CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/06/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973644
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: June 21, 1961

-(z2=�!�o
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
21 June 1961
Copy No..4:74"
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1.
2.
21 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
Laos. (Page t)
USSR: Analysis of recent Soviet ICBM test firings sug-
gests new propulsion system may be undergoing tests.
(Page it)
3. Congo: Katangan refusal to attend parliament meeting
may jeopardize Kasavubu's prospects of controlling ses-
sion. (Page it)
4. Bolivia: President threatens to resign if miners don't end
strike. (Page tit)
. Albania: Albania requests French, Italian economic aid.
(Page tit)
6. Turkey: New shake-up of armed forces leadership re-
flects continuing dissension in regime and military estab-
lishment. (Page itt)
7. France: Farmers' demonstrations spreading, could be
exploited to weaken De Gaulle's political position. (Page ti,)
8. Central African Federation: British constitutional pro-
posals for Rhodesias encounter continuing opposition.
(Page ft,)
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CHINA
BURMA
Nam Dr rag
NAMI1THA
Nam Bac
Soi ���' ong Soi 1
Ban Houei
LUANG! PRA,BANG
Muong Hot6171uang Probang
SAYABOURY
Il
/ Sam N.,?ua
\Ir.? AM NEUA
1 �
XIENG 0
\(. CT) , _ K H OU Als1 G
1Muon/) Soui hay
hong Sayan
Phou K8un
Xieng Khouang
Muor Ka� \A.') onAate,
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rs, `Y. I: Vang Vreng -�,...,,I.ssisTha Thom
1 / amone ..,,, _ ,- j---./..', 1.-.,..ft.'
*a Ban Hot Bo
`.-. �
---- / e,� ' VIENTIANE riorikhanS\
/ Ban�Hinkletip Pak Sone
, (--.--4
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1 --, Vien e
.s. � Nong Khai
THAI LAND
NORTHERN 'LAOS
411:9 GOVERNMENT
Forces
41210 KONG LE - PATHET LAO
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
0 GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS
ROAD
50
TRAIL I
STATUTE MILES
0 ROUTE NUMBER
100
610617
Lak
KHAMMVANE
Thokhe
St
Seno Pha Lane
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 June 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: Virtually no progress appears to have been made ,
in the Zurich talks between Boun Oum, Souvanna Phouma,
and Souphannouvong. The chief stumbling blocks to agree- 474 44%
ment are the method of forming a coalition government and
the role that General Phoumi would play in such a government.
Souvanna and Souphannouvong are demanding that Souvanna's
"legal government" be expanded to include rightist elements,
while the Boun Oum group wants to form a new government
headed by the King and approved by the national assembly.
Souvanna and Souphannouvong seem willing to permit Phoumi
to hold a position in the proposed coalition only if he divests
himself of his rank and influence in the military. Souvanna's
illness caused postponement of the scheduled 20 June meeting
between the three princes; whether genuine or diplomatic, this
indisposition gives the conferees some reason to extend the
Zurich meeting beyond the originally stipulated three-day
period running from 19-21 June.
Elle mixed Pathet Lao - Kong Le - North Vietnamese force
in the Pa Dong area on 20 June attacked one of the new Meo po-
sitions about 3 miles southwest of Pa Dong after subjecting the
position to mortar and artillery fire the night before. The enemy
meanwhile is continuing guerrilla actions against gover
rforeealorg Route 13 to the north and east of Vientiane:
{:loc airlift operations continue to be scheduled through
21 June.
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Pointe
Noire
BanWa.
fft
CONGO�
Brazzaville
/atone
Mate I
Republic of the Congo
Iflfl 041414 REPUBLIC
ETHIOPIA
00030
1 500
Bangassou
TUNISIA
OBlITU
�Gemena
Ise
201.
3400
net
ECUATEU
Coquilhatville
�Or �Boende
OBU1U
ETHIOPIA
MOB UT
EOPOLDVILLE � r aim 4.
