CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/05/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03156603
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: May 6, 1960

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6 May 1960
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
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6 MAY 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Comment on Khrushchev speech to Su-
preme Soviet.
East Germany reportedly plans to gain
control over Evangelical clergy by cut-
ting off church subsidies from West.
ASIA-AFRICA
Turkey - Chief of General Staff holds
student riots were spontaneous; isolated
bitter outbreaks continue,
UAR - Nasir maintains solution of boy-
cott controversy is up to US; hopes re-
criminations will not damage US-UAR
relations.
India, engaged in crash program to
strengthen defenses on Chinese border,
makes urgent request for US military
transport aircraft.
Anti-European disorders in Belgian
Congo,
Laos - CDNI intention to form political
party foreshadows struggle with old-lin(
politicians.
THE WEST
Khruslichev's forthcoming visit to
Austria.
Cuban moderate proposed as ambassa-
dor to US says he will accept only if
convinced Castro wants better relations.
British trade unions swinging against
independent British nuclear capability.
LATE ITEM
Cambodia - Sihanouk's charges of border
clash with South Vietnamese troops may
be designed to justify agreement with
visiting Chinese premier.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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6 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 5 May,
Khrushchev resorted to a Soviet device, frequently used
on the eve of important East-West negotiations, designed
to place the Western powers, particularly, the United States,
on the defensive and to, demonstrate that the USSR's peace-
ful coexistence line does not result from any weakness which
the West could exploit in summit talks. In general he sharply
criticized the West's attitude toward the summit and charged
violations of Soviet air space by American aircraft. The
speech probably was also intended to warn against any exag-
gerated expectations in the Communist world regarding the
outcome of the Paris meeting and to prepare the ground for
blaming American "insincerity" should the talks break down.
(Page I)
Khrushchev opened with an optimistic appraisal of the
prospects for the Soviet economy, especially for the consum-
er, but had little new to offer except for the announcement of
a currency exchange to take place in 1961.
(Page 3)
East Germany: he Evangelical Church, the only effec-
tive organized opposition in East Germany, faces what may be
Its most serious crisis to date. The Ulbricht regime appar-
ently intends to cut off the church's remaining financial support
from West Germany, thus making it financially dependent on
the regime and more susceptible to control. Chancellor Ade-
nauer intends to raise the matter with President Eisenhower at
their meeting on the eve of the summit and presuma
thatJChruhchev be asked to intercede with Ulbricht.
(Page 5)
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*Turkey: Student groups continue isolated but bitter dem-
onstrations against the Menderes regime. Any government ef-
fort to arrest opposition leaders, still rumored to be a likely
development, would create a new crisis. The commander of
Army. Ground Forces reportedly has resigned. Dremier Men-
deres' repeated charges that the opposition Republican People's
Party (RPP) was directing the recent riots are disputed by the
chief of the Turkish General Staff, who believes the student de
onstrations were spontaneous. RPP leader Inonu is reported
pleased with recent events, believing that his party has gained
popular support from the government's continuing attempts to
suppress its oppositio123 (Page 6)
UAR:
the Cleopatra incident and
ensuing Arab boycott have placed him in one of the most difficult
situations of his career. He does not consider. the Arabs respon
sible for the crisis, and maintains it is up to the United States t
find a solution. Nasir apparently, is anxious to convey, the mes-
sage that his strong support of the boycott has been forced upon
him, and that the sharp UAR criticism of the United States, both
official and unofficial, should not permanently damage US-UAR
relations,.3 (Page 7)
India:ndia is engaged in a crash program to improve de-
fenses, transport, and communications in the sensitive China/
Tibet border regions. Defense Minister Krishna Menon, in dis-
cussing the program with Ambassador Bunker, requested urgent
US consideration of an earlier Indian approach to buy 29 C-119G
twin-engine military transports. The Indian Air. Force now has
26 of these Fairchild Packets, but only six of them are reported
operational. Menon said India needs the 29 aircraft immediately,
before the monsoons in mid-June, and is also interested in later
purchase of 30 more Packets and one or two C-130 Hercules air-
craft_D (Page 8)
6 May 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
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Belgian Congo: The 3 May disorders at Stanleyville, in
which the cars of Europeans were stoned, constitute the first
major anti-European outbreak of the pre-independence period.
They coincided with two political rallies in the area in con-
16- nection with legislative elections to be held from 11 to 15 May.
