CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03184094
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 11, 1961

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3.5(c)
11 March 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in the Congo. (Page i)
2. Laos: Khrushchev suggests further bilateral talks with
US on Laos; Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces reported yester-
day to have occupied Muong ICassy south of Phou Khoun
road junction. (Page t)
3. USSR: Khrushchev plays down urgency of nuclear test
ban. (Page ti)
4. USSR: Moscow continuing to purchase oil tankers out-
side bloc. (Pzge tit)
5.
Vietnam: Hanoi orders Communists in South Vietnam
to disrupt presidential election to be held 9 April.
(Page ttt)
6. East Germany: Economic delegation to Moscow receives
little satisfaction in efforts to reduce dependence on im-
ports from West Germany. (Page ttt)
7. West Germany: Bonn officials fear emphasis in US
foreign policy is shifting away from Europe. (Page tv)
8. Ethiopia: Disorders in Addis Ababa may occur upon
execution of leader of revolt. (rage tv)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 March 4961
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Congo: in a 9 March discussion on the Congo with an ok,
American official, Hammarskjold expressed the belief that
further outbreaks in the Lower Congo were unlikely for the /'a't f?
time being. Relations between the UN and local authorities,i3AAjt_
however, remain uneasy. He indicated that he had not yet
found a replacement for Dayal and said that Makki Abbas of p.
Sudan, the interim appointee for the job, was "not the best
man in the world but would be all right." Hammarskjold is
also hopeful that several additional countries will contribute
contingents to the UN for Another Another UN official has said
that the Somali and Malagasy republics might contribute a
battalion each within a month.
The Tananarive conference, by conceding the existence
of several de facto centers of power in the Congo, has
strengthened Katanga's claim to autonomy and has enhanced
Tshombe's position as the leading figure in the anti-Gizenga
bloc.
(Backup Page 1)
*Laos: E his remarks to Ambassador Thompson on
Laos, Khrushchev took a generally positive line, pointing
out that the US and the USSR agree that the objective should
be neutrality for Laos, that this represents a step forward,
and that bilateral conversations should be continued. He said
that neither the US nor the USSR stands to gain anything from a
continuation of the fighting and that this would only damage
relations between the two countries. He warned, however, that
any prolonged delay in reaching a solution would complicate
the problem and could cause the fighting to flare up. He alA93
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agid any Western move toward "aggravating the military con-
flict" would lead to the defeat of the Boun Oum government.
Khrushchev offered no new proposals for arranging a settle-
ment and confined himself to reaffirming Soviet support of
Souvanna Phouma as the lawful government and for Prince
Sihanouk's proposal for a 14-nation conference. Khrushchev
said he would welcome a neutral Laos on the Austrian model,
pursuing a policy like Cambodia's and Burma
in Laos, military pressure by .mong Le - Pathet Lao forces
west of the Plaine des Iarres continues to increase. Muong
Kassy, an important point on the Vientiane - Luang Prabang
highway, is reported to have been occupied by the enemy on
10 March. This report follows the withdrawal earlier this
week of government troops from the strategic Phou Khoun
road Junction north of Muong Kassy. The Kong Le - Pathet
Lao forces evidently are continuing to press this initial ad-
vantage, but information available as of 0500 EST today is
insufficient to tell whether they have embarked on a maioref-
fnrf acraingf crnuchrnmPnf ft-IrrPc in filo ran
*USSR: (Ambassador Thompson feels that Khrushchev's
remarks on a nuclear test ban during their private conversa-
tion on 9 March indicate that the USSR has less interest than
formerly in a treaty and may intend to use the question of
French adherence as an excuse for failure to reach agreement.
After stressing that the main question was complete and gen-
eral disarmament and not a test ban, Khrushchev stated that
the USSR was willing to sign a treaty but questioned whether
France would adhere. In reply to the ambassador's question
on Communist China's adherence, Khrushchev pointed out
that France was conducting tests whereas China was not. He
added, however, that the Chinese may "achieve progress" in
this field and that it would be necessary for both France and
CoWinunist China to sign an agreement
Khrushchev's attempt to play down the urgency of a test
ban agreement contrasts with his recent public pronouncements
on this issue. Khrushchev may feel his freedom of actionlgi
11 Mar 61
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aegotiations will be sharply limited by Peiping's determination
to achieve a nuclear weapons capabiling
(Backup, Page 3)
USSR: Moscow is continuing its efforts to acquire large
oil tankers to transport rising Soviet petroleum exports. Since
the USSR embarked on its tanker procurement program in the
latter half of 1960, more than 20 tankers have been ordered 04
from the Netherlands, Japan, Italy, West Germany, and
Yugoslavia. Delivery of these tankers will raise the ton-
nage of the Soviet tanker fleet from about 990,000 in mid-
1960 to at least 1,580,000 tons. ,Backup,
Page 5)
North - South Vietnam: North Vietnam has ordered
Communists in South Vietnam to disrupt "by every means
possible" the presidential election scheduled for 9 April
and to arouse more popular support for the Tnvement to
overthrow South Vietnam's President Diem.
