CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049790
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 22, 1961

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amon
Pilau Khoun
Ban Ta Viang-,�
Vang ViWng ePo Doeg-
non,
:-rYLENTlAN, Eor ikhan$s.
Ban Ffiti:ReUp ak Sane
Vientiane
Nong Khai
THAI I AND
NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT Forces in
400 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
=KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
�ROAD
---TRAIL
0 ROUTE NUMBER
610522
510
STATUTE MILES
Kam Keut
H AM
homma
SAVAN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: ttacks against pro-government Meo partisans in
) the Pa Dong area continued on 20 May. Although pressure / �
slackened on 21 May,
additional .attack 6 ctgollilbL me meos mere were contem- .-d---(---6(--6-�
plated; R..5 r a, i
Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through ,
22 May. '64.
No significant political developments were reported over
the week end. (Backup, Page 1)
(Map)
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its I Lir oz-di,avr_, I
South Korea: The new South Korean cabinet, which was ,otti-c--6-1
/ A
installed in a public ceremony on 21 May, gives little evidence/.�
of special competence to handle the economic problems at the 3,
root of popular unrest. The American Embassy reports that
the public has maintained its passivity toward the revolutionary
government, watching in silence demORstrations staged on 19 444--i
May in support of the coup. Newspaper\editors, under pres- /P..3 .0 ot-te
sure to follow the government line, are Priyately expressing #7, v.
skepticism that the new government can achieve necessary
/gat.
social and economic reforms. Disillusionment may increase
as press censorship, restrictions imposed on citizens by mar-
tial law, and arrests of leftists and former government Offi-
cials continue.
government concern that "no social unrest or criticism"
be caused by "indiscriminate confinements of persons against
whom no case can be built." (Backup, Page 3)
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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Pointe
Noire
Banana
Brazzaville
1LECPO 1 1
55 Leopoldv
Bangassou
.Gemena
Sc tter�d_Forc
MOBUTU
LIBERIA I
3,400
200 E-OUAT EU
INDIA
Coquilhatville
800 � Boende
TUNISIA ETHIOPIA
3200, 200
NIGERIA
MOBUTU
800
MOBUTU
Matadi
Kitona
:*
Luanda
ysville
� Francqui
uluabourg
Bak
GHANA
1,600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
1. 1 Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
--- Selected road not included)
Selected railroad
4-1- Selected airfield
1001
Scattered Forces
STATUTE MILES 400
I .
Luputa
ga
Bondo
GIZENGA
,000
LIBERIA
lamina
ETHIOPIA
anleyville
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
500
INDIA
Kongolo
Kabalo
Albertville
NIGERIA
�Manono
TSHOMBE
7,000
lisabethville
0:� 0
NIGERIA
Usurnbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
870
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Congo: The impasse between Leopoldville and Stanley-
\dile over the reopening of the Congolese parliament continues.
Both Nasir and Nkrumah, have urged
Gizenga not to attend a meeting in Leopoldville for reasons of
personal safety. Ambassador Timberlake believes that Gizenga
would clearly be taking a risk in coming to Leopoldville.
The new UAR ambassador arrived in Stanleyville on 16
May and met with Gizenga the next day,
_ Guinea has also reportedly designated
an ambassador to Stanleyville, but there is no indication when
or how he will arrive. (Backup, Page 6)
(Map)
USSR: A modest but significant change of Soviet economic
policy in favor of the consumer seems implicit in Ithrushchev's
20 May remarks to exhibitors at the British Fair in Moscow. He
said, "We consider our heavy industry as built. So we are not
going to give it priority. Light industry and heavy industry will
develop at the same pace." Economic policy after World War II
has consistently provided the consumer with an annual increase
In the quantity of manufactured goods, but this increase has not
kept pace with the over-all annual growth in the output of all in-
dustry; thus consumer-oriented production has declined as a
share of total industrial output. Khrushchev's comments imply
that this decline will be slowed or halted. Because the light in-
dustrial base is small comp red to th t of he vy industry, such
a change will not re uire a larve diversion of resources away
from heavy industr Page 8)
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?wig
Roads Railroads
Sar Pal
Manua
Hadar
Shari
Staling.
