CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/12/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03148928
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: December 7, 1960

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7 December 1960
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO 00.',NGE IN CLASS.
fl DECLA%IFIL
CLASS, C.H. Mic- TO: TS S ,9
NEXT 2,1_
"111 JUN 1983
DAM REVIEWER
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7 DECEMBER 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Chinese Communist troops reportedly at-
tacked and seized Chinese Nationalist out-,
posts inside Burmese territory.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Indonesia�President Sukarno's intention
to include domestic Communist party in
Djakarta government strengthened by his
increasingly cordial relations with Soviet
bloc.
Moroccan relations with West deteriorat-
ing as result of contrasting Western and
Soviet positions on the Mauritania issue. 0
Congo--Lumumba's supporters continue
efforts to control Orientale Province;
Sudan apparently refuses transi ege
for foreign aid to Stanleyville.
III. THE WEST
France--Lagaillarde flight increases con-
cern in France over possible coup at-
tempt in Algeria. 0
LATE ITEM
�Situation in Laos.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
7 December 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - Burma: L9inese Communist troops
in late November attacked and seized Chinese Nationalist
outposts inside Burmese territory,
Limited Burmese in
was suggested
referring to "joint efforts with the Red Chinese to fight
e KMTs." The Communist troops involved are apparently
those cooperating with Burmese forces to clear the border
area of Nationalist guerrillas who might harass joint Sino-
Burmese boundary-demarcation teams. The Nationalists may
consider that the encounters with the Communists justify_
greater efforts to build un t e irregular forces in Burma i
li
(Pagel, 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
471.4.)
Indonesia: 7he increasingly cordial relations between
President Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six
months appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intention to
include the domestic Communist party in the Djakarta govern-
ment. According to the US ambassador in Djakarta, factors
influencing Sukarno are his belief that the United States is op=
posed to him personally, the Soviet Union's cultivation of him
as a leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, massive Soviet economic
and military aid, and his views of socialism and Western co-
lonialism. The army leaders, when unified, have the power and
the will to resist Sukarno on a sharply defined issue of Commu-
nist representation in the cabinet, but the President, by cloud=
thising .euver the army2,
(Page 2)
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Morocco: Moroccan relations with the West are de-
teriorating as a result of the Western position on Morocco's
claims to Mauritania in contrast with the USSR's support of
Rabat's position in vetoing Mauritania's application for UN
membership. Morocco can be expected to intensify its ef-
fort to annex Mauritania and may be preparing to abrogate
its 1 September military evacuation and base agreement
with France by drawing 1113 a long list of French "vinlatinnR"
of the agreements.
(Page 3)
77.7.7
Congo: Followers of ex-Premier Lumumba continue their
efforts to solidify control of Orientale Province as Moscow has
directed scathing criticism of Mobutu and of Western activities
in the Congo.
"control , ),
without pity" of activities of Belgian politicians and ordered
the detention of any Belgian attempting to leave the province
"before the liberation of Prime Minister Lumumba." There
are indications, however, that the Stanleyville Lumumbists may
face difficulties in arranging delivery of large-scale foreign aid.
"it is not possibld:A0 guarantee the ar-
rival (in Stanleyville) of any material or military aid via Sudan."
(Page 4)
III. THE WEST
France-Algeria: fConcern over a possible coup attempt,
perhaps timed to coincide with President de Gaulle's scheduled
arrival in Algeria on 9 December, has increased in France fol-
lowing the flight of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaillarde to Spain.
Retired Air Force Chief of Staff Edmond Jouhaud, already in
Algeria, is reported linked with Lagaillarde as military leader
of a coup. Several other generals were reported to have left
their posts in France, presumably en route to Algeria: however
the only two cited by name have since reported in
French security officials are aware of many of the rightists' plans,
but they have failed to apprehend Lagaillarde or the four other de-
fendants missing from the Paris trial of leaders of the January
uprising in Algiers. (Page 6)
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7 Dec 60
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*Laos:21ans o,a pro-�noumi coup in Vientiane
againsig-juvanna Phoutna apparently are going ahead.
General Phoumi has given his approval to the intention
of Col. Kouprasith, 5th Military Region Commander in
Vientiane, to move against the Souvanna Phouma regime.
In addition, another group of plotters apparently is co-
ordinating is nians fnr qimilar antinn with Kniriprasith's
adherents. such a
move is imminent.
