CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172667
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 12, 1960

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12 November 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
15
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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12 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Situation in Laos.
South Korea--Unification with neutraliza-
tion advocated by vocal minority in South
Korea.
Japanese patrol boats protecting fishing
vessels from South Korean seizure au-
thorized to fire in self-defense.
Iraq--Qasim regime arrests ten prom-
inent Communists.
Algeria--Army units called in against
rioters; De Gaulle canvassing cabinet
on Algerian policy.
III. THE WEST
Bolivian President, facing continued eco-
nomic difficulties and pressure from left
to seek Soviet help, planning fake coup as
excuse for declaring "state of siege." 0
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LATE ITEM
()Situation in South Vietnam.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
*Laos: A group of officers under Major Bountheng,
an infantry battalion commander, seized control of
Luang Prabaing on 10 November with the apparent ob-
jective of swinging the First Military Region over to
General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Commit-
tee. Phoumi quickly exploited his advantage by flying
paratroop elements to Luang Prabang to help Bountheng
sustain his coup. The coup was staged while First Mil-
itary Region Commander Col. Houmpanh and Armed
Forces Commander General Ouane were touring north-
ern Laos with Souvanna Phouma. [-The move was prob-
ably stimulated by the belief that Touvanna was taking in-
adequate measures to counter the Communist-dominated
Pathet Lao and that Ouane and Houmpanh had temporized
too long in carrying out their pledge to lead the First Mil-
itary Region into opposition against Souvanna if he did not
bring the Pathet Lao under control2
(Page 1)
South Korea: The newly won freedom in South Korea
is permitting a strong and vocal minority among intellec-
tuals and students to suggest that unification of the country
can be achieved by its neutralization. Their efforts will be
aided by the powerful attraction which unification has for all 'AA'
Koreans. this minority �will
be encouraged by India's present sponsorship of a UN for-
mula for neutralizing and unifying Korea. The government
and the majority of informed Koreans, however, publicly
oppose neutralization' and a majority of students seems in-
clined at this time to distrust such a proposal.
(Page 3)
--SE�RET
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*Japan-South Korea: Japanese patrol boats in the
vicinity of the "Rhee Line" in the Korean Strait have
been authorized to shoot in "emergency self-defense"
If necessary during operations to protect Japanese fish-
ing vessels from South Korean seizure, This reversal
of a standing prohibition against use of arms undoubtedly
stems from a 2 November machine-gun attack on a Jap-
anese patrol vessel. The Ikeda government, however,
remains intent on improving relations with South Korea
through negotiations for an over-all settlement of differ-
ences.
*Iraq: The Qasim regime has d� the Iraqi Commu-
nist 'fairy another blow by arresting ten prominent Com-
munists, including at least one central committee member.
This move, following the harsh suppression of Communist-
inspired riots from 5 to 7 November, is likely to induce
other key members to go underground. If Qasim endorses
this action, this may placate dissatisfied anti-Communist
elements who have felt that his recent policies have been
too favorable tn the Communists
o K
*Algeria: Police and army units should be able to con-43. K -
tam n anti-De Gaulle rioting by European youths in Algeria -1,-- (A- AL.L1,..,..c...
which has resulted in severe damage to the American Cul-a/0---,y et tre_.
tural Center. President de Gaulle is reported to be can- i,ch ,te,
vassing cabinet ministers to learn whether they are pre-
pared to support his Algerian policy as defined in his 4 No
vember address, which he apparently intends to impleme
as rapidly as possible. (fiage 4)
III. THE WEST
Bolivia: President Paz Estenssoro may be planning
to engineer a fake leftist coup attempt against his own gov-
ernment to provide an excuse within the next two weeks
for declaration of a state of siege. Paz has been unsuc-
cessful in his efforts to improve Bolivia's critical economic
12 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF Ii
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condition in his first three months in office. Although
he apparently prefers Western assistance, he faces
strong political pressures to seek Soviet economic help
and raise wages despite a threat of renewed inflation.