Meanwhile,
Diem has indicated that he intends to prevent the Commu-
nists from interfering with the election. (TOP SECRET
DINAR) (Backup, Page 6)
East Germany:EThe East German economic delegation
headed by State Planning Chief Bruno Leuschner, which re-
cently returned from Moscow, reportedly received little
satisfaction in its efforts to reduce its dependence on im-
ports from West Germany. The USSR apparently does not
consider that making the East German economy independent
of West Germany is urgent enough at this time to warrant the
shifts in bloc economic planning which would be necessary,
and probably desires to effect only a gradual shift in East
Germany's trade pattern. The initiation of such a gradual
shift is reflected in the 1961 trade protocol signed by the two
countries on 23 February. This agreement provides for..!.)
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-percent increase in the level of trade over 1960, includ-
ing greater Soviet deliveries of chemicals and engineering
products--commodities for which East Germany now depends
in part on West Germanlj, (Backup, Page 7)
West Germany: ETwo leading members of the Bundestag
Foreign Affairs Committee who accompanied Foreign Minister
Brentano on his recent visit to the US
they gained the impression that the
emphasis in US foreign policy is shifting away from Europe
and focusing on the uncommitted nations. They drew the
conclusion that Europeans needed to close ranks in a power
grouping that could stand by itself and vigorously pursue its
own interests. They also anticipated US pressure on Bonn
to revise its policy toward Eastern Europe--in particular to
recognize the Oder-Neisse line as Pnlandis wpste n boun-
darID
Page 8 (Backup,
Ethiopia: There may be disorders in Addis Ababa at the
conclusion of the trial of General Menghistu, the former com-
mander of the Imperial Body Guard, who is expected to be ex-
ecuted for treason. Menghistu, �who played a prominent role
in last December's abortive coup, is gaining acceptance among
elements of the populace of Addis Ababa as a revolutionary
hero and as a symbol of the need for reform in Ethiopia.
(Backup, Page 10)
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Situation in the Congo
According to a UN military official in New York, the
1,000-man Moroccan contingent in Katanga seems to have
embarked on a systematic program of harassment and non-
cooperation with the UN Command. Their morale is said to
be completely broken, and they allegedly have "laid down
their arms." fflammarskjold had hoped to send the group to
Matadi in a show of force, but the troops reportedly stated
� that they would obey directives only from Rabat. Rabat has
ordered this group--the only remaining part of a force which
originally totaled 3,200--to withdraw from the Congo, but
it has been delayed by transportation difficulti_e_D
The Tananarive conference apparently has agreed that
the existing central authority should be scrapped, along with
the present provincial structure. In their place a group of
new states, based largely on tribal lines, would be created,
with an ill-defined "community of united nations" arrange-
ment for a central authority, presumably in Leopoldville,
which would become a "neutral city." The participants ap-
parently are agreed that any solution reached at the conference
will be an interim one and that any definitive reform must wait
until the country is pacified. The absence--and presumably
the nonconcurrence--of Gizenga will make implementation
of these proposals difficult and will probably lead to opposi-
tion to them among his international supporters.
Tshombe seems to have been successful in his efforts
to reach agreement on replacing the present structure with
a loose confederacy. Except for Albert Kalonji of southern
Kasai--who is largely dependent on Tshombe's patronage--
the other participants have an interest in retaining some
type of central authority--ICasavubu and Ileo by virtue of their
positions in the present central government, and Leopold-
ville Provincial President Kamitatu because of his long as-
sociation with Lumumba's ideals of a unitary state. However,
local ties still have considerable importance for most of them,
and none seems to be willing to face up to strong pressure�
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from Tshombe. As a result, the conference has been able
to issue a vague communique recognizing states now exist=
ing "by right or in facto"
The only well-defined point on which the participants
agree seems to be opposition to the UN. For the most part
they are trying to limit their discussions to general princi-
ples, leaving contentious details to be worked out in a larger
conference tentatively scheduled for the end of March in
Elisabethville. Such a conference, which might be attended
by as many as 400 leaders of varying political stature, would
be likely to become involved in extensive wrangling.
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Khrushchev Minimizes Urgency of Nuclear Test
Ban Agreement
LKhrushchev began his remarks on the nuclear test ban
issue by stating that there had been no tests for over two
years and that "we were not living badly." He claimed that
the USSR had a sufficient stockpile of weapons and that even
If tests were stopped, weapons production would not be. He
repeated that if the US accepted the Soviet plan for complete
and general disarmament, the USSR would accept full control.