Leopoldv'
ysville 'T< A
, �
uluabour
Bak
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Luanda . f=1 Kasavubu�Mobutu , �
Gizenga
r-
Ear Kalonji '
(= %bombe
lia1 United Nations Forces (Service Forces
�Selected road not Included)
Selected railroad�
-r- Selected airfield
. �
STATUTE MILES 400
Mbhge
8ondo
ca.9
OR ENTAL
GIZE GA
LIBERIA
leyville
THIOPIA
MALAYA
500
Manono
FEDERATION OF R. ODES
AND NYASALAND
ake
Albert
UGANDA
NIGERIA
UANDA
URUNDI
Usunibura
TANGANYIKA
Lake
Tanganyika
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
870
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USSR: Preliminary evaluation of the characteristics of
five of the firings noted since 1 January 1961 on the Tyura Tam
Missile Test Range leads to the tentative conclusion that the
USSR may be testing a new or second generation ICBM. These
firings, which occurred on 3 March, 2 and 15 April, 16 May,
and 2 June, were distinguished from other ICBM test vehicle
firings to date by a shorter burning time, a higher acceleration,
and a lower apogee. These characteristics may be associated
with a new propulsion system. On two of these firings, the
vehicle is believed to have impacted close to the presumed tar- 926
get of previous ICBM tests, but the other three missed by sig-
nificant distances. One impacted near Khabarovsk, about 1,100
nautical miles southwest of the usual Kamchatka impact area.
Preliminary assessment of the other firings this year suggests
other groups with distinctive rharactpristieg
*Congo: Katanga's announcement that it will boycott the
Congolese parliamentary session beginning on 25 June unless eteitzt.
two virtually unacceptable conditions are met threatens to set
back efforts to end the political impasse in the Congo and to
jeopardize Kasavubuts prospects of controlling parliament. The
Katangan statement, signed by all provincial delegates to the par- /P
liament, requires that Tshombe be released before parliament
meets and that the Congolese legislature accept the confederal
accords reached at the March Tananarive meeting. Leopoldville
politicians could not accept such terms without risking a military
coup, and without Katanga's votes, the Kasavubu regime might be
outvoted by the Gizengists. CGizenga's New York spokesman
claimed on 19 June that parliament would either confirm Gizenga
as premier or select Minister of Interior Adoula as premier. with
Gizenga's agreement. The spokesman claimed Gizenga controlg
21 June 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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1 V5 out of the 137 parliament votes, but merican officials in
Leopoldville believe Gizenga's strength is closer to 40 delegates.]
The ranking UN official in the Congo had reported that the
Ghanaian IL-18 flight to Stanleyville, reportedly to deliver med-
icines and diplomatic personnel, has been canceled at his request.
(Map)
*Bolivia!' President Paz Estensoro yesterday threatened,
to resign "within five days" if striking miners, who are seek-
ing financial benefits and the release of Communist labor leaders ar-
rested in early June, do not return to work. Paz' threat is de-
signed to rally support for the government within Bolivia and
dLEIZ-
possibly also to remind the United States of the political risks he
took in arresting the Communists. Some miners had already re- "
turned to work by yesterday, and support for the mine strike ap-
peared to be diminishing. Vice President Juan Lechin would be
Paz' legal successor, but is probably too controversial a figure
to succeed to the presidency without considerable violence among
Bo,livia's regular and irregular armed forces.
Albania:` Albania Ids requested economic and technical as-
sistance from France and Italy. Despite promises of large
amounts of Chinese Communist aid, the Albanian regime evi-
dently needs still more help to offset Soviet bloc economic pres-
sures which have been applied since Albania sided with Peiping
in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Rome was giving assistance to Tirana in an effort to keep /(..
the West's foot in the door.