Termer
Pah Khumri
Bulola
Jalalab
Herat KABUL
QorI Qa1a/---
Salang Pass
Kandahar
Zaheda
AFGHANISTAN- PAKISTAN
Karach
44, NEW BORDER INCIDENT
PLISFITOON TRIBAL ARIA
OF GREATEST FRICTION
510522 2
eshawar
CHINA
JAMMl
KASHMIR
;
(P error hr di,pu cc I
RAWAVINDI
� �
Lahore
INDIA
IN
31329
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11,600 1 LILA-AU-4 1
IA
*Afghanistan -Pakistan: Afghan troops disguised as Push-
toon tribesmen apparently crossed the Pakistani border into -
the Pushtoon tribal territory of Bajaur on 20 May and attacked 7j
Pakistani garrisons there. The attacks evidently were part of ,
Kabul's continuing efforts to incite rebellion among Pushtoon /4-1-
tribes living in Pakistan. The Pakistani minister for states e
and frontier regions stated yesterday that the Afghan attacks /7) .1.;%z
were preceded by heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, and
that a captured Afghan soldier had admitted about 1,000 Afghans
took part. If, as the Pakistani minister claims, the attacks
were repulsed with heavy losses to the Afghans, Kabul may de-
cide to send additional, stronger forces across the border rather
than suffer new losses of prestige among the Pushtoon tribesmen
living on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani frontier. Pakistan,
which in the past has generally played down the frequent small-
scale armed clashes in the Pushtoon tribal areas, may use the
latest attacks as grounds for strong counteraction.
(Backup, Page 9) (Map)
Iraq: gp uneasy atmosphere prevails in Baghdad as dis-
illusionment with the Qasim regime continues to spread through-
out Iraq. On 19 May Baghdad police broke up a small demon-
stration attempted by trade unionists shouting anti-Qasim slo-
gans. Prime Minister Qasim attended a public function in a
Baghdad suburb the same day, and the military and police guard
in the area was the heaviest noted in many months. Several dif-
ferent Iraqi groups--the Moslem Brotherhood, the Iraqi Baath-
ists, a group of army and air force officers, and an organiza-
tion of prominent Iraqi exiles�are all reported to be engaged in
separate plotting to assassinate or overthrow him. Such conspir-
acies would be more likely to succeed, however, if they had sub-
stantial army support, which at present seems to be lackin0
0
Western Europe: Ll3elgian Foreign Minister Spaak, who
played a leading role in the negotiation of the Common Market
(EEC) treaty in 1955 and 1956, expressed to Ambassador Mac- cv{
Arthur on 16 May reservations regarding Britain's accession to
the EEC. Spaak doubted London would actually accept the "prin-
ciples" of the EEC and declared it would be a "disaster" if
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rice paid for British adherence were the "death of European
political integration." Spaak said he had recently told the
French ambassador that Belgium was prepared to make con-
cessions to get De Gaulle's confederation plan underway,, since
he thought political ties among the six EEC countries should be
strengthened before London asked to be admitted. London
seems increasingly disposed to seek EEC membership despite
the continued ambiguity of officir statements, and a decision
to do so is probably imminen3
(Backup, Page 10)
22 May 61 DAILY BRIEF
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%NsSECRET.
Situation in Laos
in Xieng Khouang
Province, the USSR, North Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia have
opened consulates there, with the Chinese Communists also ex-
pected to open one shortly. the So-
viet Consulate is located at Phong Sayan, while the Czech and
North Vietnamese consulates are located at }Chang Kay, report-
edly the joint headquarters for Souvanna Phouma and his half -
brother, Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong.
relations between the Pathet Lao and Kong Le as not
always good but believes the Pathet Lao control Kong 1.2:q
tThere have been recent rumors in Vientiane that Lt. Col.
Siho, the Laotian intelligence chief, is becoming disaffected
and might attempt a coup. Siho, as one of the few commanders
under Phoumi who has shown any stomach for fighting, has
risen rapidly in power and influence in recent months. Phoumi,
following his reoccupation of Vientiane last December, named
Siho his watchdog against another surprise coup along the lines
of Kong Le's successful venture last August
rrndia seems primarily concerned that Communist China
will dominate any future Laotian government. Indian Defense
Minister Krishna Menon, on his return from Geneva to India onj
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gl May, and Prime Minister Nehru have both reiterated
earlier criticism of SEATO for not increasing the stability
of the area but only provoking Communist China, In Geneva,
Indian delegation members reportedly feel they must some-
how prevent the Chinese Communists from securing a posi-
tion which will facilitate the subversion of Laotian neutrality.
