CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/08/12

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03004638
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: August 12, 1960

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3.5(c)
TOP-511-Cierr-
3.3(h)(2)
12 August 1960
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1.) SECRET
Noe
12 AUGUST 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow apparently meeting some success
in efforts to re-establish close olitica
coo eration *th
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Announcement of Ghana-USSR economic
agreement appears imminent.
Arrival of three Saudi Arabian military
officers in Tail may relate to conspiracy
against monarchy.
Representative of British aircraft firm in
Cairo to discuss sale of jet trainers to
IJAR.
Japan�Government fails to take firm ac-
tion against sit-down strikers blocking use
of US military facility.
South Korea--Agreement on Yun Po-son as
President to be followed by power struggle
for poet of prime minister.
III. THE WEST
�Iceland agrees to UK proposal to seek
agreement on fishing-limits dispute.
LATE ITEMS
�Comment on situation in Congo.
Comment on situation in Laos.
Tar crrppir
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-UAR: Soviet efforts to re-establish close political
cooperation with the UAR, which lapsed during the exchange of
recriminations in early 1959 over Nasir's anti-Communist
campaign, have intensified in recent months and now appear
to be meeting with some success. Recent signs of cooperation 2.
,r
include a striking parallelism in Soviet and UAR propaganda on
a number of issues, close contact between high Soviet officials4- ILLS"
and UAR Ambassador Kuni over the Congo crisis, and Soviet
promises to support the UAR for a seat on the UN Security Cou .?
cil. This rapprochement has been facilitated by Nasir's increas-
ing irritation with the US over, issues connected with the Arab-
Israeli dispute and by Soviet willingness to supply additional mil-
itary equipment to the UAR which would offset Israeli acquisitions.
(Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
*Ghana-USSR: fnnQuncement of a trade, economic, and tech-
nical cooperation agreement between Ghana and the USSR is ap-
parently imminent., Ghana's ambassador in Moscow,
requested "immediate action" on the terms
ot a nronosed mint enmmililque. concerning the agreement;
LEarlier reports indicated that the USSR recently offered Ghana
a long-term credit--possibly amounting to $280,000,000--provid-
,ing for the construction of a wide variety of projects, including a
steel mill, a car assembly plant, a sewerage system for Accra, an
atomic reactor, and a series of hotels. A special Ghanaian delega-
tion, composed of key representatives of the Nkrumah regime, ar-
rived in Moscow on 2 August-3
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*Saudi Arabia: Three Saudi general staff officers arrived
without orders in Taif on 10 August. Their arrival, coincid-
ing with the scheduled visit there of King Saud, may be con-
nected with plans by Saudi Army elements to overthrow the
monarchy. Taif, a major military base, is the center of the
conspiracy.
3ther army officers possi-
bly involved in the conspiracy also could be related to the MID.
r
Britain-UAR: LA. representative of a British aircraft firm
Iis in Cairo this week to discuss the possible sale of Gnat jet
trainers to the UAR. This would be the first important British it K
1 military sale to the UAR� since the Suez crisis. The British For-
eign Office is prepared to license the sale as part of its policy
of gradual improvement of relations with the UAR. Cairo has
long sought the Gnat trainer and recently sent a Durchasi7 ml
sion to visit British arms factories71
Japan: 4apanese villagers, after a 13-day sit-down strike
which blocked US and Japanese field exercises on a military range
authorized under the security treaty, have withdrawn after prom-
ises by officials of Japan's Defense Agency to seek US release of
the facility. The Japanese Government's failure to take firm action
in this instance is explainable in the light of forthcoming elections
and its reluctance to antagonize the public on the security issue.
1The incident raises doubts about the government's future willingness
to oppose concerted protest movements against other US bases at
least during the pre-election period and possibly thereafteici
(Page 4)
South Korea: The agreement of the two rival factions of the
majority Democratic party to support Yun Po-son for the largely
ceremonial post of South Korean President has centered the intra-
party struggle for power on the post of prime minister. Competi-
tion between former Vice President Chang Myon and Kim To-yon,
12 Aug 60
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the leader of the party's right wing, for this post could lead to
a party split and political instability. Both men are anti-Com-
munist and friendly toward the US. but neither rs given indi=
cations of strong leadership. (Page 5)
III. THE WEST
Iceland-UK: In what appears to be a major break in the
fishing-limits dispute between Iceland and Britain, the Ice-
landic Government on 8 August agreed to a British proposal
to hold talks on the issue. The talks are expected to begin in
about a month. The dispute has caused numerous clashes be-
tween vessels of the two countries during the�past�two years and
has threatened Iceland's cooperation with NATO. Iceland made
the talks contingent on agreement by British fishermen to con-
tinue to respect Iceland's unilaterally extended 12-mile fishing
limits after a three=month "truce" in the disputed waters ex-
pires on 13 August. British fishing interests have agreed to a
two-month extension of the "truce .fr (Page 6)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Probable Reactions to US Reconnaissance Satellite Programs.