0 The incident is likely, to accelerate the departure of Europeans
, rom the Congo prior to its independence on 30 June. The threat
f further anti-European outbreaks will add to the problems of
"v 4
Belgian security forces, which are already hard pressed to keep
the peace between warring trikes in Kasai Province.
Laos: The reported creation of a new political party by
the young reformist group, the Committee for Defense of Na-
tional Interests (CDNI), foreshadows a bitter struggle with the
conservative Rally of the Lao People, the party of former Pre-
mier Phoui, for control of the new government of Laos. CDNI
leaders, assuming credit for the anti-Communist sweep in the
K. elections, have made it clear, that they intend to be the dominant
force in the new government. Communist propaganda before the
elections hinted that the "civil war" � s ight be expanded
if the CDNI were to assume power. (Page 9)
III. THE WEST
Austria-USSR: Premier Khrushchev's expected visit to
Austria�for which Vienna has proposed the week of 27 June to
3 July�will continue the upward trend in official exchanges be-
tween the two countries initiated by Chancellor Raab's visit to
Moscow in July 1958. These exchanges have had distinct prop-
aganda advantages for the USSR in the past, and the forthcoming
ceremonial visit will afford Khrushchev another opportunity to
cite Austrian-Soviet relations as an example of successful "peace-
ful coexistence." (Page 10)
6 May 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Cuba: Jose Miro Cardona
will accept appointment as ambassador to Washington
only if convinced that Castro sincerely desires to improve Cuban-
,, US relations. Miro, a moderate who was prime minister for six
weeks after the fall of Batista, said he would turn against the re-
gime if Castro evinced a lack of good fai sting him
with the mission of improving relations, (Page 11)
*Britain: atecent trade union actions indicate that an effec-
tive iiiiTORiy of the Labor party membership may demand termi-
nation of the party's support for an independent British nuclear
deterrent policy. These developments, following the Macmillan
government's decision to abandon the Blue Streak missile pro-
gram, have faced the Labor party with the necessity of revising
its nuclear defense policy. Increasing public agitation for uni-
lateral nuclear disarmament and the prospect of a shift in La-
bor's position will add to the pressures on the government to show
some tangible progress in disarmament negotiations:1
(Page 12)
LATE ITEM
*Cambodia - South Vietnam: The Cambodian Government has
announced that its ground forces, supported by fighter planes,
repelled "sizable South Vietnamese troops" who crossed the fron-
tier on 2 May. Cambodia on 4 May requested the International
Control Commission (ICC) to make an "on the spot" investigation,
and informed the organization that the Cambodian Army has re-
ceived a report that a South Vietnamese battalion is en route to
the border area. Ambassador Trimble is suspicious of several
aspects of Cambodia's version, and feels Cambodian leader. Siha-
nouk may be seeking to "prove" aggression by South Vietnam to
justify the signing of some agreement with visiting Chinese Com-
unist premier Chou �En-lai for closer Sino-Cambodian relations.
hanouk, while expressing friendship for the West in a recent con
versation with Ambassador Trimble, stressed that Cambodia would
not hesitate to 'throw itself into the arms of the Chinese Commu-
nists" if another serious border incident with South Vietnam oc-
curredi
DAILY BRIEF iv
(5 may tio
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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
rt-term Outlook in Indonesia. SNIE 65-60. 3 May 1960.
Situation and Prospects in East Germany. SNIE 12.4-60.
3 May 1960.
Strength of the Armed Forces of the USSR. SNIE 11-6-60.
3 May 1960.
6 May 60
DAILY BRIEF
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+we
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
IChrushchev's Supreme Soviet Speech
Khrushchev climaxed his pre-summit maneuvers with a
speech on 5 May to the Supreme Soviet in which he resorted to
a Soviet tactic frequently used on the eve of important negotia-
tions�of attempting to place the West on the defensive and to
demonstrate that the USSR's peaceful coexistence policy does
not result from any weakness the West could exploit at the ne-
gotiating table.
In his speech, which was largely devoted to economic af-
fairs, Khrushchev inserted a pessimistic assessment of pros-
pects for agreement at the summit, citing recent Western pol-
icy statements and actions as providing little ground for hope
that the Western leaders "are really looking for concrete solu-
tions." He charged that "aggressive forces" in the United States
recently have intensified their efforts to "wreck the summit con-
ference, or at least prevent it from reaching agreements."
