CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001986
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 18, 1961

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18 April 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
7!:!
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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-1-U1'�-SECRET
TOP SECRET
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CONFIDENTIAL
LATE ITEM
USSR/Cuba: A Soviet government statement on 18 April
said that continuation of the invasion of Cuba "may have the
gravest consequences for world peace." The statement de-
clared that the USSR "reserves the right to take all measures,
with all states, to render the necessary assistance to the
Republic of Cuba if the armed interference in the affairs of the
Cuban peoples is not stopped." The Soviet government ex-
pressed the hope that the US government would understand
that the invasion of Cuba could "endanger the peaceful life
of the population of the United States itself." The statement
demanded immediate consideration of the Cuban, situation by
the UN General Assembly.
--e0N-FIDEIV7TAT
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Sgelr- Noe
18 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Cuba. (Page t)
2. Laos. (Page tt)
Ii
3. Angola: American consul sees possibility of "chaos
worse than Belgian Congo." (Page tit)
11
4. Communist China: Peiping may increase trade with �43
Japan. (Page tii) 0
V 2
5. India: Differences among Communist leaders remain
following 7-16 April party congress. (Page tit)
6. Iespraageel:tvIrabs object to military parade in Jerusalem.
7. Turkey: Military regime faces problem of transition
to civil government. (Page iv)
w/4
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
18 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Cuba: (As of 0430) Castro forces have suffered "considerable
casualties" and the loss of several coastal points in southern Las
Villas provincei
"heavy arms are being
brought in" by the attackers.
a unit of the attacking forces had penetrated inland to
the Laguna del Tesoro on the Matanzas provincial boundary. A
Cuban radio station monitored by US press agencies issued an ap-
peal for ambulances, "because there are many injured in Jaguey
Grande," a town in Matanzas some 20 miles from the coast. Al-
though the anti-Castro Revolutionary Council claims that the 17
April landings were intended largely to facilitate action by larger
forces already within Cuba, there has as yet been no information
of any significant action in support
of the landing forces, continued ar-
rests of suspected anti-Castro elements throughout the island.
Pro-Castro groups elsewhere in Latin America were quick
to react to the outbreak of fighting in Cuba. Mobs stoned USIA
offices in Buenos Aires and the offices of an American airline
in the Chilean capital on 17 April. Anti-US demonstrations also
occurred in at least six other Latin American cities on the same
day and more demonstrations are scheduled. In Bogota, demon-
strators were dispersed by gun fire in front of the US Embassy.
The Venezuelan armed forces,
were alerted for demonstrations by the relatively strong pro-
Castro groups in that country. Former Ecuadorean interior
minister Araujo, addressing a pro-Castro rally in Quito on 17 April,
called for volunteers to go to Cuba "to fight Yankee imperialism."
Mexican ex-President Cardenas announced that he will go to Cuba
as a personal gesture of solidarity with the Castro regime.
Both Moscow and Peiping have confined themselves to the stand-
ard non-committal statements of general support for the Castro
government. The voluminous com.mentary has been general through-
out the Bloc.
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*Laos: In central Laos, the bulk of the government force
from the Nhommarat area continues its disorganized with-
drawal to Thakhek, although some elements have established/ A .
new defensive positions along Route 12, about 11 miles from/P/
the town. In the confusion attending the withdrawal, bridges
In the Nhommarat area, previously prepared for demolition, 6-LcZe-t-e-/
were not blown. Contact with enemy forces has been broken Rcz,
off. The government garrison at Mahaxay, about
e3a
25 miles due east of Thakhek, has been ordered to withdraw A
westward to avoid being cut off. Urgent requests have been
sent to Vientiane general headquarters for dispatch of 105-mm.
howitzers to reinforce Thakhek.
Southwest of Xieng Khouang town, enemy forces continue
efforts to consolidate their position at Ban Pha.