SNIE 100-6-60. August 1960.
Sino-Soviet Relations. ME 100-3=60. August 1960,
12 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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LATE ITEMS
*Republic of the Congo: Congolese police loyal to Premier
Lumumba continue to patrol the African quarter of Leopoldville
following anti-Lumumba demonstrations on 9 and 10 August.
Lumumba, whose political position appears to have been weakened
by the recent_Bo-confidence vote against his administration by the
1 / Abako party, reportedly is planning a cabinet shake-up in order
. to displace his moderate ministers with leftist The Abako--the
best-organized party in the Leopoldville area, where Lumumba
has little popular support--is opposed to the premier's concept
of a highly centralized government
rUN Secretary General Hammarskjold, meanwhile, has told
__...._
Katanga Premier Tshombe he will arrive in Elisabethville today,
Iaccompanied by military and civilian advisers and two Swedish
companies of about 125 armed men each. He will not take a
representative of the Lumumba government with him. In an
apparent effort to curb inflammatory statements by Prime Minister
Nkrumah of Ghana, Hammarskjold discussed the situation with him
during a "refueling stop" in Accra en route to Leopoldvillej,
LUammarskjold hopes to call in the first large complement of
, troops--Irish, Moroccan, and more Swedish--for Katanga on
c 14 August. He plans to return to Leopoldville on 15 August to
begin negotiations with the Congolese and the Belgians on the
disposition of Belgian bases..1
The Belgians, in their pique at the UN, have characterized
the maintenance of troops in their trust territory of Ruanda-
Urundi as logistically dependent on retaining their ICamina base
in Katanga; they have hinted that they might be obliged to abandon
the Ruanda-Urundi trusteeship. Premier Eyskens announced on
11 August that he would request a vote of confidence on Belgium's
Congo policies next week.
Soviet officials are continuing their attempts to stimulate
among African countries dissatisfaction with UN efforts in the
Congo. a?uring his 10 August talks with Hammarskjold, however,
ISoviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov agreed that the USSR
would make all of its technicians for the Congo available through
the UN�.1
T2. Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
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*Laos: General Phoumi, defense minister in the Somsanith
government, old American and Thai officials in Ubon, Thailand,
on 10 August that he planned to gather a force of 600 paratroopers
for a drop on Vientiane airfield, which would be reinforced by an
airlift of infantry troops. Phoumi plans to place these elements un-
der the command of Colonel Sourith, commander of the Laotian air
arm, who has just returned from the United States. An American
Embassy observer notes, however, that Sourith appeared re-
luctant to undertake such a mission and had expressed high regard
for Captain Kong :Le, the leader of the Vientiane revolutionaries-0/
houmi would be heavily dependent on outside logistic and air
transport if he were to mount such an operation against Vientiane.
The American army attach�n Vientiane estimates, after counting
the planes held by the rebels, that three C-47s may still be available
to the loyalists, but this number is inadequate for an operation of the
scope apparently envisaged by Phoumi.
from the casual attitude
of the Thai officials toward Phoumi's presentation of his plans that
Thailand intended to contribute little to a counterrevolution and
expected the United States to supply the necessary support. Phoumi
has since established his headquarters at Savannakhet in south-
central Laos.1
tgoespite 13houtni's plans to mount a counteroffensive, his cabinet
colleagues in Luang Prabang, including Premier Somsanith, seem
anxious to avoid bloodshed and to reach some sort of agreement
with the rebelgl Former Premier Souvanna Phouma has told French
Ambassador Fralaize that General Ouane, who had been sent to
Vientiane as an emissary of the Somsanith government, returned to
Luang Prabang on 11 August with an "agreement" signed by the rebels
and outlining their terms. Since this "agreement" in effect asks the
government to negotiate under duress in Vientiane, it is likely to be
rejected. It will probably be followed up by further exchanges, however.