) (Page 5)
LATE ITEM
*South Vietnam: The arrival in Saigon of considerable
numbers of troops loyal to President Ngo Dinh Diem ap-
pears to have reversed the initial advantage held by para-
troop units attempting to overthrow him. Diem's promise
early on 12 November to dissolve the government seems
to have been designed to gain time for the arrival of loyal-
ist forces to whom he had appealed. Although the situa-
tion in Saigon is still fluid, information available as of
0400 hours EST on 12 November indicates that the rebels
have been forced to abandon their siege of the presidential
palace and to retreat from certain government buildings
they had seized earlier. Communist guerrillas may take
advantage of the movement of army forces into Saigon to
step up their (Page activities in the countryside.
(Page 6)
PA
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VP
DAILY BRIEF lii
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No*
The Situation in Laos
A group of officers under the leadership of Major
Bountheng, commander of the Third Infantry Battalion,
seized control of the royal capital of Luang Prabang on
the night of 10 November, with the apparent objective of
swinging the First Military Region over to General Phou-
mi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee. Phoumi
promptly flew paratroop elements to Luang Prabang to
help Bountheng sustain his coup. The coup was staged
while First Military Region Commander Col. Houmpanh
and Armed Forces Commander General Ouane were tour-
ing northern Laos with Souvanna Phouma. When he heard
of the coup, Souvanna flew directly back to Vientiane while
Houmpanh returned to Luang Prabang, apparently in an ef-
fort to dissuade the Bountheng group from going ahead with
its plans to declare for Phoumi.
Bountheng's action was probably stimulated by the be-
lief that Souvanna was not taking adequate measures to
counter the Communist-dominated Pathet Lao, who have made
substantial gains during the crisis touched off by Captain
Kong Le's August coup. 1 the Luang Prabang take-over prob-
ably, also stemmed from-the conviction that Ouane and Houm-
panh had temporized too long in carrying out their pledge to
lead the First Military Region into opposition against Souvanna
if he failed to bring the Pathet Lao under control._
If Bountheng can maintain control of Luang Prabang and
carry other units in the First Military Region along with him,
Souvanna's position will suffer a major blow. His several
fence-mending trips to northern Laos in recent weeks reflect
the importance he attached to holding the First Military Re-
gion, without whose support he would be reduced to depend-
ence on the support of the Vientiane garrison. This latter
force is believed still semiparalyzed by fear of the Pathet
Lao, who share control of Vientiane Province with regular
army elements.
The American Embassy in Vientiane, commenting on the
Luang Prabang take-over, expresses concern that this devel-
opment, coupled with frequent reports of an imminent Phoumi
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attack on Vientiane from the south, may cause the Pathet
Lao to evaluate the situation as a serious threat and attempt
� to take control of Vientiane or attack Phoumi's forces south
of Paksane. Pathet Lao units are intermingled with Vien-
tiane troops facing Phoumi's units and tension between the
opposing forces had already been increased by a skirmish
on 8 November, apparently caused by probing action by a
Phoumi company.
-SEGRET---
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ve �LUKE
Korean Neutralization and Unification
The Indian UN delegation is taking the initiative in
organizing Afro-Asian support for UN-supervised
Korean-wide elections preparatory to the unification
and neutralization of Korea,
India's sponsorship of such a formula as
a strong encouragement to the strong and vocal minority
among South Korean intellectuals and students which be-
lieves unification can be achieved by neutralization and,
since the ouster of the Rhee regime, is free to discuss
such issues. On 5 November some 2,000 Pusan university
students intended to hold a mass rally calling for early at-
tainment of unification, but were persuaded by their pro-
fessors to abandon their plans.
In view of the likelihood that the Korean question will
not be taken up by the General Assembly until after Christ-
mas, the Indians will have more than six weeks to promote
this idea among the various UN delegations, especially those
from the newly accredited African states.
the Indians were
encouraged by the South Korean Government's recent an-
nouncement of support for the UN's long-standing position
that UN-supervised elections be held in both North and South
Korea for the purpose of unification. The Chang Myon gov-
ernment has consistently asserted, however, that any such
� elections must be completely free and in accordance with the
South Korean constitution. The government and the majority
of informed South Koreans publicly oppose neutralization,
and most students appear similarly disposed.
-TOP SECRET-
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Algeria
Military reinforcements have been called in to
help the police control anti - De Gaulle rioting by
European youths in Algiers. The combined forces
will probably be able to restore order, but the re-
ported lack of enthusiasm on the part of military re-
inforcements may encourage some of the youths to
prolong their demonstration of contempt for De Gaulle.
