CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03186011
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 16, 1961

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INTELLIGENCE
16 March 1961
Copy No. C 76
CENTRAL
BULLETIN
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16 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos: Souvanna reverts to bloc-supported posi-
tions in talks with Vientiane delegation. (Page t)
2. Congo: UAR mission in Stanleyville reports on
dispute between Gizenga and Lundula.
(Page t)
3. France-Algeria: Paris announces willingness to
negotiate with rebels. (Page ti)
4. South Africa withdraws from Commonwealth. (Page tt)
5. Angola: Local Portuguese authorities uncover
rtlans fnr nativp attack on town near Luanda.
) (Page tti)
6. Saudi-Arabia: Rivalry between King Saud and
Crown Prince Faysal may come to ahead shortly.
(Page ttt)
7. Watch Committee conclusions. (Idge tit)
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tits i ves.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
16 March 1961
1
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: The failure of the 14-15 March talks between
Souvanna Phouma and a delegation of the Vientiane regime
makes it clear that an early political solution of the Laotian ctt_e_c__te_,
crisis is unlikely. Souvanna's insistence on a 14-nation con-_,
ference as a prerequisite to any settlement for Laos is in /rL 2, 7' -5 -
sharp contrast to the flexibility that he evidenced in explor-
ing solutions with General Phoumi last week, and is almost (I certainly
-
certainly conditioned by the uniformly negative reaction of
the bloc to the communique' he issued with Phoumi.
Indicating that the Communists foresee the possibility
of a long struggle in Laos, Peiping on 14 March broadcast
a Pathet Lao order of the day calling on Laotians to prepare
for a "protracted war of resistance."
(Backup, Page 1)
Congo: The UAR mission in Stanleyville reportec
"we think it
likely a dispute exists between Gizenga and Lundula which Lp
they are trying to conceal, but it has not yet reached the point 71
of Gizenga's losing control:' This was an answer to
a request for information from the office of UAR Commander
in Chief Marshal Amir. many
elements of the population, including the army, had not been
paid in February and that the possibility of "general strikes
among the civilians and soldiers" is "the most dangerous sit-
uation confronting Gizenga."
lammarskjold told an American official on 14 March that
he is thinking of sending Dayal back to the Congo around the
first of April. However, he thought that he might install three)
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african assistants in Leopoldville before Dayal's return and
that these assistants would perform most of the UN repre-
sentative's duties. Dayal might then "bow out gracefully" by
resianine a few weeks after his return.
(Backup, Pa e 3) (Map)
France-Algeria: The French Government announced yes-
terday it is ready to begin official political negotiations with - A
,
the Algerian rebels. The meeting of leaders of the rebel prolf S ;Li 3 � 7
/ �
visional Algerian government, which began in Tunis on 14
March and will probably continue through this week, report- r
edly is assessing the results of secret preliminary contacts
with the French. Both the French and the rebels have attempted
to keep secret the content of these talks, held in Geneva, but
reports indicate that some progress was made on the status of
the French minority and arrangements for a transitional gov-
ernment. The problems of implementing a tacit cease-fire
agreement, which Paris appears willing to accept, and deter-
mining sovereignty over the Sahara are likely to be especially
difficult points during negotiations. (Backup,
Page 5)
Union of South Africa: 'g9uth Africa's decision on 15 March
not to seek admittance to the Commonwealth as a republic, and
thus in effect to withdraw from that organization following se-
vere condemnation of Pretoria's racial policies, will probably
have little immediate effect on the Union's domestic affairs.
The English-speaking minority--some forty percent of South
Africa's whites--have been politically handcuffed in recent years
and are not likely to provoke significant disorders. An eventual
loss of the five-percent tariff preference would not affect more
than about eight percent of South Africa's total trade. However,
Pretoria's action is another major step in the Union's virtual
withdrawal from the outside world. Its impact, moreover, may
be greater in international African and Asian circles, where the
concept of the Commonwealth as a multiracial club will be
strengthened. Prime Minister Welensky of the RhodesialV
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DAILY BRIEF ii
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aederation may see in the London development a further indi-
cation that Britain will not modify its pro-African position in
favor of Rhodesia's white settlers, who are talking about set-
ting Up an independent state.
w?