Khrushchev also told the ambassador that he had read Am=
bassador McCloy's recent speech on disarmament and felt
that he had been talking instead about armame.lip
Eihrushchev's generally negative approach probably re-
flects the conflicting pressures which the USSR faces as the
talks resume in Geneva on 21 March. As a result of the role
which disarmament, a nuclear test ban, and Chinese desires
to achieve a nuclear weapons capability played in the Sino=
Soviet dispute, Khrushchev must weigh the advantages the
USSR could derive from further prolonged negotiations and
a possible agreement against the obvious risk that this course
will impel the Peiping regime to discard the precarious truce
produced by the Moscow Communist meeting. The Chinese
almost certainly will view the USSR's behavior at Geneva as
the first major test since the Moscow conference of Khru-
shchev's intentions regarding the whole range of Soviet policy
toward the US and its allies. The Soviet premier, on the other
hand, is well aware that the Western powers will be applying
a similar test and that developments in the Geneva talks will
have a strong bearing on the West's attitude toward high-level
negotiations on major East-West questions, such as Berlin and
Germany.
Although the precise course of Soviet policy at Geneva
will depend in part on Moscow's assessment of Western inten-
tions after the initial phase of probing of positions, Soviet
spokesmen have indicated to Western sources that Moscow
still considers the Chinese Communist factor more of an in-
centive than an obstacle to an agreeme&
It is likely that Khrushchev's ultimate decisions on this ques-
tion will be determined by two higher priority considerationsj
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Ellhis over-all evaluation of the effects of the USSR's present
posture of relative moderation and restraint toward the US
and its Western allies in obtaining a summit conference on
favorable terms, and 2) Chinese Communist reaction and
Moscow's judgment of the effects of this reaction on the USSR's
nosition in the Communist world.
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USSR Buys More Non-bloc Tankers
The USSR has recently contracted with Japan for the
construction of two 35 000-dead-weight-ton (DWT) tankers,
In addition to the four it ordered last December. Two Japanese-
built tankers bought by the USSR last fall are already being
used for Soviet deliveries to Cuba.
During recent trade negotiations with Italy, the USSR
arranged for the purchase of as many. as 11 tankers. At
least one, and possibly three, 48,000-DWT tankers will be
delivered this year. Six to eight 35,000-DWT tankers are
to be built for the USSR during 1962-1965.
Negotiations for tankers from West Germany have
also been conducted by Moscow but have not yet resulted
in firm commitments. The new Soviet - West German
trade agreement lists tankers in a clause calling for Ger-
many to supply some $37,000,000 worth of ships to the USSR
during 1961-1963. Moscow, in addition, is seeking to buy
one 32,000-ton tanker from Spain.
The Netherlands, which delivered one large tanker to
the USSR in 1960, apparently has agreed to supply several
others. Earlier this month Yugoslavia turned over a newly
constructed 25,000-ton tanker to the USSR and may have
agreed to supply one more.
CONFIDENTIAL
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North Vietnam Orders Efforts to Break Up South
Vietnamese Elections
a'resident Diem has predicted that the Communists will
step up bombings and assassinations in South Vietnamese
ities in an effort to win some control in urban as well as
ural areas. There has recently been an upsurge in guerrilla
ctivity, following a comparative lull since late December.
or several months, however, there has been increasing em-
phasis by the Communists on political activity and agitation,
including anti-Diem peasant demonstration
As part of an effort to counteract popular discontent, Diem
is reorganizing his government and has pledged to add an elected
representative from his loyal Republican Youth organization to
the village councils, now entirely appointive. One of Diem's
cabinet ministers has stated that the government's "only hope"
is to end its "mandarin spirit" and effect a drastic imnrovement
aLofftcia]s at the highest and lowest leve9
specified organization of anti-
Diem demonstrations at polling places and armed attacks on
"soldier gangs who force the compatriots to vote."
pommunist cadres with anti-Diem s
use in "guiding the compatriots in their struggle."
told guerrillas they should have South Vietnamese lo-
c nse units and village authorities "dispersed and demor-
alized" by the end of March and should "coordinate the annihila-
tion with a propaganda campaign."
the Communists
are anxious to get a more widespread following for the National
Liberation Front, which they organized in December�
cadres are told to organize separate "liberation"
oups otlrouth, women, older people, children, and students.
Instead of restricting the leadership of these groups to "key per-
sonnel and sympathizers," the Communists are told that "only a
few party members are needed" and that executive committees
will be largely composed of personnel "from outside the party."
