for possible use during his US visit stresses
that Bonn could play a key role in Western disarmament plan-
ning and the relaxation of international tensions, in view of the).
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(importance of the German problem to Khrushchev. It points
to the desirability of a more intensified Bonn effort to ex-
ploit internal instability in East Germany, without provoking
the USSR, and calls for Bonn to establish diplomatic relations
with the East European satellites. The paper, prepared by
Sada' Democratic party (SPD) experts, suggests that an SPD
victory in next September's national elections--now believed
unlikely by most observers--would bring a new "national con-
centration of effort" which could force Khrushchev to reap-
praise his whole German p01icy:3
Eithile Brandt may be unaware that the memorandum was
released into American official channels,
presumably passed it on with the knowl-
edge that its contents- -including its moderate tone and favor-
able view of the Kennedy administration--would become known
in Washingtmi.j (Backup, Page 10).
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CONFIDENTIAL Aire
Khrushchev Spells Out Soviet Position on Germany,
Disarmament, and the UN
At the end of his conversation with Ambassador Thompson,
Khrushchev spelled out the Soviet position on Germany and
Berlin along the lines of the recent memorandum to Bonn. He
stressed the necessity of a peace settlement with both Germanys
in order to confirm postwar developments and provide a legal
foundation for the postwar borders. He denied that the bloc had
any desire to expand to the West and offered to make a state-
ment to this effect if the US was prepared to begin peace treaty
negotiations
fin connection with his threat to sign a separate treaty with
East Germany, Khrushchev was careful to evade any response
to the ambassador's question on how a separate treaty would
affect the Allied position in West Berlin. Khrushchev reaf-
firmed that a peace treaty would include a clause providing
creation of a free city for West Berlin, but urged that the US
and USSR join in working out a new status for West Berlin
fithrushchev showed some flexibility in his discussion of
the Berlin problem in asserting that the USSR would provide
any guarantees necessary to preserve the internal situation in
West Berlin and to assure the United States that its prestige
would not suffer. As examples of guarantees, he mentioned
a joint police force, presumably composed of the four powers,
and he repeated a previous Soviet proposal to permit stationing
of symbolic forces of the four powers in West Berlin. He made
it clear that East Berlin was excluded from a settlement on the
grounds that it was the capital of East Germany, but he com-
mitted Ulbricht to sign any guarantees for West Berlin.I
{The Soviet leader concluded his remarks by repeating that
if the US and USSR could sign a treaty on Germany, it would
mark great progress in their relations and establish an atmos-
phere of trust. He added that a treaty could be implemented by
installments and provide for a gradual withdrawal of Soviet and
American troops from Germany, which would aid in negotiations
and disarmaments
Erhe most notable aspect of Khrushchev's statements was his
failure to stress the urgency of early negotiations on Berlin, ai)
----CONFffiENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Noe
(Jie has in his recent conversations with Western diplomats
and the Soviet memorandum to Bonn. This suggests that the
USSR will continue to hold the Berlin question in reserve un-
til the Soviet leaders assess more fully the US position on
major East-West questions. Khrushchev's remarks on Ade-
nauer's role and references to the memorandum to Bonn also
suggest that he may be awaiting a reply as a pretext for pre-
senting a more exact demand on negotiations. A French For-
eign Ministry official was recently told by his Soviet counter-
part that Moscow was considering a foreign ministers'
conference on Berlin and Germany]
[On the disarmament question Khrushchev implied that the
Western powers were attempting to defer negotiations. His
insistence that Soviet acceptance of general disarmament was
linked to UN revision was the same position he took last fall
at the UN General Assembly. At that time, however, he ex-
plained that the reorganization scheme was not a prerequisite
for negotiation
an his statements to Ambassador Thompson on the Congo,
Khrushchev labeled UN policy as "colonialist" and stressed that
the USSR would oppose it "with all its means." He emphasized
that a reorganization of the UN was necessary to prevent another
situation such as that in the Congo, and argued that the US should
have an interest in reorganization, since it might be in a minor-
ity position some time in the future. Khrushchev's revival of the
link between UN revision and disarmament, which has been
played down in recent Soviet statements, probably foreshadows
a more intensive effort to use the appeal of disarmament to gain
support for at least Hammarskjold's resignation or progress to=
ward a greater Soviet role in the UN executive organg-.
