CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02000194
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: February 13, 1961

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13 February 1961
Copy No. C 79
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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13 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
LATE ITEM: USSR la7ches Venus probe and ICBM.
1. Congo: Hammarskjold believes UN may have to
take over in Congo. (Page t)
2. USSR delivers jet aircraft to Morocco. (Page tt)
3. Poland cpntinues to offer economic aid to Cuba.
(Page tt)
4. Communist China may be holding conference of
ambassadors to discuss foreign and domestic prob-
lems. (Page tit)
5. South Korean activities impede improvement of re-
lations with Japan. (Page ttt)
6. North Vietnam to increase subversive efforts in
South Vietnam this week.
(Page it')
7. Laos: Government exploring means of easing situa-
tion. (Page it')
8. Iraqi regime acting against Communists. (Page
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*USSR: he U iaunc e aver c e, pro .a. y a tenusprobe,
from TIE- a Tam about 0035 GMT, 12 February (1935 EST,
11 February). Moscow announced about 18 hours after the
launch that the Venus probe, called an "automatic inter-
planetary station," had been launched from a sputnik, that it
weighed about 1420 pounds, and that communications are
effected by command from the earth on a freauencv of 922.8
megacycles.
� /Analysis indicates that the hour of the day this probe was
launaed was optimum insofar as guidance requirements were con-
cerned, but the date was beyond the period, 13-27 January, during
which maximum payloads could be delivered to Venus for a given
propulsion system
fcalculations�aiso indicate the probe transferred, by means
� of a iitional propulsion, from an earth orbit to its Venus trajectory
about 81 minutes after launch while over the general area of Cyprus. A
At least two, possibly three, objects incidental to this phase of the T
operation remain in the original earth orbit. Their identity cannot E
be ascertained, other than that nne is A SIVarti- hfleMfA
stage.
"a pulsating,
wnue, comet-iiice object at a time and general location which
correlate very well with the calculated time and location at which
the transfer from an earth orbit to a Venus trajectory took placl.
ET his operation has many similarities to the 4 February launch-
ing of Sputnik VII, which was believed to be an earth satellite. How-
ever, the announced weight of Sputnik VII, about 14,300 pounds, is
of a magnitude which could well contain both a 1420 pound Venus
payload and the propulsion system and fuel needed to raise it from
an earth orbit velocity to one high enough to get to Venus. It appears
now that Sputnik VII probably was an unsuccessful Venus probe, al-
though a possibility exists that the last propulsion stage was deliberate-
ly not utilized to its full capability by the Soviets..7
a_Jess than 30 hours after the Venus probe launching, at about
0459 GMT 13 February (2359 EST 12 February), the USSR launched
a test ICBM from Tyura Tam to the usual impact area on Kamchatka.
This is the fourth launching from Tyura Tam within the last 12 days,
and the fifth this year. Two of these were space program events.
Thirty generally successful ICBM program launchinvs have been con-
ducted to date%
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Congcx L__Hammarskjold stated on 10 February that if
Lumumba is-aead�which appears increasingly likely�the
UN must temporarily take over in the Congo. He has in
mind the placement of airports and all other transport fa-
cilities under UN control, the establishment of a protective
guard for all Congolese political personalities, and more
drastic steps to protect Belgians from reprisals by Lumum-
ba.'s supporters. Hammarskjold said he would justify this
action to the Security Council as a necessary emergency
measure and ask the Council for a new mandate to cover
the situatiTg
he uncertainty regarding Lumumba has apparently in-
terrupted at least some of the efforts which had been under
way at the UN to formulate a new Security Council resolution
aimed at promoting a Congolese settlement. India's repre=
sentative indicated on 10 February that a meeting which his
delegation had had that day with representatives of the neu-
tralist African states was unable to decide what to do in view
of the news about Lumumba. The Security Council meeting
scheduled for 13 February seems certain to focus mainly on
the question of Lumumba's disappearance, with the USSR call-
ing for immediate UN action to establish the facts and for the
Immediate release of Lumumba if still ali
Meanwhile,
the failure of "the Czechoslovak Red Cross
airplanes" to arrive�Khartoum in late January refused a
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Czech request to send "food and medicines" to Orientale
Province via Sudan�had produced a "violent reaction, es-
pecially in the army." Gizenga was described as being "in
a state of great despair" and fearful of a possible revolt by
army officers who had recently informed him that "the am-
munition on hand was not sufficient even for mere defense."