Meanwhile, Phoumi's troops are reportedly pressing
their offensive again and ITIAV have rPpstahlighprl a position
in the Pak Ca Dinh aren:1
7 Dec 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Chinese Communists Attack Chinese Nationalist
Forces in Burma
Chinese Communist troops, perhaps ill collaboration
with Burmese forces, in late November attacked and seized
Chinese Nationalist nutnosts in Filirma
Communist groups
totaling 1,700 men penetrated as deep as 13 miles into Burma
in the Burma-China-Laos border area. The Nationalists are
reported to have fled without resisting.
i Limited Burmese involvement in the Communist action
,.
was suggested
joint efforts with the Red Chinese to fight the ir-
regulars. The Chinese Communists, in any event, would
probably act only with Rangoon's permission, as it is unlike-
ly they would forfeit the propaganda advantages of the recent
border treaty w th Burma by taking unilateral action:
The Communist troops involved are apparently those co-
operating with Burmese forces to clear the border area of
Nationalist guerrillas who might harass joint Sino-Burmese
boundary demarcation teams. National-.
ist bands have in the past hampered the work of these teams,
and last summer the Burmese gave Chinese Communist secu-
rity forces permission to go as far as six miles inside Burma
in pursuit of Nationalists.'i
Taipei has been resupplying its irregular forces in the
Burma border area with weapons and other equipment and is
attempting to reorganize them into an effective military force
capable of tactical missions. The Nationalists may consider
that the encounters with the Communists justify greater ef-
forts to build up the irregular forces.
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Indonesian-Soviet Relations Influence Sukarno's
Domestic Policy
ahe increasingly t ordial relations between President
Sukarno and the Soviet bloc during the past six months
appear to have strengthened Sukarno's intentions to include
the domestic Communist party in the cabinet, according
to the American ambassador in Djakarta.
ESukarno's cordiality appears largely based on Khru-
shchev's cultivation of him as a leader ,Of. the Afro-Asian
bloc and the potential head of a third force. Sukarno has
accepted Khrushchev's latest invitation to visit the USSR
and is expected to go there in March or April. A further
influence on Sukarno has been the bloc's support for Dja-
karta's claim to Netherlands New Guinea and bloc credit
arrangements for economic and military aid, which now
total approximately $700 million and may soon include an-
other $300 million. Sukarno!s own views of Marxism and
Western colonialism and his concept of "Indonesian social-
ism" are factors in his tendency to accept Moscow's flattery
and general propaganda line. In contrast to his attitude to-
ward Moscow, Sukarno appears to believe that the United
States opposes him personally21
rThe army has been the principal deterrent to Sukarno's
domestic maneuvers to protect and use the Communist
party. The American ambassador feels that the army may
have both the power and the will to resist Sukarno on this
latest aspect of the Communist issue. The ambassador
fears, however, that the President may blur the issue of
Communist participation in the cabinet by presenting it as
identical with aspects of "Indonesian socialism" which the
army has already accepted. Re could also weaken the
army's position by rallying the country behind him on the
highly charged nationalistic claim to Netherlands New
Guinea and under cover of such a campaien proceed to
reorganize the cabineCi
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Morocco 'kely to Adhere More Closely to
Moroeco's relations with the West are deteriorating
markedly as Rabat moves toward a stricter implementa-
tion of its professed policy of nonalignment. This de-
velopment is partially the result of the negative Western
attitude toward Morocco's claims to Mauritania as con-
trasted with Communist bloc support, particularly the
USSR's veto of Mauritania's application for UN member-
ship. Morocco can be expected to intensify its efforts to
annex Mauritania.
At the same time, Morocco may be preparing to
abrogate its 1 September military evacuation and base
agreement with France. This agreement has been sharp-
ly criticized by the leftist opposition, which has pointedly
contrasted the presence of foreign military forces in
Morocco with the Congo's success in kidding its territory
of Belgian forces. The first step toward a possible re-
pudiation of the agreement is the compilation of a long
list of French "violations" of the agreement. Among
other things, the Moroccans claim that France maintains
large stocks of munitions at their basic flight training
schools and uses these schools to repair bombers en-
gaged in Algerian operations. Although the crown prince,
and presumably also the King, has approved the transfer
of French military headquarters from Rabat-Sale to
the jointly operated French-American naval air facility
at Kenitra
there is "absolutely" no necessity for France to
re am a headquarters in Morocco beyond 1 March, when
all French military personnel except those connected
with the operation of training facilities at six specified
bases are to have been withdrawn}
--While both the crown prince and the King have ex-
plicitly stated they would honor the King's 22 December
1959 agreement that the US might retain some forces in
Morocco until the end of 1963, they may also--in line
with their tougher posture toward the West�renew over-
tures initiated last May that American withdrawal be ex-
pedited. \
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HP'
The Situation in the Congo
Followers of ex-Premier Lumumba continue their
efforts to solidify control of Orientale Province, and Mos-
cow has launched vigorous criticis
Western activities in thp Conan
ordered the detention of any Belgian attempting
to leave the province "before the liberation of Prime Min-
ister Lumumba." Continuing its anti-Belgian line,
ecipients "control without pity the
activities of Belgian politicians remaining in your district.