(Backup, Page 1) (Maps)
18 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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7,
Angola: The American consul in Luanda reports that
rebel terrorism and governmental counteraction have re=
suited in the death of hundreds of whites and thousands of
Africans in the past month. He feels that despite Portugal's
determination to restore order, it will be impossible to re-
turn to the status quo ante. He believes that Angolan Africans
now would not be satisfied even with drastic reforms and that
there is a possibility of a complete breakdown of law and or-
der. leading ultimately to "chaos worse than the Belgian Congo."
Communist China =Japan:. There are signs of a thaw in
Sino-Japanese economic relations, obstructed since 1958 by
Peiping's strict insistence upon prior political concessions
from Japan. Actuated by a combination of economic difficul-
ties at home and trade problems with the rest of the bloc, the
authorities in Peiping now appear prepared to open the way for
some recovery in Sino-Japanese trade, which dropped from
$140,000,000 in 1957 to $23,000,000 in 1960. Publicly, however,
Peiping still insists that any "large-scale" trade depends on
Tokyo's meeting three conditions--that Japan stop being "hos-
tile" toward Communist China, stop associating itself with the
promotion of a "two Chinas scheme," and stop obstructing the
normalization of relations between the Japanese and China.
(Backup, Page 4)
bA
India:Elpdian Communist leaders made little progress in
mending their differences during the party's congress from 7 to
16 April. Preliminary reports indicate that the congress adopted
a moderate compromise resolution on the "present political sit=
uation" after postponing once again a decision on the party's fu-
ture tactical "program"�a move reportedly recommended by top OK
Soviet representative M. A. Suslov. Both actions constitute a
setback for the extremist faction and indicate that Indian Com-
munists will continue to be guided by the "peaceful, parliamentary"
policy adopted in 1958. The moderate-rightist group consolidated
its control by re-electing General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh despite
his poor healtS (Backup, Page 5)
18 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Israel-Jordan: Israel has refused to abandon its plans to 0
hold the state's 13th anniversary military parade in Jerusalem
on 20 April despite a ruling by the UN Security Council that
the parade, and a rehearsal that took place on 17 March, are
in violation of the 1949 Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement
The Israelis have changed the intended route of the parade in ip
order to avoid approaching the armistice line which bisects tie
city, but they remain adamant about including tanks and other Aitc,
heavy equipment in the procession contrary to armistice re-
strictions. The Israelis have consistently refused to accept
the UN's authority on their side of the Israeli-Arab armistice
lines. The parade plans have again fanned Arab�particularly
Jordanian--resentment toward Israel.
(Backup, Page 7)
Turkey: The military regime, which seized power on 27
May 0, has promised a transition to civil government and
national elections by 29 October0
tight surveillance of all political
activities and swift apprehension of those who in any way ex-
press discontent with the military regime. Regardless of who
wins the national elections, it is expected that the army will re-
main a major factor in Turkish politics
(Backup, Page 9)
18 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF
SECRET
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Situation in Laos
13,athet Lao influence appears to be growing among villages
surrounding Vientiane. Communist guerrilla squads have been
organized in more than a score of villages within a 25-mile
radius and are malting preparations for ambush attacks on gov-
arnmant nafrol
Meanwhile, Pathet Lao agent propagandists continue
active in and around Vientiane?
The recent enemy attack on the government outpost at Ban
Pha Pho in southernmost Laos may be more than an isolated
incident.
Communist intent to consolidate guer-
rilla assets in southern Laos for eventual combat operations
against local government forces, the
importance of the task and detailed a strategy of collecting
strength to "wipe out places one by one in order to insure vic-
tory." Reference was made to military equipment and cadres
available from "Central"--combined Pathet Lao - Vietnamese
Communist headquarters, believed located somewhere along the
northern Lao - Vietnamese border.
There has been a notable lack of incidents in southern Laos,
where government garrison forces are spread thinly and Pathet
Lao guerrillas have long exercised de facto control over much of
the hinterland. However, these guerrillas--at the end of the Com-
munist logistical pipeline�have always been the poorest equipped
in the country. Moreover, Communist attention since last fall
has been principally directed at consolidation in northern Laos.