Souvanna Phouma seems intent on acting as a go-between for the
two groups. Falaize claims that Souvanna, as president of the National
Assembly, refused Kong Le's request at the beginning of the coup to
dissolve that body unless instructed to do so by the King in Luang
Prabang. He also allegedly refused to become head of the rebel
12 Aug 60
DAILY BRIEF
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movement. The American Embassy on 11 August received a.
copy of a letter sent by Souvanna disavowing his inclusion on
the revolutionary executive committee. Souvanna is a neu-
tralist and in favor of amnesty for the Communist Pathet Lao
Insurgents, but he is considerably more moderate than some
of Kong Le's backers. He thus may consider his chances
good to be named premier in the event of a compromise be-
tween Luang Prabang and Vientiane.
12 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF
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USSR-UAR Relations Improve
Soviet efforts to re-establish close political cooperation
with the UAR have intensified in recent months and now appear
to be meeting with some success. Cairo has publicly sided
with Moscow's positions on such issues as disarmament and
the Cuban and Congo crises. Nasir has recently praised So-
viet economic aid policies and has criticized the United States�
on the alleged grounds that it has refused to respond to UAR
overtures for assistance.
high Soviet officials�including party presidium mem-
bers --have presented their views on the Congo situation on at
least three occasions and have urged Cairo to
take the lead in initiating joint action by African and Asian coun-
tries to frustrate "collective imperialism." Such Soviet-UAR
consultations were standard practice prior to the exchange of
recriminations in early 1959 over Nasir's anti-Communist cam-
paign.
the jUSSR�and presumably other bloc members of the United Na-
tions--would support the UAR's candidacy for the "Arab" seat on
the UN Security Council now held by Tunisia and due to become va-
cant next January. Malik also gave full approval to Cairo's action
in breaking off relations with Iran over the latter's recognition of
Israel, asserting that the UAR's strong stand would have an adverse
effect on the position of the "Shah and the ruling class"--long a
target of Soviet propaganda attacks.
Moscow has encouraged the rapprochement by giving public
approval to the UAR's foreign policy line in recent weeks. Soviet
radio propaganda to Arab listeners has emphasized Moscow's and
Cairo's common interest in opposing Israeli activities and West-
ern influence. Khalid Bakdash, exiled head of the Syrian Commu-
nist party, attacked UAR policies in Syria in a speech at the Ru-
manian party congress in June, but the bloc press and radio--in
contrast to past practice--did not publicize the speech.
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This phase of closer. Soviet-UAR cooperation has been fa-
cilitated by Nasir's growing irritation with the US over issues
connected with the Arab-Israeli dispute, including his appre-
hensions that a new administration may revise US policies in
favor of Israel. Nasir has also expected to secure additional
military equipment--especially newey jet aircraft�from the
USSR in order to offset acquisitions by Tel Aviv.
The Soviet Union, under agreements concluded earlier
this year, is currently preparing to make new deliveries of
arms and to provide the UAR with equipment for producing and
repairing armaments, and will build a shipyard at Alexandria.
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�SEeitier
UAR May Buy Military Jet Trainers From Britain
! London may shortly make its first important military sale
to tile UAR since the Suez crisis four years ago. A representa-
tive of the Folland aircraft firm is in Cairo this week to dis-
cuss the possible sale of jet Gnat trainers. Cairo has long
sought the Gnat trainer and recently sent a purchasing mission
to visit British arms factories:1
..\1The British Foreign Office is prepared to license the sale
as part of its policy of gradual improvement of relations with
the UAR. The British charg�n Cairo has been instructed to
try to see Nasir personally�which would be the first such
meeting since Suez--to explain why London is willing to do
this. The charg�ould indicate, if necessary, that some mil-
itary assistance of the type provided to Iraq and Israel is possi-
ble within the framework of Britain's policy of disinterested
friendship for all Middle Eastern States. In this connection,
the British want particularly to reassure Nasir that they have
not instigated the recent Jordanian propaganda attacks on h1m7
LLondon has made a major effort to increase trade with the
UAR and raise the status of its mission in Cairo to an embassy.