Tirana had also recently
approached Paris on this matter and that aid would probably be
given. France and Italy are the only Western countries having
diplomatic relations with Albania. Their trade with Albania has
been negligible, although late in 1960 France shipped Albania
30,000 tons of wheat, at least 20,000 tons of which was paid for
bvthe rhinc.Qp rnmmilni.t.
Turkey:, A new shake-up in the top echelon of the Turkish
armed forces reflects continuing political and personal dissension
21 June 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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within the military establishment and the Committee of Na-
tional Union. Three admirals and two generals have, been
retired, several senior army officers have been reassigned,
and there are strong rumors of an impending purge of an =-
disclosed number of officers in the grades captain through
colonel.. These changes, added to the recent forced resigna-
tion of General Madanoglu from the command of the Ankara
Garrison and the removal of several air force colonels, indi-
cate a further improvement of the power position of General
Irfan Tansel, reinstated chief of the Turkish Air Force. He
has the support of a majority of the younger, less conserva-
tive officers on the Committee of National Union.
(Backup, Page 3)
France: The farmers' agitation which began two weeks
ago in Brittany is spreading to central and southern France
and may become subject to further exploitation by anti-Gaullist
elements, particularly rightists opposed to De Gaulle's Algerian
policy. The government, in view of the efficient mobilization
tactics being employed by leaders of the movement, has report-
edly not ruled out the hypothesis that the demonstrations may be
part of a plan to weaken De Gaulle's political position and to tie
down security forces in areas remote from Paris.
(Backup, Page 5)
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland:U3ritain is running
into growing difficulty in its efforts to obtain acceptance for
the constitutional proposals it is developing for the Central
� African Federation. Africans in Northern Rhodesia are threat-
ening to call widespread strikes and to demand a definite date
for self-government if, under pressure from Europeans, Colo-
nial Secretary Macleod announces measures which would leave
the whites in control of the protectorate's legislature. The
British governor of Northern Rhodesia reportedly has said he
will resign if Macleod insists on revisions to favor, the whites....3
(Backup, Page 7)
214JUL-1.-ci
DAILY BRIEF
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Laotian Developments
Unless Phoumi is prepared to make concessions he will
probably maneuver for an early collapse of the Zurich talks.
The longer the talks go on the more vulnerable members of
the Boun Oum - Phoumi entourage will be to offers by Souvanna
of personal deals, which would lead to Phoumrs isolation and
to the collapse of the Boun Oum government. Phoumi will also
feel himself under a strong compulsion to return to Vientiane
to resume personal direction of governmental affairs. he sec-
ond-level leaders he left in charge there are sending Phoumi
highly colored reports on the trend of developments in Laos
since his departure for Europe.3
[General Bounleut, responsible for military affairs in
Phoumi's absence,
thought it necessary for Phoumi to return to Vien-
tiane as soon as possible. Bounleut indicated that he had been
having some difficulty inducing Lt. Col. Siho to provide details
of his plans for defending Vientiane. BounleUt also referred to
"slightly disturbing rumors" of discontent among officers in
Luang Prabangj
{Fuller information on a previously reported enemy attack
on a Meo position about 20 miles northeast of the Plaine des
Jarres from 16 to 18 June indicates that the attacking force num-
bered between 800 and 900 and may have been predominantly
North Vietnamese. Mortars and recoilless rifles were used in
the attack which forced the dispersion of the Meos into hills,
where they reportedly plan to operate as guerrillas. In the Ban
Hat Bo area northeast of Pak Sane, the enemy for the present
appears to be consolidating its forces and not organizing any
pursuit of the Laotian army elements which retreated from the
area last week.
{gfforts are apparently being made to improve overland sup-
ply of the Communist forces in Laos.
Route 7 between Muong Sen in North]
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Vietnam and Ban Ban is being paved and widened to about 26
teet. In addition, all wooden bridges are being replaced with
steel structuresD
a group
of Chinese Communist experts planned to "commence work on
21 June," possibly on the road connecting Phong Saly with China,
which previous reports indicate the Chinese have undertaken to
construct.