They believe that the West will be unable to maintain its influ-
ence in Laos, and, considering the growth of Communist in-
fluence inevitable, they would prefer Soviet influence rather
than Chinese. They reportedly are disappointed that the USSR
has not given stronger support to Souvanna Phouma and that
the Soviet delegation supported demands for equal status for
the Pathet Lao, who New Delhi believes are oriented toward
PeipinD
Menon emphasized to newsmen that the reactivated Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC) must not be asked to with-
draw from Laos by any future government except with the con-
sent of all parties concerned, presumably including India.
Peiping characterizes Secretary Rusk's departure from
Geneva as indicating a US desire to avoid serious discussion
of matters of substance on the Laotian problem. Both Peiping
and Hanoi have denounced US proposals for international ma-
chinery for supervising Laotian neutrality as designed for arbi-
trary interference in Laotian internal affairs.
Available flight schedules indicate a reduced level of over-
all air activity on 21 May. Six Soviet IL-14s and two LI-2s were
to fly into Laos. On 20 May, airlift activity included at least
seven and probably more IL-14s flying the Hanoi - Vinh - Dong
Hoi route. The Soviet AN-12 which arrived at Haiphong from
the USSR on 1.5 May left Haiphong on 20 May, probably on a re-
turn flight to the USSR.
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Situation in South Korea
The embassy believes that the known Communist affilia-
tion of coup leader Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui before the Korean
war and the obscure backgrounds of other new leaders may
tempt opponents of the new government to charge that the coup
was Communist inspired. He is apparently sensitive about his
past Communist affiliation and may lean over backward to vin-
dicate himself by publicly taking a strong anti-Communist po-
sition. However, former army chief of staff Lt. Gen. Choi
Yong-nok, who has opposed the coup, implied in a conversa-
tion with the US army attache that Pak's anti-Communism
might be a pose and said it would become apparent within three
months that the coup was Communist inspired.
rP-ak was admittedly a Communist in 1948 and is reported
to have turned state's evidence to reveal other Communists in
the army. He was court-martialed, but his sentence was sus-
pended. When the Korean war began in 1950, he was recalled
to active duty. His war record was excellent, but the South
Korean Army Counter Intelligence Corps continued to be sus-
picious of him. Both American and South Korean officials
have observed that Pak appears "obsessively concerned" with
corruption and have even suggested that Pak's motive in direct-
ing the coup is self-vindication)
The revolutionary government has suspended civil rights
and on 20 May arrested a number of prominent military offi-
cers, cabinet officers, and other officials of the deposed
Chang Myon government. Former Premier Chang himself
remains under surveillance in his home.
the Home Ministry order police
bureau chiefs to f �iifIOftist students who "are plotting
to flee to the coast or the area of the truce line and seize a
chance to go to Japan or cross north."
However, the revolutionary leaders have ordered police
to exercise "special caution in the confinement of students"
and to take "particular pains to ensure that the students do
not strike back." The students, largely
responsible tor overthrowing the 1tnee government a yeapago, have
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generally remained quiet since the coup, although the American
Embassy reports that 400 "unenthusiastic" students did appear
in a pro-government demonstration on 19 May.
The coup government is rapidly establishing direct control
over the press by threatening arrest and shutdown, in addition
to continuing the heavy censorship imposed immediately after
the coup. Leading newspapers moved by 19 May from their
initial reaction that coup leaders would quickly return the gov-
ernment to civilian control to a position justifying the coup as
the exercise of the people's "natural right of revolution." The
press is also distorting the reaction of US government leaders
to the coup as welcoming the resignation of the "weak" Chang
government and the "smooth success of the military revolution."
Banks and trading companies still appear hesitant to resume
normal operations. Retail business is generally limited to daily
necessities. Relaxations from the total freeze instituted on 16
May are being made by the coup government on a case-by-case
basis.
Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong remains head of the Supreme Coun-
cil for National Reconstruction (SCNR)--the new name of the Mil-
itary Revolutionary Committee which staged the coup--as well
as being prime minister and defense minister. Pak Chong-hui,
its deputy chairman,holds no position in the new cabinet set up
by the SCNR. The cabinet is comprised of 13 general and field-
grade officers, mostly in their thirties, and of one retired lieu-
tenant general, Foreign Minister Kim Hong-Il, former ambassa-
dor to Nationalist China.
North Korea, still charging that the coup was engineered by
the US, is staging mass rallies to voice its opposition. Speaking
at a rally on 20 May, Vice Premier Kim Ii called on the entire
South Korean population to smash the coup; the Pyongyang re-
gime earlier had urged all South Korean military personnel to
resist the coup leaders. Pyongyang is using the disturbed sit-
uation in South Korea to renew its contention that the only solution
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to the South's problems is unification, saying that only on the
basis of the "self-sufficient" economy of the North can South
Korea's economic ills be remedied.
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Situation in the Congo
Lin �
__than Charge Rahman in Leopoldville, who has recently
engaged in anti-ICasavubu activity, stated in mid-May that he
did not think Gizenga had enough votes in parliament to be-
come premier. He said he felt that if Gizenga insisted on try-
ing for this post, he would merely weaken the "nationalist" po-
sition and pave the way for a dictatorship by some member of
the present Leopoldville government. He added that Gizenga
should be prepared to lead the opposition or accept a minor
ministerial post if necessary. Ambassador Timberlake, how-
ever, believes that Gizenga, by threats and bribes, might win
out in a parliamentary session. Cleophas ICamitatu, governor
of Leopoldville Province who is generally sympathetic to Gi-
zenga, reportedly feels that Gizenga must not refuse to attend
parliament if it opens-
Nkrumah counseled Gizenga to insist on reconvening par-
liament in Stanleyville, and Nasir on 17 May strongly urged him
not to go to Leopoldville, "as I believe there is a plot to kidnap
or arrest you, just as happened with Tshombe." Nasir went on
to say that he did not think Gizenga should leave Stanleyville at
the present time "in any circumstances." Nasir made no refer-
ence in the message to Gizenga's proposal to reconvene parlia-
ment in Kamina.
The UAR ambassador is the third diplomatic official actual-
ly to arrive in Stanleyville�Mali has an ambassador there, Yugo-
slavia a charge. The UAR ambassador reported to Cairo that
Gizenga had told him Nasir was "the greatest of African leaders
in understanding of the Congo problem, and one of the greatest in
supporting the legal government."
The sudden departure on 20 May of Mekki Abbas, top UN
official in the Congo during Dayal's absence in New York, will
be regretted by the Leopoldville government, with whom Abbas
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had worked harmoniously. T_,_eopoldville will be particularly
concerned because Hammarskjold reportedly sent a letter to
Kasavubu on 19 May announcing that Dayal, who left Leopold-
ville on 10 March, will return to the Congo. Hammarskjold
said that he would not make this letter public until he had re-
ceived Kasavubu's replig (
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Soviet Consumer Goods Production May Increase
Khrushchev's remarks made clear that the change in eco-
nomic policy benefiting the Soviet consumer would be limited
to the relationship between the annual growth rates planned for
"Group A" (Which designates the means of production in Soviet
jargon) and for "Group 13" (consumer goods). The 1961 plan
called for a 9.5-percent increase for Group A and a 6.9-per-
cent increase for Group B. The subordinate position relegated
to consumer goods is shown by the fact that investment alloca-
tions for Group B account for something more than one tenth
but less than two tenths of total investment in industry.
The regime announced last December that it considered
the overfulfillment of plans1,1?y heavy industry warranted some
reallocation of resources toward fulfilling "public demand."
The continuing critical commentary on the failure to achieve
planned agricultural output goals and Khrushchev's earlier
remarks on these subjects suggest that the reduction in the
disparity between the growth rates for heavy industry and
consumer goods may be made, at least in part, by a transfer
of resources from heavy industry�slightly slowing its growth
rate--to agriculture rather than to light industry.