Portuguese Angola:
� recently captured prisoners have admitted that plans involving
"thousands of natives" were being made for an attack on a town
near Luanda between 19 and 25 March. Earlier reports have
Indicated that African nationalist groups outside of Angola and
the exclave of Cabinda are intent on fomenting disorders in
those territories with the objective of focusing attentio
to coincide with the Security Council debate on Angola.
(Backup, Page 7)
*Saudi Arabia: the rivalry between King Saud and Crown
Prince Faysal may come to a head during the next few days.
Members of the Saudi Government reportedly expect violence
between the Saud and Faysal forces, starting in Jidda. Mem-
bers of the royal cabinet have bren thrpatened with bodily' h7rm
iitilacc +hem racicrn +hair rtne+1
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
v
Lion the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that3
A. CNo change from last week]
B. g�To change from last weekg
C. (-Continued pressure by the Communist forces has led to a
general deterioration in the Lao army's position in the Route
13 area. The Communists apparently intend to presj
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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Ltheir local advantage, and, unless the Lao army's will-
to-fight improves significantly, the Communists may
shortly be able to threaten Luang Prabang. The logisti-
cal build-up in the Plaine des Jarres continues at a high
rate. With their generally improving military situation,
the Communists are in a position to press for commen-
surately increased concessions in whatever, discussions
may deal with settlement of the Laos problem
D. Erhe atmosphere generated by the Tananarive conference
and Gizenga's continuing difficulty in obtaining military aid
give hope that a political rather than a military solution
may be in the making. The arrival of Indian UN contin-
gents may touch off local incidents between the UN forces
and Congolese army elements
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DAILY BRIEF
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NoeI- �Ur iSLCHL I
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The Situation in Laos
'ape retreat of Laotian Army troops from the Phou Khoun
junction has at least temporarily been halted. The Pathet Lao,
who may for the time being have overextended their supply
lines, are maintaining only light pressure at present. Govern-
ment units which withdrew northward are regrouping and es-
tablishing defensive positions about 25 miles south of Luang
Prabang. Vientiane's forces are being reinforced by three
battalions moved from southern Laos; these troops, however,
are raw recruits and their effectiveness is probably low. Morale
is also low, and the ability of government units to withstand a
concerted Pathet Lao drive on Luang Prabang is highly ques-
tionable]
Soviet Ambassador boldatov reattirmect boviet sup-
port for an international conference and maintained that the 18
February Soviet proposals to reactivate the ICC and convene an
international conference were inseparable. The proposals called
for the convening of an international conference and suggested
the immediate reactivation of the ICC in New Delhi as an interim
step to its being sent to Lao.5
Soldatov probably
wanted to make it clear to the British, whose reply to the So-
viet proposals is still pending, that the USSR would not accept
Western agreement on the ICC plan if it did not call at the same
time for an international conference. Soldatov took issue with
opinion that the conference would only provide a
forum for acrimonious exchanges. He contended that the 1954
Geneva Conference had worked well and had quickly produced the
desired results and that he saw no reason why a new conference
should not be similarly successful. The USSR probably feels
that by taking a firm position with the UK on the need to call a
conference, additional pressure may be brought to bear on the
US to acquiesce in the Soviet demaadj
Communist China's ambassador in Cambodia called on
Prince Sihanouk on 14 March to "convey details" of Peiping's
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views on Laos. These details were not announced, but the am-
bassador almost certainly took issue with the position Sihanouk
recently expressed in a letter to Chou En-lai. In this letter,
published in Phnom Penh on 5 March, Sihanouk stated,, "There
are now two de facto governments in Laos and neither can claim
complete legality." Sihanouk proposed "dissolution" of both re-
gimes and creation of a "coalition government." This proposi-
tion, coming from a key neutral, undoubtedly disturbed Peiping
as it undercuts the bloc position that the Communists are sup-
porting the only "lawful government of Laos."
bloc diplomats are concerned lest
Cambodian reservations about the legality of the Souvanna "gov-
ernment" will leave the status of the entire Communist aid pro-
gram in Laos open to question.