The UAR group asked Cairo for instructions as to what po-
sition to take in the event of a "revolt or coup" in Stanley-
ville. (Page 1)
USSR-Morocco: Soviet military jet aircraft -consist-
ing of 12 MIG-17 fighters, two MIG-15 trainers, and pos-
sibly two IL-28 light bombers--were delivered to Morocco
on 10 February. The aircraft apparently were accompanied
by Soviet technicians, despite recent informal assurances to
American officials by Morocco's top leaders that such per-
sonnel would not be admitted. The technicians presumably
will assemble the planes and may also establish a training
program for Moroccan personnel. However,
Crown Prince Moulay Hassan,
Morocco's deputy prime minister, had requested approval to
send two Moroccan officers to Cairo "to familiarize them-
selves with MIG planes" and indicated he would ask the UAR
to send two officers and 14 mechanics to train Moroccan per-
sonnel when the MIGs arrived. The delivery of the aircraft
coincided with Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to Morocco,
during which he offered economic assistance to King MohamedV.
Poland-Cuba: Poland is negotiating the terms of small-
scale economic aid to Cuba despite US warnings that this would
jeopardize Poland's chances of receiving continued financial as-
sistance from the United States.
Poland has offered Cuba a
steel tounary pricea at 4).1,,uou,uuu, with a 30-percent down pay-
ment and the rest payable over a six-year period at 5-percent
interest. These terms were arrived at after a $5,000,000 US
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credit to Poland was held up in January on the basis of an
earlier offer of aid Poland reportedly made to Cuba. To
date the Poles have responded only unofficially with the
argument that their trade with Havana is not aid but is con-
ducted on the same basis as their commercial relations
with other underdeveloped countries.
(Page 3)
Communist China: Peiping's envoys to at least ten bloc
and nonbloc countries were absent from their posts in early
February, suggesting that they and others of their colleagues
may have been recalled to Peiping for an ambassadorial con-
ference. Although no formal meeting has been announced, a
conclave at this time would almost certainly take into account
the change of administration in the United States, the status
of Sino-Soviet relations since the Moscow conference, emer-
gency situations such as Laos, and the regime's domestic
problems arising from food shortages and other economic
difficulties.
Japan = South Korea: Japan's expectation that the forma-
tion of a new government in South Korea would lead to early
establishment of diplomatic relations and abolition of the con-
troversial Rhee Line prohibiting Japanese fishing in interna-
tional waters has diminished as a result of recent South Korean
actions. Among these have been the seizure of a Japanese fish-
ing vessel for violating the Rhee Line, Seoul's cancellation of
a visit by a Japanese economic mission, and the unanimous
passage of a resolution by the South Korean House of Repre-
sentatives opposing early normalization of relations and in-
sisting on retention of the Rhee Line. Although there have
been mitigating circumstances surrounding these incidents
and Chang Myon's government seems genuinely anxious to reach
a settlement with Japan, South Korean negotiators have indi-
cated that strong pressures from political opponents and busi-
ness elements are hindering the government's efforts in this
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direction. Within Japan, the South Korean actions are
likely to give added support to the Socialists and other
elements which oppose an agreement with Seoul on the
grounds that it would be prejudicial to prospective Jap-
anese interests�mostly economic--in North Korea.
(Page 4) (Map)
North Vietnam - South Vietnam: North Vietnam has
instructed its agents in South Vietnam to undertake spe-
cial propaganda and terrorist action against the Diem re-
gime during the Vietnamese New Year festival, from 15
to 17 February. lists
slogans to be used in efforts to subvert South Vietnamese
military personnel and directs armed Communists to "as-
sassinate. . . build up guerrilla forces. . . and resist mop-
ping-up operations." Noting that the Saigon government in
the past has ordered its troops to fire on demonstrators
and has taken other harsh repressive measures, Hanoi
warns its agents to "be extremely careful" but exhorts them
not to "hold back because the struggle will naturally cause
bloodshed." South Vietnamese security forces will probably
be on full alert during the holiday period; lax security dur-
ing last year's celebration contributed to the success of a
daring Communist attack on a regimental headquarters,
heralding the start of an intensified campaign by North
Vietnam to unseat the Diem government.