Details of bloc airlift operations for the past several days are
as follows: On 16 June there was a total of 13 sorties, of which
11 were into Laos; on 17 June, 18 sorties were flown, 12 of
which were into Laos. No flights into Laos were noted on 18
June, On 19 June, 17 sorties were flown, of which 12 were into
Laos. During the week 12 through 18 June, there was an esti-
mated total of 102 sorties for an estimated delivered cargo of
211 tons. Through 18 June there has been an estimated total
of 3,047 sorties by bloc aircraft-2,676 by Soviet transports and
371 by North Vietnamese --for an estimated delivered cargo of
5,706 tons.
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Military Shake-up Continues in Turkey
The abortive attempt by a group of senior military officers
to oust 52-year-old Lt. Gen, Irfan Tansel from his command in
early June has resulted in significant changes in power relation-
ships in Turkey. General Gursel's position as head of the gov-
ernment has been undermined. General Madanoglu, who had be-
come one of the leading members of the governing Committee of
National Union (CNU), has resigned. General Alankus, while
continuing to serve�temporarily at least as minister of defense,
has been retired from the army along with Lt. Gen. Alkoc, who
was commander of Ground Forces. The deputy chief of staff, Lt.
Gen. Onur, is being groomed to replace Sunay as chief of the Gen-
eral Staff. One of the three top-level naval officers retired was
Vice Adm. Ozak, who was chief of the Turkish Navy. His retire-
ment, and replacement by Adm. Uran, had been anticipated for
some time, however, and does not necessarily indicate naval in-
volvement in the intraservice power struggle. Most of the changes
appear designed either to remove officers who represent possible
sources of trouble or to re-establish seniorities in the chain of
command.
ET'he so-called "Forces of Solidarity," first mentioned during
the present crisis, remains something of a mystery. It report-
edly includes most of the younger members of the CNU, some
members of the General Staff, officers located in the Ministry of
Defense, and officers from army units located in the vicinity of
Ankara. General Onur has also aligned himself with this group,
which apparently was largely responsible for the reinstatement
of General Tansel as chief of the Air Force at the height of the
crisis. Because of its representation in units strategically lo-
cated near Ankara, the "Forces of Solidarity" is far more impor-
tant than its numbers suggest. The alleged aims of this group in-
clude continued military influence on the government following
elections, the execution of the top leaders of the former regime,
and military intervention against all activities directed against
the CNU. The aspirations of the "Forces of Solidarity" could
lead to further dissension within the armed forces3
It has become increasingly apparent that a highly critical
situation existed in Ankara during the period 6-9 June. One
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leading Turkish political figure has commented that for a 48
hour period the "possibility of bloodshed hung in the balance."
The government has again reaffirmed its intention to hold the
referendum on the constitution and national election within the
time period previously promised. The referendum is to be in
early June and elections prior to the 29 October deadline.
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Subversive Threat in French Farm Unrest
Low farm prices and the government's failure to imple-
ment the promises it made last year to improve agricultural
conditions have sparked a crisis which in some respects paral-
lels that of the spring of 1960. In March 1960 a demonstration
at Amiens was transformed into a major riot on behalf of
"French Algeria," and deputies of all major political parties
except the Gaullist UNR in effect ganged up to test De Gaulle's
political strength by demanding that he convene a special ses-
sion of parliament. His refusal has been described as a viola-
tion of the Fifth Republic constitution in subsequent political
assaults on his regime.
The appearance at sabotage sites of the initials "O.A.S."
accompanied by a Celtic cross is intended to link the farm dem-
onstrations to the Organization of the Secret Army in Algeria,
which is composed of European settler extremists and some
military elements. According to the American Embassy in Paris,
the same individuals--"commandos"--have participated in dem-
onstrations at successive trouble sites. A vice president of the
national federation of agricultural syndicates has reportedly ad-
mitted that troublemakers may have infiltrated the demonstra-
tions to profit from disorders. The Communists have made
efforts to exploit the movement but thus far have apparently been
unable to penetrate it.