CICh' rushchev showed considerable satisfaction when informed
by Thompson that the US hoped shortly to lift its ban on Soviet
crabmeat imports, although he expressed some disappointment
at the recent canceling of a license for precision grinding ma-
chines. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position that trade
relations must be normalized and again emphasized that the USSR-)
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Awe CONFIDENTIAL Nue
grades with other Western powers. In addition, he pointed out
that the USSR does not compete with the US in trade and could
be a very good customer for American exports. Khrushchev
avoided mentioning Moscow's previous request for credits to
finance Soviet purchases.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Situation in Laos
General Phoumi has told Ambassador Brown that during
his recent visit to Phnom Penh, he was able to clear up the
misconceptions of the Cambodian foreign minister over King
Savang's proposal for a neutral nations commission--com-
posed of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya--and that Souvanna
himself now would attempt to persuade Sihanouk to reconsider
his rejection of the commission's chairmanship.
Although Phoumi and his aides returned to Vientiane ap-
parently convinced of Souvanna's acquiescence to an investiga-
tive commission prior to a full-scale international conference,
there is already some indication that Souvanna may have been
temporizing. Souvanna is reported to have stated publicly on
11 March that the three nation commission should meet "about
the same time" as the 14-power conference proposed by Si-
hanouk, in order to enable the conference to give directives
to the commission.
Phoumi also reports that he and Souvanna, in their discus-
sion of the question of a coalition government including the
Pathet Lao, agreed that Communists should hold no posts.
Phoumi, however, apparently did not rule out the possibility
that "non-Communist" members of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS),
the Pathet Lao's political arm, might be included. A long-
standing argument of Souvanna, which has found favor among
many Laotian officials, is that Prince Souphannouvong--head
of the NLHS�and many other party members are nationalists
rather than Communists.
Moscow's initial reaction to the discussions between Phoumi
and Souvanna Phouma indicates that the USSR will claim that the
general compromised his own position as a result of his visit to
Phnom Penh and that Souvanna will accept no solution in Laos
which does not make the convening of an international conference
the first order of business.
A Pathet Lao statement, rebroadcast by both Peiping and
Hanoi, vigorously attacked Phoumi's mission to Phnom Penh as
an effort to "use the name of Premier Souvanna Phouma" to split
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the Laotian people. The Pathet Lao radio claimed it was
only because of military reverses that Phoumi "attempted to
compel Prince Phouma to negotiate with and make conces-
sions to the traitors' clique." The statement clearly indicated
that the Communists do not recognize the Phnom Penh commu-
nique as in any way restricting their freedom of action.
Reflecting some uneasiness over the possibility that Sou-
vanna may have made some deal with Phoumi, the Pathet Lao
radio stressed the unflinching support of the Pathet Lao for ces
for Souvanna. It pointed out that Souvanna's speeches and
statements made in Xieng Khouang during his visit there prove
that he would refuse "to knuckle under in any circumstances
before the traitors' clique in Vientiane." The statement reit-
erated the bloc contention that an international conference must
be held, to be followed by an international commission to work
in Laos in accordance with the specific powers granted to it
by the conference.
EThe recent successes of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
appear to have been due less to aggressive action on their part
than to withdrawal by the Vientiane forces in the face of such a
threat. Vientiane troops north of Phou Khoun junction are re-
ported in a state of low morale and unlikely to put up much re-
sistance to any further Pathet Lao advance. All supplies that
had been stockpiled by these troops at the junction were left
intact when they withdrew and now are in enemy hand
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Situation in the Congo
alammarskjold recently sent a conciliatory letter to
Kasavubu, who is attending the Tananarive conference of
Congolese leaders, in an attempt to lessen the likelihood of
a conflict between Indian and Congolese troops. He tried
to reassure Kasavubu that the arrival of these troops was not
part of a planned military build-up to be used against the
Congolese Army, explaining that the Security Council had not
authorized such action in connection with the proposed reor-
ganization of the army3
Lin a discussion with an American official, Hammarskjold
indicated a belief that "some kind of political game was going
on in Leopoldville" between two rival acting prime ministers
In the absence of Ileo, who accompanied Kasavubu to Tananarive.
He noted that acting Prime Minister Delvaux modified his earlier
hostile attitude toward the UN and became willing to negotiate
after Massa suddenly "took over" that office. Hammarskjold
remarked that "there are too many untutored people with guns
who become involved in political moves" in the Congo:1
Tshombe's apparent success in dominating the proceedings
at Tananarive has been complemented by another success in
Katanga. Before leaving for the conference, Tshombe�appar-
ently fearing that his deputy Kibwe and French Colonel Trinquier
were plotting to oust him--ordered Trinquier to leave the coun-
try by 10 March. The American Consul in Elisabethville reported
that Trinquier, under pressure from Katangan authorities and
possibly the UN, departed for Brussels on 11 March.