With the government now increasingly on the defensive on
all fronts, the Pathet Lao may feel free to divert additional troops
and material from the northern sector for use in the south. Es-
tablishment of an open presence in southern Laos would bolster
the Pathet Lao's posture as a nationwide force and would commen-
surately strengthen the Communist hand in any future negotiations.
In this connection, Kong Le claimed in a speech at Xieng Khouang
town on 15 April that the "government forces and Pathet Lao
RET
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fighting units" had liberated two thirds of the country's ter-
ritory.
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Soviet Pre-
mier Khrushchev, in a recent discussion of world affairs with
the Indian ambassador in Moscow, implied that the USSR had
entered the Laotian struggle to prevent Chinese involvement.
Khrushchev reportedly said that Chinese Communist involve-
ment in Laos might have caused the conflict to spread "from
Southeast Asia to the straits of Formosa;' and eventually raise
the question of the USSR's obligations under the Sino-Soviet de-
fense pact. Ithrushchev's purpose in referring to Sino-Soviet
differences on policy in Laos probably was to impress New Delhi
with the USSR's reasonableness and restraint in the Laotian af-
fair and to underscore the need for accepting Soviet terms for
negotiati0ns:4
rgoviet spokesmen apparently took much the same line with
Indian officials in the US in mid-February. In a 14 February
discussion with an American official regarding Laos, the deputy
chief of Indian Mission, Chatterjee, remarked that he had gath-
ered the impression from Soviet colleagues in Washington that
if Laos developed into another Korea, the Chinese Communists
would necessarily control the situation. Chatterjee said that the
Soviet spokesmen took pains to leave the impression that the
USSR, by remaining in control of the Laotian situation, had fore-
stalled Chinese intervention3
Burmese Pre-
mier U Nu and Chou En-lai endorsed the principal of "coordi-
nation and cooperation" against the Chinese Nationalist irregulars.
Peiping and Rangoon mounted joint military operations
against the irregular forces in Burma earlier this year. The
reference to the Nationalist forces was prob-
ably sought by the Chinese Communists as an implicit expres-
sion of Burmese support for Peiping's expressed concern about
the activities of these irregulars in Laos. Chinese Communist
broadcasts have labeled the evacuation of irregulars from Laos
to Taiwan "phony" and warned that only the old and ineffective
were removed. Peiping radio also recently charged that Chinese
Nationalist elements conducted a raid into China from Laos.
II divided Laos is unacceptable, according to a Chinese Com-
munist journalist who periodically briefs editors of the Communist/
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ress in Hong Kong. In a recent briefing he asserted that
there was no reason to divide the country like Korea or Viet-
nam when there was still a chance of gettin7 a unified Laos/
Airlift flights continue to be scheduled at about the average
level. Since 15 April, however, airlift activity has been cur-
tailed by adverse weather conditions, a situation that will prob-
ably become more frequent with the approach of the monsoon
season.
TOP SECRET
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Communist China Encourages Some Increase in Sino-Japanese
Trade
Taking the initiative in recent weeks, Peiping has offered
Japan 60,000 tons of coking coal highly desired by the Japanese
steel industry. For the first time since 1958 it has invited
Japanese firms to send representatives to the annual spring
trade fair in Canton. It has increased to over 70 the number
of Japanese firms which are designated as "friendly" by the
Chinese Communists and with which they will therefore do
business. This is more than quadruple the number designated
at the first of the year. In response to these moves, the Japa-
nese have eliminated the requirement that this trade be con-
ducted on a straight barter basis and eased clearing account
procedures.
Conciliatory Chinese moves have been accompanied by con-
tinued reminders of the need for some initiative from Japan to-
ward a political accommodation. Peiping hopes the bait of sub-
stantial trade will keep alive pressure in Japan on the Ikeda gov-
ernment to meet the Chinese conditions.
Within Japan, press and business circles have welcomed
the moves by both governments and have renewed suggestions
for a government-to-government trade agreement--which Pei-
ping says can be signed only if Tokyo meets its political demands.
