CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/11/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03172671
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: November 21, 1960

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INTELLIGENCE
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NEXT IICYfEW DATES 2010
AUTHi Ha 70-2
1 0 JUN 798
DATE: REVIEWER
-T-O-P-SECRET-
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21 NOVEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist parties apparently continue
Moscow meeting in effort to find formula
acceptable to both Peiping and Moscow.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Morocco sending mission to Moscow to
take formal delivery of Soviet arms, but
requests trained pilot's from UAR in or-
der to avoid presence of Soviet pilots and
technicians.
Congo--UAR ambassador favors "trans-
forming the Congo into another Algeria"
in order to overcome weakening of Lti�
mumba's position.
Senegalese President foresees early es-
tablishment of Soviet embassy.
Situation in Laos.
III. THE WEST
0
West German official denies that Bonn had
authorized high-level governmental con-
tacts with East Germans over interzonal (-)
trade.
�El Salvador--Pro-Communists moving
rapidly to consolidate their position; ar-
my officers probably still planning coun-
tercoup but are weakened by internal ar-
my dissension.
�Cuba--Castro regime organizing the
militia as an instrument for internal con-
trol and political indoctrination; some
units assigned full-tim military duties.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-China: The meeting of Communist parties in
Moscow is apparently still continuing after some ten days
of efforts to arrive at formulas acceptable to both Moscow
and Peiping. The Polish ambassador told Ambassador
Thompson in Moscow on 18 November that the conference k-
would go over to the following week, "in view of the large
number of speakers."E.The chief Indian delegate reportedly
�
wrote a letter to his associates in New Delhi last week pre-
dicting that the declaration of unity at the end of the confer-
ence would be a mere formality. since "inwardly the Chi-
nese are as hard as everfj
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Morocco-USSR-UAR: EA Moroccan military mission is
expected to depart for Moscow within the next few days to
take "formal delivery" of the Soviet arms package�includ-
ing jet aircraft Mean-
while, the King and crown prince, who prefer not to have So-
viet pilots or technicians, have requested UAR pilots trained
In Soviet aircraft and have been assured by the UAR ambassa-
dor that Cairo would provide them. Rabat's abrupt acceptance
of the standing Soviet arms offer�apparently taken on the prince's
initiative without consultation with the Moroccan Council of Min=
isters--followed Paris' cancellation of promised assistance to
the Moroccan Air Force, arising from French irritation over be-
ing hustled prematurely out of Rabat military installations. Sev-
eral Moroccan officials believe that delivery of Soviet arms may
provide cover for the supply of Soviet arms to the Algerian reb=
els:1
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Congo:
Lu-
mumba's supporters are concerned that his influence is
sagging and may be contemplating some drastic measures
in the near future. In commenting on Mobutu's military
parade of 17 November,
it was considered a success and enthusiastically received
by the people, a development "we had not expected.� He
also reported that Lumumba, increasingly nervous, wished
to leave Leopoldville before the arrival of the UN Concilia-
tion Commission.
the "large gains the imperialists
have made during the past week." He suggested that after
the UN committee visited Leopoldville, it would be best to
"solve the problem by transforming the Congo into another
Algeria and leading the situation to the brink of world war."
Although, of-
ficials of three moderate nations�Nigeria, Malaya and
Ethiopia--were elected to the top posts in the 15-nation Con-
ciliation Commission, the Pakistani delegation believes that
seven nations on the commission support Lumumba and only
four Kasavubu.
Meanwhile, the situation
in Orientale Province, to which Lumumba may retire, has
deteriorated due to the activities of his henchmen.
(Page 1)
Senegal-USSR:rSenegal's pro-Western President Sen.-
gliortoldthe AmeriaMi ambassador in Dakar on 16 November
that he anticipated the opening of a Soviet embassy in Senegal
"in the foreseeable future," following a recent "approach" by
the Soviet ambassador in Paris. Senghor professed an inten-
tion to "stave off" the Soviet Union as long as possible, but
added that Senegal could not disregard Moscow b wishes--an
apparent acknowledgment that his conservative, pro-French
regime feels vulnerable to militant African nationalism.
The USSR, which had no diplomatic missions in West Africa
until early 1959, now has embassies in Guinea, Ghana, anon
21 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Togo and is expected to open one at any time in Mali, where
cgations for economic aid talks.