Disgruntled political leaders may use the farm issue to voice
increasing discontent over the continuation of the emergency pow-
ers De Gaulle assumed when he crushed the military revolt last
April. They feel these powers handicap normal political activity
and are a threat to French democracy. @ocialist party Secretary
General Guy Mollet reportedly views the farm demonstrations as
a "bad sign" of potentially explosive social unrest which had
hitherto been restrained by the fact that French-Algerian negotia-
tions had finally begun:D
Reported government concern over the possibility that the
farm demonstrations may be part of a coordinated move to weaken
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De Gaulle politically and pin down metropolitan security forces
may be based on information uncovered by investigations of the
April military mutiny. The investigations reportedly indicated
that a widespread plot against the government was being pre-
pared in metropolitan France as well as Algeria. Security forces
in France are considered barely adequate for normal coverage,
and government spokesmen have usually voiced alarm when
events in Algeria have required the temporary dispatch of many
such units from the metropole. Further violent demonstrations
are likely on 22 June, when instigators of the seizure of the
town of Morlaix earlier this month are scheduled to be tried,
and 27 June, which farmers in central France have proclaimed
as "Roadblock Day" to indicate their sympathy for the Brittany
movement.
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Constitutional Problems Facing Britain in Central Africa
Dm its efforts to guide the political evolution of the Fed-
eration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Britain is trying to balance
the demands of the Federation's two main racial groups as well
as its four juridical entities--the largely self-governing colony
of Southern Rhodesia, the two protectorates of Northern Rho-
desia and Nyasaland, and the government of the Federation as
a whole. Most of these have different legal bases, and all are
at different stages of evolution. The Nyasaland government is
to have an African majority following elections this August. A
constitutional conference for the Federation as a whole has been
adjourned since mid-December 1960, pending the formulation
of new constitutions for Northern and Southern Rhodesia,3
EFollowing talks on Northern Rhodesia's constitution, held
in London in February and March, Britain seems to have de-
cided tentatively to establish a 45-member legislature for the
protectorate. Of the 45, fifteen would be elected by a group of
voters�predominantly European--with high educational and fi-
nancial qualifications and fifteen by another group�largely
African--with lower qualifications. Fifteen "national members"
would be elected by all voters, with the votes of each community
given equal weight. Under pressure from right-wing Conserva-
tives at home and from white leaders in the Federation, however,
the details of the British plan, which may be formally announced
later this week or early next week, have been arranged so as to
make more likely the numerical predominance of moderate whites
and of Africans amenable to their influence. These arrangements
have been denounced by both African nationalist organizations
in the protectorate. Although Kenneth K,aunda, the outstanding
African leader in the territory, has forbidden his followers to
resort to violence in opposing the proposals, some of Kaunda's
lieutenants have been making references to "racial strikes" and
"fanaticism']
C.The alleged concessions to the whites in Northern Rhodesia
probably were made partly in order to increase the chances of
approval for the Southern Rhodesian referendum next month, The
referendum on constitutional proposals published a week ago will
be voted on by 76,000 of the 225,000 whites but only 4,000 of the3
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L2,870,000 Africans. Under these proposals, Africans for the
first time would sit in the colony's legislature. Britain would
also agree to end the veto it has held on racial matters, in ex-
change for the promulgation of a bill of rights and the establish-
ment of a constitutional council to pass on racial legislation.
The present moderate leaders of the African nationalist party
agreed to these proposals in conference but, apparently as a
result of pressure from their extremist followers, rejected it
when it was published. With the white electorate almost evenly
divided on the issue, African opposition or abstention could re-
sult in the defeat of the proposals. The British apparently hope
that the Northern Rhodesian constitutional revisions will cause
enough Europeans in Southern Rhodesia to vote for the new con-
stitution to offset the loss in African votesj
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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