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Bananas
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
Luanda
315,94F
ic
MALAYA
150
Gemena
Scattered ,Forcez___
N101�I�JTU
SUDAN
390
TUNISIA
2,600
MALAYA
210
INDONESIA
1,150
MOBUTU
Scattered Forces
EOPOLDVILL
Leopoldvi
ysville
GHANA
1,900_
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu-Mobutu
EJ Gizenga
Kalonji
r: Tshombe
3 United Nations Forces
---.Selected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTE MILES
uluabourg
Bak
400
the Conao
ORIENTAL
MALAYA
400
LIBERIA
Usumbura
ll
ETHIOPI Albertvi
600 I NIGERIA I
1,300
} �Manono
-. .,,
A-TANGA \IA
Kaminaf
,
SWEDEN
680
TSHOMBE
4,000
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Situation in the Congo
Elammarskjold apparently feels that Dayal's return to the
Congo is necessitated by the "question of Indian prestige";
ultimately, however, he hopes to have an African at the head
of the operation, with another African and an Asian as depu-
ties. He has stated that Makki Abbas, his interim represent-
ative in Leopoldville, is popular with the Congolese--a view
which was confirmed by Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko
in Leopoldville. However, Abbas is to return to his post as
executive secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa in
a few weekq
With the exception of Joseph Ileo, whose job as prime min-
ister in the Leopoldville regime apparently was abolished, the
participants at the Tananarive conference reportedly are well
satisfied with the "Confederation of Central African States"
proposed in the conference's final resolution. The Congolese
apparently have decided to wait until the confederation's con-
stituent states have been formed before determining its struc-
ture. So far four such states, in addition to the eight proposed
at the conference, have been proclaimed. Three of the twelve
are in Leopoldville Province, and Kasai and Katanga contain
two each. Another state reportedly has been formed from
parts of Leopoldville, Equateur, and Kasai provinces. In ad-
dition, an Orientale "government-in-exile" and the remainder
of Equateur have joined the confederation as separate entities.
This process of fragmentation is likely to continue. Although
this trend is derived from the tribalism which has made the
larger political groupings unrealistic, the resulting states al-
most certainly will be highly unstable.
Lundula's inviting the head of the Orien-
tale "government -in-exile" and another official to come from
Tananarive to Stanleyville in order to discuss a "national en-
tente" apparently was devised by Gizenga in an effort to lure
e officials into Orientale.
Gizenga told his representative not to worry
and appears to have stated that he intended to arrest
the visitors on their arrival.
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Polish
ship arrived in Alexandria on 21 February with a cargo of
light arms for Gizenga. The cargo reportedly was still in
Alexandria on 10 March.
the ship, the Opole, loaded its cargo in Consta.nza, Rumania,
rather than in the Soviet arms port of Nikolaev. Any arms
originating from this port are likely to be of World War II vin-
tage and to be untraceable to bloc sources. No reflection of
this shipment has been observed
Taieb Sahbani, secretary general of the Tunisian foreign
secretariat, left Tunis on 13 March for Brussels, where he is
to be Hammarskjold's representative in talks with the Belgian
Government. Sahbani told the American ambassador in Tunis
that the timing of his mission is unfortunate, since Belgium is
in the midst of an election campaign and cannot be expected to
take new initiatives before the formation of a new government7
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Prospects for French-Algerian Negotiations
The French announcement on negotiations with the Al-
gerian rebels followed meetings of the government Algerian
Affairs Committee and cabinet. It said the cabinet "wished
to see the opening of talks on the conditions for the self-
determination of the Algerian people as well as on related
problems." By using this language Paris apparently opened
the way to political negotiations without requiring a prior
formal cease-fire agreement. However, any negotiating po-
sition formulated by the provisional Algerian government
(PAG) during its meeting in Tunis may have to be ratified by
the 62-man National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA),
theoretically responsible. T
the supreme governing body of the rebel movement
CNRA ise_nt to which
the PAG is at least
naid to be gathering in Tunis, and reports indicate that some
f its key military and civilian members from within Algeria
re skeptical that a satisfactory negotiated settlement can be
reached without further fighting and significant rebel military
successeq
the French repre-
sentatives at the recent secret talks asked the PAG to agree
to a truce, as well as to French retention--with full owner=
ship-of the Mers el-Kebir naval base near Oran, and recog-
nition of French sovereignty over the Sahara.