When informed that Brussels intended to remove some 30
Belgian military technicians from Katanga, Tshombe indicated
he would oppose this action by all means possible and that he
might close the Belgian Consulate General in Elisabethville.
In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev
said it was clear that the US and the Soviet Union were in com-
plete disagreement on the Congo. Khrushchev failed to respond
to Ambassador Thompson's remark that there was nothing in the
CONFIDENTIAL
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coNn DEN TIA
esCongo situation basic to US or Soviet interests. The ambas-
sador noted that the Soviet premier refrained from mention-
ing any new approach to a solution of the Congo problem and
referred to the internal Congo situation only in terms of the
page,
21Khrushchev used the Congo question to launch a vigorous
attack on UN policies; he told the ambassador that the US and
the Soviet Union had different positions on this question and
prospects were not bright. He reiterated the standard charges
that the UN and Hammarskjold were responsible for Lumumba's
death.)
-CONFIDENTIAL
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Portuguese Seeking to Minimize Numbers of Africans
Recently Killed in Angola
Portuguese author-
ities were already anticipating that the Angolan situation would
be discussed in the United Nations and that revelation of the ex-
tent of their military operations against nationalist outbreaks in
Angola last month would adversely affect their position. The
Portuguese Overseas Ministry recently issued a statement
claiming that the February disturbances were brought about
by Communist-directed agitators from outside Angola, and
that the number of victims could not be determined because of
the Africans' custom of concealing their dead.
in addition to the 243 known dead, there was an undeter-
mimed number of casualties from air attacks.
clear that the military operations were not the result
of an intertribal struggle or of clashes erupting from a labor
dispute, as indicated by official public Portuguese statements.
Portugal, hostile to any influences which could lessen its
tight control of its African possessions, has been increasingly
concerned over the "infection" of its territories from neighbor-
ing areas, particularly the Congo. Since July it has reinforced
its troops to about 10,000 and increased its already considerable
counterespionage forces. On 10 March the Portuguese foreign
minister informed Ambassador Elbrick in Lisbon that Portugal
intended "to take the necessary measures" to thwart a reported
terrorist plan to take over the Portuguese enclave of Cabinda,
at the mouth of the Congo River, in mid-March. The foreign
minister said he wanted to stress that the terrorist operation
was planned and organized from outside Portuguese territory.
The Angolan Peoples' Union (UPA), an anti-Communist
nationalist group with headquarters in Leopoldville, is going
ahead with its plans to launch attacks this month in northern
Angola, between Luanda and the Congo border.
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(attacks, to begin on 14 March, were to be coordinated with
other groups within Angola. the UPA had
limited supplies of arms and ammunition ana lacked adequate
communication facilities; he estimated that the fighting could
last no more than ten dayg.
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Nftw Nee
Position Paper Prepared for Mayor Brandt
[The position paper of the Social Democratic party (SPD),
given to Mayor Brandt just before he left Germany, emphasizes
that Moscow's stand on the German problem stems from confi-
dence that the USSR can achieve control of West Germany be-
tween 1970 and 1980. The paper also stresses that the internal
weakness of East Germany has played an important part in So-
viet planning, and points out that "liquidation" of West Berlin
is necessary for any consolidation of the Ulbricht regime in
East Germany:3
(The recent Soviet memorandum to Bonn is cited as con-
firmation that Soviet goals in Germany and Berlin remain un-
changed. The paper claims, however, that the Ulbricht regime
for the time being is faced with a critical situation as a result
of the collectivization of agriculture and the political disinte-
gration within the Socialist Unity party, brought on by the con-
tinuing problem of "revision" within the party and the discon-
tent over recent purges of party members during the reissue
of party membership books throughout East Germany:s
CThe main purpose of the SPD analysis is apparently to dif-
ferentiate between Soviet and East German goals; it implies
that a firm Western policy on Berlin would bring about further
difficulties for East Germany, which would cause Khrushchev
to retreat from his offensive against Berlin. As such, the SPD
paper tends to exaggerate the current situation in East Germany
and to overemphasize the immediate objectives of East Germany
in Berlin, while implying that IChrushchev could easily be dis-
suaded from his determination to solve the German issue in
1961)
[The paper is laudatory of the Kennedy administration, not-
ing the "new powerful impetus" in the Western world. It calls for
steps to improve German-American relations and to remove
anti-German sentiments in the United States. Mayor Brandt re-
cently told American officials in B erlin that he was concerned
about reports from two of his party deputies who were recently
in the United States that the American people have become in-
creasingly critical toward Germany-) 3,N)
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`411itie
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi'gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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