References to President Eisenhower, although couched in
moderate terms, went further in criticizing him than at any time
since Khrushchev's visit to the United States. The Soviet pre-
mier remarked that recent speeches by American spokesmen
were a bad omen for a favorable outcome at the summit and said
this situation had been aggravated by the "unfortunate fact that
even the American President approved these speeches." He ex-
pressed regret that President Eisenhower intended to limit his
presence at the summit to only seven days and observed that this
shows that questions to be discussed in Paris "do not enjoy, due
attention on the part of the US Government."
Khrushchev apparently intends to use his charges of recent
violations of Soviet air space by American aircraft to embarrass
the United States as much as possible without blocking his path to
the summit. He denounced such violations as a "direct provoca-
tion" and announced that the USSR would take the matter to the UN
Security Council. He charged that the incidents were timed to
coincide with the summit meeting and that the United States is seeking
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to weaken the USSR's "determination to fight for a relaxation of
International. tension and an end to the cold war and arms race."
In an effort to portray American policy as irresponsible and pro-
vocative and to generate widespread public alarm over its possi-
ble consequences, Khrushchev warned that the USSR reserves the
right to reply to "such aggressive actions" in the future "with
measures which we shall find necessary to ensure the safety of
our country:' Without committing the USSR to such a course, he
attempted to convey the notion that it might employ missile retal-
iation.
IChrushchev's speech probably was also calculated to warn
against any exaggerated expectations in the Communist world
regarding the outcome of the Paris talks, which he has been
careful to portray as only the first of a series of such negotia-
tions. Khrushchev's harsh criticism of the United States may
also be intended to prepare a case for blaming American "in-
sincerity" should the talks break down.
Khrushchev carefully disassociated himself from the more
belligerent policies favored by the Chinese Communists. He de-
clared, "We shall not spread the ideas of Communism by means
of war." Having used the aircraft incident to raise the threat of a
new and dangerous crisis, Ithrushchev concluded his speech by
reaffirming his "clear-cut, consistent" commitment to the "Len-
inist policy" of peaceful coexistence. By pledging himself to spare
no effort at Paris to "achieve a mutually acceptable agreement,"
Khrushchev sought to reassure Western leaders and forest
speculation that he has lost interest in summit talks.
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Economic Aspects of Khrushchev's Speech
In his Supreme Soviet speech of 5 May, Khrushchev held
out bright hope for major improvements in the Soviet con-
sumer's welfare but, with the exception of the plan to alter
the value of the ruble, disclosed little that was new. Plans
to abolish income tax for factory and office workers and
shorten the workweek were restatements of Seven-Year-Plan
goals. Like other topics in the speech, these plans were
discussed in a way designed to gain maximum propaganda
benefit, but the Soviet consumer has been and will continue
to be only a residual claimant on economic output.
Khrushchev continues to be extremely optimistic about
overfulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan and about progress in
",catching up." His data continue to be carefully selected to
make the best impression--for example, comparisons in
cloth production were again presented in linear measures,
after a year of using the more realistic and less favorable
square measurement.
Khrushchev reiterated the goal of a 41-hour workweek
for all except collective farmers by the end of 1960 and of
starting on a 35-hour workweek in 1964. Less than 30 per-
cent of the 58,000,000 workers now have the 41-hour workweek,
and the conversion has hardly started outside of heavy in-
dustry. Correction of hoarding and of inefficient use of labor,
together with technological improvements, is making it pos-
sible for the USSR to carry out the cut in man-hours without
sacrificing increases in output.
The income tax has been a very minor source (currently
about 7 percent) of budget revenue, which depends mainly on
indirect taxation, e. g., profit deductions and turnover tax.
The abolition of income taxes will have the effect of raising
slightly the take-home pay of most workers, although the
more highly paid workers will have their wages decreased by
an amount equivalent to the tax no longer charged.
Khrushchev stated that all prices and all payments will
be revalued at the end of the. year on the basis of ten old
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rubles for one new. The existing currency is to be replaced
by new currency over a three-month period. The change would
have no significant effect in domestic trade. Khrushchev said
the gold content of the ruble will be raised but did not say by�
how much.
The external value of the ruble will also be changed at a
rate not yet announced and probably different from the one-to�
-
ten rate applying to domestic funds. This would make it pos-
sible to bring the two values of the ruble closer together,
simplify the bookkeeping of the USSR's foreign trade, and
enhance the prestige of the ruble. The currency change will
also give the regime useful data as to who holds the present-
ly outstanding currency.