*Laos: Premier Souvanna Phouma, following a two-day visit
to Sal---Neua, announced in Vientiane yesterday that he had signed
an agreement with Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong on
ways to end civil strife in Laos. This agreement presumably
formalizes the accords reached recently between government
and Pathet Lao negotiators in Vientiane looking toward forma-
tion of a coalition government and the establishment of ties with
North Vietnam and Communist China. Souvanna reportedly also
said he had obtained Souphannouvong's agreement to the inclusion
of General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee in a
government of national unity. It seems highly unlikely, however,
that Phoumi would agree at this time to a coalition with the Pathet
Lao,Elthough he reportedly has indicated willingness in principle
to negotiate with Vientiane.
a skirmish between
Vientiane and Phoumi forces southeast of Pak Sane on 19-20 No-
vember as the heaviest fighting in that area since late September.
Although the two sides are said to have broken off action, the clash
may be indicative of growinglensions in the area which could lead
to more extensive hostilities.
III. THE WEST
West Germany: A Bonn Foreign Ministry official categor-
ically denied on 18 November that--as reported last week--the
Federal Republic had authorized that interzonal trade be nego-
tiated secretly with the East Germans at a high government
level. a meet-
ing had been scheduled secretly for 17 November. There is
no evidence to date, however, that such a meeting was held.
On 18 November Adenauer labeled as "utterly unfounded" ru-
mors that he is launching a "new Eastern policy" and said that
such rumors had probably been started to stir up mistrust be-
tween West Germany and its allies. (Page 3)
21 Nov 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
'MP .QPC'PLIT
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� . El Salvador: r. arid other Inn:I-Communist ele-
ments in ��..,;----alvnn. :re .-onn, facorig aa open challenge from
Communist and Cs.- �..1.n:ifluenced group3, which have
moved rapidly to con: oliente thn.ir positions in the provisional
government and in Cii pocally potent labor and student or-
ganizations. Thoon
are bring-
ing peasants from tne countryside into the capital to swell their
ranks. Colonel r arcil1n, the moderate minister of interior,
said that he is very disturbed but
feels a crackdovn Innn1:1 lead to a bloody revolution.
Though the governo..-neoz &aims to have suppressed on 16 No-
vember a counternen�, plot in which leftist groups charge United
States implication, 1, .,hly placed army officers are probably
still plantling a coo.,:_occep. They are weakened, however, by
internal dissension. 7, the army.
Cuba: The Caonno regime is moving rapidly and efficiently
to organize the militia in order to strengthen its internal con-
trol throughout the island: This force of some 200,000 "volun-
teers"--penetrated extensively at all levels by Communists-- is
serving not only as an Instrument for police control but also
as a device for sulonefoing a relatively large number of Cu-
bans to military clinennline and political indoctrination. In
addition, a hard co:' o of the militia is assicmed full-time mil-
itary duties.
militia uni;:s are training with antiaircraft artillery,
preparing to manufacture antitank mines, and guarding outly-
ing installations. (Page 4)
21 Nov 60 DAILY BRIEF
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I.
Gvise)
Situation in the Congo
The UAR ambassador in the Congo is concerned about the
increasing power of Colonel Mobutu and the "agents of imperi-
alism,"
The ambassador admitted that Mobutu's parade on 17
November was more successful and excited more crowd enthu-
siasm than had been expected.
"we have become cautious in our activities;' and that "the
imperialists are holding the threat of expulsion over our heads
in order to stop our activities completely."
the pro-Mobutu newspapers have
threatened the expulsion of the embassies of Guinea, the UAR,
Morocco, and India. The Ghanaian representative was given
an ultimatum to leave the Congo on 19 November; he insists he
does not recognize the right of Colonel Mobutu to make such a
demand, however, and may be counting on UN refusal to permit
the Congolese Army to enter the embassy.
Lumumba
was unable to remain in Leopoldville until the
UN Commission arrived, and that he desired to go to Stanley-
in Orientale Province, the
situation in Orientale Province has deteriorated, due to the ac-
tivities of Lumumba and his henchmen.