Press reports of raids into neighboring Equateur
Province by Lumumbists in Orientale tend to confirm in-
dications that Lumumba's adherents will attempt to expand
their influence outside Orientale Province. There are
other indications, however, that the Stanleyville Lumum-
bists may face difficulties in arranging delivery of large-
scale foreign aid. Sudanese
Premier Abboud, mnecDusU�IthNasir in
Late November, stated that he did not favor allowing Lu-
mumba's forces to shi materia
Suda.n.
"it is not pos-
ee e arr va(in Stanleyville) of any ma-
terial or:militaxyaid viO, Sudan."
On 5 December the USSR issued an official statement
on the Congo--the second in three days�which scathingly
attacked NATO, liammarskjold and the UN Command, and the
"large colonial powers." Asserting that the situation has
entered a new and more acute state, Moscow laid the blame
entirely on alleged US interference in internal Congolese
affairs. The Soviet statement voiced displeasure with those
African and Asian states which "have not preserved the
requisite unity" on the Congo issue and demanded that order
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7 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RUH FTIN
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be restored in the Congo by releasing 'Premier Lumumba,
reinstating his legitimate government, and disarming Mo-
butu's "terrorist" forces.
Despite Soviet UN delegate Zorin's insistence yesterday
on a meeting of the Security Council last night, a majority
of the eleven council members agreed to meet this morning
to discuss Lumumba's arrest and treatment.
UN officials in New York, who lately have shown a
dispcisition to blame UN military commander Von Horn for
the shortcomings of the Congo operation, have indicated
that he will be replaced shortly.] Meanwhile,
Nasir may be sounding out various
African nations concerning a possible troop withdrawal
from the Congo. Nasir has sent
a letter dealing with "the critical Congo situation" to
seven Asian-African countries with troops in the UN Congo
force.
7 Dec 60
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Lagaillarde Flight Stirs Concern Over Iniminen Coup Attempt
LConcern over creased in
France following the disappearance of rightist Deputy Pierre
Lagaillarde, who apparently crossed the border into Spain and
may be on his way to Algeria. Warrants have been issued for
the arrest of Lagaillarde and four other defendants missing
from the Paris trial of leaders of the January uprising in Al-
giers, but French security forces have failed to apprehend any
of them. Lagaillarde is reported to have escaped through Spain
with the aid of former Algerian commander Raoul Salan, who
has been in Spain for over a month. Salan had been reported
planning to go to Algeria to organize opposition to De Gaulle's
referendum. Both Salan and Lagaillarde have been reported
to be members of a group of rightists planning to set up a pro-
visional Algerian government pledged to the integration of Al-
geria with France.j
also reported missing were several French generals--pre-
sumably en route to Algeria. Only, two of these, however, Jacques
Faure and Henri Mirambeau, were cited by name, and they have
since reported in as being at their posts Another
military figure linked with Lagaillarde is retired Air Force Chief
of Staff Edmond Jouhaud, who played an important role in the May
1958 revolt and who, especially since his retirement, has openly
aligned himself with the rightist forces in Algeria. Jouhaud, who
now lives in Oran, is reportedly ready to assume military leader-
ship of a coupi
Lagaillarde was released on bail almost three weeks ago. His
dec sion to take advantage of his freedom suggests that the accel-
erated pace of De Gaulle's program for a referendum in Algeria
may be precipitating action by opponents of the regime. Either
the opening of debate on De Gaulle's Algerian program in the Na-
tional Assembly on 7 December or the arrival of De Gaulle in
Algeria on 9 December could spark rightist actionj
CF rench security forces are aware of many of the rightist plans,
but have apparently been unable to restrict the activities of key
plotters. The transfer of large numbers of metropolitan security
and police personnel to Algeria in anticipation of rightist-initiated
trouble there probably has reduced police effectiveness in Francej.
7 Dec 60 CENTDAI ikrret I it-�rkiifto el rvik I
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0111"
CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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