The disorders broke out on 10 November as prepara-
tions began .for the observance of Armistice Day and
resumed during the ceremonies on 11 November. The
attack on the American Cultural Center, which has been
damaged much more severely than in May 1958 when it
was last a target for European demonstrators, is a
manifestation of the European rightist belief that the
United States is displacing France in North Africa.
Less destructive rioting occurred in Oran, Algeria's
second largest city and another important center of resist-
ance to De Gaulle's Algerian policy.
In France, De Gaulle is said to be summoning cabinet
ministers individually to learn whether they are prepared
to follow him in implementing his 4 November address on
Algerian policy, now defined as aiming at establishment
of an Algerian Republic. He apparently has decided to
press ahead with his policy for Algeria as soon as possible.
French press reports state that he is planning soon to an-
nounce the formation of a three-member Algerian execu-
tive, and envisages a federal system within Algeria based
on zones corresponding to the distribution of racial groups.
He plans another trip to Algeria next month and will seek a
national vote of confidence in a mid-December referendum.
Although most of these moves were foreshadowed on
4 November, De Gaulle is unlikely to implement them prior
to the UN debate on Algeria in order to avoid giving the im-
pression that he is acting under international pressure.
12 Nov 60 CENTRAL INTFI LinFKirF RI III FTIN
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"WNW'
Bolivian President Apparently Planning Fake Leftist
Coup Attempt
President Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia may be plan-
ning to engineer a fake leftist coup attempt within the
next two weeks to provide an excuse to declare a state
of siege. Paz first came to office through the sweep-
ing revolution of 1952 and governed by decree, with no
congress in session, until 1956. In the first three months
of his present term he has not improved the country's
critical financial condition, and he may feel that renewal
of government by decree would enhance his efforts to stem
rising pressures for wage increases. These pressures
are threatening the US-backed economic stabilization pro-
gram, which has curbed inflation in the past four years but
has not successfully promoted economic growth.
Paz is under strong pressure to seek Soviet economic
help, but he apparently prefers Western assistance, in
part because negotiations with Soviet representatives on
a tin sales question in which he took part in 1958 were long
drawn out and ultimately unsatisfactory. Communist-abetted
popular pressures now are focused on a recent Soviet offer
to construct a tin smelter in Bolivia, an offer which plays
on the emotional belief of many Bolivians that the the 1952
nationalization of the mines failed to make them rich and
economically independent only because of their dependence
on foreign smelters.
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The Situation in South Vietnam
(Based on information available as of 0400 hours, EST,
12 November)
The coup effort against President Ngo Dinh Diem ap=
pears to be losing its strength rapidly. Although the situa-
tion in Saigon is still fluid, the arrival in the city of consid-
erable numbers of troops loyal to Diem apparently has
reversed the early advantage held by rebellious paratroop
units that besieged the presidential palace on the morning
of 11 November.
Troops of the 7th Division began arriving in Saigon in
the early hours of 12 November, local time, in response to
Diem's call for support, and elements of the 21st Division
may now also be in the city. Loyalist troops are reported
to have advanced on the palace area and to have forced the
withdrawal of paratroop units there. The rebels are now said
to have retreated to an army barracks about one-half mile
from 1- he nalae.P nnel hpntru firing has been heard from that
area.
Approximately at the time when loyalist forces were pre-
paring to enter Saigon, a statement by President Diem broad-
cast by Saigon radio promised to dissolve the present govern-
ment and to allow the military to set up a provisional govern-
ment. This statement, following negotiations between the
president and the rebels, apparently was designed to gain time
for the arrival of reinforcements. At 1015 hours on 12 Novem-
ber, Saigon time, the Saigon radio announced that Diem's forces
were again in control of the station with the assertion that "coun-
terrevolutionary forces offer this victory to President Ngo Dinh
Diem and the people." At 1100 hours local time officials of the
Directorate General of Police and Security announced that loyal
army forces had reoccupied police headquarters following sur-
render of the rebels there.
There are no reports thus far of significant Communist guer-
rilla exploitation of the present situation. However, the movement
of army forces from heavily infested areas outside the capital, and
the confused situation in the city, provide additional opportunities
for increased activities.
SECRET
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4.,14,11 11-/1-11 I 1 I 4"). La
Noe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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