Lu-
mumba's forces in Orientale Province, as well as those in parts
of four other provinces, could reverse the situation if they
formed a united military front and were supplied with the nec-
essary moral and material support. Although this would mean
the final partition of the Congo into two fronts,
he believes the only "real way to solve the Congolese
problem is by transforming the Congo into another Algeria and
leading the situation to the brink of world war." He pointed out,
however, that this plan would depend on cooperation by the Sudan
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in permitting use of its air space and certain communica-
tions, intervention by the bloc, supplying of arms to the
united front, and Lumumba's escape to Stanleyville. He
believes any such moves should be held in abeyance until
the UN Conciliation Commission has come to Leopoldville,
which it is planning to do before the end of the year.
the 15-
nation commission on 16 November elected as its officers
three moderate officials, representing Nigeria, Malaya,
and Ethiopia. seven
nations favor Lumumba and only four support Kasavubu.
CA front of nationalist parties reportedly has been estab-
lisft-ed to support Lumumba, including his National Congolese
Movement, the African Solidarity party, and Sendwe's Baluba-
kat; others are expected to join soon. Several party officials
planned to go to Stanleyville on 17 November to buy off Congo-
lese Army officers--who apparently have not been paid re-
cently and who have stolen government funds from several
banks--as well as to open and gain control of the local airport.
The front apparently plans to contact Communist sources in
Accra for some 50,000,000 francs ($1,000,000) to pay the army
units.
--TOP-SEeR-E-T-
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West German Official Denies Reported High-Level Contact
With East Germans
A Bonn Foreign Ministry official categorically denied on
18 November that, as reported last week, the Federal Repub-
lic had authorized high-level, secret negotiations with the East
Germans on interzonal trade.
Economics Minis-
try Under Secretary Westrick was scheduled to meet secretly
with East German representatives on 17 November for this pur-
pose. The East Germans could exploit any such high-level meet-
ing in their drive for recognition; on the other hand, Adenauer
might hope by such a shift in policy to obtain East German guar-
antees of civilian access to Berlin.
There is no evidence to date that such a meeting has been
held. Most reports prior to that had
Indicated that West Germany would initiate new interzonal trade
negotiations only through Kurt Leopold, its low-level represent-
ative of the semiofficial so-called "trustee office" estahlished in
West TIPrlin trn handlP trarip with 'Pact*. normally
Leopold would begin the new ne-
gotiations. [An earlier report suggested, however, that Adenauer
would be wining to raise the talks to the ministerial level if he
were pressured by the East Germans and could get from East Ger-
many a counterconcession of meaningful guarantees on access to
Berlin.1
In a two-hour policy speech on 18 November kicking off the
campaign for next year's federal election, Adenauer said rumors
that he is launching a "new Eastern policy are utterly unfounded."
He voiced the suspicion that these rumors had been started in or-
der to stir up mistrust between West Germany and its allies.
SECRET
21 Nov 60 CEKITD A I IkITCI I inckirc Di II TIM
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Cuban Militia Becomir_ strurnent of Police State
In an effort to str Jen its control, the Castro regime
Is giving intensive tralsi s throughout the island to a militia
force of some 2C0,0a .-3:eantears." This force was formed
late last year after lose Communist urging, and there was a
sudden intensification oL csganization and training with the of-
ficially inspired "war 2, ieit" in late October and early Novem-
ber, when the alleged ;."_siat of an "imminent invasion" from
the US was used to jus:;,N, a nationwide mobilization.
The militia, which as a namber of similarities to the
Chinese Communist rniJJa, is not only a force or police con-
trol but also a means 02 : sleeting a relatively large number
of Cubans to military Cs:-iplin and political indoctrination.
It also provides the rc_jesse with a cheap labor force, reducing
the threat of political en:. st stemming from the chronic unem-
ployment problem. Wit-a. a:densive Commenist peneteation at
all levels, the militia cosTA also prove valuable against anti-
Castro activity in the le politically reliable regular armed
forces.
While the bulk of islii'siiamen and women undergo regular
part-time military train:s.g and indoctrination, a hard core of
the militia is assigned full-time duties normally the responsi-
bility of the regular armed forces.
various militia units are being
trained in the use of antiaircraft artillery, are preparing to
manufacture antitank mines "and other similar objects," and
are assuming responsibility for outlying stations of the inter-
nal communiestons network, among other duties.
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'�riPe woe'
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence arid Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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