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Nair Nor
East Germans Threaten to Cut Off West German Financial Aid
To Evangelical Church
ahe Ulbricht regime appears to De aeterminea to stage a
showdown with the Evangelical Church, the only effective organ-
ized opposition in East Germany, by cutting off financial support
coming from the church in West Germany. In early April, For-
eign Trade Minister Heinrich Rau told a high West German church-
man that the regime would not discuss the renewal of the arrange-
ments under which this support is provided. In the past this has
involved such methods as the purchase of West German products
for delivery to the regime, which then deposits the price to the
church's credit. Rau said the whole matter was political, not
economic, and said it would have to be taken up with Premier
Grotewohl--after the summit meetine
[Vest German church officials believe the Communists wish to
bring the church under direct state control by cutting off its inde-
pendent financial resources and introducing a system of state pay-
ment of pastors and other expenses. The state already is begin-
ning to bring church lands under control of collective farms:3
Eplancellor Adenauer told a West German church representa-
tive he would take the problem up with President Eisenhower at
the Western heads-of-government meeting in Paris on 15 May, with
the aim of having the President bring pressure on Khrushchev at
the summit to prevent Ulbricht from carrying out his plans. Ade-
nauer reportedly assured him that Bonn would consider economic
sanctions against East Germany--"if such a measure is deemed
necessary." West German industrialists and officials of the Eco-
nomics Ministry, however, view, economic reprisals as ineffective,
since goods denied by the Federal Republic could easily be pur-
chased elsewhere, and reprisals would also invite retaliation a-
gainst West BerliKg
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Turkey
[Qccasional student demonstrations continue in the larger
Turkish cities, and the security situation could deteriorate
rapidly if the government implements reported plans to lift the
parliamentary immunity and arrest four to six opposition dep-
uties] The situation in Ankara remains tense, as indicated by
the angry student demonstration which broke out in the capital
on 5 May around the car in which Premier Menderes was riding.
Menderes reportedly was jostled but uninjured.
CR:epublican People's party (RPP) leader Inonu is reported
pleased with the extent of political gains which he believes have
accrued to his party during recent events. He feels that the
RPP should remain quiet for the present and let the adminis-
tration engender greater unpopularity with its oppressive meas-
ure!) The RPP will continue to apply pressure on the govern-
ment, however, as indicated by the action of RPP deputies in
walking out of the National Assembly on 4 May when an RPP
deposition requesting an investigation of the premier's recent
actions was not read before the legislature.
ahe chief of the Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, Gen-
eral Erdelhun, in reviewing recent events in Istanbul for the
American army attache on 3 May, stressed that no evidence had
been uncovered that the RPP had participated in or directed the
student demonstrations. This comment is contrary to recent
statements by Menderes and the Ministry of Interior denouncing
the RPP for instigating an "open rebellion." Erdelhun also stated
that as long� as he remains chief of the General Staff, the Turkish
Army will not be used either to overthrow the government or to
crush the opposition. Erdelhun's blunt statements indicate his
firm determination to maintain the armed forces' traditional
aloofness from politics and do much to clarify recent specula-
tion about the army's potential role in future political crises.
The reported sudden resignation of the commander of the Army
Ground Forces on 5 May demonstrates, however, that important
army, leaders are opposed to the present government's po1icies:1
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Nasir's Views on Arab Boycott
although Nasir intends to continue giving his full support to
the Arab boycott of American shipping, he feels he is in one of
the most difficult situations of his career,
The
anxiety Nasir has apparently felt about the boycott's effect on
UAR-US relations continues to trouble him, and he seems hope-
ful the American Government will believe that he was compelled
to adopt a strong line. Nasir main-
tains that the Arabs are not responsible for the crisis and that
the United States must find a solutiorlj
The UAR press and radio are leading the Arab world in an
increasingly shrill campaign against the alleged Israeli "conspir-
acy" behind the picketing of the UAR ship Cleopatra in New York
and the Congressional amendment of the Mutual Security Act. As
the boycott continues, the possibility grows that it will be ex-
tended to include American aircraft and the import of American
goods. �To date, most American-flag ships headed for Arab ports
have been diverted, so that only a few have actually been boycotted.
American embassies and consulates have recommended that Amer-
ican passengers on US ships stopping at UAR and Lebanese ports
not disembark because of the possibility of involvement in inci-
dents.