Although only a gradual increase in trade is likely, one major
item was the delivery in June of the first of possibly four com-
mercial jets under a $9,800,000 contract. Nasir does not yet
appear ready to exchange ambassadors. Differences persist
over UAR demands for consulates in African and Arabian ter-
ritories under British control or influence, but Cairo now ap-
pears willing to make some compromises':-
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Japanese GovZiFnment Equivocates in Dispute -e'er US
Military Range
�
9 August, to end a 13-day sit-dowli strike by residents
of O�no village in Yamanashi Prefecture, the director of
Japan's Defense Agency agreed to try to have the US release
a US-Japanese military firing range on the slopes of Mt. Fuji
to the local farmers who owned the land originally. Even
though the strike had forced cancellation of several firing ex-
ercises by Japanese forces and delayed as well as drastically
curtailed a scheduled exercise by 7,000 US marines temporari-
ly transferred from Okinawa, Japanese officials decided against
forcible removal of the strikers, who numbered between 80
and 300 daily.,1
'The villagers are claiming that the right to use the land for
mil tary purposes expired on 23 June at the same time as the
old US-Japanese security treaty under which the range was es-
tablished. They also are claiming that the transfer of US
troops from Okinawa to Japan is a violation of the treatyj
t�.tn a separate incident on Niijima, an island 100 miles
south of Tokyo in lower Sagami Bay, continued opposition
from island residents--abetted by national leftist organiza-
tions--induced the Defense Agency on 26 July to withdraw a
military unit which had been attempting to construct a missile
testing range for Japanese ground forceiti
tThe Japanese Government's failure to take firm action is
explainable in the light of forthcoming elections and its reluc-
tance to antagonize the public on the security issue. The in-
cidents raise doubts about the government's willingness to op-
pose concerted protest moves against other US bases, at least
during the pre-election period. They also reveal the Japanese
Government's responsiveness to public manifestations of neu-
tralist or pacifist sentiment and to pressures based on local
interests. /
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VA VA A Am, As. A V A AA AI A4�1
South Korean President Selected
After agreement between the two rival factions of the ma-
jority Democratic party, Yun Po-son was elected on 11 August
for the largely ceremonial post of President of South Korea.
The intraparty struggle for power now centers on the position of
prime minister. Yun, a 62-year-old Edinburgh-educated
archaeologist and onetime minister of commerce and industry,
has a reputation for personal honesty and integrity. A member
of the anti - Chang Myon faction of the party, he was a long-time
opponent of former President Rhee and is regarded as a skilled
compromiser.
Competition for the premiership between former Vice Pres-
ident Chang Myon, titular head of the party, and right-wing lead-
er Kim To-yon could lead to a party split and political instability.
The two factions are about equally represented in the lower house,
where the party holds over two thirds of the 233 seats. Both are
trying to pick up support among the some 40 independent and lib-
eral members of the chamber. In a test of strength on 8 August
for one of the vice-speakerships of the lower house the anti-Chang
group won by a vote of 114 to 99.
Both Chang and Kim are anti-Communist and friendly to the
United States, but neither has given indications of strong leader-
ship. Chang, a graduate of Manhattan College and a doctor of
medicine, served as ambassador to the United States during 1948-
50 and as prime minister under Rhee in 1952. Kim was educated
in Japan and the United States and holds a Ph. D. in economics. He
qualifies as a national patriot, having been imprisoned in 1919 for
anti-Japanese agitation. He has been active in politics since 1948
and has held several government and high party posts.
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Nue
Nior
Icelandic and British Governments to Hold Talks on Fishing
Limits Dispute
The Icelandic Government on 8 August agreed to a British
'-
proposal to hold talks on the deadlocked two-year-old fishing
limits controversy between the two countries. The decision
represents a major break in the dispute occasioned by Iceland's
unilateral extension of its fishing limits to 12 miles in Septem-
ber 1958. Subsequent clashes between fishing and naval vessels
of the two countries have led to Icelandic threats to withdraw
from NATO and at times brought relations between Iceland and
Britain close to the breaking point21
r,/
1,1n preliminary conversations with British officials early
this month, the Icelanders indicated their willingness to begin
formal talks if British fishing interests would agree to extend
the "truce" currently in effect in the disputed waters beyond its
13 August deadline. British fishing industry workers agreed this
week to a two-month extension, and the talks now are expected to
begin in about a month)
Aware of its vulnerability on this emotional issue as a re-
sult of Communist agitation and misrepresentation, Iceland's
Conservative - Social Democratic government has insisted that
the 12=mile limit is not to be a matter for negotiation. The Brit-
ish, however, have already indicated their willingness to accept
this limit, provided they are able to phase out their fishing opera-
tions within it over a period of years. Communists and other ex-
tremist groups will accuse the Thors government of backing down
on this vital issue, but the government probably expects the ma-
jority of Icelanders to approve a moderate solution which includes
recognition of the extended fishing limits)
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
DireCtor, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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