the PAG had already decided that tne oil-ricn
Sahara could not be French, and that its future must be worked
out within the context of a North African accord.
he French had first insisted that the Algerian
Liberation Army (ALN) lay down its arms before negotiations
begin, and then had requested only token disarming of some
no
he PAG fears a truce would permit the French Army to
identify and expose ALN clandestine elements. The rebels ap-
parently made counterproposals, suggesting that the impasse
could be solved by agreeing to a de facto cease-fire or by confining]
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[troops of both sides to barracks while joint patrols maintained
order. Both the French Army and the ALN may be generating
pressure on their respective governments not to make conces-
sions on the cease-fire issue71
�J
the Algerian repre-
sentatives at me secret talks ieit that the French negotiators
ad conflicting instructions from Premier Debra and the Foreign
inistry. the
rench negotiators at these talks were irritating in small matters
and gave an entirely different impression of the French position
from that conveyed to the PAG by President Bourguibi)
The commander of the Algiers army corps told the US con-
sul general on 11 March that he fears the emotional release which
will accompany the ending of Ramadan this week end may produce
disorders among the Moslem population, which has been under
great strain from fasting and the expectation that peace is at hand.
He added that, "unfortunately," there were still European activ-
ists in Algiers who might create incidents designed to provoke
violent Moslem counteraction. French authorities reportedl
have tightened security nrecantions in Algiers and Oran.
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Portuguese African Territories May Face Dissidence
The Portuguese are concerned over the activities of two
emigre nationalist organizations�the anti-Communist Angolan
People's Union (UPA), with headquarters in Leopoldville, and
the pro-Communist African Revolutionary Front for the Inde-
pendence of Portuguese Colonies in Africa (FRAIN), which is
based at Conakry. Earlier reports indicated that the UPA
planned to launch a series of terrorist attacks against white-
owned plantations in northern Angola on 14 March to coincide
with the UN Security council's consideration of a Liberian
resolution on Angola.
no evidence of disturbances in this Portuguese exclave,
esp. e earlier indications that attacks�presumably by the UPA--
were to be launched against it in mid-March. While no informa-
tion has been received that these plans are being carried out,
strict Portuguese censorship probably could suppress such in-
formation for some time.
FRAIN has devoted much of its attention to Portuguese
Guinea. The American Embassy in Dakar reports that while
that colony presents an outward picture of complete stability
and calm, determined efforts are being made from neighboring
Guinea to introduce subversive elements and undermine the
present order there. Radio Conakry has been especially active
in attempting to incite the inhabitants, who are b ecoming con-
scious of the political changes in other African territories.
In Brazil, the anti-Salazar group which engineered the cap-
ture of the Portuguese liner Santa Maria in January still hopes
to upset the Portuguese regime by fomenting new disturbances
in its African territories
Portuguese representatives are apparently well informed of the
group's activities through close cooperation with Brazilian po-
lice. The leader of the Santa Maria mutiny, Henriques Galvao,
is involved, as is General Humberto Delgado, the defeated
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candidate in Portugal's last presidential election. The group
plans to establish a Portuguese government-in-exile some-
where in Africa.
Delgado recently stated to the press that his object is to
"create confusion" in Portugal as a prelude to provoking an
eventual military rebellion.
Galvao hoped to establish himself in one of the Rhodesias.
Another mentioned Tangier.
one of the group plans a trip to Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana,
Senegal, and Guinea to see if the group can establish itself in
one of these countries. Portuguese authorities are Dressing
Brazil to block the group's departure.
0
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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