American-owned vessels under flags of convenience will not
be boycotted, according to the under secretary of the UAR For-
eign Ministry. On 4 May the Bahrein government, out of consid-
eration for its oil revenues, reversed an initial order to boycott
both US-flag and US-owned tankers, and an American-flag tanker
has since been loaded. The boycott in Kuwait, however, does ap-
ply, to American tankers, but very few call there and the Kuwait
Oil Company has decided these will be diverted.
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India Desires Immediate 'Purchase of US Military Transports
rIndia's strenuous efforts to improve its defensive capa-
bilities and means of communication in the remote Himalayan
border regions were outlined to Ambassador Bunker by De-
fense Minister Krishna Menon on 4 May to support his request
for urgent US consideration of an earlier approach for the
�
purchase of 29 C-119G twin-engine military transports with
spares. He claimed the urgency is tied to the coming monsoon
season, which begins in mid-June and will make overland sup-
port to the mountainous border areas extremely difficult if
not impossible-.]
atenon further stated that later, in connection with its road-
construction program in the border region, New Delhi wants to
buy 30 aciditional such C-119s. He also expressed an interest
in one or two C-130 Hercules turboprop military transports,
and suggestedfinancingthese.laterpurchases with credits from
the Export-Import Bank or some other lending agencyA
[The Indian Air Force now has 26 C-119s, of which only
six are reported operational. ::These craft, together
with India's military and civilian fleet of time-worn aircraft
of the C-47/DC-3 type, are at present the mainstay of the coun-
try's airlift capability in the north. Plans to begin replace-
ment of the C-47s with an Indian-produced, British-designed
turboprop transport will not be carried out until 1962. The
Indians, however, are apparently convinced they cannot wait
that long, inasmuch as the border problem with the Chinese,
left unsettled by the Nehru-Chou conversations, will continue
for some timej
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Nor
Political Maneuvering in Laos
The reported creation of a new political party in Laos by
the young reformist Committee for Defense of National Inter-
ests (CDNI) foreshadows a bitter struggle among the victorious
conservative elements in the recent elections for control of the
government to be formed after the National Assembly convenes
on 11 May. ahe new party, as yet unnamed, will consist of as-
sembly deputies elected with CDNI affiliation or support; deter-
mination of its precise strength will probably have to await a
voting test after the assembly. opens. The CDNI will reportedly
continue to function as an anti-Communist reform group whose
main function will be to generate the mass support necessary
to assure the new party of control of the assemblyj
There are strong indications that the new party may attempt
to organize a government without the participation of former
Premiers Souvanna Phouma and Phoui Sananikone, who between
� them control the bulk of the deputies in the other major assem-
bly grouping, the Rally of the Lao People (RLP). Any such at-
tempt, if successful, would give Laos a narrowly based govern-
ment which would face formidable opposition in the assembly;
an unsuccessful effort would leave a residue of bitterness that
would impair vital RLP-CDNI cooperation in any coalition gov-
ernment.
General Phoumi and other CDNI leaders have claimed cred-
it for the anti-Communist sweep in the elections and appear
determined to cash in on the political gains they feel their group
has made in recent months. They can be expected to hold out
for a dominant voice in whatever government is formed and to
oppose the appointment of either Souvanna or. Phoui as premier.
A CDNI-dominated government would be the development
most likely to lead to an intensification of Communist Pathet
Lao guerrilla attacks throughout the country. Communist
propaganda before the elections consistently singled out the
CDNI for attack and hinted that the "civil war" in Laos might
be expanded if the CDNI were to assume power.
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I I I. THE WEST
Khrushchev's Forthcoming Austrian Visit
Premier Khrushcheves expected visit to Austria this year--
for which Vienna has proposed the week of 27 June to 3 July--will
continue the notable increase in official exchanges between the two
countries which has followed Chancellor Raab's visit to Moscow in
July 1958. More than 30 comparatively high-level exchanges have
occurred since then, highlighted by Defense Minister Graf's visit
to Moscow in October 1958 and President Schaerf's visit a year later.
As a result of Schaerf's trip, President Voroshilov has an invitation
to visit Austria.
According to Austrian plans, Khrushchev will spend three days
in Vienna--where he will be entertained with "all the pomp Austria
can muster"--and will then tour the provinces. Austrian officials
may hope the largely, ceremonial occasion will also provide oppor-
tunity to discuss trade matters. Reparations deliveries--with the
exception of oil--will be completed early next year, and Vienna has
long hoped that these deliveries could be placed on a commercial
basis after that.