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Soviet - East German Trade Relations
drade between East Germany and the USSR is planned to
reach a level of over $2 billion this year. Soviet deliveries
of many commodities, including ferrous and nonferrous metals,
are scheduled to increase in line with the provisions of the
long-term agreement, while deliveries of chemicals and
engineering products are to be higher than the amounts stip-
ulated by the agreement. The total increase in trade is not
sufficient to enable East Germany to reduce significantly its
reliance on West Germany as a source of many necessary
materials. West Germany now accounts for about 11 percent
of East Germany's total trade and is second only to the USSR
as East Germany's most important trading partnejg
CE_ast Germany will probably seek alternate sources for
traditionally West German imports in other Western countries
as well as in the satellites. Trade with the industrial countries
of the West, however, would be limited by East Germany's in-
ability to provide goods of sufficient quality and quantity to pay
for therx2g
Lin at least one key industry�chemicals�East German of-
ficials reportedly already feel that earlier estimates concerning
the reduction of dependence on West German deliveries were
overly optimistic and must be revised. They fear that it may
take as long as three years to become independent of West Ger-
man chemical deliveries and five years to achieve independence
from other Western countries. Other areas of the East German
economy--machine building and metallurgy�are probably even
more sensitive to any interruption of Western imports. While
East Germany has affirmed its great interest in continuing in-
terzonal trade, Deputy Premier Heinrich Rau hinted at a press
conference at the Leipzig Fair that the regime intends to change
the character of such trade. "It may be that we may no longer
need the same goods," he said, "but we shall need other goods
Instead; g99ds for which we can overnight switch over to other
suppliers."J
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US - West German Relations
Brentano found American officials "mistrustful"
of Bonn's intentions and doubtful of its genuine willingness
to "right Nazi wrongs." However, he felt that "the lack of
sentimentality" on the part of Adenauer and President Ken-
nedy might provide a common basis of understanding between
the two men when the chancellor meets with the President
next month. Brentano's report of growing anti-German feel-
ing apparently prompted Adenauer's press conference state-
ment on 10 March that he fears further damage to West
Germany's reputation from the impending trial of Adolf Eich-
manninIsrael. In reply to a reporter's question, Adenauer
also stated it was "quite possible" that Bonn might arrive at
a kind of nonaggression pact with Poland but indicated that
negotiations were dormant for the time being.?
adenauer has recently made cautious overtures to Warsaw
in anticipation of a more flexible US policy toward Poland. He
favors improving relations by undertaking a number of concil-
iatory moves such as extending economic aid and increasing
trade, but he opposes diplomatic relations because the Poles
continue to insist that Bonn first accept the Oder-Neisse line--
something Bonn refuses to do chiefly because of domestic polit-
ical considerations?
[A-denauer's strong desire for continued close ties with the
US was clearly indicated by his press conference statement
that he did not believe the administration's review of policy to-
ward Germany would lead to any basic changes, since the alli-
ance is based on "political and geographic facts which remain
the sampj
aevertheless, Adenauer's underlying fear of a possible
decision by the United States to reduce its European commit-
ments, including the withdrawal of US military forces in Europe]
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Gs a factor in prompting him to consider drawing closer to
France in some kind of continental groupinsi:j
Cauttenberg, who is normally close to Adenauer in outlook,
is known to favor the establishment of a separate European nu-
clear capability as the only way to assure a dependable deter-
rent to Soviet aggression
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Ethiopian Dissidence Growing
The Emperor has not carried out reforms for which there
has been considerable pressure and his recent government ap-
pointments represent essentially a reshuffling of the conserva-
tive old guard. Such inaction is increasing the widespread
discontent among the young educated class, whose minimum
demands include the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.
Antiregime leaflets, which have been distributed in Addis
Ababa by dissident elements since last December, are becom-
ing more menacing in tone; some recently have threatened that
the Emperor would be assassinated if Menghistu were executed.
Efforts by the security forces to determine the origin of the
leaflets are believed unsuccessful to date, although large num-
bers of students and other suspects have been arrested. Sub-
versive slogans are appearing on public buildings, and rumors
are being spread that clandestine radiobroadcasts are calling
for uprisings and attacks on the homes of prominent government
officials.
Officials in Ethiopia's Interior Ministry believe the outcome
of the trial against Menghistu and other rebels is a foregone con-
clusion and that they will be convicted and publicly executed. The
government, however, does not expect public disturbances, de-
spite the indications of growing unrest.
The deteriorating political situation in the capital appears
to be spreading to eastern Ethiopia,
large numbers of former Imperial Body Guards-
men--absoivea ot blame for the recent coup but reassigned to
units in the remote Ogaden region--deserted their new posts with
full equipment in late February. The whereabouts of an additional
850 guardsmen who were scheduled to arrive in the area some
time ago is also unknown.
There is also information that a group of middle-level army
officers, dissatisfied over low pay scales and conditions in gen-
eral, is joining the malcontents who favor the objectives of the
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rebels. There is no firm evidence, however, that there is
yet a strong leader capable of attracting sufficient support
among the dissidents to pose a serious threat to the regime.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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