Modest policy changes in favor of the consumer have been
common during Khrushchev's regime; they are intended to pro-
vide, in lieu Of coercion, the material incentives deemed nec-
essary for a growth in labor productivity, to improve the for-
eign image of the Soviet citizen's lot, and to influence favorably
the attitude of the populace toward the regime.
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The Afghan-Pakistani Border
The Afghan-Pakistani border dispute has been marked by
sporadic clashes and almost continuous propaganda warfare
since the partition of India in 1947. Kabul has consistently de-
manded that the Pushtoon tribes living on the Pakistani side of
the border be given the right of self-determination. The Pak- �
istani government has just as consistently rejected these de-
mands as interference in its internal affairs. The most recent
significant clash prior to this past week occurred last Septem-
ber, when a force of Afghan irregulars .was driven from the
Bajaur area with heavy losses. Since then Kabul has been try-
ing to regain some of its lost prestige among the tribes by giving
increasing support to dissident tribal elements in Pakistan.
Although Kabul claims that the 20 May attack was launched
by Pushtoons living in Pakistan--and that the Pakistanis suf-
fered heavy losses--the latest action seems to indicate that Af-
ghanistan has now begun to use regular Afghan troops disguised
as tribesmen in Pakistani tribal territory. Evidence was pre-
viously reported of Afghan plans to use of some of its regular
units especially equipped for guerrilla operations in Pakistan.
old British-made weapons rather than the new Soviet-
supplied weapons were being distributed to units along the border
opposite Bajaur. The Afghan army uniform factory in Kabul
had already manufadtured10,000 sets of tribal-type clothing, ap-
parently for use by Afghan soldiers disguised as tribal irregulars.
This latest clash may lead to new criticism of the United
States by both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistani President
Ayub has complained that American inquiries about the use of
US-supplied arms in the tribal area made the Afghans "bolder."
The Afghans, on the other hand, have frequently complained that
US military assistance to Pakistan is used to "suppress the free-
dom-lovin Pushtoon tribesmen.7
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�ftpf
CONFIDENTIAL *401
Spaak Has Reservations Pegarding Britain's Membership
In the Common Market
Jan his wide-ranging review of what he called the "problem
of Europe," Spaak made it clear he felt the economic and politi-
cal unification of Europe would be achieved only if the present
momentum is maintained. European integration could be
stalled or frustrated, he believes, either from "without" if
Britain's adherence should involve the sacrifice of the "prin-
ciples and institutions" of the EEC treaty, or from "within"
if De Gaulle and France should become "totally recalcitrant
and uncooperative." Given the difficulties Britain may have in
accepting the EEC as it stands, Spaak feels it necessary that
further steps be taken to strengthen ties among the EEC mem-
bers. He believes that continued progress by the EEC would
encourage London to join in its own self-intereD
dp strengthen the EEC politically, Spaak is willing to pro-
ceed from De Gaulle's confederation plan. This plan is cur-
rently stalled, in large part by Dutch opposition to considera-
tion of NATO problems by the confederation, and a 19 May
meeting to discuss the plan was postponed until July. At his
meeting with the French ambassador, however, Spaak said
he would not support the Dutch view and would even make other
concessions if De Gaulle in turn would agree to certain steps
to strengthen EEC institutions. In explaining to MacArthur
this position, Spaak admitted he is "not encouraged" by De
Gaulle's views either on Europe or NATO, but feels it must be
recognized that De Gaulle now is the dominant figure in Europe
and shoilid be "utilized rather than frustrated." Spaak doubts
France can in the long run dominate Europe and believes the
other five EEC countries might be able to "force" De Gaulle to
be more forthcoming in NATO discussionSg
Ence apaak's prestige in European and NATO affairs is
considerable, his position suggests that the Common Market
will be extremely cautious in considering British entry. There
have been a number of indications that British opinion is
rapidly evolving in favor of at least a conditioned bid for mem-
bership, despite the continued ambiguity of official public
statements and repeated reassurances that London will not')
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CONFIDENTIAL
rhetray domestic agricultural interests or Britain's obliga.tWns
to Commonwealth members and to the countries of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA). The American Embassy in
London believes that the government statement to the House of
Commons on 1.7 May--which strongly emphasized the advantages
of a close British link to the EEC--is part of an educatio
paign to enlist public support for negotiations to that end.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIALNIS
THE PRESIDENT
,e Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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