Skepticism about Peiping's intentions and tactics remains. Japa-
nese business elements recognize that the government is not likely
to make any move toward Communist China until after the prime
minister's visit to the United States in June.
SECRET
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Indian Communist Party Congress Fails to Repair Rift
The main stumbling block to agreement on the CPI's future
tactics continued to be the degree of support which Indian Com-
munists should give Prime Minister Nehru and certain "pro-
gressive" policies of his Congress party government. Several
days of bitter debate on this basic issue failed to resolve the
split between the moderates, who line up with Moscow in favor
of exploiting Nehru's prestige domestically and internationally,
and the leftist extremists, who echo Peiping's line that Nehru
has sold out to the "reactionaries" and must be actively opposed.
The question of the party's long-range program was turned
over to the newly elected National Council, in effect shelving
the problem for the time being. Press reports indicate that
the council comprises 56 "right-wing" representatives, 36
"leftists," and 18 who take a middle-of-the-road position.
The congress was confronted with three draft resolutions
on the current political situation, reflecting the views of the
rival factions. Prolonged discussion and maneuvering pro-
duced a compromise in which the moderate-backed "official"
draft, drawn up during the executive meetings in February,
was accepted with some concessions in emphasis to the left-
wing dissidents. The amended resolution probably will reit-
erate much of the double talk characteristic of the February
declaration.
A striking omission in the discussions and statements of
the congress was any reference to the Sino-Indian border dis-
pute, suggesting that antagonism between the "nationalist" and
pro-Chinese "internationalist" factions is still too strong to be
smoothed over in a compromise resolution. all addition, So-
viet delegate Suslov reportedly had exerted pressure to prevent
discussion of this issue?
While the party's official tactics for the national elections
next February remain to be worked out, Ajoy Ghosh's closing
address to the conference on 16 April indicates the line the CPI
is likely to take under moderate leadership. Ghosh called on
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"progressive forces" in all parties, including the ruling Con-
gress party, to form a common front to work for the progress
of India. A report issued by the party secretariat, while
promising a "big political battle" against the government's "anti-
people" policies, also pointed out that most of the CPI's "poten-
tial allies" were inside the Congress party and should be drawn
into "mass action."
Suslov's presence and his apparent role in the decisions of the
congress point up Moscow's continued predominant influence in
Indian Communist party affairs. Chinese suspicions of the So-
viet Union's "soft" policy in regard to countries such as India
may well be re-fired by the moderation of the program which
was adopted at a congress which Moscow apparently went to
some lengths to control. In any event, the results of t n-
gress will hardly be looked upon with favor in Peiping.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Israeli Military Parade in Jerusalem
The Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement signed on
3 April 1949 specifically excluded armored vehicles from a ten-
kilometer (6,2 miles) strip on either side of the armistice
demarcation line which includes the divided city of Jeru-
salem. The Israelis have announced that their parade will
include over 300 pieces of ordnance, headed by 14 recently
delivered British Centurion tanks and including 18 Sherman
tanks, 26 French AMX light tanks, heavy and light artillery
including French 85-10 guided antitank missiles, and Amer-
ican 106-mm. jeep-mounted recoilless guns. Some of these
units are already in Jerusalem. The column also will include
motorized infantry and a marching contingent of 4,000 men
and women from the Israeli armed services. There will be
no air force overflights because of the closeness of the bor-
der.
In recent years Israel has held its anniversary parade
alternately in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem on the Jewish
calendar date which corresponds to 14 May 1948, when Israel
attained its independence. This year the Israelis attempted to
forestall the furor that arose in connection with the 1958
parade in Jerusalem by apprising the UN Truce Supervision
Organization, and through it the Jordanians, of their plans,
stressing that the heavy equipment to be shown is only for
ceremonial purposes. The Mixed Armistice Commission
(MAC) subsequently condemned theiIsraelis for using tanks
and heavy artillery in the 17 March rehearsal.