Laos: King Savang is scheduled to preside over a full- 0 k
scalFrOrmcil of Ministers conference in Vientiane this week
to examine possible political and military measures to ease
the Laotian crisis; preliminary discussions were held lay Pre- -7,
mier Boun Oum at a cabinet meeting over the weekend. /he ir u'l"
government, meanwhile, is making new overtures to for- (Ul�
mer Premier Souvanna Phouma in Phnom Penh in an effort /Li
to woo him back to Vientiane in some official capacit/3 While '
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there is general agreement among Laotian leaders that
Souvanna's inclusion in the government would greatly
strengthen its position at home and abroad, there is dis-
agreement over what post he might be offered. Souvanna,
however, shows no disposition to return prior to the hold-
ing of a new international conference on Laos along the
lines of Cambodian Premier Sihanouk's proposal for a 14-
nation meeting. There have been no recent reports of sig-
nificant military activity.
Soviet IL-14s and LI-2s continue their airlift into Laos.
Some of the LI-2s are also continuing shuttle operations be-
tween Hanoi and Haiphong.
Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim, although 'unpopuiar, con- i;
tinues as the apparently unchallenged leader of the country
despite repeated press as well as private criticism of his etAit.,tti
regime. Pressure is mounting, however, for Qasim to ful-
fill.4 his promises of a return to constitutional government and
the election of a parliament. The regime is actively repress-4
ing the Iraqi Communists, many of whose leaders are in jail
or in hiding. Condemnation of the Communists, who formerly
enjoyed considerable popular prestige, now is reported to be
general.
Iraq's relations with the Soviet bloc, however, remain
cordial, and the military advisory group of over 200 Russians
is expected to be increased in size. Qasim is catering to pop-
ular emotion by emphasizing Arab cooperation and solidarity,
especially against Western "imperialism," as in the recent
Arab League meeting at Baghdad.
While there is moderate confidence among businessmen
and hopes for 1.961 harvests are good, the government's
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budgetary situation is still precarious, and it has insti-
tuted a series of "austerity" measures.
(Page 6)
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The 'Congo Situation
Although proof is still lacking, the conviction is growing
among observers in the Congo that Lumumba and his two fel-
low prisoners are already dead and that the story of their es-
cape is a fabrication developed by Tshombe's Katanga regime
in anticipation of a UN move to force the release of all polit-
ical prisoners. ff..2opoldville's newly designated Premier Ileo
reportedly confirmed Lumumba's death on 11 February, while
a former Congolese official is said to be claiming to have wit-
nessed the execution of the three prisoners following their
-tran-sfer�tn--Kataneaar �
umumba is dead and that e ew e en y o
the person who executed him.] The Katanga government is of-
ficially still pressing a sealai for Lumumba, but the American
consul in Elisabethville reports that no Katanga official appears
really concerned over the alleged escape. The consul expressed
a growing belief that Lumumba will never be found.
Tshombe''s regime has cast further suspicion upon itself
by indicating it would refuse to cooperate with the mission of
inquiry sent to Elisabethville by the UN Command, Tshombe
told newsmen on 12 February that the "escape" is "a strictly
internal affair and the UN has nothing to do with it."
During a meeting on 10 February with Ambassador Steven-
son, Soviet UN delegate Zorin expressed his skepticism over
reports of Lumumba's escape and said the situation in the Congo
would become "uncontrollable if he had indeed been killed. In
the Security Council meeting on 13 February Zorin may exploit
any discussion of Lumumba's fate as further proof of Moscow's
charge that Ilammaxskjold has proved himself untrustworthy and
incapable of discharging the Security Council's mandate for the
Congo. So-
viet Deputy Foreign Minister Sobolev,
told the UAR ambassador in
Moscow that the USSR favored the establishment of a supervir
sory committee in the Congo, to replace the UN secretary gen-
eral, formed from the Afro-Asian nations which support the
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� nationalist movement in the Congo--meaning Gizenga's
Stanleyville regime.