IChrushchev will probably attempt to gain support for Soviet for-
eign policy positions such as that on disarmament, and he will urge
the Austrians, both in public and in private, to follow a strictly neu-
tral course. He will, as Soviet visitors have in the past, emphasize
Austro-Soviet friendship and cite relations between the two countries
as an outstanding example of successful coexistence. US Embassy
officials in Vienna note that the USSR in the past has gained "one-
sided propaganda and prestige advantage" from its exchange pro-
gram with Austria. During his 1958 visit, for example, Raab--who
was hoping at the time to obtain some alleviation of Austria's repara-
tions burden--virtually credited the USSR with the successful con-
clusion of the state treaty.
Although the embassy officials doubt the exchange program has
materially changed Austria's basic anti-Soviet feelings, they, believe
firsthand acquaintance with the USSR's technological achievements
and power have impressed Austrian visitors.
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Prospective Prospective Cuban Ambassador to Washington
Jose Miro Cardona, for whom the Cuban Government has
requested agrement as its ambassador to Washington, seems
unsure of the real nature of his mission,
until a reporter informed him of
the request, he had heard nothing about the assignment since
it was discussed as a possibility with President Dorticos soon
after Miro's recall as ambassador to Spain in January. He said
he would accept the post only if convinced that Castro sincerely
desires to solve what Miro considers significant differences in
Cuban-US relations. Miro said he would break with the regime
if Castro empowered him to seek a real improvement in rela-
tions and then showed a lack of good faith which caused the mis-
sion to fail.
Miro Cardona is a respected lawyer and political moderate
who opposed Batista and was prime minister for the first six
weeks after Batista's ouster. He resigned on amicable terms
with Castro after insisting that, as the real locus of power, the
revolutionary leader should assume the prime ministry. As am-
bassador to Spain, Miro was not close to the ruling coterie in
Cuba during the period of its most significant political and eco-
nomic actions and apparently has seen Castro only once casually
since his return from Madrid. Thus it is difficult to believe that
Miro would actually receive the strong mandate he says he re-
quires in order to go to Washington.
The circumstances of Miro's appointment may reflect a grow-
ing dichotomy in foreign policy between Cuban officials who feel
some modus vivendi with the US is necessary and those extrem-
ists led by Che Guevara and Raul Castro who would consider any
diminution of the Cuban Government's viciously anti-US posture
a capitulation to Washington. Since Cuba has been becoming in-
creasingly isolated from other Latin American governments, the
choice of Miro may also be a maneuver to impress hemisphere
opinion.
SECRET
6 May 60
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Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03156603
CONFIDENTIAL
Public Pressuir4e6 Increasing for British NuclealirDisarmament
he resolution passea on iviayioy tne amalgamated Engineer-
ing Union, Britain's second largest, demanding that the government
:renounce the testing, manufacturing, and stockpiling of nuclear weap-
ons and the basing of such arms in the United Kingdom indicated
that opponents of Labor's present nuclear weapons policy will have
a majority at the party conference next fall. The party's policy now
calls for an independent British nuclear deterrent pending forma-
tion of a non-nuclear "club?' Three of the six largest trade unions,
which make up the bulk of the Labor party membership, are on rec-
ord favoring unilateral nuclear disarmament. Local Labor constit-
uencies, which muster 750,000 votes at the conference, have long
supported this view. Together these add up to the 3,300,000 votes
required for a conference majority.1
rWhile party leader Gaitskell insisted as recently as 1 May that
Britain could not disarm unilaterally and renege on its NATO com-
mitments, he acknowledged that Labor's policy would have to be re-
considered. He implied that as a compromise to accommodate crit-
ics of the policy, the leaders might consider calling for an end to
production of nuclear weapons but for retention of those already on
hand. Any change in policy would come up for ratification at the
conference.A
(he government's decision to abandon the Blue Streak missile
project, which Labor contends is an admission of the impossibility
of providing an independent British deterrent, gives party leaders
an occasion for changing the party's nuclear defense policy with-
out losing further prestigf3
E13.- ising antinuclear sentiment in Britain apparently is not con-
fined to the Laborites. In commenting on the highly successful
Easter week-end march sponsored by the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament, the American Embassy noted that the movement now
contains supporters from among an influential cross-section of the
British public. These factors will add to the pressures on the Mac-
millan government, already highly sensitive to public opinion on the
issue, to achieve some tangible progress on disarmament in East-
West negotiationsj
CONFIDENTIAL
6 May 60
CEN1Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03156603 Page 12
Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03156603
WM" IIRSIN 1 IAL
Namew.
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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