A Baghdad newspaper reported on 14 April that the Arab
states might hold a joint military parade in the Arab sector of
Jerusalem, with Jordan providing the major force and smaller
contingents representing other Arab armies. Jordanian
foreign minister has since said that his government has def-
initely decided not to hold a "retaliatory" parade. However, he
pointed out that failure to do anything would be interpreted both
In Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world either as weakness
or as yielding to pressure from the United Statesi
On 15 April Jordan submitted a new complaint to the MAC
regarding the Israeli heavy equipment which already is in
tONFIDENTIAL
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Jerusalem for the parade. The MAC indicated it would first
consider a prior Israeli complaint on alleged Jordanian vio-
lations. The Israeli press, meanwhile, has been criticizing
the UN Truce Supervision Organization for making an "issue"
of the parade. A Foreign Ministry spokesman has said publicly
that Israel will cancel its parade if Jordan will implement those
clauses of the armistice agreement dealing with free Israeli
access to the Wailing Wall and the Mount Scopus enclave.
The UN partition of Palestine on 29 November 1947 provided
for putting the city of Jerusalem and its environs under direct
international administration. The ensuing Arab-Israeli war
prevented the carrying out of this resolution, but the General
Assembly reaffirmed its recommendation on 9 December 1949.
In accordance with these acts, the United States does not reco
nize Israel's claim to Jerusalem as the Israeli capital.
.COPIEFIDEI'ffV[T-
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The Situation in Turkey
The Turkish public appears to be more apprehensive over
the future course of events than at any time since the Commit-
tee of National Union (CNU) purged 14 of its 37 members last
November. Civil leaders are moving cautiously to make sure
that the CNU will have no occasion to back down on its promise
to hold elections by 29 October. An American Embassy official
stated recently that partisan sentiment seemed sure to become
extremely disruptive either before or after elections. He also
noted that one result of the political tension is a resurgence of
xenophobia and an increase in private criticism of US-Turkish
military cooperation.
The avowed main task of the regime is to restore civil
government. Many Turks believe that this will be done but that
the timing will be determined by the completion of trials and
approval of the new constitution and electoral law. The elec-
toral legislation passed the House of Representatives on 6 April
and has been sent to the CNU. The House now is debating the
draft constitution. When this review is completed, the draft
will be submitted to the CNU for approval, and must then be
approved by a popular referendum.
There can be little doubt that the military still determines
the policy of the Turkish Government and that any cabinet min-
ister who differs with the CNU must resign. The resignation of
the minister of industry on 14 April suggests continuing discon-
tent within the government over military rule. Ek's one prom-
inent Turkish politician observed, "For years to come, Turk-
ish politicians will feel a bayonet at the backs of their necks?,
Since the relaxation of restrictions on activities of polit-
ical organizations, it has become increasingly apparent that the
banned Democrat party (DP) of the former regime remains a
significant factor in Turkish politics. The CNU is apparently
alarmed by indications of DP strength and is trying to keep it
under control without having to take openly repressive measures.
New political parties have been warned not to identify themselves
too closely with the outlawed party. Behind the scenes the DP,
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which may represent up to 50 percent of the electorate, has
maintained considerable party cohesion, and at least one of
the new parties has reportedly offered itself as a continuation
of the DP and has appointed former DP members to positions
of influence.
Political observers anticipate the transfer of power from
the CNU to the Republican People's party (RPP) of Ismet Inonu,
but few believe such a transfer is possible in a truly democratic
fashion. The CNU may regard such a transfer as the only way
to provide stability for the country and assure safety for itself.
The political trials of the leaders of the ousted Bayar-
Menderes regime, now in their seventh month, are approach-
ing the critical stage of determining who was responsible for the
use of force against the student demonstrators in Ankara and
Istanbul and whether Bayar and Menderes are guilty of violating
the constitution by creating the special investigatory committee
and by other repressive actions. Some executions are probable;
estimates run as high as 80, but this is probably exaggerated.
In the final analysis the CNU's decision will depend largely on
its assessment of domestic and foreign reaction.
5E-e-
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NorCONFIDENTIAL .�%.09
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Ais Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986
Approved