Gizenga,
asked Khrushchev, Nasir, Guinea's President Tour&
Mali's President Keita, and Morocco's King Mohamed V
to "issue an ultimatum for confirmation of the lives" of
Lumumba and his associates, adding that "your direct
act'o ommended."
Gizenga chas-
tised his representative in Cairo for not providing ade-
quate warning that the aid which had been expected would
�not arrive. The representative was told to ask "our So-
viet comrades" to request the UN "vigorously" for_per-
mission "to bring us what we need to keep alive." Gizenga
said that in the event this permission was denied, he would
"undertake measures which will make the entire earth
shudder." he alluded to
the Stanleyvilie military forces' increasing impatience
over the inability of their supporters abroad to send in
"aidintIe form of arms and ammunition."
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Poland Negotiating Aid for Cuba
In conversations with US officials over the past two
months, Polish representatives have gone to great lengths
to play down their relations with Cuba and have stressed
that their actions have not been and will not be inimical to
US interests.
Poland was reminded in January that under the Mutual
Security Act the US will refuse to grant assistance to any
country which provides economic or military aid to the Cas-
tro regime. The new and less favorable tender made on 7
February apparently was offered in reaction to the US posi-
tion. The Polish regime evidently feels that the new terms
can be more easily defended as falling within the meaning of
"normal" commercial transactions.
Possibly in anticipation of US objections, the first Polish-
Cuban trade agreement,dated 31 March 1960, provided that
separate credit terms would be set for each Polish industrial
plant bought by Cuba. The foundry contract may be the pre-
cursor of many which the Poles plan to finance with relatively
small credits, the aggregate of which could amount to a sub-
stantial contribution to the bloc's economic aid program in Cu-
ba. Among other items, Poland is negotiating for the delivery
on credit of a complete shipyard, a pig iron foundry, tool fac-
tories, copper and iron ore processing plants, television and
radio factories, and a meat processing plant.
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� Japanese - South Korean Relations
Discussions between Japan and South Korea for a post-
World War II settlement began in October 1951. Major out-
standing issues consist of a basic relations treaty, the sta-
tus of some 550,000 Koreans living in Japan, claims to ves-
sels of Korean registry which were taken by the Japanese
during their withdrawal in 1945, mutual property claims,
and fishing rights in international waters around Korea. Be-
hind the issues have been general Korean bitterness toward
Japan for its 40-year occupation of the country and, in the
past, President Rhee's strong personal hatred for the Jap-
anese.
NNW
The negotiations have been stormy and have been sus-
pended frequently by Seoul following refusals by the Japanese
to accede to South Korea's "all or nothing" demands. Tokyo
usually has made compromise offers, but Seoul's position has
been essentially negative. Except for exchanges of captured
Japanese fishermen and Korean nationals detained in Japan
for illegal entry, there has been little progress. Following
the most recent resumption of talks in October 1960, however,
the Chang Myon government has demonstrated more interest
than the Rhee administration in negotiating in good faith for a
settlement.
The most difficult issue is that of fisheries. In January
1952, Rhee unilaterally proclaimed his "peace line" excluding
Japanese fishermen from rich fishing grounds adjacent to
Korean territorial waters. The line is approximately 1,600
statute miles in length and extends between 20 and 200 miles
off. the Korean coast. As a precedent, Rhee cited a protected
Korean fishing zone established earlier by General MacArthur.
Later he asserted that the Sea Defense Zone established by
General Clark during the Korean war supported the Korean po-
sition.
Since the line was established, South Korea has seized 173
Japanese fishing vessels, of which 150 have been confiscated,
2 have been sunk, and 21 released. Of 2,230 Japanese fisher-
men captured, most were imprisoned for periods ranging be-
tween six months and five years; five died in captivity. Three
seizures have occurred since Rhee was ousted in April 1960,
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the inost recent on 13 January. In the past, Rhee used the
captured fishermen as hostages to extract concessions from
Tokyo on issues other than fishing, but Seoul currently is in
the process of releasing the last five Japanese fishermen it
holds.
The Chang Myon government believes that the South Korean
economy would benefit appreciably from the normalization of
relations and it is committed to an early settlement of differ-
ences. Many Koreans, however, fear that a normalization of
relations would eventually lead to Japanese economic and cul-
tural domination of South Korea even though political independ-
ence is retained. Opposition political elements and business
groups with a vested economic interest in preventing a normal-
ization of trade relations with Japan are attempting to aggravate
such public fears.
On 23 January Seoul called off the visit of a private Jap-
anese business mission after police reports indicated that
there would be public demonstrations and possible violence.
Minor. South Korean leftist parties have formed a "National
Anti-Japanese Struggle Committee." Conservative opposition
members spearheaded passage of a resolution in the House of
Representatives on 3 February upholding the continued defense
of the Rhee Line and opposing full normalization of relations
until all "historical problems" had been settled, including the
complex claims issue. The resolution also opposed the nor-
malization of economic relations until after formal diplomatic
relations were established.
Japan desires a settlement principally to remove the ex-
isting threat to its fishing operations and has proposed a con-
servation agreement which would restrict Japanese fishing
within a broad area covered by the Rhee Line and prohibit it
altogether in certain portions. In addition, trade and invest-
ment opportunities in South Korea hold considerable attraction.
Tokyo, however, is limited in the concessions it feels able to
make because of public outrage over the South Korean seizures
and leftist arguments that Seoul's inability to speak for all of
Korea exposes the Japanese to double jeppar4yththec
North Korea presents claims of its own.
�Crr'#PfDEN-T-M42-
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Iraqi Regime Cracks Down on Communists
Moscow radio's broadcast on 11 February of an appeal by
the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions
to Prime Minister Qasim, urging the release of imprisoned
Iraqi Communists, indicates the declining position of the Com-
munist party in Iraq. The appeal followed publication of ar-
ticles in the Soviet press last week complaining of "persecu-
tion" and expressing concern over "cruel and unjust" sentences
meted out to those who stood in the "forefront of the July 1958
revolution'
Anti-Communist actions by the Iraqi Government since
last November have been extensive. In late December 66 Com-
munists were given long sentences for atrocities perpetrated
in Mosul in March 1959; others have been jailed for circulating
"false news among the peasants," carrying out unlawful strikes,
and publishing articles critical of the regime. Other measures
taken against the party include the closure of schools dominated
by Communists, dismissal of suspected Communist employees
from the railways, forced relocation of a number of prominent
Communists, the suspension of several pro-Communist news-
papers, and the banning of a number of Communist-front organ-
izations. Warrants have been issued for the arrest of several
party leaders who a,
a
t;iube waxen is Kept on activities of the party, numerous arrests
of Communists have been made in the provinces, and party
leaders' bank accounts in Lebanon are being investigated. So-
viet nersonnpl Iraq are under surveillance at all times.
Growing unpopularity of the Communist cause in Iraq is evi-
denced by the recent,published statements of several labor groups
that they would no longer accept "pamphlets, booklets, and jour-
nals" sent them by the Soviet Embassy. Anti-Communist arti-
cles, including revelations of Communist methods, in the gov-
ernment-controlled press have increased greatly during the
past several months. One article charged the Iraqi Communists
with trying to "imitate the role of Lenin. . . and with considering
Qasim as Kerenski."
Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, Iraq's prominent Kurdish leader
who returned in triumph at Qasim's invitation after over ten years
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" in exile in the USSR, has fallen from Qasim's favor. Qasim,
who is acutely aware of Iraq's position as a nation of reli-
gious and linguistic minorities--Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans,
and Sunni and Shia Moslems--became suspicious of Barzani's
Kurdish nationalist aspirations and threw his support to rival
Kurds. Upon Barzani's return from a trip to Moscow in Jan-
uary, he was stripped of many governmental privileges, and
several of his followers were arrested. Sporadic fighting be-
tween Barzani's tribes and other Kurdish tribes last fall
caused the regime considerable concern. Qasim probably
fears that any Soviet ipportJorKurdish nationalists could
threaten his regime.
ET
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THE PItESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Director, The Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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